PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

UM 1635

Staff Opening Testimony

Of

Judy Johnson

In the Matter of
NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS COMPANY, dba NW
NATURAL
Mechanism for Recovery of Environmental
Remediation Costs.

May 3, 2013

CASE: UM 1635

WITNESS: JUDY JOHNSON

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 100

Opening Testimony

May 3, 2013

- Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, PRESENT POSITION WITH THE OREGON PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- A. My name is Judy Johnson. I am employed as a Senior Economist in Energy Rates, Finance and Audit Division of the Utility Program. My business address is 550 Capitol Street NE Suite 215, Salem, Oregon 97301-2551.
- Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND WORK EXPERIENCE.
- A. My Witness Qualification Statement is in Exhibit Staff/101.
- Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
- A. The purpose of my testimony is to respond to the opening testimony of Northwest Natural Gas Company (NW Natural) related to the recovery of environmental remediation costs in this proceeding.
- Q. HOW IS YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?
- A. My testimony is organized as follows:
 - I. The earnings test that should be applied to NW Natural's environmental remediation deferred accounts.
 - II. The earnings test that should be applied to NW Natural's Site Remediation Recovery Mechanism (SRRM) on a going forward basis.
 - III. The prudency of NW Natural's environmental remediation costs to date, as well as the prudence of insurance settlements and third party contributions.
 - IV. The appropriate treatment of the GASCO plant that is not yet in operation.
 - V. The appropriate allocation factor to use to allocate environmental remediation costs between Oregon and Washington.

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- Q. BEFORE YOU COMMENT SPECIFICALLY ON THE EARNINGS TEST TO APPLY IN THIS PROCEEDING, DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT DEFERRED ACCOUNTING AND WHY EARNINGS TESTS ARE NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE FOR GOOD REGULATORY POLICY?
- A. Yes. The Commission's primary objective in regulation is to establish rates that are fair and reasonable. Whether or not rates are fair and reasonable does not depend upon an isolated review of a single expense. Rather, ratemaking is holistic and the overall result must be fair and reasonable, which means that single issues are generally not viewed in isolation in order to determine if overall rates are fair and reasonable. As an exception to normal ratemaking, deferred accounting allows retroactive ratemaking for extraordinary events that occur between rate cases and, through amortization, include expenses that the utility cannot otherwise absorb and maintain fair and reasonable rates. Application of an earnings test to deferred account balances operates as a check on single issue ratemaking. Before deferred amounts can be amortized, Commission Staff does an earnings test to determine if overall rates are fair and reasonable. Deferred accounting does not alter the Commission's primary objective of establishing fair and reasonable rates.

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- Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT NW NATURAL'S EARNINGS TEST PROPOSAL IS

 CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION'S LONG STANDING PRACTICE

 OF EARNINGS TEST ON DEFERRED BALANCES?
- A. No. NW Natural's proposed earnings test is much more generous to NW Natural than application of the historic practice of earnings test for deferred account balances. For example, NW Natural proposes that the earnings test on its deferred balances be 100 basis points above its then authorized return on equity (ROE). NW Natural also proposes to "average" its ROE from 2003 until the present, which allows it to avoid absorbing some of the environmental remediation costs in the deferred account balances due to averaging over-earning years with under-earning years. Both of these proposals are inconsistent with the manner in which an earnings test is typically applied.
- Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EARNINGS TEST THAT STAFF SUPPORTS IN THIS PROCEEDING.
 - A. Staff recommends that the Commission apply the earnings test that is typically applied in these circumstances. It is long standing policy to conduct an earnings test when deferred amounts are requested to be amortized in order to determine whether or not the utility could have absorbed some or all of the costs that were deferred. First, Staff reviews the utility's results of operations and makes Type 1 adjustments. Then, it compares these results to the utility's authorized ROE for the period of the deferrals. As a general rule, Staff considers the deferral period to be the year or period when the

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costs were deferred. Finally, Staff determines how much, if any, of the deferred costs could have been appropriately absorbed by the utility in the deferral period. In sum, Staff compares the utility's results of operations after Type 1 adjustments to its authorized ROE for the deferral period for which the costs were incurred. Then, it considers how much, if any, of the costs should be amortized in order to maintain fair and reasonable rates by comparing actual results to a reasonable return during the same deferral period.

- Q. IF THE COMMISSION WERE TO DEPART FROM APPLYING ITS LONG
 STANDING EARNINGS TEST, ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT THERE
 WOULD BE FUTURE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES TO GOOD
 REGULATORY POLICY?
- A. Yes. Departing from past practice on an earnings test for utilities would establish a new practice of allowing utilities to collect costs in deferred accounts even if they had reasonable earnings during the deferral period. As discussed above, deferred accounting is an exception to normal ratemaking and should not be employed to establish rates that are not fair and reasonable. Instead, it should only be employed for extraordinary costs and even then only for the purpose of bringing earnings up to a reasonable level.

 Once earnings reach a reasonable level, utilities should have to absorb the cost incurred between rate cases.

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Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE SOME SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON NW NATURAL'S ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION DEFERRED ACCOUNT BALANCES?

A. Yes. In this testimony, the historic period of environmental remediation deferred accounts are the years 2003 through 2011. I have prepared Staff Exhibit Staff/102, which at Johnson/1 line 24 shows the total environmental remediation costs for this time period as \$71.128 million. The exhibit also shows the Company's actual (results of operation after Type 1 adjustments) ROE for each year on line 9, while on line 12 the Company's authorized ROE is presented. The Exhibit also shows the year-by-year amount of environmental deferrals (plus interest) and various options for earnings tests on those deferred amounts.

Q. DOES AN EARNINGS TEST OF THIS TYPE TYPICALLY DO A YEAR-BY-YEAR COMPARISION?

A. Yes. Contrary to this typical practice, NW Natural proposes that its earnings results be aggregated and averaged instead of reviewing each year individually. The result of NW Natural's proposal is to skew the years it overearned and had substantial environmental costs and use years where it under-earned and had limited environmental costs.

¹ Because NW Natural continues to put costs in the deferred account until Commission resolution of this docket, this exhibit will need to be updated once 2012 actuals are finalized.

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- DO YOU MAINTAIN THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD DO A YEAR-BY-Q. YEAR EARNINGS COMPARISION INSTEAD OF THE NEW AVERAGE APPROACH PROPOSED BY NW NATURAL?
- Yes, employing a year-by-year approach is consistent with Commission long Α. standing practices. I continue to believe this is the correct approach because it is consistent with good regulatory policy, results in fair and reasonable rates, and incorporates the purpose of the limited exceptions that allow retroactive ratemaking. In a deferral period as long as the one at issue here, a year-by-year approach accounts for the financial viability of the utility during the same period it is incurring costs for environmental remediation. Furthermore, the utility controls when it requests amortization of deferred account balances. If the Commission were to allow averaging of a long deferral period, a utility could time the request for amortization so as to maximize collection of deferred costs at the expense of ratepayers. Finally, good regulatory policy should try to match the costs and earnings as accurately as possible. A year-by-year comparison is a much more accurate way of comparing the overall earnings of the utility as related to when they incurred deferred accounting expenses.
- Q. DOES STAFF AGREE WITH NW NATURAL'S PROPOSAL TO MAKE THE EARNINGS TEST 100 BASIS POINTS MORE THAN AUTHORIZED ROE?
- No. I do not believe the purpose of the limited exception to retroactive Α. ratemaking should allow a utility to pick a single issue or cost and have it considered in isolation and result in a utility over-earning. While the law

allows deferrals in certain circumstances, it provides that an earnings review must be conducted at the time of amortization. The earnings review is to determine how many of the deferred costs should be amortized to bring the utility up to reasonable earnings. While I agree that reasonable earnings is not the same as authorized ROE, in context of the purpose of deferred accounting as an exception to normal ratemaking, I do not believe reasonable earnings are more than authorized ROE during this period. To the contrary, I believe reasonable earnings for this period are authorized ROE or an earnings amount below authorized ROE.

- Q. HAVE YOU PROVIDED THE COMMISISON OPTIONS FOR DETERMINING REASONABLE EARINGS DURING THIS DEFERRAL PERIOD?
- A. Yes, Staff/102 provides numerous options and the impact of those options.

 Consistent with long standing Commission practice, I recommend that the

 Commission adopt reasonable earnings for this deferral period as between

 9.2 percent, which is 100 basis points below the authorized ROE, to 10.2

 percent, which was authorized ROE during the deferral period.
- Q. WHY DO YOU RECOMMEND A RANGE OF REASONABLE EARNINGS
 THAT EXTENDS BELOW AUTHORIZED ROE?
- A. I believe legal retroactive ratemaking is an exception to normal ratemaking and that its main purpose is to allow deferral of extraordinary costs that can later be considered for amortization if it is necessary to bring the utility up to modest, but reasonable earnings. I do not believe that retroactive ratemaking, which does not consider rates holistically, should be used to

allow utilities to earn more than authorized ROE.² Finally, it is my opinion that return of equity returns between 9.2 and 10.2 percent during the deferral period is not inconsistent with earnings that are required to attract capital and obtain credit.

- Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH NW NATURAL'S ASSERTION THAT

 ENVIRONENTAL COSTS CANNOT BE CONTROLLED AND THUS

 RATEPAYERS SHOULD PAY 100 PERCENT OF THE COSTS?
- A. No. As discussed above, deferred accounting does not change the Commission's charge to establish overall fair and reasonable rates. Even if one set of costs could not be controlled, deferred accounting does not exist to allow the costs to be borne by ratepayers when other costs can be controlled and the result is overall reasonable earnings. That stated, I still believe NW Natural has some control over the extent of environmental remediation costs.
- Q. CAN YOU GIVE ANY EXAMPLES ON HOW NW NATURAL MAY CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS?
- A. Yes. NW Natural can control costs by advocating for and convincing the Environmental Protection Agency of the least cost, best benefit plan to clean the site. NW Natural can also control costs by aggressively and successfully seeking third party contribution and insurance proceeds.

² Theoretically, I agree that reasonable earnings could be more than authorized ROE. However, it would be an extreme circumstance such as severe inflation in a short period of time that made authorized ROE unreasonable considering the deferral period subject to severe inflation. The period of 2003-2011 clearly does not fall into the category of severe inflation.

Q. DO YOU AGREE A PRUDENCE REVIEW PROVIDES ALL THE INCENTIVE

NW NATURAL NEEDS TO CONTROL ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION

COSTS?

- A. No. Although NW Natural can control costs by the least cost, best benefit plan to clean the site and maximizing collections through third party contributions and insurance proceeds, those actions are difficult to challenge in a prudence review under the prudence standard. As a result, good regulatory policy would build in incentives for NW Natural to control environmental remediation costs.
- Q. WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON INSURANCE PROCEEDS AND THIRD PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS?
- A. Yes. Unlike the environmental remediation costs that are expended year-by-year and should be compared to earnings year-by-year, insurance proceeds and third party contributions are highly unpredictable, lumpy, and do not necessarily match the benefits with the burdens, i.e. the proceeds versus when the costs were incurred.
- Q. DO YOU HAVE A PROPOSAL FOR HOW TO HANDLE INSURANCE PROCEEDS AND THIRD PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS?
- A. Yes. The first step in my proposal is to allocate the proceeds and contributions to the historic period and future period. To accomplish this, I take historical costs of approximately \$71 million through 2011 and add to it NW Natural's estimate of future costs of \$58 million, for a total estimate of \$129 million. Then, I take the \$71 million in historic costs and divide by the

\$129 million total and I take the \$58 million estimate of future costs and divide it by the \$129 million total, which results in 55 percent of proceeds and contributions that should be applied to the historic balance and the 45 percent that should be applied to offset future costs. Because the \$58 million estimate of future environmental remediation costs is a conservative estimate and not all of the sites have a future estimate, I recommend allocating insurance proceeds 50/50 to historic and future costs, respectively.³

The second step in my proposal is to allocate the historic share of the proceeds and contributions to each year in the historic period. To accomplish this, I determine the share of total historic costs spent in each year. More specifically, I take the costs for each year plus interest (See Staff/102, line 20) and divide it by the total historic costs (\$71 million). The result of this step will give me a percentage of the cost paid in each year.

The final step is to allocate insurance proceeds and third party contributions. For illustration, assume that there is a total of \$100 million of insurance proceeds.

Under step 1, you would determine that the insurance proceeds and third party contributions should be allocated 50 percent to the past costs and 50 percent to the future expected costs. Under step 2, you would determine that the share of costs in 2003 is 10.5 percent (the costs in 2003 of \$7.5

³ I note that if the Commission desired to use a less conservative estimate of future environmental remediation costs, the amount of insurance proceeds and third party contributions allocated to the historic balances would be less, which would mean that the net of costs minus proceeds would be higher in the historic years, which may result in NW Natural having to absorb more of the costs under the historic earnings test.

million divided by total costs of \$71 million, or 10.5 percent). In the final step, you would use the percentages from steps 1 and 2 to allocate a share of the \$100 million in insurance proceeds to calendar year 2003. In this illustration you would allocate \$5.25 million to 2003 (\$100 million multiplied by 50% from step 1 and by 10.5% from step 2). Therefore, you would net the \$5.25 million of insurance proceeds and third party contributions against the \$7.5 million in the costs for that same year. Because in this example 2003 is a year subject to an earnings test, the net amount (\$7.5 million minus \$5.25 million) of \$2.25 million would be subject to the earnings test.

- Q. IS YOUR PROPOSAL ON INSURANCE PROCEEDS AND THIRD PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS FAIR AND REASONABLE?
- A. Yes. Because of the unique nature of the proceeds and contributions, it seems fair and reasonable to allocate them differently than simply accounting for them in the year in which they are received.
 - II. The earnings test that should be applied to NW Natural's Site Remediation Recovery Mechanism (SRRM) on a going forward basis.
- Q. WHAT PRINCIPLES DID YOU CONSIDER IN DEVLEOPING A
 RECOMMENDATION FOR THE EARNINGS TEST GOING FORWARD?
- A. My primary principles were to create an earnings test that created the appropriate incentives and prevented perverse outcomes.
- Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY APPROPRIATE INCENTIVES?
- A. As I stated earlier, I believe NW Natural has some ability to control costs by implementing a least cost, best benefit plan to clean the site and by

maximizing collections through third party contributions and insurance proceeds. As a result, good regulatory policy should build in incentives for NW Natural to control these environmental remediation costs.

Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY PREVENTION OF PERVERSE OUTCOMES?

- A. One scenario for a perverse outcome would be a situation where the regulatory mechanism resulted in a large surcharge to customers in a year when the company's actual earnings exceeded its authorized earnings by a wide margin. Another scenario for a perverse outcome would be a situation where the regulatory mechanism resulted in a large refund to customers in a year when the company's actual earnings were less than its authorized earnings by a wide margin.
- Q. WITH THESE PRINCIPLES IN MIND, WHAT EARNINGS TEST DO YOU RECOMMEND GOING FORWARD?
- A. My primary recommendation for an earnings test going forward is to establish an earnings test that has 50/50 sharing in a band for results both up to 50 basis points higher than authorized ROE and results down to 50 basis points lower than authorized ROE. For results lower than 50 basis points of authorized ROE, I recommend sharing the environmental remediation costs where ratepayers pay 95 percent of the costs and shareholders pay 5 percent of the costs. For results above more than 50 basis points of authorized ROE, I recommend sharing the environmental remediation costs where customers pay 5 percent of the costs and shareholders pay 95 percent of the costs.

Because the currently authorized ROE is 9.5 percent, this would mean that any results between 9.0 percent and 10.0 percent would be shared 50/50 between ratepayers and shareholders. Thus, the future earnings band contains symmetrical sharing within a band of plus and minus 50 basis points. If the results were more than 10.0 percent, the amount above 10.0 percent would be paid 95 percent by shareholders and 5 percent by ratepayers. If the results were lower than 9.0 percent, the amount below 9.0 percent would be paid 95 percent by ratepayers and 5 percent by shareholders.

Q. DOES THIS MECHANISM SATISFY YOUR TWO PRINCIPLES?

A. Yes, it reasonably balances these criteria. The earnings bands help to prevent perverse outcomes while the sharing percentages help provide the incentive to continuously and effectively manage costs.

Q. DO YOU HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION TO OFFER THE COMMISSION ON AN EARNINGS TEST GOING FORWARD?

A. Yes. Although the Commission rejected explicit sharing in the rate case, UG 221, it recognized that an earnings test may result in de facto sharing. As an alternative to the earnings test described above, I recommend 90/10 sharing of environmental remediation costs going forward, independent of NW Natural's earnings levels, if the Commission desired to reconsider its position on this issue in light of the new testimony in this docket. Under this sharing approach, customers would pay 90 percent of the prudently incurred costs net insurance proceeds and NW Natural's shareholder would pay 10 percent of the incurred costs net insurance proceeds.

Q. DOES THIS MECHANISM SATISFY YOUR TWO PRINCIPLES?

- A. No, although it would provide an incentive for NW Natural to appropriately manage costs and insurance proceeds, it does little to mitigate against perverse outcomes.
 - III. The prudency of NW Natural's environmental remediation costs to date, as well as the prudence of insurance settlements and third party contributions.
- Q. DID STAFF REVIEW THE PRUDENCY OF NW NATURAL'S INVESTMENT
 IN ITS ENVIROMENTAL REMEDIATION?
- A. Yes. Staff member Erik Colville performed the prudency review under my guidance. In this testimony, I adopt and support the conclusions of Mr. Colville's prudency review.
 - Q. CAN YOU DESCRIBE HOW THE PRUDENCY REVIEW WAS CONDUCTED?
 - A. Yes. Mr. Colville reviewed written materials and met with NW Natural employees, Mr. Bob Wyatt, who is the Environmental Project Manager, and Ms. Cristan Kelley, who is a Rate Analyst, to discuss the prudence of NW Natural's environmental remediation.
 - Q. WHICH SITES ARE INVOLVED IN NW NATURAL'S ENVIORNMENTAL REMEDIATION?
 - A. There are two locations, which are the Gasco/Siltronics site and the Portland Gas Manufacturing site. Within those two locations, there are six clean-up projects, which are: Portland Harbor Superfund Site; Gasco Sediments;

Gasco Uplands; Gasco Source Control; Siltronics Uplands; and Portland Gas Manufacturing.

- Q. WHO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ENVIRONMTAL REMEDIATION OF THESE SITES?
- A. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has jurisdiction over the Portland Harbor Superfund Site and Gasco Sediments site. The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has jurisdiction over Gasco Uplands, Gasco Source Control, Siltronics Upland, and Portland Gas Manufacturing sites.
- Q. DOES STAFF CONCLUDE THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
 ACTIONS TAKEN THUS FAR HAVE BEEN PRUDENT?
- A. Yes. After reviewing the record from UG 221, NW Natural's opening testimony in UM 1635, and the information that Mr. Colville obtained in meetings with Mr. Wyatt and Ms. Kelley, I conclude, with a limited exception noted below, that NW Natural's environmental remediation costs through 2011 were prudently incurred.
 Initially, Staff had concerns that a recent EPA decision negated the early actions NW Natural took regarding Gasco Sediments and the removal of tarlike substances from a limited area of the riverfront followed by installation of a containment cap on that area. However, based upon discussions with Mr.

work already completed.

Wyatt, Staff became convinced that the EPA decision was to expand the area

involved in the 2005 clean up, but that the EPA decision did not impact the

Q. YOU STATED THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION THUS FAR HAS BEEN PRUDENT, BUT NOTED A LIMITED EXCEPTION. CAN YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN THE LIMITED EXCEPTION?

- A. Yes. I reviewed the accounting details of environmental remediation costs incurred thus far. In that review, NW Natural was unable or incapable of demonstrating where \$33,400 dollars of costs were incurred. As a result, it is my recommendation to approve the prudency of NW Natural's environmental remediation costs through 2011, with the exception of the \$33,400 dollars that should be removed due to NW Natural's inability to carry its burden of proof.⁴
- Q. DID YOU ALSO REVIEW THE PRUDENCE OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS
 AND THIRD PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH 2011?
- A. Yes. I generally reviewed the actions of NW Natural to seek recovery from insurance policies and third parties. I also reviewed NW Natural's legal costs to confirm that they were not double counted.
- Q. DO YOU AGREE THAT THESE PROCEEDS AND CONTRIBUTIONS ARE PRUDENT?
- A. Yes. I did not discover any double counting of legal costs and have no reason to believe that NW Natural's efforts to recover proceeds and contributions has been imprudent. However, as I mentioned earlier in my testimony, it is difficult to review environmental remediation activities and second guess NW Natural's insurance efforts after they have occurred. As a

⁴ I also confirmed that no fines and penalty amounts are included in the deferred account balances. However, if fines and penalties are incurred in the future, I recommended that the Commission exclude all fines and penalties from consideration for rate recover.

result, while I find these efforts prudent through 2011, I continue to recommend that the Commission adopt earnings tests and policies that incentive NW Natural to control environmental remediation costs while maximizing proceeds and contributions.

- IV. <u>The appropriate treatment of the GASCO plant that is not yet in operation.</u>
- Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE GASCO PLANT
 THAT IS NOT IN OPERATION, OR USED AND USEFUL, YET?
- A. I recommend that a decision on GASCO is not ripe for decision in this proceeding. NW Natural is requesting that we pre-approve inclusion of GASCO, subject to a prudence review. Because GASCO is not expected to become operational in the near future, there is no need to consider it for inclusion at this premature date. Once GASCO is in operation, NW Natural may request appropriate ratemaking treatement.
 - V. <u>The appropriate allocation factor to use to allocate environmental remediation costs between Oregon and Washington.</u>
- A. There are two options to allocate the environmental remediation costs between Oregon and Washington. NW Natural proposes to allocate the costs 96.68 percent to Oregon and 3.32 percent to Washington. The basis of this allocation among the states is to reflect that during the historical period of time when the plant was operational Oregon received 96.68 percent of the benefits and, therefore, should be allocated 96.68 percent of the costs.

 On the other hand, NW Natural is proposing to collect the costs of environmental remediation from current customers and the current allocation

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is 90.15 percent to Oregon and 9.85 percent to Washington. Under this rationale, the allocation to the states should be based upon who is paying today.

Staff's primary recommendation is that the historic allocation that is less favorable to Oregon is more consistent with the benefits and the burdens of the site so should be adopted.

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

A. Yes.

CASE: UM 1635

WITNESS: Judy Johnson

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 101

Witness Qualifications Statement

WITNESS QUALIFICATION STATEMENT

NAME:

JUDY A. JOHNSON

EMPLOYER:

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

TITLE:

Senior Economist – Energy, Rates, Finance, and Audit

ADDRESS:

550 CAPITOL ST. N.E., SALEM, OREGON 97310-1380

EDUCATION:

MBA with an emphasis in Statistics from

Eastern Washington University

Cheney, Washington

BA in Accounting from

Eastern Washington University

Cheney, Washington

EXPERIENCE:

3/95-Present

I have been employed by the Oregon Public Utility Commission since March of 1995. My current position is Senior Economist for Energy, Rates, Finance, and Audit. I was previously a Senior Analyst for the Revenue Requirements Section.

6/77-2/95

I was employed by Avista Corporation, an electric

and natural gas utility located in Spokane,

Washington. The majority of my employment was

spent in the Rates and Regulatory Affairs
Department as a Senior Rate Analyst. I have
prepared testimony and exhibits in numerous
electric and natural gas rate cases, primarily in the
area of results of operations and cost of service.

CASE: UM 1635 WITNESS: JUDY JOHNSON

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 102

Exhibits in Support Of Opening Testimony

May 3, 2013

NW Natural				
UM 1635				
Analysis of Oregon Earnings Tests				
(\$,000\$)		2	m	
	2003	2004	2005	2006
1 Per Results of Operations ("ROO") as filed: data is from filed.	d ROOs, column c (after T	ype I normalizing	adjustments), t	here are sli
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Per Results of Operations ("ROO") as filed: data is from filed ROOs, column c (after Type I normalizing adjustments), there are slight rounding differences	Type (Jensey Type	s normalizing 2	diustments), the	re are slight rour	nding differences						
	וחוווו כ (מוכבו ואם	י פיייאווסוויוסון ז									
Net Operating Revenue	\$61,541	\$71,694	\$78,821	\$82,753	\$83,957	\$83,918	\$89,513	\$84,845	089'98\$		
Total Rate Base	\$814,052	\$858,497	\$940,148	\$958,767	\$975,963	\$978,907	\$986,180	\$967,308	\$993,165		
Return on Rate Base	7.56%	8.35%	8.38%	8.63%	8.60%	8.57%	9.08%	8.77%	8.73%		
Return on Equity	8.05%	9.49%	9.77%	10.31%	10.17%	10.05%	11.21%	11.10%	11.19%		
Authorized ROE	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%	10.20%		
ROE Threshold for each year's Spring Earnings Test	13.27%	13.27%	13.32%	13.44%	13.40%	13,14%	11.54%	11.02%	10.92%		
Environmental costs: Environmental deferrals (as actually recorded each year) Inferest on deferrals (as actually recorded each year) Total Environmental deferrals with interest	\$1,034 \$0 \$1,034	\$2,205 \$0 \$0 \$2,205	\$9,209 \$ \$602,6\$	\$5,290 \$1,270 \$6,560	\$6,754 \$2,008 \$8,762	\$5,415 \$2,750 \$8,165	\$6,464 \$3,503 \$9,967	\$9,231 \$4,444 \$13,675	\$5,993 \$5,559 \$11,551	Totals \$51,594 \$19,534 \$71,128	Note: Insurance recovery
Insurance proceeds	\$1,034	\$2,205	\$9,209	9\$,560	\$8,762	\$8,165	296'6\$	\$13,675	\$11,551	\$71,128	amounts subject to protective order -these amounts will be added once the order is in place
Environmental Deferrals Earnings Test Scenarios: these scenarios consider the pre-tax amount exceeding an example threshold ROE, and calculate the amount of environmental costs that would be written off if the test is interpretated that exceeded the threshold. Under this interpretation, the writeoff is the lesser of the pre-tax amount exceeding threshold ROE or the actual environmental spe	sider the pre-tax earnings exceede	amount exceeding the threshold.	ng an example th Under this interp	amount exceeding an example threshold ROE, and calculate the amount of environmental costs that would be written off if the test is interpretated ed the threshold. Under this interpretation, the writeoff is the lesser of the pre-tax amount exceeding threshold ROE or the actual environmental spent.	d calculate the ar	mount of enviror	nmental costs th amount exceedir	at would be writt ig threshold ROE	en off if the test or the actual en	is interpretate	ed bent.
Pre tax amount of ROE compared to 10.2% write off to extent of earnings exceeded 10.2% deadband write off to extent of earnings exceeded from all earnings tests	(\$14,492) \$0 \$0	0\$ 0\$ 0\$	\$0\$ \$0 0\$	\$878 \$878 \$878	(\$233) \$0 \$0 \$0	(\$1,327) \$0 \$6,166	\$8,719 \$8,719 \$0	\$6,940 \$6,940 \$5,889	\$7,643 \$7,643 \$5,172	Totals (\$786) \$24,180 \$18,105	writeoff as % of enviro cost 34.0% 25.5%
using deadband that existed in relevant Spring Earnings Test [a] write off to extent of earnings exceeded deadband writeoff if WACOG sharing excluded from all earnings tests	\$ \$	0\$ \$	88	0\$ \$\$	0\$	0\$	0\$ O\$	0\$ 662\$	\$2,081 \$0	\$2,680	3.8%
100 bps deadband write off to extent of earnings exceeded 11.2% deadband → writeoff if WACOG sharing excluded from all earnings tests	0\$ \$	0\$ \$	0\$	0\$	0\$ \$	0\$	\$115	0\$	0\$	\$115 \$0	0.2%
50 bps deadband write off to extent of earnings exceeded 10.7% deadband write off to extent of earnings exceeded from all earnings tests	0\$	0\$	0.05	0\$ \$	0\$	\$0 \$1,775	\$4,417 \$0	\$3,074	\$3,780 \$1,309	\$11,271	15.8% 7.2%
-50 bps deadband write off to extent of earnings exceeded 9.7% deadband → writeoff if WACOG sharing excluded from all earnings tests	0\$	0\$ \$	\$536	\$5,008	\$4,067	\$3,064 \$8,165	0\$ 296'6\$	\$10,807 \$9,756	\$11,506 \$9,035	\$44,954	63.2%
-100 bps deadband write off to extent of earnings exceeded 9.2% deadband → writeoff if WACOG sharing excluded from all earnings tests	0\$	\$2,151 \$2,151	\$4,606	\$6,560 \$6,560	\$8,367 \$8,367	\$7,454 \$8,165	\$9,967 \$1,377	\$13,675 \$13,622	\$11,551 \$11,551	\$64,332 \$56,400	90.4%
Variable bps deadbands: 100 write off to extent of earnings exceed 11.20% deadband → writeoff if WACOG sharing excluded from all earnings tests	\$ \$	0, 0,	0\$	0\$	0\$	0\$	\$115 \$0	0\$	0\$	\$115	0.2%
-100 write off to extent of earnings exceed 9.20% deadband → writeoff if WACOG sharing excluded from all earnings tests	0\$	\$2,151 \$2,151	\$4,606 \$4,606	\$6,560 \$6,560	\$8,367 \$8,367	\$7,454 \$8,165	\$9,967 \$1,377	\$13,675 \$13,622	\$11,551 \$11,551	\$64,332 \$56,400	90.4%
Other data from earnings test needed for calculations above After Tax Rate	60.71%	60.71%	60,71%	60.71%	60.71%	60.71%	59.87%	59.87%	60.06%		

I	CERTIFICATE	OF SERVICE
2	I certify that on May 3, 2013, I served the	foregoing Staff Opening Testimony upon the
3	following parties in this proceeding by sending a	true, exact and full copy by electronic mail only
4	as all parties waive paper service.	a a
5	W	W
6	CABLE HUSTON BENEDICT HAAGENSEN & LLOYD	MCDOWELL RACKNER & GIBSON PC LISA F RACKNER (C) (HC)
7	TOMMY A BROOKS (C) 1001 SW FIFTH AVE, STE 2000 PORTLAND OR 97204-1136	419 SW 11TH AVE., SUITE 400 PORTLAND OR 97205 dockets@mcd-law.com
8	tbrooks@cablehuston.com	
U	W	W NORTHWEST INDUSTRIAL GAS USERS
9	CABLE HUSTON BENEDICT HAAGENSEN & LLOYD LLP	EDWARD FINKLEA (C) 326 FIFTH ST
10	CHAD M STOKES (C) 1001 SW 5TH - STE 2000	LAKE OSWEGO OR 97034 efinklea@nwigu.org
11	PORTLAND OR 97204-1136 cstokes@cablehuston.com	W
12	W	NORTHWEST NATURAL E-FILING
13	CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD OF OREGON OPUC DOCKETS	220 NW 2ND AVE PORTLAND OR 97209
14	610 SW BROADWAY, STE 400 PORTLAND OR 97205 dockets@oregoncub.org	efiling@nwnatural.com MARK R THOMPSON (C) (HC)
15	ROBERT JENKS (C) (HC)	220 NW 2ND AVE PORTLAND OR 97209
16	610 SW BROADWAY, STE 400 PORTLAND OR 97205	mark.thompson@nwnatural.com
	bob@oregoncub.org	W PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC
17	G. CATRIONA MCCRACKEN (C) (HC) 610 SW BROADWAY, STE 400	RICHARD GEORGE (C) 121 SW SALMON ST - 1WTC1301
18	PORTLAND OR 97205 catriona@oregoncub.org	PORTLAND OR 97204 richard.george@pgn.com
19	w	JAY TINKER
20	MCDOWELL RACKNER & GIBSON PC AMIE JAMIESON (C) (HC)	121 SW SALMON ST 1WTC-0702 PORTLAND OR 97204
21	419 SW 11TH AVE., STE 400 PORTLAND OR 97205	pge.opuc.filings@pgn.com
22	amie@mcd-law.com	
23		
24		
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1	W PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON
2	JUDY JOHNSON (C) (HC) PO BOX 2148
3	SALEM OR 97308-2148 judy.johnson@state.or.us
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Page 2 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE – UM 1635

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Neoma Lane

Legal Secretary
Department of Justice
Business Activities Section