# BOEHM, KURTZ \& LOWRY 

## Via Electronic Mail - PUC.FilingCenter@state.or.us

June 4, 2020

Public Utility Commission of Oregon
201 High Street SE, Suite 100
Salem, Oregon 97301-3398
Attn: Filing Center

## Re: Case No. UE-374

Dear Sir or Madam:

Please find attached the OPENING TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OF JUSTIN BIEBER on behalf of FRED MEYER STORES, INC. A SUBSIDIARY OF THE KROGER CO. AND QUALITY FOOD CENTERS for filing in the above referenced matter.

Copies have been served on all parties of record. Please place this document of file.

Very truly yours,
Kurt J. Boehm
Kurt J. Boehm, Esq.
Jody Kyler Cohn, Esq.
BOEHM, KURTZ \& LOWRY
KJBkew
Enclosure

# BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON 

In the Matter of PacifiCorp's Request for a )<br>Docket No. UE 374 General Rate Revision

# OPENING TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN BIEBER 

ON BEHALF OF
FRED MEYER STORES

JUNE 4, 2020

## OPENING TESTIMONY OF JUSTIN BIEBER

## Introduction

Q. Please state your name and business address.
A. My name is Justin Bieber. My business address is 215 South State Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
A. I am a Senior Consultant for Energy Strategies, LLC. Energy Strategies is a private consulting firm specializing in economic and policy analysis applicable to energy production, transportation, and consumption.
Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?
A. My testimony is being sponsored by Fred Meyer Stores and Quality Food Centers ("Fred Meyer"), divisions of The Kroger Co. Kroger receives most of its service from PacifiCorp ("PacifiCorp" or "the Company") under rate Schedule 730.

## Q. Please describe your professional experience and qualifications.

A. My academic background is in business and engineering. I earned a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Duke University in 2006 and a Master of Business Administration from the University of Southern California in 2012. In 2017, I completed Practical Regulatory Training for the Electric Industry sponsored by the New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities and the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. I am also a registered Professional Civil Engineer in the state of California.

I joined Energy Strategies in 2017, where I provide regulatory and technical support on a variety of energy issues, including regulatory services, transmission and renewable development, and financial and economic analyses. I have also filed and supported the development of testimony before various different state utility regulatory commissions.

Prior to joining Energy Strategies, I held positions at Pacific Gas and Electric Company as Manager of Transmission Project Development, ISO Relations and FERC Policy Principal, and Supervisor of Electric Generator Interconnections. During my career at Pacific Gas and Electric Company, I supported multiple facets of utility operations, and led efforts in policy, regulatory, and strategic initiatives, including supporting the development of testimony before and submittal of comments to the FERC, California ISO, and the California Public Utility Commission. Prior to my work at Pacific Gas \& Electric, I was a project manager and engineer for heavy construction bridge and highway projects.

## Q. Have you testified previously before this Commission?

A. Yes, I testified in Portland General Electric Company's 2018 request for a general rate revision, Docket No. UE 335.
Q. Have you filed testimony previously before any other state utility regulatory commissions?
A. Yes. I have testified before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, the Kentucky Public Service Commission, the Michigan Public Service Commission, the Montana Public Service Commission, the North Carolina Utilities Commission, the Public Utilities

Commission of Ohio, the Utah Public Service Commission, and the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin.

## Overview and Conclusions

## Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A. My testimony addresses the following topics:

- Rate design for Schedule 200 Base Supply Service applicable to customers served under Schedule 30/730 secondary,
- The Company's proposed Rate Mitigation Adjustments ("RMA"), and
- The Company's proposed Schedule 29 non-residential time of use pilot.


## Q. Please summarize your recommendations to the Commission.

I offer the following recommendations for the Commission:

- PacifiCorp's proposed rate design for Schedule 200 Base Supply Service rates that are applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary customers significantly understate demand related charges while overstating the energy charges relative to the cost of service. I recommend revenue neutral modifications to the proposed rate design that will improve the alignment between the rate components and the underlying costs while employing the principle of gradualism and mitigating intra-class rate impacts.
- The Company is proposing reductions to the current RMA credits that would reduce the current interclass subsidies while also mitigating the rate impacts for certain groups of customers. Specifically, the Company is proposing a level of RMA credits that would cap the rate increase for

Schedule $41 / 741$ at $10 \%$ and reduce the subsidies that are currently being received by Schedule $47 / 747$ and Schedule $48 / 748$ by $50 \%$. Given the circumstances of this case, at the Company's proposed revenue requirement, the proposed RMA represents a reasonable balance between reducing subsidies and mitigating rate impacts. However, to the extent that the Commission approves a rate increase that is less than the Company's request, then I recommend that the Commission take advantage of the opportunity to improve the alignment between revenue responsibility and cost causation while still reducing the requested rate increase for all rate classes.

- The Company's proposed Schedule 29 would be a specialty rate that is really intended to lower costs for customers with low load factor utilization rates. While the proposed Schedule 29 is only a pilot, low load factor specialty rates can often have unintended consequences that require subsidies and result in less efficient price signals for customers. In the future, before the Company considers expanding the proposed pilot program, it will be important to ensure that this proposed pilot rate design can be aligned with the cost of service and actually deliver the intended benefits to low load factor customers without requiring subsidies from other customers.


## Schedule 200 Rate Design

## Q. Please describe PacifiCorp's rate Schedule 30/730.

A. PacifiCorp's Schedule 30/730 is generally available to large non-residential customers with electric demands between 200 kW to $1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ that are interconnected at secondary and primary voltages. Full-service customers take service under Schedule 30 while direct access customers take service under Schedule 730. Both full-service and direct access customers on Schedule 30/730 are required to pay the applicable rates for Schedule 200 Base Supply Service. However, Schedule 30 customers are required to pay Schedule 201 Net Power Costs ("NPC"), whereas Schedule 730 customers do not.

## Q. Can you please describe PacifiCorp's Schedule 200?

A. Schedule 200 is intended to recover generation-related costs except NPC generation costs, which are recovered in Schedule 201. These non-NPC generation costs include both demand-related and energy-related costs. While Schedule 201 is updated annually in the Transition Adjustment Mechanism ("TAM") proceedings, Schedule 200 does not change between general rate cases.
Q. What are the components of Schedule 200?
A. For energy-billed billed customers, Schedule 200 recovers both demandrelated and energy-related costs in energy charges. For demand-billed customers, the Schedule 200 charges include both demand and energy charges.
Q. Please explain how PacifiCorp has proposed to modify the Schedule 200 rates that are applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary customers.
A. As it applies to Rate Schedule 30/730 secondary, the Schedule 200
demand charge is currently $\$ 1.88$ per kW . PacifiCorp is proposing to increase this charge to $\$ 1.95$ per kW .

The current energy rates have a declining energy block rate structure. However, in this case the Company is recommending to eliminate tiers for this rate schedule and charge customers a flat energy rate for Schedule 200. According to PacifiCorp's rate design witness Robert Meredith, the declining tiered rates create additional complexity and send confusing price signals. ${ }^{1}$ PacifiCorp's current energy charges are 2.860 cents per kWh for the first 20,000 kWh and 2.480 cents for each additional kWh . PacifiCorp's proposed flat energy charge in this case is 2.631 cents per kWh .

Table FM-1 below summarizes the Company's current and proposed Schedule 200 rates applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary at the Company's proposed revenue requirement and revenue allocation.

Table FM-1
PacifiCorp Present and Proposed Schedule 200 Rates
Applicable to Schedule 30/730 Secondary
at PacifiCorp's Proposed Revenue Requirement

| Schedule 200 | Units | Present Rate | Proposed Rate |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Demand Charge | $\$ / \mathrm{kW}$ | 1.88 | 1.95 |
| 1 st 20,000 kWh | $\phi / \mathrm{kWh}$ | 2.860 | 2.631 |
| All additional kWh | $\phi / \mathrm{kWh}$ | 2.480 | 2.631 |

Q. What is your assessment of PacifiCorp's proposed Schedule 200 rates applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary?

[^0]
#### Abstract

A. PacifiCorp's proposed demand charge would significantly under-recover the demand-related generation costs while the proposed energy charge would significantly over-recover the energy-related generation costs. This results in a significant misalignment between the rate design charges and the underlying cost causation. In fact, the proposed Schedule 200 energy rates would recover approximately $269 \%$ of the functionalized energy costs. At the same time, the proposed demand charge would only recover about $25 \%$ of the functionalized demand costs. Table FM-2 below compares the Company's proposed charges relative to cost.


Table FM-2
PacifiCorp Proposed Schedule 200 Charges Relative to Costs
Applicable to Schedule 30/730 Secondary at PacifiCorp's Proposed Revenue Requirement

| Schedule 200 | Units | Cost-Based <br> Rate | Proposed <br> Rate | Charge/ <br> Cost |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Demand Charge | $\$ / \mathrm{kW}$ | 7.95 | 1.95 | $25 \%$ |
| 1 st 20,000 kWh | $\phi / \mathrm{kWh}$ | 0.976 | 2.631 | $269 \%$ |
| All additional kWh | $\phi / \mathrm{kWh}$ | 0.976 | 2.631 | $269 \%$ |

Q. Can you please explain how you determined the functionalized demand and energy related costs for Schedule 200 applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary customers?
A. As described in Exhibit PAC/1408, the proposed marginal generation costs are based on the Company's most recent avoided cost calculations, which recognize that baseload generation provides both capacity and energy. The Company's marginal generation costs are based on the fixed and variable cost of a combined cycle combustion turbine ("CCCT") which the Company operates as a baseload
unit. The cost of the CCCT is split into capacity and energy components. The fixed cost of a simple cycle combustion turbine ("SCCT") defines the fixed costs of the CCCT that are assigned to capacity. The CCCT fixed costs in excess of the SCCT fixed costs are assigned to energy. ${ }^{2}$ These fixed generation costs are recovered through Schedule 200 charges while the variable avoided energy costs are recovered through Schedule 201.

While I am not taking a position on the Company's marginal cost of service study methods at this time, based on the Company's methodology, I determined that $30.8 \%$ of the fixed generation marginal costs for Schedule 30/730 secondary are energy related, while the remaining $69.2 \%$ are demand related. Therefore, $30.8 \%$ of the functionalized Schedule 200 costs allocated to Schedule 30/730, or $\$ 12.3$ million, should be considered energy related, while the remaining $69.2 \%$, or $\$ 27.7$ million, should be considered demand related. For ease of comparison, I then calculated cost-based demand and energy rates by dividing the energy and demand related costs by the appropriate billing determinants for the class. The derivation of these demand and energy costs is presented in Exhibit FM/102.

## Q. Does PacifiCorp's proposed rate design make reasonable movement towards

 improving the alignment between the charges and the underlying costs?A.

No, it does not. The proposed Schedule 200 rates applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary would increase the recovery of revenues through demand-related per kW charges by $3.9 \%$, while the recovery of revenues through energy-related per kWh charges would increase by $3.7 \%$. Increasing the energy-related and

[^1]demand-related revenue recovery by approximately the same percentage would effectively maintain the current rate structure and would not make reasonable movement towards improving the alignment between the Schedule 200 rates and the cost of service.
Q. From a customer's perspective, why should it matter if PacifiCorp proposes a demand charge that does not fully recover its demand-related costs?
A. If a utility proposes a demand charge that is below the cost of demand, it is going to seek to recover its revenue requirement by over-recovering its costs in another area, most typically through levying an energy charge that is greater than the underlying energy costs, which is the case with PacifiCorp's proposed rate design. For a given rate schedule such as Schedule 30/730, when demand charges are set below cost, and energy charges are set above cost, those customers with relatively higher load factors are required to subsidize the lower load factor customers within the class.

## Q. How do you define higher load factor customers?

A. For purposes of this discussion, I use this term to refer to customers whose load factors are greater than the average for the rate schedule.
Q. Why is it important for rate design to be representative of underlying cost causation?
A.

Aligning rate design with underlying cost causation improves efficiency because it sends proper price signals. For example, setting a demand charge below the cost of demand understates the economic cost of demand-related assets, which
in turn distorts consumption decisions, and calls forth a greater level of investment in fixed assets than is economically desirable.

At the same time, aligning rate design with cost causation is important for ensuring equity among customers, because properly aligning charges with costs minimizes cross-subsidies among customers. As I stated above, if demand costs are understated in utility rates, the costs are made up elsewhere - typically in energy rates. When this happens, higher-load-factor customers (who use fixed assets relatively efficiently through relatively constant energy usage) are forced to pay the demand-related costs of lower-load-factor customers. This amounts to a crosssubsidy that is fundamentally inequitable.

## Q. Does the Company recognize the importance of aligning rate design with the underlying costs?

A. Yes, it does. According to Mr. Meredith, well-designed prices should send a clear price signal about the incremental cost of additional energy consumption and thus promote energy efficiency. He also states that when a rate structure unduly penalizes incremental energy usage above its additional costs, it can result in unintended consequences. ${ }^{3}$
Q. What is your recommendation with respect to Schedule 200 rate design applicable to Schedule 30/730?
A. I recommend moderate changes to the proposed Schedule 200 demand and energy rates that will make some progress towards aligning the rate design with the underlying costs while also mitigating the intra-class rate impacts that would result

[^2]from a more significant movement towards cost-based rates at this time. Specifically, I recommend that the demand charge should be increased to $\$ 3.75$ per kW , which would recover approximately $47 \%$ of the demand-related costs. The energy charges should be adjusted downward by the amount necessary to recover the final approved revenue target. I am not recommending any changes to the other Schedule 30/730 rate elements proposed by the Company. The revenue verification for this rate design is presented in Exhibit FM/103. My proposed rates and resulting cost alignment are compared to PacifiCorp's proposed rates in Table FM-3 below.

## Table FM-3

PacifiCorp and Fred Meyer Proposed Schedule 200 Charges Relative to Cost Applicable to Schedule 30/730 Secondary at PacifiCorp's Proposed Revenue Requirement

|  |  |  | PacifiCorp |  | Fred Meyer |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Schedule 200 | Units | Cost-Based |  |  |  |  |
| Rate | Proposed | Charge/ | Proposed | Charge/ |  |  |
| Rate | Cost | Rate | Cost |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Demand Charge | $\$ / \mathrm{kW}$ | 7.95 | 1.95 | $25 \%$ | 3.75 | $47 \%$ |
| 1 st 20,000 kWh | $\phi / \mathrm{kWh}$ | 0.976 | 2.631 | $269 \%$ | 2.134 | $219 \%$ |
| All additional kWh | $\phi / \mathrm{kWh}$ | 0.976 | 2.631 | $269 \%$ | 2.134 | $219 \%$ |

Q. How does your recommended rate design improve the alignment between charges and the underlying cost components?
A. As I describe above, the Company's proposed rate design for the Schedule 200 demand and energy charges applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary customers significantly under-recover the demand related costs while significantly over-recovering the energy related costs. My proposal to increase the Schedule 200 demand-related charge to recover a greater share of the demand-related costs makes gradual movement towards improving the alignment between the demand and energy revenues and costs.
Q. Does your proposed rate design result in charges that are $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ aligned with costs?
A. No, it does not. As I explain above, I am proposing modest changes to the Schedule 200 rate design that result in gradual movement towards aligning rates with the cost of service in order to mitigate the intra-class rate impacts that could result from a more significant movement towards cost at this time. In fact, under my proposed rate design, the Schedule 200 energy charges applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary rate would still be more than double the energy related costs.
Q. Have you prepared a rate impact analysis of your recommended changes to Schedule 200 rate design for Schedule 30?
A. Yes. My rate impact analysis is presented in Exhibit FM/104 and illustrates the total bill impacts to customers that would result from my recommended improvements to the rate design at the Company's proposed revenue requirement. For ease of comparison, I have utilized the same format and customer load profiles for this analysis that the Company uses for this purpose in Exhibit PAC/1410. ${ }^{4}$ However, I have added one additional column to illustrate the load factor for each customer load profile. I have also eliminated the load profiles for customers with a load size of 100 kW , since Schedule 30/730 is only available to customers whose loads have registered greater than 200 kW more than six times in the preceding 12month period.

[^3]Q. Your proposed rate design results in a smaller rate impact on higher-loadfactor customers than lower-load-factor customers. Is this a reasonable result?
A. Yes, it is a reasonable result. My proposed rate design reflects a cost-based difference while providing gradual movement towards cost-based rates. The proposed rate design for Schedule 200 applicable to Schedule 30/730 secondary customers contains a significant misalignment between the charges and the cost of service, which results in an intra-class subsidy from higher-load-factor customers to lower-load-factor customers. As I state above, I am not proposing full movement towards cost-based rates in this case. Instead, my proposed rate design makes gradual movement towards aligning rates with cost causation and reduces, but does not eliminate, the existing intra-class subsidy. By gradually reducing this intraclass subsidy, lower-load-factor customers will experience greater rate increases than higher-load-factor customers. This is a reasonable result because it strikes a balance between two important rate-making principles - improving the alignment between rates and the underlying cost components while employing gradualism.
Q. Would your proposed rate design result in better revenue stability for the Company?
A. Yes, it would. In general, energy usage is more volatile than billing demand. Therefore, increasing the proportion of revenues that are recovered through demand charges would result in increased revenue stability for Schedule 30/730.
Q. Your proposed Schedule 200 rate design was calculated using the Company's proposed revenue requirement. How should your proposed rate design be implemented if the Commission adopts a base rate revenue requirement that is less than PacifiCorp's request?
A. To the extent that the Commission approves a revenue target for Schedule 30/730 secondary that is less than that proposed by PacifiCorp, I recommend that Schedule 200 energy charges that I have proposed be reduced by the necessary amount in order to recover the target revenue requirement.

## Rate Mitigation Adjustment

Q. What is the RMA?
A. As Mr. Meredith describes, the RMA, which is recovered through Schedule 299 , is designed to mitigate the impacts of changes to the functionalized revenue requirement on net rates across rate schedules. Net rates include the impacts of all tariff riders, including the RMA. Some rate schedules receive a credit through the RMA that provides rate mitigation, while other rate schedules receive offsetting charges. ${ }^{5}$
Q. Is the RMA designed to be revenue neutral?
A. Yes, it is. According to Mr. Meredith, the proposed RMA rates have been designed to be revenue neutral for the 2021 test period. ${ }^{6}$
Q. Please describe the Company's proposed RMA in this case.

[^4]
#### Abstract

A. Mr. Meredith explains that the Company's RMA objective is to minimize rate schedule subsidization while at the same time minimizing impacts to its customers. In this case, PacifiCorp is proposing a slight reduction to the RMA credit for Schedule 41/741 Agricultural Pumping Service rate that would reduce the annual RMA credits from $\$ 1.3$ million to $\$ 1.2$ million and result in a cap for the Schedule $41 / 741$ rate increase at $10 \%$. PacifiCorp is also proposing a $50 \%$ reduction to the present RMA credits for the Large General Service Schedules $47 / 747$ and 48/748. Despite this reduction relative to the current RMA, this would still result in substantial RMA credits for these rate schedules equal to $\$ 5.4$ million on an annual basis. The Company proposes to fund these RMA credits for Schedule 41/741 and the Large General Service Schedules $47 / 747$ and $48 / 748$ with RMA surcharges that would be allocated to General Service Schedules 28/728 and $30 / 730$. These proposed RMA surcharges would total $\$ 6.6$ million and would be allocated in a manner that produces a net increase for the General Service Schedules that is slightly less than the overall average at about 4\%. Finally, the Company proposes bringing the RMA to zero for the Residential Schedule 4, General Service Schedule 23/723, and Lighting Schedules 15, 51, 53 and 54. ${ }^{7}$ Table FM-4 below summarizes the Company's proposed RMA credits and the resulting net increase by rate schedule.


Table FM-4
PacifiCorp Proposed RMA Credits and Net Increase by Rate Schedule

[^5]| Description | Proposed <br> Schedule | Proposed <br> RMA | PAC Proposed Increase ${ }^{1}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | (\$000) | (\$000) | \% |
| Residential | 4 | \$0 | \$27,663 | 4.3\% |
| Gen. Svc. $<31 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 23 | \$0 | \$6,845 | 5.2\% |
| Gen. Svc. 31-200 kW | 28 | \$5,749 | \$6,192 | 3.2\% |
| Secondary |  | \$5,676 | \$6,026 | 3.2\% |
| Primary |  | \$73 | \$166 | 7.1\% |
| Gen. Svc. 201-999 kW | 30 | \$899 | \$3,630 | 3.2\% |
| Secondary |  | \$834 | \$3,280 | 3.1\% |
| Primary |  | \$65 | \$350 | 4.3\% |
| Large General Service $>=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 48 | $(\$ 5,368)$ | \$15,641 | 7.6\% |
| Secondary |  | (\$744) | \$5,026 | 11.7\% |
| Primary |  | $(\$ 2,593)$ | \$8,142 | 7.7\% |
| Transmission |  | $(\$ 2,031)$ | \$2,473 | 4.2\% |
| Partial Req. Svc. $>=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 47 | (\$76) | \$370 | 7.2\% |
| Dist. Only Lg Gen Svc $>=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 848 | \$0 | (\$106) | -4.7\% |
| Agricultural Pumping Service | 41 | $(\$ 1,205)$ | \$2,310 | 9.2\% |
| Total Public Street Lighting |  | \$0 | $(\$ 1,218)$ | -19.3\% |
| Subtotal |  | (\$2) | \$61,327 | 4.6\% |

${ }^{1}$ Includes RAC and Adders. Adders Exclude effects of the Low Income Bill Payment Assistance Charge (Sch. 91), BPA Credit (Sch. 98), Public Purpose Charge (Sch. 290) and Energy Conservation Charge (Sch. 297).
Q. What is your assessment of the Company's proposed RMA in this case?
A. In general, based on the circumstances of this case, the Company's proposed RMA appears to be reasonable. The proposed RMA results in a small subsidy reduction for Schedule 41/741 Agricultural Pumping Service that would cap the net rate increase for the rate class at slightly less than twice the system average. At the same time it results in a $50 \%$ reduction in subsidies for the Large General Service Schedules 47/747 and 48/748.

However, while the proposed subsidies for the subsidy receiving classes would be reduced, the General Service Schedules 28/728 and 30/730 would fund the entire amount under the Company's proposal, while the remaining rate schedules would not be allocated any RMA surcharges. This proposal would actually cause the total amount of subsidies being funded by General Service Schedules 28/728 and 30/730 to be more than double the present RMA amounts.

## Q. What do you recommend regarding the Company's proposed RMA?

A. I am not recommending any changes to the Company's proposed RMA, at the Company's proposed revenue requirement because it results in a substantial reduction to the existing subsidies for the subsidy receiving classes. However, to the extent that the Commission approves a rate increase that is less than that being proposed by the Company, then I recommend that the Commission take advantage of the opportunity to improve the alignment between revenue responsibility and cost causation while still reducing the requested rate increase for all rate classes.

To accomplish this goal, I recommend that any reduction to PacifiCorp's proposed rate increase should be allocated using a two-step process. In the first step, the reduction to the proposed rate increase should be used to reduce the proposed functionalized revenues for all rate schedules. This reduction should be allocated consistent with the cost of service or on a pro rata basis based on the Company's proposed net rates less the RMA credits and surcharges.

For the second step, I recommend that the total $\$ 6.6$ million in subsidies that are proposed to be allocated through the RMA should be reduced by an amount that is equal to $10 \%$ of the rate reduction relative to the Company's filed case. For
example, if the Commission approves a final rate increase that is $\$ 10$ million less than the Company's request, then the subsidies to be allocated through the RMA should be reduced by $\$ 1$ million. ${ }^{8}$ The subsidies should be reduced on a pro rata basis in proportion to the amount of the subsidy each class is currently paying in its present rates.

## Q. Can you provide an example that demonstrates how your recommendation could be implemented if the Commission approves a rate increase that is less than the Company's request?

A. Yes, I have prepared an example to show how the proposed rate increase and RMA could be reallocated if the Commission approves a rate increase that is $\$ 10$ million less than PacifiCorp's request. To be clear, I am not recommending that $\$ 10$ million is the appropriate adjustment to PacifiCorp's proposed revenue requirement. However, this example is intended to demonstrate how my recommendation can be applied for a rate increase that is less than PacifiCorp's proposed increase in this case. Table FM-5 summarizes the results of my recommended methodology for adjusting the rate increase and RMA between rate classes at a revenue requirement that is $\$ 10$ million less than PacifiCorp's proposed request. The derivation of the adjusted revenue allocation is provided in Exhibit $\mathrm{FM} / 105$. As can be seen in this example, every rate class would receive a rate increase that is less than PacifiCorp's proposed rate increase, even those rate classes that are currently receiving large interclass subsidies.

[^6]| Description | Proposed Schedule | Proposed RMA | PAC Proposed Increase ${ }^{1}$ |  | Rate Reduction <br> Relative to <br> Filed Case | Increase at Reduced Revenue Requirement ${ }^{1}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | (\$000) | (\$000) | \% | (\$000) | (\$000) | \% |
| Residential | 4 | \$0 | \$27,663 | 4.3\% | (\$4,823) | \$22,839 | 3.6\% |
| Gen. Svc. $<31 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 23 | \$0 | \$6,845 | 5.2\% | $(\$ 1,006)$ | \$5,839 | 4.4\% |
| Gen. Svc. 31-200 kW | 28 | \$5,749 | \$6,192 | 3.2\% | $(\$ 2,254)$ | \$3,938 | 2.0\% |
| Secondary |  | \$5,676 | \$6,026 | 3.2\% | $(\$ 2,226)$ | \$3,800 | 2.0\% |
| Primary |  | \$73 | \$166 | 7.1\% | (\$29) | \$138 | 5.9\% |
| Gen. Svc. 201-999 kW | 30 | \$899 | \$3,630 | 3.2\% | (\$973) | \$2,658 | 2.3\% |
| Secondary |  | \$834 | \$3,280 | 3.1\% | (\$902) | \$2,378 | 2.3\% |
| Primary |  | \$65 | \$350 | 4.3\% | (\$70) | \$280 | 3.4\% |
| Large General Service $>=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 48 | $(\$ 5,368)$ | \$15,641 | 7.6\% | (\$838) | \$14,803 | 7.1\% |
| Secondary |  | (\$744) | \$5,026 | 11.7\% | (\$238) | \$4,787 | 11.2\% |
| Primary |  | $(\$ 2,593)$ | \$8,142 | 7.7\% | (\$450) | \$7,692 | 7.3\% |
| Transmission |  | (\$2,031) | \$2,473 | 4.2\% | (\$150) | \$2,323 | 4.0\% |
| Partial Req. Svc. $>=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 47 | (\$76) | \$370 | 7.2\% | (\$29) | \$341 | 6.6\% |
| Dist. Only Lg Gen Svc $>=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 848 | \$0 | (\$106) | -4.7\% | (\$15) | (\$121) | -5.4\% |
| Agricultural Pumping Service | 41 | $(\$ 1,205)$ | \$2,310 | 9.2\% | (\$24) | \$2,286 | 9.1\% |
| Total Public Street Lighting |  | \$0 | $(\$ 1,218)$ | -19.3\% | (\$37) | $(\$ 1,255)$ | -19.8\% |
| Subtotal |  | (\$2) | \$61,327 | 4.6\% | (\$10,000) | \$51,327 | 3.9\% |

${ }^{1}$ Includes RAC and Adders. Adders Exclude effects of the Low Income Bill Payment Assistance Charge (Sch. 91), BPA Credit (Sch. 98), Public
Purpose Charge (Sch. 290) and Energy Conservation Charge (Sch. 297).

## Proposed Schedule 29 - Non-Residential Time of Use Pilot

Q. Please describe the Company's proposed Schedule 29 Time of Use Pilot.
A. Company witness Mr. Meredith explains that the Company is proposing a new optional time of use pilot program that would be available for non-residential customers who would otherwise qualify for Schedule 23, Schedule 28, or Schedule $30 .{ }^{9}$
Q. What are the alleged benefits of this type of rate structure?

[^7]A. Mr. Meredith claims that demand charges are an impediment to the buildout
of fast-charging transportation infrastructure. He explains that although the
existing Schedule 45 already provides a limited opportunity to shield publicly
available DC fast-charging stations from the rate impacts of a demand charge, that
the Company would like to explore a more broadly available time of use option that
also minimizes the adverse bill impacts for very low load factor customers. He also
asserts that other forms of transportation electrification or other customers with
very low load utilization could take advantage of the proposed Schedule $29 .{ }^{10}$
Qhy does the Company believe it is reasonable for very low load factor
customers to pay less on this optional rate schedule?
Mr. Meredith claims that customers with very low load factors are less
A. likely to have peak demands that coincide with the Company's system peaks. To
support this claim, he provides research sample load data for customers on
Schedules 23,28 , and 30 . Figure FM-1 below compares the load factor to the
coincidence with system peak of the various customer load profiles.
Schedule 23, 28 and 30 Coincidence with Monthly System Peaks as
Compared to Individual Customer Load Factor ${ }^{11}$

[^8]

## Load Factor

Q. Do you agree that customers with low load factors on Schedules 23, 28, and 30 are less likely to have peak demands that coincide with the Company's system peaks.
A. While there is a positive correlation between the annual load factor and the average coincidence with system peak in the load research data provided by the Company, there is still quite a bit of variation and some customers with relatively low load factors do have high coincidence factors with the system peak. For example, the subset of customers with relatively low load factors between $20 \%$ and $25 \%$ have coincidence factors with system peak that range between $6.7 \%$ and $57 \%$. In addition, the subset of customers with a coincidence factor between $40 \%$ and $50 \%$ have a wide range of load factors between $7.2 \%$ and $59.4 \% .^{12}$

[^9]Further, the research sample load factor and coincidence factor data are based on the aggregate 12 monthly billing demands and coincident peak loads for the sample customers. Utilizing the aggregate yearly data to compute the load factor to coincidence factor ratio effectively compares the average annual load factor to the average coincidence with the system peak load. This method would provide a reasonable assessment of a customer's coincidence with system peak relative to load factor if the ratios of that customer's monthly billing demands and coincidence with system peaks are relatively constant throughout the year. However, it would not reasonably reflect the cost contribution of a low load factor customer that has a very high coincidence with the system peak in one or two months, but low coincidence with system peaks during the rest of the year.

## Q. Please describe the Company's proposed rate design for the Schedule 29 time of use pilot rate.

A. Mr. Meredith explains that the proposed pilot program would utilize declining $\mathrm{kWh}-\mathrm{per}-\mathrm{kW}$ energy charges. The first 50 kWh for each kW of demand would be charged at a higher rate and all additional $\mathrm{kWh}-\mathrm{per}-\mathrm{kW}$ would be charged at a lower rate. According to Mr. Meredith, this rate structure results in a declining average energy price that declines as load factor increases, which has a similar impact to a demand charge, but it puts a cap on how high the average cost can be for low load factor customers. Mr. Meredith also explains that the proposed Schedule 29 rate would apply a sur-credit to off-peak energy so that the energy prices would be time differentiated. ${ }^{13}$

[^10]Q. The Company is proposing a rate structure that would utilize declining $k W h-$ per-kW energy charges. Can you please elaborate regarding the general purpose of this form of rate design?
A. The rate structure that PacifiCorp is proposing for Schedule 29 that would utilize declining kWh-per-kW energy charges is also known as an "hours-use" rate design, or a Wright rate design, after its originator. An hours-use charge is a somewhat complex rate design element that is not used by all utilities.

An hours-use charge is a type of energy charge that recovers both demandrelated and energy-related costs in the same charge. This is accomplished by setting the hours-use energy charge at a level greater than the base energy charge. The portion of the hours-use charge in excess of the base energy charge performs a role similar to that of a demand charge and can be construed to be recovering demandrelated costs. If properly designed, the remainder of the charge, equivalent to the base energy charge, should recover only energy-related costs.

The hours-use rate design can be illustrated by examining the Company's proposed rate design for Schedule 29. The proposed rates would utilize a charge of 20.614 cents for the for the first $50 \mathrm{kWh}-\mathrm{per}-\mathrm{kW}$ and 7.274 cents for all additional kWh . Thus the 7.274 cent rate for all additional kWh utilizes a basic per-kWh rate design and ideally should represent the purely energy-related component of the rate. The hours-use charge is the 20.614 cents that applies to the first $50 \mathrm{kWh}-$ per- kW . This means that the charge is not a function of energy usage only, but rather a function of energy usage in relation to the customer's billing demand, and therefore a means to recover demand-related costs. To describe it
another way, it is a premium rate that is applied to the energy usage associated with low-load-factor consumption. In the case of the proposed Schedule 29 rates, this hours-use rate applies to energy usage below a load factor of $6.8 \%$ ( 50 hours/730 hours per month).

## Q. What is your assessment of the Company's proposed Schedule 29 NonResidential Time of Use Pilot? <br> A. Although the Company is proposing to call its proposed Schedule 29 a time of use pilot, it is clear that this pilot it is really intended to be a specialty low load factor rate that would shield low load factor customers from the impacts of demand charges. Mr. Meredith confirms this intent when he describes the alleged benefits of the proposed pilot. Specifically, he asserts that the Company would like to explore a more broadly available time of use option that also minimizes the adverse bill impacts for very low load factor customers and that other customers with very low load utilization could take advantage for the proposed Schedule 29. ${ }^{14}$

## Q. Do you have any concerns with this proposed rate?

A. Yes, I do. The proposed rate design has the potential to subsidize low load factor customers which could result in adverse impacts to other customers who could end up funding the subsidy. Despite the Company's assertion that very low load factor customers generally have a lower coincidence with system peak, some low load factor customers could have high coincidence with the system peak.

[^11]Further, the proposed rate design would incorporate a relatively complex hours-use charge, which would run counter to the Company's stated goals to reduce complexity and avoid confusing price signals. ${ }^{15}$

## Q. What do you recommend regarding the proposed Schedule 29 Non-Residential Time of Use Pilot?

A. While the proposed Schedule 29 is only a pilot program, low load factor specialty rates can often have unintended consequences that require subsidies and result in less efficient price signals for customers. In the future, before the Company considers expanding the proposed pilot program, it will be important to ensure that this proposed pilot rate design can be aligned with the cost to serve and actually deliver the intended benefits to low load factor customers without requiring subsidies from its other customers.
Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?
A.
Yes, it does.

[^12]
## BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSTION OF THE STATE OR OREGON

In the Matter of PacifiCorp's Request for a ) General Rate Revision

## AFFIDAVIT OF JUSTIN BIEBER

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Justin Bieber, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that:

1. He is a Senior Consultant with Energy Strategies. L.L.C., in Salt Lake City, Utah;
2. He is the witness who sponsors the accompanying testimony entitled "Opening Testimony of Justin Bieber;"
3. Said testimony was prepared by him and under his direction and supervision;
4. If inquiries were made as to the facts and schedules in said testimony he would respond as therein set forth; and
5. The aforesaid testimony and schedules are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.


Subscribed and sworn to or affirmed before me this 4th day of June, 2020, by Justin Bieber.


# Docket No. UE-374 

Fred Meyer<br>Exhibit FM/101

PacifiCorp Responses to

## Data Requests Referenced in Testimony

## Kroger Data Request 2.3

Refer to the Direct Testimony of Robert M. Meredith page 57, Figure 2.
Schedule 23, 28 and 30 Coincidence with Monthly System Peaks as Compared to Individual Customer Load Factor.
a. Please provide the source data and workpapers supporting Figure 2. Please provide the data in excel format, with working formula.

## Response to Kroger Data Request 2.3

a. Please see Attachment Kroger 2.3.

|  | Energy (kWh) | 12 Max Load (kW) | 12 CP (kW) | Load Factor | CP/NCP | Schedule |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 1 | 62 | 8.278 | 0 | 1.0\% | 0.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 2 | 70 | 2.45 | 0.138 | 3.9\% | 5.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 3 | 4,575 | 160.05 | 2.082 | 3.9\% | 1.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 4 | 63 | 1.516 | 0.362 | 5.7\% | 23.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 5 | 2,056 | 47.538 | 3.112 | 5.9\% | 6.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 6 | 847 | 19.252 | 0.62 | 6.0\% | 3.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 7 | 360 | 8.11 | 0.444 | 6.1\% | 5.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 8 | 435 | 8.99 | 0.294 | 6.6\% | 3.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 9 | 522 | 8.528 | 0.534 | 8.4\% | 6.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 10 | 2,685 | 39.23 | 2.576 | 9.4\% | 6.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 11 | 2,230 | 31.386 | 1.812 | 9.7\% | 5.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 12 | 360 | 5.056 | 0.428 | 9.8\% | 8.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 13 | 2,810 | 38.994 | 2.42 | 9.9\% | 6.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 14 | 2,139 | 27.454 | 3.858 | 10.7\% | 14.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 15 | 3,980 | 44.15 | 3.738 | 12.3\% | 8.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 16 | 3,936 | 42.234 | 7.032 | 12.8\% | 16.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 17 | 8,020 | 83.684 | 14.528 | 13.1\% | 17.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 18 | 4,045 | 42.068 | 10.87 | 13.2\% | 25.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 19 | 8,942 | 92.674 | 23.078 | 13.2\% | 24.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 20 | 9,174 | 93.042 | 22.509 | 13.5\% | 24.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 21 | 812 | 7.558 | 1.64 | 14.7\% | 21.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 22 | 3,967 | 35.662 | 2.06 | 15.2\% | 5.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 23 | 878 | 7.566 | 2.074 | 15.9\% | 27.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 24 | 20,956 | 179.502 | 42.82 | 16.0\% | 23.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 25 | 3,152 | 26.744 | 2.55 | 16.1\% | 9.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 26 | 4,384 | 36.916 | 5.73 | 16.3\% | 15.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 27 | 2,937 | 24.49 | 7.596 | 16.4\% | 31.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 28 | 4,744 | 39.432 | 7.034 | 16.5\% | 17.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 29 | 24,245 | 197.332 | 79.62 | 16.8\% | 40.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 30 | 5,230 | 41.078 | 3.318 | 17.4\% | 8.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 31 | 5,720 | 43.496 | 8.77 | 18.0\% | 20.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 32 | 20,015 | 146.106 | 18.02 | 18.8\% | 12.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 33 | 14,467 | 102.446 | 34.92 | 19.3\% | 34.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 34 | 11,473 | 80.824 | 33.66 | 19.4\% | 41.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 35 | 2,869 | 18.986 | 5.56 | 20.7\% | 29.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 36 | 10,143 | 65.2 | 19.334 | 21.3\% | 29.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 37 | 5,896 | 36.72 | 12.828 | 22.0\% | 34.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 38 | 830 | 5.038 | 0.99 | 22.6\% | 19.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 39 | 48,685 | 293.472 | 159.074 | 22.7\% | 54.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 40 | 3,664 | 21.586 | 10.104 | 23.2\% | 46.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 41 | 6,058 | 34.554 | 10.524 | 24.0\% | 30.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 42 | 17,993 | 100.866 | 28.416 | 24.4\% | 28.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 43 | 3,044 | 16.908 | 6.652 | 24.7\% | 39.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 44 | 6,926 | 38.414 | 9.548 | 24.7\% | 24.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 45 | 8,713 | 47.548 | 21.614 | 25.1\% | 45.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 46 | 36,734 | 198.336 | 100.496 | 25.4\% | 50.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 47 | 6,734 | 36.316 | 14.052 | 25.4\% | 38.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 48 | 45,477 | 243.056 | 105.312 | 25.6\% | 43.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 49 | 5,021 | 26.74 | 6.296 | 25.7\% | 23.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 50 | 6,655 | 34.928 | 11.526 | 26.1\% | 33.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 51 | 29,817 | 154.26 | 94.836 | 26.5\% | 61.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 52 | 20,519 | 105.932 | 24.144 | 26.5\% | 22.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 53 | 1,030 | 5.272 | 1.374 | 26.8\% | 26.1\% | 23 |



| Cust 54 | 4,158 | 21.134 | 5.544 | 27.0\% | 26.2\% | 23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 55 | 32,430 | 163.928 | 49.688 | 27.1\% | 30.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 56 | 5,317 | 26.804 | 10.312 | 27.2\% | 38.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 57 | 26,012 | 130.778 | 44.704 | 27.2\% | 34.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 58 | 10,995 | 55.26 | 28.348 | 27.3\% | 51.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 59 | 40,174 | 198.824 | 103.72 | 27.7\% | 52.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 60 | 15,401 | 76.202 | 45.268 | 27.7\% | 59.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 61 | 8,448 | 41.57 | 11.566 | 27.8\% | 27.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 62 | 4,602 | 22.446 | 9.738 | 28.1\% | 43.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 63 | 34,511 | 167.472 | 94.388 | 28.2\% | 56.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 64 | 983 | 4.77 | 0.874 | 28.2\% | 18.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 65 | 30,600 | 148.362 | 56.306 | 28.3\% | 38.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 66 | 1,093 | 5.24 | 1.456 | 28.6\% | 27.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 67 | 19,786 | 94.768 | 60.312 | 28.6\% | 63.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 68 | 5,451 | 26.092 | 7.576 | 28.6\% | 29.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 69 | 15,612 | 73.204 | 38.652 | 29.2\% | 52.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 70 | 38,419 | 171.15 | 78.852 | 30.8\% | 46.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 71 | 12,394 | 53.246 | 29.452 | 31.9\% | 55.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 72 | 12,543 | 53.776 | 40.162 | 32.0\% | 74.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 73 | 45,083 | 188.974 | 58.796 | 32.7\% | 31.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 74 | 2,358 | 9.606 | 4.023 | 33.6\% | 41.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 75 | 25,869 | 104.976 | 43.68 | 33.8\% | 41.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 76 | 33,970 | 137.73 | 77.142 | 33.8\% | 56.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 77 | 22,396 | 88.266 | 48.618 | 34.8\% | 55.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 78 | 9,969 | 38.338 | 16.438 | 35.6\% | 42.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 79 | 42,869 | 163.6 | 119.222 | 35.9\% | 72.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 80 | 53,159 | 201.326 | 122.582 | 36.2\% | 60.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 81 | 39,773 | 148.168 | 51.074 | 36.8\% | 34.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 82 | 34,865 | 128.022 | 85.245 | 37.3\% | 66.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 83 | 57,092 | 206.216 | 112.816 | 37.9\% | 54.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 84 | 37,222 | 133.08 | 72.368 | 38.3\% | 54.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 85 | 5,997 | 21.264 | 13.118 | 38.6\% | 61.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 86 | 31,512 | 111.063 | 79.86 | 38.9\% | 71.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 87 | 14,170 | 49.656 | 26.85 | 39.1\% | 54.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 88 | 8,695 | 30.42 | 9.752 | 39.2\% | 32.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 89 | 45,740 | 151.662 | 80.832 | 41.3\% | 53.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 90 | 17,955 | 58.354 | 22.424 | 42.1\% | 38.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 91 | 81,397 | 258.704 | 180.976 | 43.1\% | 70.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 92 | 11,392 | 35.488 | 26.266 | 44.0\% | 74.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 93 | 11,076 | 34.474 | 20.432 | 44.0\% | 59.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 94 | 33,116 | 101.324 | 55.428 | 44.8\% | 54.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 95 | 60,958 | 183.062 | 129.494 | 45.6\% | 70.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 96 | 31,046 | 92.234 | 59.912 | 46.1\% | 65.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 97 | 50,881 | 150.744 | 120.52 | 46.2\% | 80.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 98 | 38,619 | 114.246 | 60.61 | 46.3\% | 53.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 99 | 41,756 | 122.29 | 65.562 | 46.8\% | 53.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 100 | 3,751 | 10.944 | 1.518 | 47.0\% | 13.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 101 | 53,272 | 154.882 | 95.422 | 47.1\% | 61.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 102 | 60,681 | 175.204 | 146.422 | 47.4\% | 83.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 103 | 90,709 | 260.56 | 187.544 | 47.7\% | 72.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 104 | 62,981 | 179.274 | 121.872 | 48.1\% | 68.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 105 | 49,117 | 139.738 | 102.506 | 48.1\% | 73.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 106 | 84,552 | 237.52 | 152.818 | 48.8\% | 64.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 107 | 48,578 | 136.156 | 100.098 | 48.9\% | 73.5\% | 23 |

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| Cust 108 | 54,307 | 152.184 | 103.28 | 48.9\% | 67.9\% | 23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 109 | 59,003 | 164.944 | 96.2 | 49.0\% | 58.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 110 | 42,462 | 117.424 | 65.088 | 49.5\% | 55.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 111 | 78,736 | 216.902 | 90.708 | 49.7\% | 41.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 112 | 17,478 | 47.666 | 23.666 | 50.2\% | 49.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 113 | 473 | 1.288 | 0.504 | 50.3\% | 39.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 114 | 77,021 | 206.292 | 136.376 | 51.1\% | 66.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 115 | 50,364 | 133.668 | 81.54 | 51.6\% | 61.0\% | 23 |
| Cust 116 | 56,280 | 147.516 | 90.204 | 52.3\% | 61.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 117 | 56,937 | 148.62 | 107.4 | 52.5\% | 72.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 118 | 22,108 | 57.078 | 41.16 | 53.1\% | 72.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 119 | 20,348 | 52.28 | 15.062 | 53.3\% | 28.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 120 | 52,383 | 132.544 | 82.56 | 54.1\% | 62.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 121 | 99,214 | 244.55 | 170.05 | 55.6\% | 69.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 122 | 6,175 | 14.89 | 5.616 | 56.8\% | 37.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 123 | 7,855 | 18.882 | 8.63 | 57.0\% | 45.7\% | 23 |
| Cust 124 | 101,167 | 241.413 | 190.905 | 57.4\% | 79.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 125 | 49,588 | 117.624 | 90.972 | 57.8\% | 77.3\% | 23 |
| Cust 126 | 6,524 | 15.044 | 6.784 | 59.4\% | 45.1\% | 23 |
| Cust 127 | 80,352 | 164.44 | 114.22 | 66.9\% | 69.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 128 | 99,087 | 193.504 | 145.568 | 70.1\% | 75.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 129 | 210,286 | 410.306 | 288.884 | 70.2\% | 70.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 130 | 82,644 | 151.918 | 105.69 | 74.5\% | 69.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 131 | 106,390 | 185.914 | 163.452 | 78.4\% | 87.9\% | 23 |
| Cust 132 | 39,140 | 68.21 | 61.798 | 78.6\% | 90.6\% | 23 |
| Cust 133 | 24,820 | 41.616 | 36.398 | 81.7\% | 87.5\% | 23 |
| Cust 134 | 40,928 | 64.688 | 58.742 | 86.7\% | 90.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 135 | 71,224 | 111.458 | 99.444 | 87.5\% | 89.2\% | 23 |
| Cust 136 | 1,322 | 2.068 | 1.92 | 87.6\% | 92.8\% | 23 |
| Cust 137 | 5,421 | 8.316 | 7.436 | 89.3\% | 89.4\% | 23 |
| Cust 138 | - | 0 | 0 | 0.0\% | 0.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 139 | 0 | 0.008 | 0 | 0.1\% | 0.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 140 | 37,619 | 1517.904 | 22.848 | 3.4\% | 1.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 141 | 11,926 | 285.036 | 14.16 | 5.7\% | 5.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 142 | 7,314 | 138.928 | 62.864 | 7.2\% | 45.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 143 | 31,989 | 397.816 | 83.992 | 11.0\% | 21.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 144 | 51,294 | 567.568 | 118.144 | 12.4\% | 20.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 145 | 17,819 | 177.72 | 24.544 | 13.7\% | 13.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 146 | 61,615 | 584.104 | 156.616 | 14.5\% | 26.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 147 | 3,385 | 31.764 | 4.966 | 14.6\% | 15.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 148 | 106,275 | 806.568 | 86.168 | 18.0\% | 10.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 149 | 35,107 | 256.192 | 106.4 | 18.8\% | 41.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 150 | 60,674 | 431.904 | 168.232 | 19.2\% | 39.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 151 | 74,763 | 509.336 | 187.56 | 20.1\% | 36.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 152 | 189,196 | 1264.208 | 429.248 | 20.5\% | 34.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 153 | 22,063 | 146.024 | 49.08 | 20.7\% | 33.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 154 | 82,323 | 522.192 | 150.352 | 21.6\% | 28.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 155 | 59,568 | 376.184 | 101.512 | 21.7\% | 27.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 156 | 223,591 | 1350.528 | 770.048 | 22.7\% | 57.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 157 | 133,505 | 804.944 | 292.464 | 22.7\% | 36.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 158 | 101,296 | 606.112 | 232.8 | 22.9\% | 38.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 159 | 31,518 | 186.339 | 59.253 | 23.2\% | 31.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 160 | 212,060 | 1253.64 | 396.24 | 23.2\% | 31.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 161 | 9,372 | 54.52 | 12.872 | 23.5\% | 23.6\% | 28 |

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| Cust 162 | 254,754 | 1443.744 | 614.752 | 24.2\% | 42.6\% | 28 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 163 | 148,686 | 839.12 | 323.792 | 24.3\% | 38.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 164 | 338,765 | 1879.5 | 737.1 | 24.7\% | 39.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 165 | 107,385 | 590.216 | 241.736 | 24.9\% | 41.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 166 | 50,447 | 272.488 | 137.464 | 25.4\% | 50.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 167 | 42,671 | 227.448 | 85.288 | 25.7\% | 37.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 168 | 30,344 | 161.184 | 79.978 | 25.8\% | 49.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 169 | 172,950 | 907.68 | 315.6 | 26.1\% | 34.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 170 | 57,181 | 286.696 | 115.392 | 27.3\% | 40.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 171 | 90,829 | 449.544 | 243.336 | 27.7\% | 54.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 172 | 175,866 | 858.72 | 574.928 | 28.1\% | 67.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 173 | 318,693 | 1525.352 | 594.712 | 28.6\% | 39.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 174 | 147,684 | 700.576 | 214.576 | 28.9\% | 30.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 175 | 276,169 | 1307.88 | 675.06 | 28.9\% | 51.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 176 | 39,954 | 183.726 | 79.821 | 29.8\% | 43.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 177 | 151,494 | 694.16 | 223.744 | 29.9\% | 32.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 178 | 164,206 | 750.504 | 301.848 | 30.0\% | 40.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 179 | 72,980 | 323.604 | 167.992 | 30.9\% | 51.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 180 | 126,881 | 558.04 | 335.8 | 31.1\% | 60.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 181 | 295,702 | 1280.08 | 612.368 | 31.6\% | 47.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 182 | 349,206 | 1426.32 | 761.936 | 33.5\% | 53.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 183 | 55,518 | 226.616 | 145.077 | 33.6\% | 64.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 184 | 84,074 | 341.847 | 163.227 | 33.7\% | 47.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 185 | 80,408 | 325.872 | 249.008 | 33.8\% | 76.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 186 | 297,358 | 1178.184 | 626.448 | 34.6\% | 53.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 187 | 140,364 | 548.96 | 231.232 | 35.0\% | 42.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 188 | 341,626 | 1326.848 | 825.536 | 35.3\% | 62.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 189 | 243,968 | 947.312 | 633.744 | 35.3\% | 66.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 190 | 155,946 | 602.904 | 305.64 | 35.4\% | 50.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 191 | 103,060 | 398 | 235.096 | 35.5\% | 59.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 192 | 334,297 | 1280.976 | 689.568 | 35.7\% | 53.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 193 | 7,538 | 28.784 | 9.104 | 35.9\% | 31.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 194 | 156,061 | 581.928 | 295.608 | 36.7\% | 50.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 195 | 490,033 | 1799.648 | 1009.536 | 37.3\% | 56.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 196 | 168,244 | 615.528 | 345.136 | 37.4\% | 56.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 197 | 507,965 | 1842.6 | 1523.52 | 37.8\% | 82.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 198 | 264,431 | 935.248 | 312.096 | 38.7\% | 33.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 199 | 534,274 | 1882.8 | 1356.3 | 38.9\% | 72.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 200 | 91,647 | 322.08 | 196.496 | 39.0\% | 61.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 201 | 89,102 | 312.76 | 163.92 | 39.0\% | 52.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 202 | 108,228 | 378.616 | 227.304 | 39.2\% | 60.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 203 | 20,254 | 70.192 | 32.9 | 39.5\% | 46.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 204 | 50,243 | 170.64 | 103.017 | 40.3\% | 60.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 205 | 220,186 | 743.632 | 398.4 | 40.6\% | 53.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 206 | 51,192 | 172.768 | 87.52 | 40.6\% | 50.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 207 | 65,624 | 220.998 | 114.093 | 40.7\% | 51.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 208 | 92,544 | 309.328 | 197.024 | 41.0\% | 63.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 209 | 239,295 | 786.816 | 482.224 | 41.7\% | 61.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 210 | 422,366 | 1363.904 | 979.104 | 42.4\% | 71.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 211 | 201,696 | 645.612 | 528.492 | 42.8\% | 81.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 212 | 249,336 | 796.928 | 387.152 | 42.9\% | 48.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 213 | 437,660 | 1397.54 | 1022.74 | 42.9\% | 73.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 214 | 99,691 | 316.984 | 258.08 | 43.1\% | 81.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 215 | 241,951 | 767.872 | 324.704 | 43.2\% | 42.3\% | 28 |

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| Cust 216 | 139,013 | 440.128 | 351.824 | 43.3\% | 79.9\% | 28 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 217 | 81,092 | 254.504 | 162.88 | 43.6\% | 64.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 218 | 130,648 | 409.872 | 286.784 | 43.7\% | 70.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 219 | 68,531 | 213.912 | 99.842 | 43.9\% | 46.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 220 | 121,625 | 378.696 | 228.216 | 44.0\% | 60.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 221 | 106,761 | 330.336 | 233.824 | 44.3\% | 70.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 222 | 205,327 | 633.392 | 438.912 | 44.4\% | 69.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 223 | 628,575 | 1882.272 | 1291.744 | 45.7\% | 68.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 224 | 318,071 | 949.968 | 658.32 | 45.9\% | 69.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 225 | 13,149 | 39.2 | 15.664 | 45.9\% | 40.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 226 | 117,482 | 344.584 | 213.168 | 46.7\% | 61.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 227 | 736,382 | 2124.512 | 1878.624 | 47.5\% | 88.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 228 | 149,194 | 425.664 | 221.304 | 48.0\% | 52.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 229 | 495,591 | 1410.4 | 1090.768 | 48.1\% | 77.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 230 | 135,668 | 377.146 | 246.208 | 49.3\% | 65.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 231 | 127,123 | 351.12 | 179.568 | 49.6\% | 51.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 232 | 244,914 | 668.368 | 393.776 | 50.2\% | 58.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 233 | 147,483 | 400.672 | 322.392 | 50.4\% | 80.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 234 | 587,360 | 1593.168 | 1280.208 | 50.5\% | 80.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 235 | 289,955 | 784.976 | 615.896 | 50.6\% | 78.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 236 | 713,491 | 1931.12 | 1465.664 | 50.6\% | 75.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 237 | 505,171 | 1363.088 | 655.664 | 50.8\% | 48.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 238 | 603,317 | 1623.28 | 1279.16 | 50.9\% | 78.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 239 | 184,824 | 496.64 | 396.232 | 51.0\% | 79.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 240 | 594,214 | 1595.056 | 973.712 | 51.0\% | 61.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 241 | 152,641 | 402.728 | 249.744 | 51.9\% | 62.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 242 | 86,249 | 222.36 | 140.6 | 53.1\% | 63.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 243 | 475,727 | 1202.896 | 791.424 | 54.2\% | 65.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 244 | 230,429 | 579.688 | 361.64 | 54.5\% | 62.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 245 | 622,637 | 1544.192 | 1206.192 | 55.2\% | 78.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 246 | 142,517 | 353.08 | 273.8 | 55.3\% | 77.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 247 | 430,312 | 1048.744 | 664.232 | 56.2\% | 63.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 248 | 332,134 | 805.968 | 603.132 | 56.5\% | 74.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 249 | 549,741 | 1332.304 | 1149.664 | 56.5\% | 86.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 250 | 95,537 | 231.48 | 137.256 | 56.5\% | 59.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 251 | 276,340 | 668.624 | 509.488 | 56.6\% | 76.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 252 | 194,446 | 468.776 | 383.072 | 56.8\% | 81.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 253 | 491,474 | 1182.84 | 963.78 | 56.9\% | 81.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 254 | 370,379 | 884.584 | 573.224 | 57.4\% | 64.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 255 | 80,592 | 188.139 | 150.327 | 58.7\% | 79.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 256 | 126,001 | 292.167 | 197.277 | 59.1\% | 67.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 257 | 408,662 | 944.4 | 732.208 | 59.3\% | 77.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 258 | 297,312 | 683.856 | 590.176 | 59.6\% | 86.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 259 | 97,749 | 224.76 | 157.512 | 59.6\% | 70.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 260 | 505,035 | 1140.144 | 692.064 | 60.7\% | 60.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 261 | 745,448 | 1678.336 | 1205.696 | 60.8\% | 71.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 262 | 174,164 | 388.26 | 291.66 | 61.4\% | 75.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 263 | 245,667 | 544.336 | 377.728 | 61.8\% | 69.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 264 | 632,027 | 1378.08 | 1132.86 | 62.8\% | 82.2\% | 28 |
| Cust 265 | 770,473 | 1668.864 | 1356.48 | 63.2\% | 81.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 266 | 355,060 | 762.736 | 647.712 | 63.8\% | 84.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 267 | 115,595 | 248.236 | 198.238 | 63.8\% | 79.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 268 | 825,018 | 1771.232 | 1504.272 | 63.8\% | 84.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 269 | 581,919 | 1240.232 | 1035.072 | 64.3\% | 83.5\% | 28 |

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| Cust 270 | 719,889 | 1533.264 | 1066.858667 | 64.3\% | 69.6\% | 28 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 271 | 915,968 | 1923.24 | 1745.16 | 65.2\% | 90.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 272 | 251,926 | 523.216 | 392.928 | 66.0\% | 75.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 273 | 233,171 | 481.808 | 377.528 | 66.3\% | 78.4\% | 28 |
| Cust 274 | 471,832 | 967.04 | 858.72 | 66.8\% | 88.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 275 | 442,183 | 899.392 | 740.296 | 67.3\% | 82.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 276 | 155,367 | 314.416 | 250.92 | 67.7\% | 79.8\% | 28 |
| Cust 277 | 571,650 | 1138.544 | 962.64 | 68.8\% | 84.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 278 | 357,541 | 710.904 | 609.544 | 68.9\% | 85.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 279 | 207,265 | 409.68 | 329.824 | 69.3\% | 80.5\% | 28 |
| Cust 280 | 1,001,736 | 1948.8 | 1650.72 | 70.4\% | 84.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 281 | 195,398 | 377.888 | 301.92 | 70.8\% | 79.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 282 | 458,008 | 884.128 | 785.808 | 71.0\% | 88.9\% | 28 |
| Cust 283 | 482,054 | 923.208 | 809.896 | 71.5\% | 87.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 284 | 871,877 | 1642.688 | 1151.552 | 72.7\% | 70.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 285 | 255,710 | 474.976 | 381.176 | 73.7\% | 80.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 286 | 269,705 | 495.264 | 387.968 | 74.6\% | 78.3\% | 28 |
| Cust 287 | 52,526 | 95.904 | 80.576 | 75.0\% | 84.0\% | 28 |
| Cust 288 | 61,358 | 108.256 | 84.544 | 77.6\% | 78.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 289 | 158,331 | 278.888 | 241.448 | 77.8\% | 86.6\% | 28 |
| Cust 290 | 877,282 | 1541.408 | 1398.656 | 78.0\% | 90.7\% | 28 |
| Cust 291 | 628,837 | 1037.824 | 935.584 | 83.0\% | 90.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 292 | 191,909 | 307.584 | 280.328 | 85.5\% | 91.1\% | 28 |
| Cust 293 | 138,416 | 3678.048 | 338.208 | 5.2\% | 9.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 294 | 245,569 | 4987.296 | 473.536 | 6.7\% | 9.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 295 | 117,477 | 2336.94 | 508.68 | 6.9\% | 21.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 296 | 76,090 | 1484.76 | 9.12 | 7.0\% | 0.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 297 | 122,993 | 1641.552 | 217.824 | 10.3\% | 13.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 298 | 146,924 | 1823.984 | 375.776 | 11.0\% | 20.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 299 | 868,430 | 8057.64 | 1991.96 | 14.8\% | 24.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 300 | 424,335 | 3873.52 | 774.448 | 15.0\% | 20.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 301 | 603,401 | 4411.936 | 1257.152 | 18.7\% | 28.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 302 | 173,252 | 1223.584 | 502.144 | 19.4\% | 41.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 303 | 229,138 | 1608.112 | 174.416 | 19.5\% | 10.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 304 | 629,374 | 4261.664 | 1639.552 | 20.2\% | 38.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 305 | 1,399,768 | 9306.54 | 3341.1 | 20.6\% | 35.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 306 | 1,072,023 | 6671.46 | 2748.96 | 22.0\% | 41.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 307 | 421,901 | 2502.176 | 166.872 | 23.1\% | 6.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 308 | 580,419 | 3066.28 | 1779.28 | 25.9\% | 58.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 309 | 1,696,793 | 8490.48 | 4253.82 | 27.4\% | 50.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 310 | 342,702 | 1709.552 | 863.792 | 27.5\% | 50.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 311 | 712,507 | 3489.18 | 938.46 | 28.0\% | 26.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 312 | 498,393 | 2434.608 | 1503.936 | 28.0\% | 61.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 313 | 949,265 | 4631.808 | 2700.864 | 28.1\% | 58.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 314 | 310,810 | 1510.384 | 673.92 | 28.2\% | 44.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 315 | 594,502 | 2759.52 | 1960.92 | 29.5\% | 71.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 316 | 1,623,204 | 7465.52 | 3380.8 | 29.8\% | 45.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 317 | 4,217 | 19.176 | 5.424 | 30.1\% | 28.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 318 | 898,185 | 4060.816 | 1478.912 | 30.3\% | 36.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 319 | 750,518 | 3311.34 | 1708.02 | 31.0\% | 51.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 320 | 1,312,676 | 5745.408 | 3511.2 | 31.3\% | 61.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 321 | 1,080,799 | 4676.048 | 1464.528 | 31.7\% | 31.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 322 | 1,110,777 | 4748.88 | 2497.872 | 32.0\% | 52.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 323 | 1,168,637 | 4872 | 3236.7 | 32.9\% | 66.4\% | 30 |

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| Cust 324 | 1,169,376 | 4854.9 | 2446.56 | 33.0\% | 50.4\% | 30 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 325 | 1,339,302 | 5550.64 | 1639.2 | 33.1\% | 29.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 326 | 1,935,397 | 7867.488 | 3827.28 | 33.7\% | 48.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 327 | 1,062,591 | 4265.952 | 1822.848 | 34.1\% | 42.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 328 | 594,290 | 2370.6 | 1695.6 | 34.3\% | 71.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 329 | 1,400,800 | 5542.68 | 3373.8 | 34.6\% | 60.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 330 | 1,065,696 | 4214.672 | 2443.472 | 34.6\% | 58.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 331 | 766,665 | 3003.9 | 1669.68 | 35.0\% | 55.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 332 | 1,244,517 | 4861.14 | 1827.84 | 35.1\% | 37.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 333 | 464,373 | 1804.784 | 765.8 | 35.2\% | 42.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 334 | 1,679,891 | 6416.82 | 3887.16 | 35.9\% | 60.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 335 | 729,907 | 2777.2 | 1661.56 | 36.0\% | 59.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 336 | 549,731 | 2033.112 | 1214.088 | 37.0\% | 59.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 337 | 786,287 | 2874.528 | 2345.216 | 37.5\% | 81.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 338 | 1,076,657 | 3907.944 | 2484.072 | 37.7\% | 63.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 339 | 115,057 | 409.744 | 168.112 | 38.5\% | 41.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 340 | 497,096 | 1766.808 | 1024.416 | 38.5\% | 58.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 341 | 802,783 | 2773.824 | 1646.112 | 39.6\% | 59.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 342 | 511,290 | 1763.056 | 1134.384 | 39.7\% | 64.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 343 | 1,261,132 | 4271.44 | 2060.98 | 40.4\% | 48.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 344 | 1,639,897 | 5540.784 | 3635.344 | 40.5\% | 65.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 345 | 1,221,995 | 4120.256 | 2327.488 | 40.6\% | 56.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 346 | 475,978 | 1547.872 | 1058.288 | 42.1\% | 68.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 347 | 462,204 | 1476.064 | 911.872 | 42.9\% | 61.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 348 | 662,017 | 2039.94 | 1255.38 | 44.5\% | 61.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 349 | 323,316 | 991.2 | 834.84 | 44.7\% | 84.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 350 | 569,752 | 1726.944 | 1256.016 | 45.2\% | 72.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 351 | 1,032,620 | 3124.288 | 1554.608 | 45.3\% | 49.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 352 | 1,667,370 | 5030.4 | 3969 | 45.4\% | 78.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 353 | 466,558 | 1386.72 | 983.424 | 46.1\% | 70.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 354 | 34,526 | 102.08 | 50.544 | 46.3\% | 49.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 355 | 2,246,552 | 6527.856 | 5321.984 | 47.1\% | 81.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 356 | 811,602 | 2356.576 | 1666.96 | 47.2\% | 70.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 357 | 541,254 | 1569.68 | 903.6 | 47.2\% | 57.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 358 | 895,812 | 2570.768 | 1765.712 | 47.7\% | 68.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 359 | 1,404,088 | 3938.28 | 3295.44 | 48.8\% | 83.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 360 | 1,049,236 | 2931.36 | 2294.688 | 49.0\% | 78.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 361 | 207,089 | 571.52 | 268.56 | 49.6\% | 47.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 362 | 245,537 | 673.6 | 330.16 | 49.9\% | 49.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 363 | 2,138,554 | 5848.8 | 5178.84 | 50.1\% | 88.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 364 | 2,652,032 | 7216.38 | 6145.74 | 50.3\% | 85.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 365 | 2,967,822 | 7997.56 | 5207.8 | 50.8\% | 65.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 366 | 2,924,335 | 7840.48 | 6486 | 51.1\% | 82.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 367 | 837,051 | 2149.808 | 1800.688 | 53.3\% | 83.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 368 | 1,908,333 | 4868.64 | 3177.76 | 53.7\% | 65.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 369 | 3,704,273 | 9376.2 | 7216.44 | 54.1\% | 77.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 370 | 361,802 | 890.24 | 606.304 | 55.7\% | 68.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 371 | 956,939 | 2337.48 | 1382.28 | 56.1\% | 59.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 372 | 2,538,257 | 6175.32 | 4997.4 | 56.3\% | 80.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 373 | 1,369,055 | 3313.08 | 2773.74 | 56.6\% | 83.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 374 | 3,178,942 | 7593.66 | 6045.66 | 57.3\% | 79.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 375 | 3,361,492 | 7928.64 | 6532.44 | 58.1\% | 82.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 376 | 1,037,192 | 2430.72 | 2016.24 | 58.5\% | 82.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 377 | 960,122 | 2236.128 | 1734.528 | 58.8\% | 77.6\% | 30 |

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| Cust 378 | 3,158,232 | 7253.46 | 6580.74 | 59.6\% | 90.7\% | 30 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cust 379 | 783,928 | 1791.42 | 1369.86 | 59.9\% | 76.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 380 | 1,061,945 | 2423.568 | 1766.496 | 60.0\% | 72.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 381 | 2,001,463 | 4567.02 | 3493.5 | 60.0\% | 76.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 382 | 1,424,840 | 3199.5 | 2336.22 | 61.0\% | 73.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 383 | 3,673,269 | 8219.52 | 6518.58 | 61.2\% | 79.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 384 | 6,707 | 14.896 | 9.112 | 61.7\% | 61.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 385 | 1,489,135 | 3272.64 | 2733.36 | 62.3\% | 83.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 386 | 1,654,866 | 3622.86 | 2892.18 | 62.6\% | 79.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 387 | 1,805,142 | 3928.44 | 3364.68 | 62.9\% | 85.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 388 | 2,463,379 | 5301.84 | 3461.4 | 63.6\% | 65.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 389 | 1,051,139 | 2223.144 | 1768.184 | 64.8\% | 79.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 390 | 1,686,588 | 3549.392 | 2534.992 | 65.1\% | 71.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 391 | 1,703,854 | 3580.32 | 3299.64 | 65.2\% | 92.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 392 | 1,094,918 | 2246.24 | 1835.2 | 66.8\% | 81.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 393 | 1,596,577 | 3274.032 | 2728.016 | 66.8\% | 83.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 394 | 1,101,760 | 2255.296 | 1898.464 | 66.9\% | 84.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 395 | 1,352,558 | 2768.608 | 2392.448 | 66.9\% | 86.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 396 | 2,102,421 | 4288.8 | 3218.4 | 67.2\% | 75.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 397 | 1,668,891 | 3389.744 | 2375.328 | 67.4\% | 70.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 398 | 983,494 | 1987.36 | 1628.8 | 67.8\% | 82.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 399 | 1,806,654 | 3650.1 | 3028.86 | 67.8\% | 83.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 400 | 1,356,141 | 2732.448 | 2188.896 | 68.0\% | 80.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 401 | 1,557,586 | 3111.84 | 2577.24 | 68.6\% | 82.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 402 | 1,757,486 | 3484.048 | 3242.72 | 69.1\% | 93.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 403 | 2,564,446 | 5079.44 | 4002.4 | 69.2\% | 78.8\% | 30 |
| Cust 404 | 1,170,570 | 2311.62 | 1961.58 | 69.4\% | 84.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 405 | 2,272,073 | 4482.72 | 3380.128 | 69.4\% | 75.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 406 | 2,564,470 | 4999.728 | 3563.744 | 70.3\% | 71.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 407 | 1,386,565 | 2700.352 | 2396.544 | 70.3\% | 88.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 408 | 2,847,510 | 5468.28 | 4163.16 | 71.3\% | 76.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 409 | 2,982,058 | 5726.016 | 5049.216 | 71.3\% | 88.2\% | 30 |
| Cust 410 | 1,918,423 | 3672.66 | 3214.86 | 71.6\% | 87.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 411 | 369,424 | 698.88 | 625.08 | 72.4\% | 89.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 412 | 2,665,535 | 4982.4 | 3591.12 | 73.3\% | 72.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 413 | 1,717,015 | 3174.54 | 2839.44 | 74.1\% | 89.4\% | 30 |
| Cust 414 | 3,007,761 | 5552.04 | 4405.32 | 74.2\% | 79.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 415 | 2,433,525 | 4477.6 | 3908 | 74.5\% | 87.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 416 | 1,742,894 | 3154.32 | 2866.68 | 75.7\% | 90.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 417 | 1,095,432 | 1957.344 | 1639.04 | 76.7\% | 83.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 418 | 3,178,484 | 5586.42 | 4518.09 | 77.9\% | 80.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 419 | 2,158,809 | 3768.84 | 3297.54 | 78.5\% | 87.5\% | 30 |
| Cust 420 | 1,508,962 | 2613.504 | 2437.92 | 79.1\% | 93.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 421 | 3,159,267 | 5464.32 | 5034.78 | 79.2\% | 92.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 422 | 1,480,566 | 2557.088 | 2282.736 | 79.3\% | 89.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 423 | 3,443,099 | 5944.56 | 5425.98 | 79.3\% | 91.3\% | 30 |
| Cust 424 | 4,309,150 | 7386.96 | 6796.2 | 79.9\% | 92.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 425 | 1,414,901 | 2401.44 | 1993.248 | 80.7\% | 83.0\% | 30 |
| Cust 426 | 2,790,219 | 4710.576 | 4101.216 | 81.1\% | 87.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 427 | 2,505,158 | 4223.58 | 3721.86 | 81.3\% | 88.1\% | 30 |
| Cust 428 | 1,017,025 | 1704.424 | 1478.4 | 81.7\% | 86.7\% | 30 |
| Cust 429 | 4,258,788 | 7124.16 | 6384.08 | 81.9\% | 89.6\% | 30 |
| Cust 430 | 4,750,280 | 7752.42 | 6967.14 | 83.9\% | 89.9\% | 30 |
| Cust 431 | 2,568,188 | 4144.48 | 3734.128 | 84.9\% | 90.1\% | 30 |

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| Cust 432 | 21,988 | 35.328 | 29.088 | $85.3 \%$ | $82.3 \%$ | 30 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Cust 433 | $2,532,603$ | 4000.544 | 3692.016 | $86.7 \%$ | $92.3 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 434 | $2,080,797$ | 3219.06 | 2964.24 | $88.5 \%$ | $92.1 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 435 | $1,944,990$ | 2996.624 | 2776.544 | $88.9 \%$ | $92.7 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 436 | $2,119,592$ | 3240.78 | 3013.86 | $89.6 \%$ | $93.0 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 437 | $3,906,377$ | 5874.624 | 5559.216 | $91.1 \%$ | $94.6 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 438 | $2,137,352$ | 3202.08 | 2909.7 | $91.4 \%$ | $90.9 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 439 | $4,918,151$ | 7300.38 | 6788.04 | $92.3 \%$ | $93.0 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 440 | $4,990,685$ | 7255.38 | 6834.72 | $94.2 \%$ | $94.2 \%$ | 30 |
| Cust 441 | $5,522,205$ | 7959 | 7686 | $95.0 \%$ | $96.6 \%$ | 30 |

## Marginal Generation Energy Costs <br> Derivation of Fixed and Variable Energy Costs

Page 1 of 2


Total Energy Costs Fixed Energy Costs Variable Energy Costs (Mills/kWh)
(Mills/kWh)
(Mills/kWh)
2021-2040 (20 Year, Long Run)

# Functionalized Generation Demand and Energy Costs <br> For Schedule 200 Base Supply Service Applicable to Schedule 30/730 Secondary Customers 

Marginal Demand Cost (\$000)
Marginal Energy Cost (\$000)
Proportion of Marginal Energy Fixed Cost
Proportion of Marginal Energy Variable Cost
Marginal Energy Fixed Cost (\$000)
Marginal Energy Variable Cost (NPC) (\$000)
Total Marginal Generation Cost (\$000)
Marginal Generation Variable Cost (NPC) (\$000)
Marginal Generation Fixed Cost (non-NPC) (\$000)
Proportion of Marginal Generation Energy Fixed Cos
Proportion of Marginal Generation Demand Fixed Cos
Functionalized Generation Revenue Requirement (\$000
Generation Energy - Net Power Costs (Sch 201) (\$000)
Generation Energy - Other (non-NPC) (Sch 200) (\$000)
Sch 200 Energy Related Cost (\$000)
Sche 200 Energy Billing Determinants (MWh
Sch 200 Cost-Based Energy Rate $(\phi / k W h)$
Sch 200 Demand Related Cost (\$000)
Sch 200 Demand Billing Determinants (MW
Sch 200 Cost-Based Demand Rate $(\$ / \mathrm{kW})$

| \$23,482 | Exhibit PAC 1408, pg. 17, line 32 |
| :---: | :---: |
| \$45,596 | Exhibit PAC 1408, pg. 17, line 40 |
| 22.9\% | Exhibit FM/101, pg. 1 |
| 77.1\% | Exhibit FM/101, pg. 1 |
| \$10,454 | Line $2 \times$ Line 3 |
| \$35,142 | Line $2 \times$ Line 4 |
| \$69,078 | Line $1+$ Line 2 |
| \$35,142 | Line 6 |
| \$33,935 | Line $1+$ Line 5 |
| 30.80\% | Line 5 / Line 9 |
| 69.20\% | Line 1 / Line 9 |
| \$67,038 | Exhibit PAC 1407, pg. 1, column F, line 29 |
| \$26,984 | Exhibit PAC 1408, pg. 1, column 4 |
| \$40,053 | Exhibit PAC 1408, pg. 1, column 6 |
| \$12,338 | Line 10 x Line 14 |
| 1,263,680 | Exhibit PAC 1409, pg. 6, Forecast 1/21-12/21 Units |
| 0.976 ¢ | Line 13 / Line 14 * 100 |
| \$27,715 | Line $11 \times$ Line 14 |
| 3,485 | Exhibit PAC 1409, pg. 6, Forecast 1/21-12/21 Units |
| \$7.95 | Line 18 / Line 19 |

# Fred Meyer <br> Exhibit FM/103 <br> Docket No. UE 374 

Fred Meyer Proposed Schedule 200 Rate Design
Applicable to Schedule 30/730 Secondary
At PacifiCorp Proposed Revenue Requirement

| Schedule No. 30/730-Composite Large General Service - (Secondary) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Forecast |  | Present |  | PacifiCorp Proposed |  | Fred Meyer Proposed |  |
|  | Units |  | Price | Dollars | Price | Dollars | Price | Dollars |
| Transmission \& Ancillary Services Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| per kW | 3,485,385 | kW | \$1.71 | \$5,960,008 | \$2.52 | \$8,783,170 | \$2.52 | \$8,783,170 |
| System Usage Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sch 200 related, per kWh | 1,263,679,782 | kWh | 0.067 ¢ | \$846,665 | 0.082 ¢ | \$1,036,217 | 0.082 ¢ | \$1,036,217 |
| T\&A and Sch 201 related, per kWh | 1,263,679,782 | kWh | 0.070 ¢ | \$884,576 | 0.074 ¢ | \$935,123 | 0.074 ¢ | \$935,123 |
| Distribution Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Basic Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Load Size $\leq 200 \mathrm{~kW}$, per month | 131 | bill | \$468.00 | \$61,308 | \$541.00 | \$70,871 | \$541.00 | \$70,871 |
| Load Size 201-300 kW, per month | 2,777 | bill | \$138.00 | \$383,226 | \$161.00 | \$447,097 | \$161.00 | \$447,097 |
| Load Size > 300 kW , per month | 6,980 | bill | \$363.00 | \$2,533,740 | \$423.00 | \$2,952,540 | \$423.00 | \$2,952,540 |
| Load Size Charge |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\leq 200 \mathrm{Kw}$, per kW |  |  | No Charge |  | No Charge |  | No Charge |  |
| 201-300 kW, per kW | 708,467 | kW | \$1.65 | \$1,168,971 | \$1.90 | \$1,346,087 | \$1.90 | \$1,346,087 |
| $>300 \mathrm{~kW}$, per kW | 3,406,483 | kW | \$0.80 | \$2,725,186 | \$0.95 | \$3,236,159 | \$0.95 | \$3,236,159 |
| Demand Charge, per kW | 3,485,385 | kW | \$3.98 | \$13,871,832 | \$4.64 | \$16,172,186 | \$4.64 | \$16,172,186 |
| Reactive Power Charge, per kvar | 258,668 | kvar | $65.00 ¢$ | \$168,134 | 65.00 ¢ | \$168,134 | 65.00 ¢ | \$168,134 |
| Energy Charge - Schedule 200 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Demand Charge, per kW | 3,485,385 | kW | \$1.88 | \$6,542,068 | \$1.95 | \$6,796,501 | \$3.75 | \$13,070,194 |
| 1 st $20,000 \mathrm{kWh}$, per kWh | 186,649,079 | kWh | 2.86 ¢ | \$5,338,164 | $2.631 ¢$ | \$4,910,737 | $2.134 \phi$ | \$3,983,091 |
| All additional kWh , per kWh | 1,077,030,703 | kWh | 2.48 ¢ | \$26,710,361 | $2.631 ¢$ | \$28,336,678 | $2.134 ¢$ | \$22,983,835 |
| Subtotal | 1,263,679,782 | kWh |  | \$67,194,240 |  | \$75,191,501 |  | \$75,184,705 |
| Renewable Adjustment Clause (202), per kWh | 1,263,679,782 | kWh | 0.149 ¢ | \$1,882,883 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 |
| Adj to Remove Deer Creek (196), per kWh | 1,263,679,782 | kWh | -0.021¢ | -\$265,373 | $0.000 \not \subset$ | \$0 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 |
| Schedule 80 Adjustment, per kWh | 1,263,679,782 | kWh | 0.055 ¢ | \$695,024 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 |
| , per kW | 3,485,385 | kW | \$0.40 | \$1,394,154 | \$0.00 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$0 |
| TAM Adj for Other Revs (205) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 st $20,000 \mathrm{kWh}$, per kWh | 186,649,079 | kWh | 0.023 ¢ | \$42,929 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 |
| All additional kWh , per kWh | 1,077,030,703 | kWh | $0.020 ¢$ | \$215,406 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 | $0.000 ¢$ | \$0 |
| Subtotal |  |  |  | \$71,159,263 |  | \$75,191,501 |  | \$75,184,705 |
| Schedule 201 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 st $20,000 \mathrm{kWh}$, per kWh | 186,649,079 | kWh | 2.831 ¢ | \$5,284,035 | $2.831 ¢$ | \$5,284,035 | $2.831 \not \subset$ | \$5,284,035 |
| All additional kWh , per kWh | 1,077,030,703 | kWh | $2.454 ¢$ | \$26,430,333 | $2.454 ¢$ | \$26,430,333 | 2.454 ¢ | \$26,430,333 |
| Total | 1,263,679,782 | kWh |  | \$102,873,632 |  | \$106,905,870 |  | \$106,899,074 |

# Rate Schedule 30 Monthly Bill Comparison at Fred Meyer Proposed Rates at PacifiCorp Proposed Revenue Requirement 

| kW <br> Load Size |  |  | Monthly Billing* |  | Percent <br> Difference |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | kWh | Load Factor | Present Price | Proposed Price |  |
| 200 | 40,000 | 27.4\% | \$4,631 | \$5,022 | 8.43\% |
|  | 60,000 | 41.1\% | \$5,802 | \$6,085 | 4.88\% |
|  | 100,000 | 68.5\% | \$8,145 | \$8,213 | 0.84\% |
| 300 | 60,000 | 27.4\% | \$6,797 | \$7,410 | 9.02\% |
|  | 90,000 | 41.1\% | \$8,554 | \$9,006 | 5.29\% |
|  | 150,000 | 68.5\% | \$12,067 | \$12,197 | 1.08\% |
| 400 | 80,000 | 27.4\% | \$8,844 | \$9,677 | 9.42\% |
|  | 120,000 | 41.1\% | \$11,186 | \$11,804 | 5.53\% |
|  | 200,000 | 68.5\% | \$15,870 | \$16,059 | 1.19\% |
| 500 | 100,000 | 27.4\% | \$10,922 | \$11,967 | 9.57\% |
|  | 150,000 | 41.1\% | \$13,849 | \$14,626 | 5.61\% |
|  | 250,000 | 68.5\% | \$19,705 | \$19,945 | 1.22\% |
| 600 | 120,000 | 27.4\% | \$12,999 | \$14,257 | 9.68\% |
|  | 180,000 | 41.1\% | \$16,513 | \$17,448 | 5.67\% |
|  | 300,000 | 68.5\% | \$23,539 | \$23,831 | 1.24\% |
| 800 | 160,000 | 27.4\% | \$17,155 | \$18,838 | 9.81\% |
|  | 240,000 | 41.1\% | \$21,839 | \$23,093 | 5.74\% |
|  | 400,000 | 68.5\% | \$31,208 | \$31,603 | 1.27\% |
| 1000 | 200,000 | 27.4\% | \$21,310 | \$23,419 | 9.89\% |
|  | 300,000 | 41.1\% | \$27,166 | \$28,737 | 5.78\% |
|  | 500,000 | 68.5\% | \$38,876 | \$39,374 | 1.28\% |

[^13]
## Docket No. UE 374

Witness: Justin Bieber
Page 1 of 1

## Example Adjustment to the Functionalized Revenue and Rate Mitigation Adjustment

At A \$10 Million Rate Reduction Relative to PacifiCorp's Filed Case

| Description | Proposed <br> Schedule | MWh | Present RMA (\$000) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Proposed } \\ \text { RMA } \\ (\$ 000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Present } \\ \text { Net Rates }{ }^{1} \\ (\$ 000) \end{gathered}$ | PAC <br> Proposed Net <br> Rates ${ }^{1}$ <br> (\$000) | PAC Proposed <br> Net Increase ${ }^{1}$ |  | Step 1 Rate Reduction for All Schedules (\$000) | sucp <br> Reduction to Proposed Subsidies (\$000) | 18ace <br> Reduction Relative to Filed Case (\$000) | Increase at Reduced Revenue Requirement ${ }^{1}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Residential | 4 | 5,521,127 | \$3,202 | \$0 | \$641,058 | \$668,720 | \$27,663 | 4.3\% | $(\$ 4,823)$ | \$0 | $(\$ 4,823)$ | \$22,839 | 3.6\% |
| Gen. Sve. < 31 kW | 23 | 1,130,147 | \$4,701 | \$0 | \$132,631 | \$139,476 | \$6,845 | 5.2\% | $(\$ 1,006)$ | \$0 | $(\$ 1,006)$ | \$5,839 | 4.4\% |
| Gen. Svc. 31-200 kW | 28 | 2,038,726 | \$2,304 | \$5,749 | \$192,212 | \$198,404 | \$6,192 | 3.2\% | $(\$ 1,390)$ | (\$865) | $(\$ 2,254)$ | \$3,938 | 2.0\% |
| Secondary |  | 2,012,760 | \$2,274 | \$5,676 | \$189,880 | \$195,906 | \$6,026 | 3.2\% | $(\$ 1,372)$ | (\$854) | $(\$ 2,226)$ | \$3,800 | 2.0\% |
| Primary |  | 25,965 | \$29 | \$73 | \$2,331 | \$2,498 | \$166 | 7.1\% | (\$17) | (\$11) | (\$29) | \$138 | 5.9\% |
| Gen. Sve. 201-999 kW | 30 | 1,361,426 | \$531 | \$899 | \$113,368 | \$116,998 | \$3,630 | 3.2\% | (\$837) | (\$135) | (\$973) | \$2,658 | 2.3\% |
| Secondary |  | 1,263,680 | \$493 | \$834 | \$105,246 | \$108,526 | \$3,280 | 3.1\% | (\$777) | (\$125) | (\$902) | \$2,378 | 2.3\% |
| Primary |  | 97,746 | \$38 | \$65 | \$8,122 | \$8,472 | \$350 | 4.3\% | (\$61) | (\$10) | (\$70) | \$280 | 3.4\% |
| Large General Service > $=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 48 | 3,079,837 | (\$10,690) | $(\$ 5,368)$ | \$207,155 | \$222,795 | \$15,641 | 7.6\% | $(\$ 1,646)$ | \$807 | (\$838) | \$14,803 | 7.1\% |
| Secondary |  | 555,158 | $(\$ 1,482)$ | (\$744) | \$42,774 | \$47,800 | \$5,026 | wl | (\$350) | \$112 | (\$238) | \$4,787 | 11.2\% |
| Primary |  | 1,543,656 | $(\$ 5,156)$ | $(\$ 2,593)$ | \$105,688 | \$113,829 | \$8,142 | 7.7\% | (\$840) | \$390 | (\$450) | \$7,692 | 7.3\% |
| Transmission |  | 981,023 | $(\$ 4,052)$ | $(\$ 2,031)$ | \$58,693 | \$61,166 | \$2,473 | 4.2\% | (\$456) | \$305 | (\$150) | \$2,323 | 4.0\% |
| Partial Req. Svc. > $=1,000 \mathrm{~kW}$ | 47 | 41,898 | (\$152) | (\$76) | \$5,161 | \$5,530 | \$370 | 7.2\% | (\$40) | \$11 | (\$29) | \$341 | 6.6\% |
| Dist. Only Lg Gen Sve >= 1,000 kW | 848 | 0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$2,234 | \$2,128 | (\$106) | -4.7\% | (\$15) | \$0 | (\$15) | (\$121) | -5.4\% |
| Agricultural Pumping Service | 41 | 221,554 | $(\$ 1,318)$ | $(\$ 1,205)$ | \$24,992 | \$27,302 | \$2,310 | 9.2\% | (\$206) | \$181 | (\$24) | \$2,286 | 9.1\% |
| Total Public Street Lighting |  | 42,434 | \$1,016 | \$0 | \$6,325 | \$5,106 | (\$1,218) | -19.3\% | (\$37) | \$0 | (\$37) | $(\$ 1,255)$ | -19.8\% |
| Subtotal |  | 13,437,150 | (\$405) | (\$2) | \$1,325,134 | \$1,386,461 | \$61,327 | 4.6\% | $(\$ 10,000)$ | \$0 | $(\$ 10,000)$ | \$51,327 | 3.9\% |

Data Source: Exhibit PAC/1410 and PAC/1409
${ }^{1}$ Includes RAC and Adders. Adders Exclude effects of the Low Income Bill Payment Assistance Charge (Sch. 91), BPA Credit (Sch. 98), Public Purpose Charge (Sch. 290) and Energy Conservation Charge (Sch. 297).

| Total Proposed Subsidies | $\$ 6,648$ |
| ---: | :---: |
| Hypothetical Rate Reduction | $(\$ 10,000)$ |
| \% Subsidy Reduction | $10.00 \%$ |
| Subsidy Reduction | $(\$ 1,000)$ |
| Total Subsidies After Rate Reduction | $\$ 5,648$ |

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that true copy of the foregoing was served via electronic mail, unless otherwise noted, this $4^{\text {th }}$ day of June, 2020.

Kurt J. Boehm,
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Jody Kyler Cohn, Esq.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Direct Testimony of Robert M. Meredith, p. 48.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ Exhibit PAC/1408, pg. 1.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3} \mathrm{Id}, \mathrm{p} .26$.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ Exhibit PAC/1410, pg. 13.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Id, p. 21.
    ${ }^{6}$ Id.

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ Id, pp. 22-23.

[^6]:    ${ }^{8} \$ 10$ million hypothetical revenue requirement reduction $\times 10 \%=\$ 1$ million RMA subsidy reduction.

[^7]:    ${ }^{9} \mathrm{Id}, \mathrm{pp} .54-55$.

[^8]:    ${ }^{10} \mathrm{Id}$, pp. 55-56.
    ${ }^{11}$ Reproduced from the Direct Testimony of Robert M. Meredith, p. 57, Figure 2.

[^9]:    ${ }^{12}$ PAC Response to Kroger Data Request 2.3, reproduced in Exhibit FM/101.

[^10]:    ${ }^{13}$ Id, p. 55.

[^11]:    ${ }^{14}$ Id, pp. 55-56.

[^12]:    ${ }^{15} \mathrm{Id}, \mathrm{p} .48$.

[^13]:    * Net rate including Schedules 91, 290 and 297.

