



# Oregon

Kate Brown, Governor

## Public Utility Commission

201 High St SE Suite 100

Salem, OR 97301

**Mailing Address:** PO Box 1088

Salem, OR 97308-1088

**Consumer Services**

1-800-522-2404

Local: 503-378-6600

**Administrative Services**

503-373-7394

November 13, 2015

### ***Via Electronic Filing***

OREGON PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

ATTENTION: FILING CENTER

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**RE: Docket No. UM 1734 – In the Matter of PACIFICORP, dba  
PACIFIC POWER's Application to Reduce the Qualifying Facility  
Contract Term and Lower the Qualifying Facility Standard  
Contract Eligibility Cap.**

Enclosed for filing is Staff's Cross Response Testimony and Exhibit  
in UM 1734.

/s/ Kay Barnes

Utility Program

(503) 378-5763

Email: [kay.barnes@state.or.us](mailto:kay.barnes@state.or.us)

CASE: UM 1734  
WITNESS: BRITTANY ANDRUS

**PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF  
OREGON**

**STAFF EXHIBIT 200**

**Cross-Response Testimony**

**November 13, 2015**

1 **Q. Please state your name, occupation, and business address.**

2 A. My name is Brittany Andrus. My business address is 201 High St SE  
3 Suite 100, Salem, Oregon 97301.

4 **Q. Please describe your educational background and work experience.**

5 A. My Witness Qualification Statement is found in Exhibit Staff/101.

6 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

7 A. I address several issues raised in response testimony filed on  
8 October 15, 2015, and provide additional information regarding Staff's position.

9 **Q. Has Staff been persuaded by the response testimony to change its**  
10 **position regarding the term for fixed price payments to Qualifying**  
11 **Facilities (QFs)?**

12 A. No. Staff agrees with the QFs and other parties that the term of fixed cost  
13 prices in standard power purchase agreements (PPAs) should remain at 15  
14 years.

15 **Q. Please recap Staff's reasoning in supporting the 15-year fixed price**  
16 **term.**

17 A. Staff supports the 15-year period because many QFs that qualify for standard  
18 PPAs and avoided cost prices must have a steady stream of revenue to satisfy  
19 financing requirements. Staff disagrees with PacifiCorp's argument that fixed  
20 prices for QFs should be fixed for three years because it mirrors the  
21 Company's hedging and risk management policies. PacifiCorp's long term  
22 resource planning in its integrated resource plan (IRP) is based on forecasts of

1 costs over a period of 20 years, not three years. The Commission adopted this  
2 policy in 2005,<sup>1</sup> and affirmed it in 2014.<sup>2</sup>

3 **Q. Has Staff been persuaded by the response testimony to change its**  
4 **position regarding the eligibility cap for standard power purchase**  
5 **agreements (PPAs) and avoided cost prices?**

6 A. Staff maintains its position that the eligibility cap for standard PPAs and prices,  
7 currently at ten MW, should be reduced for wind and solar QFs.

8 **Q. Please explain again the history of the eligibility cap.**

9 A. Standard avoided cost prices are intended to eliminate the barriers to entry  
10 associated with negotiating a long-term PPA. When the Federal Energy  
11 Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopted rules implementing PURPA, it  
12 required utilities to offer standard avoided cost prices to QFs 100 kW and less,  
13 and authorized states to establish a higher eligibility cap. FERC noted the  
14 downside to standard prices is that the standard prices will not take the  
15 characteristics of the individual projects into account:

16 The Commission is aware that the supply characteristics of a  
17 particular facility may vary in value from the average rate set  
18 forth in the utility's standard rate required by this paragraph.  
19 However if the Commission were to require individualized rates,  
20 the transaction cost associated with administration of the  
21 program would likely render the program uneconomic for \* \* \*[a]  
22 qualifying facility [that is 100 kW or less]. As a result, the  
23 Commission will require that standardized tariffs be implemented  
24 for facilities of 100 kW or less.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Order No. 05-584 at 17.

<sup>2</sup> Order No. 14-058 at 2.

<sup>3</sup> FERC Order No. 69, 45 Fed. Reg. 12214 (Feb. 25, 1980).

1           This Commission initially established the cap for standard avoided cost  
2           prices at 100 kW, raising it to one MW in 1991<sup>4</sup> and to ten MW in 2005.<sup>5</sup> The  
3           Commission noted that negotiating a PPA could pose a barrier to entry for QFs  
4           above and below ten MW, but decided to address the issue with standard  
5           contracts for QFs ten MW and below and with parameters for negotiation for  
6           QFs 10 MW and above.<sup>6</sup>

7           Staff continued to support the ten MW eligibility cap for standard contracts  
8           in Phase I of Docket UM 1610, conditioned on the Commission's adoption of  
9           Staff's proposal for a capacity contribution adjustment that would result in  
10          different standard avoided cost price streams for different resource types,  
11          based on the different resource types' contributions to meeting the utility's  
12          peak load.<sup>7</sup> The Commission adopted Staff's capacity contribution adjustment  
13          proposal and maintained the eligibility cap for standard contracts and terms at  
14          ten MW.<sup>8</sup>

15          **Q. Why has Staff changed its position on maintaining the eligibility cap**  
16          **for standard contracts at ten MW?**

17          A. For a combination of reasons, but primarily because Staff believes the ten MW  
18          cap is not serving the purpose for which it is intended. Since Staff filed  
19          testimony in Phase I of UM 1610 in April 2013, Staff has observed that QFs  
20          that do not need protection from market barriers appear to be seeking standard

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<sup>4</sup> Order No. 81-319 at 4.

<sup>5</sup> Order No. 91-1605 at 2.

<sup>6</sup> Order No. 05-584 at 16-17.

<sup>7</sup> Order No. 14-058 at 15.

<sup>8</sup> Order No. 14-058 at 7.

1 avoided cost prices. Because standard prices are based on a proxy resource,  
2 they do not account for the operating characteristics of the specific QF  
3 resource. FERC's policy is that QF pricing may be adjusted for certain factors<sup>9</sup>  
4 to account for these characteristics for nonstandard contracts. The risk of  
5 inaccurate standard avoided cost prices increases with the size of the project.

6 The Commission noted this in 2005:

7 [W]e recognize a need to balance our interest in reducing these market  
8 barriers with our goal of ensuring that a utility pays a QF no more than its  
9 avoided costs for the purchase of energy. With standard contracts, project  
10 characteristics that cause the utility's cost savings to differ from its actual  
11 avoided costs are ignored. No party presented evidence in this docket  
12 that the special characteristics of larger projects do not need to be  
13 considered in order to achieve rates that reflect actual avoided costs.  
14 Furthermore, the risk customers face because avoided costs in the future  
15 may be different from the prices paid under a standard contract (through  
16 the Fixed-Price Method, for example) is greater for a large QF than a  
17 small one.<sup>10</sup>

18 Staff's recommendation for the lower cap attempts to balance the need  
19 to provide a standard contract and pricing option for QFs without the resources  
20 to overcome those barriers, while ensuring that large projects are priced  
21 according to their specific characteristics and their impacts to the utility's  
22 system and ratepayers via a negotiated PPA.

23 Staff notes that QF technologies have changed in recent years with the  
24 advent of wind and solar; hydropower, biomass, biogas and combined heat  
25 and power projects were predominant in earlier years. Given the increased

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<sup>9</sup> 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b).


<sup>10</sup> Order No. 05-584 at 16.

1 variability of these newer technologies, it is even more important to price these  
2 QFs based on their specific generation profiles.

3 **Q. Please discuss Staff’s observations regarding QFs that are selecting**  
4 **standard avoided cost prices.**


5 A. Staff has observed patterns of QF development that show developers seeking  
6 multiple standard PPAs at or near ten MW within a short time frame. Staff has  
7 focused on the development of solar QFs because that is the technology that is  
8 currently showing the fastest growth; however, the same pattern of multiple  
9 ten MW QF projects by a single developer holds true for wind as well, as  
10 illustrated in Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1. PacifiCorp Oregon Wind QF Contracts and MW by Developer, 2008 to 2014.**



1 With respect to solar facilities, all of PacifiCorp’s solar QF PPAs have  
 2 been executed within the past 18 months, as shown on Exhibit 201.<sup>11</sup> Figure 2  
 3 below graphically depicts the solar contracts listed on Exhibit 201, showing the  
 4 number of projects and their respective MW capacity, grouped by developer.  
 5 For those with multiple projects at or very near the eligibility cap (9.9 MW),  
 6 Staff includes the time window within which the PPAs were executed.

7 **Figure 2. PacifiCorp Oregon Solar QF Contract and MW by Developer.**



8 **Q. Please explain more the data in Figure 2 above.**

9 A. Figure 2 shows that 16 out of the 27 solar QF PPAs for PacifiCorp are at or  
 10 within one percent (9.9 MW) of the ten MW eligibility cap. Three developers  
 11 have executed multiple contracts for projects at that MW capacity within time  
 12 periods less than one month. Of these, one developer executed seven PPAs  
 13 for 78 MW in less than one week.

<sup>11</sup> Staff/201; CREA DR 1.1 Supp 1.



1 **Q. What is the significance of this pattern of QF development?**

2 A. Developers that have financial resources to develop a project sized as large as  
3 30 to 70 MW are instead entering contracts for multiple projects that are sized  
4 small enough to qualify for standard PPAs and prices. Developers with the  
5 resources to develop projects of this size do not need the protection from  
6 transaction costs or barriers that are provided by standard contracts.

7 **Q. What action does Staff recommend?**

8 A. Staff recommends that the Commission set the eligibility cap for standard  
9 contracts for PacifiCorp at a level that is low enough to discourage  
10 disaggregation, but not so low as to exclude from the market the QF  
11 developers that may not have the resources to negotiate a long-term PPA with  
12 the utility.

13 **Q. Does Staff's recommendation apply to all QFs in PacifiCorp territory?**

14 A. No. Staff's recommendation is only for PPAs offered to solar and wind QFs  
15 because of the relative ease with which these types of resources can be  
16 disaggregated.

17 **Q. What is Staff's recommendation regarding the standard contract**  
18 **eligibility cap for wind and solar resources?**

19 A. Staff recommends that the Commission establish a cap somewhere between  
20 two and four MWs.

1 **Q. Does Staff believe that QF developers will continue to disaggregate**  
2 **their projects in order to sign multiple standard PPAs at the lower cap?**

3 A. Staff does not know, given the fact that solar and wind projects can be divided  
4 into smaller projects, whereas many QF technologies cannot. A developer that  
5 will sign PPAs for six, ten MW QF projects in order to meet the current eligibility  
6 cap may divide into 20 individual three-MW projects, or 30 individual two-MW  
7 projects. However, to be eligible for the standard PPA and prices, the total  
8 nameplate capacity of each QF cannot exceed the eligibility cap at the same  
9 site, defined as a five-mile radius.<sup>12</sup> Given this requirement, QF developers  
10 may face incremental costs of dividing projects, such as electrical infrastructure  
11 and permitting, that would be avoided by consolidating into a single project and  
12 negotiating a nonstandard contract.

13 **Q. How did Staff arrive at the two to four MW recommendation?**

14 A. First, Staff concluded that the current ten MW eligibility cap should be lowered,  
15 for the reasons explained above. Second, Staff did not want to recommend an  
16 eligibility cap that would preclude a larger single-turbine wind project from  
17 qualifying for a standard PPA. The majority of wind turbines currently  
18 operating in the U.S. are between 1.8 MW and 2.3 MW.<sup>13</sup> Third, given Staff's  
19 concern about the current practice of disaggregation of projects, Staff  
20 concluded that the eligibility cap should be at the lower end of the two- to ten-  
21 MW range to discourage disaggregation because the incremental costs of

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<sup>12</sup> Order No. 06-586, Appendix B, Exhibit A.

<sup>13</sup> Energy Information Administration, Form 860; <http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/>.

1 disaggregating a large project will increase as the cap is lowered and more  
2 sites are required. These considerations led Staff to the recommended  
3 eligibility cap of two to four MW.

4 **Q. What impact on QF development does Staff anticipate if a lower cap of**  
5 **two, three, or four MW is adopted?**

6 A. A lower cap should encourage developers currently seeking to build multiple  
7 individual projects at the ten MW cap, such as those seen in recent months, to  
8 consolidate into a single project and negotiate a PPA and a price with  
9 PacifiCorp. With respect to the smaller QF developers that the Commission  
10 considered when it established the previous eligibility caps, they will continue  
11 to be able to build QF projects and benefit from 15 years of fixed avoided cost  
12 prices.

13 **Q. Several QFs provided testimony stating that negotiated contracts are**  
14 **costly and difficult to execute. What is Staff's response?**

15 A. Staff agrees that negotiated PPAs are more complex to negotiate. However,  
16 as stated in response testimony, the Commission has implemented a dispute  
17 resolution process for disputes arising during negotiation of a non-standard  
18 PURPA contract.

19 Staff also reviewed QF eligibility caps in other western states, and  
20 determined that despite lower caps, some large QFs have negotiated  
21 nonstandard contracts. For example, the eligibility cap in Utah is three MW,<sup>14</sup>

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
<sup>14</sup> Rocky Mountain Power, Schedule 37, Avoided Cost Purchases from Qualifying Facilities, Sheet No. 37.1.

1 and PacifiCorp has ten solar QF projects averaging 71 MW apiece under  
2 contract.<sup>15</sup>

3 **Q. Is there any other information Staff considered in recommending the two**  
4 **to four MW cap?**

5 A. In addition to looking at the consolidation of projects and developers, Staff  
6 looked at the overall distribution of project sizes, as shown below in Figure 3.

7 **Figure 3. PacifiCorp Oregon Solar QF Contracts 2014 and 2015 (partial).**



8 Staff does not believe that this data points to a definitive answer for what the  
9 cap should be. However, the capacity distribution of solar QF projects may be  
10 useful information for the Commission as it considers the question of whether  
11 the cap should remain at ten MW, and if it is lowered, to what level.

<sup>15</sup> Sierra Club data request 1.16 response.

1 **Q. Does Staff have any other alternatives to the recommended lower cap?**

2 A. Staff believes that the recommended eligibility cap of two to four MWs  
3 achieves a balance between the need to eliminate barriers for small QFs  
4 and the need for avoided cost prices that reflect individual QFs'  
5 characteristics, given the nature of QF development in PacifiCorp's service  
6 territory. However, one alternative for the Commission would be to retain  
7 the 10 MW eligibility cap until the Commission sees evidence that recent  
8 and upcoming reductions to avoided cost prices, mentioned in Staff's earlier  
9 testimony, will not prove to be a significant impediment to QF development.


10 **Q. Please explain.**

11 A. PacifiCorp's avoided cost prices have declined substantially in recent years, as  
12 shown in Figure 4 below.<sup>16</sup> Standard nonrenewable avoided costs for  
13 baseload resources declined 47 percent from 2011 to 2015.

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<sup>16</sup> PacifiCorp's renewable avoided costs first approved August 19, 2014; Order No. 14-295.

1

**Figure 4. PacifiCorp Avoided Costs for Baseload Resources.**

2

**Q. What is the potential downside of leaving the current eligibility cap unchanged?**

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4

**A.** Other factors could counterbalance the disincentive of lower avoided cost

5

prices, in which case, the current problem might not be mitigated. For

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example, the investment tax credit could be extended at 30 percent beyond

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2016 rather than lowering to ten percent; equipment costs for solar

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development could decline by a larger share than expected; technology

9

efficiency could improve more rapidly than anticipated. All of these factors, and

10

possibly others, could reduce the impact of lower avoided costs on the pace of

11

QF development. This would leave the door open to larger QF developers

12

continuing to leverage multiple projects receiving payments at the standard

13

avoided cost prices, which leaves ratepayers exposed to increased risk.

1 **Q. Please summarize Staff's position.**

2 A. Staff supports QF contracts that include 15 years of fixed avoided cost prices.

3 Staff believes that the current eligibility cap is being taken advantage of by  
4 developers of large QFs that should be negotiating prices specific to their entire  
5 project, and therefore the cap should be lowered, to a capacity limit of between  
6 two and four MW. Staff's recommendation for the lower cap attempts to  
7 balance the need to provide a standard contracts and pricing option for QFs  
8 without the resources to overcome those barriers, while ensuring that large  
9 projects are priced according to their specific characteristics and their impacts  
10 on the utility and ratepayers via a negotiated PPA. Alternately, Staff notes that  
11 the impact on QF development of the recently reduced avoided cost prices is  
12 still largely unknown, and that the Commission would also be justified in  
13 retaining the 10 MW eligibility cap.

14 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

15 A. Yes.

CREA 1.1 1st Supplemental

Note: Data request response spreadsheet is filtered by Staff for wind and solar QF technologies, and includes columns pertinent to Staff's testimony (sorted by PPA execution date).

Project Name	Project Owner	Name	Project Type and Fuel Source	Nameplate Capacity (kW)	Date of execution of PPA (Some PPAs are renewals)	Standard or Negotiated PPA
Big Top LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	1,650	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Butter Creek Power LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	4,950	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Oregon Trail Windfarm LLC	Oregon Trail Windfarm, LLC	Maurice Miller	Wind	6,500	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Pacific Canyon Windfarm LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	8,250	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Sand Ranch Windfarm LLC	Oregon Trail Windfarm, LLC	Maurice Miller	Wind	9,900	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Wagon Trail LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	3,300	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Ward Butte Windfarm LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	6,600	December 19, 2008	Standard Contract / Public
Four Corners Windfarm LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	10,000	June 16, 2009	Standard Contract / Public
Four Mile Canyon Windfarm LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	10,000	June 16, 2009	Standard Contract / Public
Threemile Canyon Wind I LLC	Exelon Wind	Richard S. Free	Wind	10,000	June 19, 2009	Standard Contract / Public
Mariah Wind	Mariah Wind LLC	Chris Mason	Wind	10,000	April 1, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Orem Family Wind	Orem Family Wind LLC	Eric Orem	Wind	9,900	April 1, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Chopin Wind, LLC	BayWa r.e.	Florian Zerhusen	Wind	10,000	May 5, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Bly Solar Center, LLC	Bly Solar Center, LLC	Andrew Foukal	Solar	8,500	July 24, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Obsidian Renewables LLC - Black Cap Solar II	Obsidian Renewables, LLC	David Brown	Solar	8,000	July 24, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Obsidian Renewables LLC - Ivory Pine Solar	Obsidian Renewables, LLC	David Brown	Solar	10,000	July 30, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Obsidian Renewables LLC - Sprague River Solar	Obsidian Renewables, LLC	David Brown	Solar	7,000	July 30, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Adams Solar Center, LLC	Coronal Energy	Andrew Foukal	Solar	10,000	August 7, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Elbe Solar Center, LLC	Coronal Energy	Andrew Foukal	Solar	10,000	August 7, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Ewauna Solar LLC	OneEnergy Renewables	Bill Eddie	Solar	825	August 8, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Obsidian Renewables LLC - Beatty Solar	Obsidian Renewables, LLC	David Brown	Solar	5,000	August 18, 2014	Standard Contract / Public
Norwest Energy 12 LLC (Falvey)	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	8,000	May 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Norwest Energy 2 LLC (Neff)	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	9,900	May 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Norwest Energy 4 LLC (Bonanza)	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	6,000	May 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Norwest Energy 5 LLC (Arlington)	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	2,900	May 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Norwest Energy 9 LLC (Pendleton)	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	9,900	May 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Ewanua Solar 2 LLC	OneEnergy Renewables	Bill Eddie	Solar	2,900	June 5, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Woodline Solar LLC	Woodline Solar, LLC	William M. Eddie	Solar	8,000	June 5, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 1 (Sprague River Solar)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 11, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 2 (Agate Bay Solar)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 11, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 3 (Turkey Hill Solar)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 11, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 4 (Bly Solar)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 11, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 5 (Merrill)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	8,000	June 17, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 6 (Lakeview)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 17, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 7 (Jacksonville)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 17, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OR Solar 8 (Dairy)	Origis Energy LLC	Samir Verstyn	Solar	10,000	June 17, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Merrill Solar, LLC	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	10,000	June 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Norwest Energy 7 LLC (Eagle Point)	Cypress Creek Renewables		Solar	9,900	June 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
OSLH - Collier Solar	Oregon Solar Land Holdings, LLC	Troy Snyder	Solar	10,000	June 29, 2015	Standard Contract / Public
Bear Creek Solar Center, LLC	Coronal Energy	Andrew Foukal	Solar	10,000	August 7, 2015 *	Standard Contract / Public

\*Contract dated August 7, 2014; see Docket RE 142, August 26, 2014 filing.