

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF OREGON**

UE 458

In the Matter of

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC  
COMPANY,

Schedule 152, Major Event Cost Recovery  
Associated with the January 2024 Winter  
Storms.

ORDER

DISPOSITION: SCHEDULE 152 APPROVED WITH MODIFICATIONS

**I. SUMMARY**

On July 3, 2025, Portland General Electric Company (PGE) filed a request to recover costs associated with winter storms that occurred in January 2024 (January 2024 Winter Storm). We grant PGE's request, with modifications as discussed below. We conclude that with the modifications described in this order, the resulting rates will be fair, just, and reasonable.

**II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND**

In its initial filing, PGE requested recovery of \$44.2 million in principal costs related to the January 2024 winter storms, plus interest. PGE estimated that the total cost recovery would be \$51.4 million, to be amortized over two years and included in rates effective April 1, 2026. PGE requested that it be allowed to securitize all the reliability contingency event costs, stating that it expected House Bill 3179 to be signed into law. In later testimony, PGE revised its requested recovery to \$42,785,512 of operations and maintenance (O&M) costs and \$9,365,744 of incremental capital investments associated with the January 2024 Winter Storm.

The Staff of the Public Utility Commission of Oregon, the Oregon Citizens' Utility Board (CUB), and the Alliance of Western Energy Consumers (AWEC) all participated as parties to this proceeding. The Commission held an evidentiary hearing on January 8,

2026. PGE, Staff, and AWEC filed opening briefs on February 2, 2026.<sup>1</sup> Staff, AWEC, and CUB each filed closing briefs on February 26, 2026, and PGE filed its closing brief on March 10, 2026.

### III. ISSUES AND RESOLUTION

#### A. Capital Costs

PGE proposes to recover \$9,365,744 in capital costs it asserts were prudently incurred in response to the January 2024 Winter Storm, resulting in a revenue requirement of \$1.4 million. No party proposes any adjustments to or disputes the prudence of PGE's capital costs. We approve PGE's cost recovery of these capital costs.

#### B. Operations and Maintenance Costs

##### 1. *Positions of the Parties*

###### a. Staff

Staff recommends the Commission make several adjustments to PGE's O&M costs. First, Staff recommends the Commission remove \$1.26 million in costs for Incentives & Bonuses and Meals from those eligible for amortization. Staff argues the Commission should remove 50 percent of merit-based incentives from the deferral balance. Staff explains that the Commission has repeatedly articulated a policy to allow utilities to recover only 50 percent of merit-based employee incentives in rates, and that the financial bonuses at issue are indistinguishable from the merit-based award discussed in other Commission orders.

Staff argues the Commission should remove 50 percent of certain meal costs from the deferral balance. Staff explains that the Commission has repeatedly articulated a policy allowing utilities to share costs of meals and entertainment 50/50 between ratepayers and shareholders. Here, Staff proposes an adjustment removing 50 percent of catered meals for office employees but does not propose any sharing of meal vouchers paid to employees working in the field during the January 2024 Winter Storm.

Staff proposes a disallowance of \$94,006 in costs Staff asserts were related to a failure of PGE's outage management system (OMS). Staff argues that while these costs were incurred during the 2024 winter storm, they are the result of flaws in PGE's system, and they should not automatically be recoverable as storm related.

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<sup>1</sup> CUB Notice (Feb. 2, 2026), indicating it would not file an opening brief in this docket.

Staff argues that PGE did not show the deferred costs incurred on and after May 1, 2024 are storm-related. Staff notes that any repairs within the scope of storm repairs should have been completed no later than April 14, 2024 and the company has not demonstrated that repairs occurring after May 1, 2024 are storm-related. As such, Staff urges the Commission to require PGE to make this showing in a compliance filing prior to amortizing any deferred amounts.

b. AWEC

AWEC recommends the Commission reduce PGE's deferral account by \$2,083,338 to account for employee incentives. AWEC argues the cost of employee incentives was already approved in docket UE 416; and therefore, is already reflected in base rate revenue requirement. AWEC notes it does not dispute that these incentives may have been unrelated to the January 2024 Winter Storm, but that they cannot be reasonably distinguished from the overall incentives and labor costs already included in the base rate revenue requirement.

c. PGE

PGE urges the Commission to reject the proposed adjustments from Staff and AWEC, and allow it to recover the full \$42.8 million in incremental O&M costs it seeks in this docket.

PGE disagrees with Staff and AWEC's arguments regarding merit-based incentives. PGE explains that while the Commission has recognized a difference between performance and merit-based incentives, here, it should be allowed full recovery for its response recognition payments because they were paid for the exclusive benefit of ratepayers. The company notes that field and non-field employees worked longer hours than usual to respond to the emergency event, and the response recognition payments were made to recognize significant amounts of time outside normal work hours spent on storm restoration tasks and essentially amount to overtime payments for salaried employees. PGE argues that the payments are not included in base rates because they stem from exceptional and unpredictable events, unlike normalized costs included in base rates.

PGE disagrees with Staff's proposed disallowance related to meals. PGE explains it incurred \$567,723 in meal costs proximally related to the January 2024 Winter Storm, and that it should be allowed full recovery of those costs. PGE notes that Staff does not object to full recovery for \$126,000 of meal costs but proposes 50/50 sharing of the remaining \$440,462 in meal costs. PGE explains that the Commission allows exceptions to the usual 50/50 cost sharing for meals and entertainment. PGE argues that these meal costs were directly related to the storm and were for non-union meals in the form of

meals provided as opposed to meal vouchers. PGE asserts it specifically documented these costs, and they were necessary for its employees working beyond typical work responsibilities during exigent conditions to restore service during the storm.

PGE argues that the Commission should reject Staff's proposed \$94,006 disallowance for costs related to the OMS. PGE asserts the OMS was compromised during the January 2024 Winter Storm, and it incurred costs as a result that were directly caused by the storm. PGE explains that had the storm not occurred, the OMS would not have been strained, and it would not have had to incur costs to remediate OMS issues. PGE argues that incurring these costs and providing alternate means of customer service was prudent during the storm, and that not incurring these costs would have meant customers would have been without customer service to communicate outages during the storm. PGE also notes that Staff's proposed disallowance is incorrect, and that if the Commission agrees with an OMS-related disallowance, the correct amount is \$52,514, which is the amount of incremental labor costs at issue in this docket.

The company argues that Staff's proposed adjustment for work occurring after May 1, 2024, is not supported by the record. PGE explains that most of the work conducted after May 1, 2024, was to remove abandoned poles damaged by the storm, and that this work is documented in its records. PGE believes Staff's proposed May 1, 2024, cutoff is arbitrary and is based on PGE's prioritization of work to recover from the storm, not when work related to the storm was completed. PGE notes that Staff's proposed May 1, 2024, cutoff does not account for PGE's required accrual accounting and would require PGE to follow legally required accrual accounting principles, and then modify its accounting records in a different way to make Staff's requested showing. PGE explains that because Staff made this argument for the first time at the hearing, the company did not have an opportunity to submit responsive records in these proceedings.

## **2. Resolution**

We agree with Staff that the company and ratepayers should evenly split the cost for employee incentives related to the January 2024 Winter Storm. We disagree with AWEC that employee incentives related to the 2024 winter storm are already included in base rates as authorized by our order resolving PGE's general rate case in docket UE 416. Indeed, the incentives at issue here relate to a particular event not contemplated by PGE's normalized employee compensation included in base rates and are appropriately subject to cost recovery in this docket. We do not, however, agree with PGE that the fact that the employee incentives relate to the 2024 winter storm means that ratepayers should pay for the entirety of their cost. We have repeatedly explained our policy to require the company and rate payers to split the cost of such incentives, and see no reason to depart from that

policy here. As such, we disallow \$1.04 million from PGE's O&M costs related to employee incentives, which represents half of the amount PGE sought for cost recovery here.

We agree with Staff's proposal to allow full cost recovery of meals for its field personnel during the 2024 Winter Storm and an adjustment for in-office meal costs during the storm. We therefore disallow \$220,731 of these meal costs. This represents an even split between the company and ratepayers for these in-office employee meal costs incurred during the January 2024 Winter Storm. PGE states it has provided the context, identification, and documentation for all its meal costs associated with the January 2024 Winter Storm; however, we do not agree that it has fully explained why ratepayers should pay the entirety of those in-office meal costs, and depart from our usual 50/50 split between a utility and its ratepayers for those meals.

Although the meal costs at issue are identifiable in its filed exhibits,<sup>2</sup> PGE provides no narrative explanation to us as to why we should allow it greater cost recovery after Staff challenged whether in-office meals were necessary for storm restoration activities.<sup>3</sup> We agree that meals for field-based personnel were necessary for fast and safe storm restoration work, but we note that meal costs during the 2024 Winter Storm for PGE's office personnel were more than three times the amount for the company's field personnel. PGE states in its briefing and testimony that these costs were reasonable, necessary, and prudent, but does not provide additional explanation or details to support that conclusion. For example, information such as the number of in-office personnel versus field personnel, per person/meal costs, and greater narrative specificity on the necessity of the in-office work would better allow us to evaluate whether the incurred costs were reasonable, prudent, and recoverable. PGE has not met its burden here. Cost recovery for some amount of meals for in-office personnel is reasonable and we believe application of our usual 50/50 split for meals achieves a reasonable result here by encouraging cost minimization.

We agree with Staff's proposed disallowance related to the failure of PGE's OMS system during the January 2024 Winter Storm. Although the failure occurred during the January 2024 Winter Storm, the failure was the result of flaws in PGE's underlying system. The storm merely highlighted the flaws, and we therefore decline to allow the company to recover costs related to the OMS system failure as storm costs. PGE states that Staff's proposed disallowance amount was incorrect, and Staff did not rebut PGE's argument. As such, we accept PGE's calculation and disallow \$52,514 O&M costs related to the OMS system failure.

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<sup>2</sup> See PGE/402C.

<sup>3</sup> Staff/100, Mondragon/19.

We decline to impose Staff's proposed disallowance for O&M costs incurred on and after May 1, 2024, that Staff asserts are not shown to be related to the 2024 winter storm. PGE's testimony and exhibits provide sufficient support to rebut Staff's arguments and persuade us that the costs incurred after May 1, 2024 were required aspects of PGE's storm restoration work.<sup>4</sup> Staff places considerable emphasis on a PGE graphic used to train the company's restoration crews and while informative, we do not find the training materials to be binding on the company and its crews, or otherwise limit recovery to a specific time-frame. We decline to impose Staff's proposed May 1, 2024 cutoff for costs nor do we require additional information from PGE for these specific costs. Although we do not impose Staff's proposed adjustment, we note that this dispute appears to have been unnecessary and believe the company could have been more forthcoming in this docket to assuage Staff's concerns and resolve differences between PGE's accounting and the information Staff requires to evaluate company filings. We believe increased cooperation and candor could help to avoid such disputes in future dockets.

In sum, we disallow \$1,313,245 from PGE's O&M costs as described above.

### **C. Application of the Level III Storm Mechanism**

#### **1. Positions of the Parties**

##### **a. AWEC**

AWEC argues that because the January 2024 Winter Storm qualifies as a Level III storm, PGE's recovery in this docket be limited to amounts not otherwise recoverable through the Level III storm mechanism due to the cap on negative balances. AWEC asserts that the orders related to pre-authorized deferrals of costs associated with declared emergencies, Order Nos. 21-259<sup>5</sup> and 21-309<sup>6</sup>, are non-determinative as to which mechanism should apply and PGE's support for its position relies on orders stemming from stipulations, not fully litigated contested cases.

AWEC explains that customers already incur costs for major events such as the January 2024 Winter Storm through a method averaging costs of major storms over a 10-year period with an inflationary adjustment. AWEC explains that the Level III storm mechanism then allows PGE to track variances from year to year, with positive balances

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<sup>4</sup> PGE/400, Putnam-Batzler/17-22; PGE/403C.

<sup>5</sup> *In the Matter of PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON, Pre-filed Emergency Deferral Applications*, Docket No. UM 2181, Order No. 21-259 (Aug. 12, 2021).

<sup>6</sup> *In the Matter of PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Application for a Pre-Filed Emergency Deferral of Costs Associated with Declared Emergencies*, Docket No. UM 2190, Order No. 21-309 (Sept. 22, 2021).

carrying over from year to year. AWEC states that the January 2024 Winter Storm is the only major storm experienced by PGE since 2022 and it is therefore reasonable to expect the Level III storm accrual to absorb at least some of the costs associated with this storm.

b. Staff

Staff agrees that AWEC's proposal to require PGE to rely on its Level III storm mechanism is a viable option. Staff notes that if the Commission requires use of the Level III storm mechanism, the costs of the 2024 storm should be included in the rolling average used to establish the annual amount PGE recovers from ratepayers. If, however, the Commission does not require use of the Level III storm mechanism, Staff explains that the costs of the 2024 winter storm should be excluded from the rolling average used to establish the annual amount PGE recovers from ratepayers.

c. PGE

PGE argues that the Commission should not apply the Level III mechanism. The company explains that while it agrees the January 2024 Winter Storm was a Level III outage event, the Level III storm mechanism is to account for outage events for which PGE can no longer obtain insurance coverage at a reasonable cost and it cannot be used when the company recovers such costs through other regulatory mechanisms. The company notes that it has an approved pre-filed emergency deferral and complied with its requirements in making the filing in this docket. According to the company, because the costs for the January 2024 Winter Storm do not meet the stated purpose of the Level III storm mechanism and because cost recovery is available through the pre-filed emergency deferral, it would not be appropriate for the company to use the Level III storm mechanism.

**2. Resolution**

We decline to require PGE to apply the Level III storm mechanism to this storm, though we disagree with PGE's rationale for reaching this result. We disagree that as a fundamental matter, PGE was precluded from seeking cost recovery in the Level III storm mechanism. PGE's briefing and testimony misconstrues our prior orders discussing the Level III storm mechanism. However, we find that the size and scope of the January 2024 Winter Storm justifies seeking cost recovery through a deferral rather than within the Level III storm mechanism, especially given the ramifications of including the January 2024 Winter Storm in the Level III storm mechanism's 10-year average for future accruals and the resulting impacts on rates.

In establishing the Level III storm mechanism, we did not intend for it to apply only when there was no other vehicle for cost recovery. We may have reached a different result here if the 2024 winter storm was of a smaller magnitude.

We would be open to holistically reviewing PGE's storm-related deferrals, including the interaction between mechanisms, in the future to ensure they are functioning appropriately.

**D. Earnings Test and Cost Sharing**

***1. Positions of the Parties***

**a. Staff**

Staff proposes that the Commission set an earnings test at 50 basis points below PGE's authorized ROE of 9.5 percent, or 9.0 percent. Staff explains that a deferral is not intended to be a mechanism ensuring a utility earns its authorized ROE, and given recent and upcoming rate increases in combination with economic strain experienced by PGE's ratepayers during the January 2024 Winter Storm, a benchmark ROE of 9.0 percent is reasonable.

Staff also argues that in line with prior emergency deferral dockets, the Commission require PGE to share costs within a range of normal business risk, 36 basis points, noting this would incentivize cost minimization. Staff disagrees with PGE's argument that cost sharing is not appropriate for a deferral authorized under the Commission's emergency deferral mechanism. Staff explains that the Commission rejected this argument in PGE's 2022 general rate case, where the Commission explained that emergency deferral mechanisms would receive a full review, including the potential application of earnings tests and cost sharing. Although Staff recognizes that the Commission declined to require cost sharing related to emergency deferral accounts in PGE's 2022 general rate case, Staff posits that requiring cost sharing is logical and fair to ratepayers. Staff argues that it is reasonable to only allow PGE to recover costs that exceed the amount PGE can expect to absorb between general rate cases in the ordinary course of business.

**b. AWEC**

AWEC agrees with Staff that an earnings test set at 50 basis points below PGE's authorized ROE of 9.5 percent, or 9.0 percent, is appropriate. AWEC explains that while an earnings test is not statutorily required, it would be in line with recent Commission decisions. AWEC explains that its position in briefing differs from its position in testimony due to updates from PGE in PGE's final round of testimony. AWEC notes that

while it supports Staff's proposal, in the alternative, AWEC continues to support its initial recommendation of an earnings test applied at 20 basis points below PGE's authorized ROE of 9.5 percent, or 9.3 percent. AWEC explains this would be consistent with the Commission's decisions on 2020 Wildfire costs and February 2021 Ice Storm deferrals.

AWEC also agrees with Staff that cost sharing is appropriate in this docket, noting that preserving incentives for cost control is an important policy decision for the Commission.

c. PGE

PGE asserts no earnings test is appropriate. PGE explains that the costs at issue here were related to the company's response to a declared emergency event that lasted over a week, and were incurred to the exclusive benefit of customers in restoring service. PGE also notes that its authorized ROE trends lower than industry average and that prior use of earnings tests have impacted the company's cost of capital. PGE argues that considering these factors counsels against an earnings test here. According to PGE, applying an earnings test would disincentivize it from expending the full amount of necessary costs to respond to an emergency. The company also notes that California has not imposed an earnings test on cost recovery for catastrophic emergency events there and urges the Commission to take a similar approach here.

If the Commission decides an earnings test is warranted, PGE argues that it should be set at PGE's authorized ROE. An earnings test below its authorized ROE would run counter to recent Commission decisions on emergency response costs for the company. PGE also warns that there is risk that while an earnings test may provide short-term help to ratepayers, in the long-term ratepayers may be hurt by increased financing costs for the company.

PGE argues that applying cost sharing would be inconsistent with Commission precedent and finds Staff's cited decision to be distinguishable. PGE notes that when the Commission considered deferrals for the 2021 ice storm and 2020 wildfires, which the company asserts were similar events to the 2024 winter storm, the Commission rejected Staff's proposal for cost sharing to encourage efforts to promptly respond to exigent circumstances. PGE also explains that cost sharing in conjunction with the proposed earnings test, the Commission would be applying an earnings test that is 50 basis points below PGE's 2024 authorized ROE. Finally, PGE argues that the Commission considered cost sharing when approving PGE's application for a pre-filed emergency deferral and concluded that the deferred balance would be subject to full recovery. The company

asserts it would be inappropriate to change the conditions for a deferral now, at the time of amortization, as opposed to when it first authorized the deferral.

## 2. *Resolution*

We agree with Staff and AWEC that an earnings test is appropriate. Deferrals, such as the one at issue here, are intended to provide for a range of outcomes and are not intended to guarantee recovery at the company's authorized ROE. An earnings test will allow us to ensure that resulting rates are fair, just, and reasonable.

In Order No. 22-129 addressing the 2021 ice storm and 2020 wildfire deferrals, we agreed that in the face of extraordinary events, “PGE should absorb some of that risk associated with its operations in challenging circumstances, rather than allowing the operation of an earnings test to preserve earnings at the precise level of PGE's AROE.”<sup>7</sup> We also explained that “[f]or unexpected and unprecedented events of such substantial magnitude, we find that it is appropriate for customers to also bear some costs of restoration” and adopted an earnings test at 20 basis points below PGE's authorized ROE.<sup>8</sup> We noted that “[t]he effect of this will be that PGE will likely bear some of the costs of the wildfire and ice storm deferrals to the extent it can do so while maintaining a level of return near—but not precisely at—its AROE, with customers also contributing to restoration costs.”<sup>9</sup>

We similarly declined to require cost sharing related to the 2021 ice storm and 2020 wildfire deferrals, explaining that the earnings test applied there was “designed to ensure that PGE shares some portion of these expenses when its earnings will remain near its AROE after absorbing such costs, with customers also contributing to restoration costs when appropriate.”<sup>10</sup> We noted that there, we “designed the earnings test to achieve our intended balance of sharing” and declined to require additional cost sharing.<sup>11</sup> We believe this reasoning similarly applies to the costs for the 2024 winter storm.

Here, for the 2024 winter storm, we also set the earnings test at 20 basis points below PGE's authorized ROE in 2024, or at 9.3 percent, without requiring any additional sharing. The earnings test achieves our desired balance of cost sharing while factoring in the company's earnings. We direct PGE to apply this earnings test to its 2024 Results of Operations (ROO) in the compliance filing required by this order.

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<sup>7</sup> *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company, Request for a General Rate Revision*, Docket No. UE 394, Order No. 22-129 at 53 (Apr. 25, 2022).

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 54.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.*

**E. Results of Operations Calculation**

**1. Positions of the Parties**

a. Staff

Staff urges the Commission to reject PGE's adjustments to its 2024 Results of Operation for the purposes of the earnings test. Staff argues that PGE's assumption that it will recognize zero rate recovery for other established accounting mechanisms such as the Portland Harbor Environmental Remediation Account, Wildfire Mitigation Cost Recovery Mechanism, Transportation Electrification Pilots, EV Charging, and battery storage deferrals is unreasonable. Staff asserts these approximately \$66 million in costs should not be included as unrecovered costs when determining PGE's earnings for 2024.

However, Staff does not oppose PGE's proposal to update the earnings test in this docket with the actual results of the Commission's decision in docket UE 457, PGE's 2024 Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism (PCAM).<sup>12</sup> Despite this, Staff is concerned that it did not have an opportunity to file responsive testimony to PGE's corrected ROO, which was filed after Staff's final opportunity to file testimony in this docket. As such, Staff recommends that if the Commission grants PGE's recommendation to update the ROO for the purpose of the earnings test, it allows Staff and other parties to file responsive testimony regarding PGE's corrected ROO.

b. AWEC

AWEC agrees with Staff's initial recommendation that PGE's ROO should be adjusted to address the assumption that the company would receive zero rate recovery for other 2024 deferrals.

c. PGE

PGE first notes that if the Commission declines to impose an earnings test in this docket, as recommended by PGE, the issue of its ROO calculation is moot, as it is only relevant to an earnings test.

PGE next explains that it and Staff agree that the Commission should use the actual costs allowed for recovery in the 2024 PCAM. PGE notes that because of the significant disputes in that docket, PGE's ROE in the ROO could change by approximately 195 basis points. PGE recommends the Commission order PGE to file an updated ROO as a

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<sup>12</sup> *In the Matter of PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 2024 Annual Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism*, Docket No. UE 457.

compliance filing consistent with the Commission's decision in this docket and the decision in the 2024 PCAM, which is expected to be issued on or around the same time.

The company also explains that its approach to ROO is consistent with the adjustment principle and reflects that there remains uncertainty surrounding whether PGE will recover the full costs for certain deferrals given that earnings test and performance rate mechanisms add uncertainty to that cost recovery.

**2. Resolution**

We agree that PGE's 2024 ROO should be consistent with the actual costs allowed for recovery in its 2024 PCAM. We direct the company to file an updated ROO as a compliance filing that also incorporates the results of PGE's 2024 PCAM and the earnings test discussed elsewhere in this order.

Given the timing of the orders in this docket and PGE's 2024 PCAM docket, as well as the April 1, 2026 effective date for the dockets, we decline Staff's request to submit further testimony regarding PGE's 2024 ROO.

**F. Amortization**

**1. Positions of the Parties**

PGE proposes to amortize the approved cost recovery over two years at the modified blend treasury rate (MBTR). Staff supports an amortization of no more than two years. AWEC states that it supports an amortization of two years if the Commission adopts its proposed adjustments and an amortization of three years if the Commission approves recovery for an amount larger than AWEC's adjusted costs. CUB proposes an amortization of four years at the MBTR.

**2. Resolution**

We find that a two-year amortization period at the MBTR is reasonable for the cost recovery at issue in this docket.

**IV. ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Advice No. 25-21, filed on July 3, 2025, is permanently suspended.
2. Portland General Electric Company shall file revised schedules consistent with the directives of this order for effect on April 1, 2026.
3. In its compliance filing, the company is directed to provide detailed rate impacts for the adjustment authorized in this order as well as the combined rate impacts for all rate adjustments to be effective on April 1, 2026. All rate impacts should be expressed relative to current overall rates, both in dollar and percentage terms. For the individual and combined rate impacts, the company is directed provide average residential customer bill impacts, identifying the associated level of usage.

Made, entered, and effective Mar 17 2026.



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**Letha Tawney**  
Chair



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**Les Perkins**  
Commissioner



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**Karin Power**  
Commissioner



A party may request rehearing or reconsideration of this order under ORS 756.561. A request for rehearing or reconsideration must be filed with the Commission within 60 days of the date of service of this order. The request must comply with the requirements in OAR 860-001- 0720. A copy of the request must also be served on each party to the proceedings as provided in OAR 860-001-0180(2). A party may appeal this order by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals in compliance with ORS 183.480 through 183.484.