

August 25, 2020

Via Electronic Filing

Public Utility Commission of Oregon Attn: Filing Center 201 High St. SE, Suite 100 Salem, OR 97301

Re: Docket No. UE 374 Errata Sierra Club Opening Testimony

Sierra Club hereby submits the following Errata to the Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher for filing in the above-referenced dockets.

After discussions with PacifiCorp, both Sierra Club and the company agree, PacifiCorp overdesignated certain information in its direct testimony as confidential. Accordingly, Sierra Club is submitting an updated version of the Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher (Sierra Club/100). PacifiCorp sent an email on June 11, 2020 to UE 374 parties formally removing certain confidential designations and additional information was publicly presented in the Reply Testimony of Dana Ralston (PAC/2600). Sections of Dr. Fisher's testimony based on the following information are now public:

- Selected details about the Hayden SCR Project made public in PAC/2600 (Sierra Club/100 at Fisher/7, Fisher/77-79, Fisher/81-82, Fisher/84, Fisher/87-88)
- \$31 million fuel cost increase and \$28.3 million in reclamation costs related to the Bridger Mine made public in PAC/2600 at Ralston/8
- PAC/710
- PAC/800, Teply/24:6-19

Also, in the corrected version, Sierra Club added a citation to Teply/24 in footnotes 147 and 150. Lastly, Sierra Club/106 was inadvertently mislabeled and therefore Sierra Club is submitting a correctly labeled version of that the exhibit.

If you have any questions or require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Respectfully submitted,

Criazson

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BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

In the Matter of

PACIFICORP d/b/a PACIFIC POWER,

UE 374

Request for a General Rate Revision

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 25th day of August, 2020, I have served the foregoing Errata to the Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher upon all party representatives on the official service list for this proceeding. The public version of this document was served upon parties via email, and the highly confidential and confidential portions of this document were served pursuant to Protective Order No. 20-040 and 20-131 respectively upon all eligible party representatives electronically via encrypted password protected ZIP folders.

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Dated this 25th day of August, 2020 at Redwood City, CA.

/s/ Ana Boyd

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BEFORE THE OREGON PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

In the Matter of PACIFICORP d/b/a PACIFIC POWER Request for a General Rate Revision.

UE 374

Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher, PhD

> On Behalf of Sierra Club

Public Version

June 4, 2020 Corrected August 25, 2020

REDACTED - PROTECTED INFORMATION SUBJECT TO GENERAL PROTECTIVE ORDER

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Sierra Club/101	Curriculum Vitae of Jeremy Fisher, PhD
Sierra Club/102	Public Discovery Responses
Sierra Club/103	Confidential Direct Testimony of Rick Link in 20000-418-EA-12 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n) (provided as an attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.1)
Sierra Club/104	Redacted Rebuttal Testimony of Rick Link in 20000- 418-EA-12 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/105	WY DEQ Bart Appeal Settlement Agreement (November 2010)
Sierra Club/106	PacifiCorp Emission Reduction Plan (Nov. 2, 2010)
Sierra Club/107	PacifiCorp Comments on WY Regional Haze Plan (Aug. 26, 2013) (excerpt)
Sierra Club/108	Confidential Rebuttal Testimony of Dana Ralston in UE-152253 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n) (provided as an attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.8(c))
Sierra Club/109	Redacted Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of Cindy A. Crane in UE-152253 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/110	PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 4.9 in Docket No. 13-035-184 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/111	Hearing Transcript of Ms. Cindy Crane in Docket No. 20000-418-EA-12 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/112	"Attach Sierra Club 3.27" in Docket No. LC 70
Sierra Club/113	Andrew Graham, <i>Life beneath the earth in Wyo's only underground coal mine</i>
Sierra Club/114	Supplemental Testimony of Jeremy Twitchell in Docket No. UE-152253 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/115	Confidential Attachment 1.5-2 to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request
Sierra Club/116	PacifiCorp, 2012 Natural Gas Request for Proposals Workshop (Oct. 29, 2013)

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Sierra Club/117	PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 4.10 in Docket No. 13-035-184 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/118	PacifiCorp Dec. 5, 2013 Memorandum (provided as a confidential attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.4)
Sierra Club/119	Highly Confidential Exhibit B Re: Bridger EPC Contract
Sierra Club/120	Direct Testimony of Susan Arigoni in Docket No. 11A-917E (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n)
Sierra Club/121	Confidential Technical Workshop: Review of Existing Analysis on Craig and Hayden Environmental Investments (provided as a confidential attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club 2.6)
Sierra Club/122	Confidential Attachment to Pacificorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.6-2 (Hayden PVRR)
Sierra Club/123	Confidential Hayden SCR Recommendation Memo (provided as a confidential attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.4)
Sierra Club/124	Confidential Attachment to Pacificorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.4 (Xcel Energy Projects)
Sierra Club/125	Direct Testimony of James Hill in Docket No. 10M- 245E (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n)

1 **1.** INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

2	Q	Please state your name, position, and business address.
3	A	My name is Jeremy I. Fisher. I am a Senior Advisor for Strategic Research and
4		Development in Sierra Club's Environmental Law Program, which is located at
5		2101 Webster Street, Suite 1300 in Oakland, California.
6	Q	On whose behalf are you providing testimony in this case?
7	A	I am providing testimony on behalf of Sierra Club.
8	Q	Please describe your role at Sierra Club.
9	A	Sierra Club is a national public interest group dedicated to the responsible use of
10		ecosystems and resources with over 800,000 members. My role as an advisor is to
11		work with the Environmental Law Program to understand and engage
12		productively with best utility practices in energy system planning, fossil
13		generation issues, energy efficiency and renewable energy, ratemaking and rate
14		design, market power issues, and utility regulations.
15	Q	Please summarize your work experience and educational background.
16	A	Prior to joining Sierra Club in December 2017, I held the position of Principal
17		Associate with Synapse Energy Economics in Cambridge, Massachusetts where I
18		worked for a decade on electricity system energy planning, supporting regulators
19		in the use and execution of environmental regulations, and helping states craft or
20		revise resource planning rules. As a consultant, I worked with a wide variety of
21		public sector and public interest clients, including the U.S. Environmental

1	Protection Agency ("EPA"), the National Association of Regulatory Utility
2	Commissioners ("NARUC"), the National Association of State Utility Consumer
3	Advocates ("NASUCA"), National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
4	("NRECA"), the energy offices and public utility commissions of Alaska,
5	Arkansas, Michigan, and Utah, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Tennessee
6	Valley Authority Office of Inspector General ("TVA OIG"), the California
7	Division of Ratepayer Advocates ("CADRA"), the California Energy
8	Commission ("CEC"), the Regulatory Assistance Project ("RAP"), and multiple
9	environmental public interest groups. In 2014 and 2015, I provided training to
10	federal regulators on resource planning practice. I recently led an intensive
11	statewide planning process on behalf of the Michigan Public Service Commission
12	("MPSC") and worked on behalf of the Puerto Rico Energy Commission
13	("CEPR") on the first open audit of the Commonwealth's public utility.
14	I have provided testimony in electricity planning and general rate case dockets in
15	California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
16	Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Utah, Washington,
17	Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
18	I hold a doctorate in Geological Sciences from Brown University, and I received
19	my bachelor degrees from University of Maryland in Geology and Geography.

1 My full curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/101.

2	Q	Have you previously provided comments to or testified before the Oregon
3		Public Utility Commission previously?
4	A	Yes. I've submitted testimony on behalf of Sierra Club in PacifiCorp's prior rate
5		case in 2012 (OR UE 246), and supported Sierra Club comments in multiple
6		PacifiCorp IRP proceedings from 2013 to the present day.
7	Q	In general, are you familiar with PacifiCorp's system and practices?
8	A	Yes. Since 2010, I've reviewed PacifiCorp's long-term resource planning and
9		short-term modeling in dockets across the Company's service territory. This
10		includes expert testimony in rate cases (WY 20000-384-ER-10, WY 20000-446-
11		ER-14, OR UE 246, WA UE-152253), certificates of public convenience and
12		necessity ("CPCN") (WY 20000-418-EA-12), assessments of fuel contracts (OR
13		UM 1712, CA A.15-09-007), and multiple integrated resource planning ("IRP")
14		reviews in 2013 (OR LC 57, UT 13-2035-01), 2015 (OR LC-62, UT 15-035-04),
15		2017 (OR LC-67, UT 17-035-16), and 2019 (OR LC 70, UT 19-035-02).
16	Q	What is the purpose of your testimony?
17	Α	My testimony is focused on the election of PacifiCorp d.b.a. Pacific Power
18		("Company") to install high-cost selective catalytic reduction ("SCR") emissions
19		controls at the Jim Bridger units 3 & 4 and Hayden 1 & 2 coal-fired power
20		stations. My testimony walks through the process of how PacifiCorp, or in the
21		case of Hayden, its co-owner Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo"),
22		decided to move forward with the retrofits, and the analyses that PacifiCorp

1		employed to assess whether the retrofits were in the best interests of customers. I
2		assess the alternatives available to the Company at each key decision-making
3		moment, and how the Company's decisions aligned with the information it knew,
4		or should have known at the moment.
5		I show that the Company understood that its election to move forward with the
6		SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 was premature, and had degraded in value from the
7		time the Company first proposed the projects to effectively no economic value to
8		ratepayers at the time. Once the Company began construction, the liability of the
9		project degraded faster than the monies the Company sank into it, meaning
10		ratepayers would have benefited from cancelation mid-stream.
11		I also show that the Company failed to conduct appropriate due diligence on the
12		Hayden SCR projects when decisions on those projects were underway by PSCo,
13		and then failed to appropriately exercise its participation rights when it
14		determined that the projects were not favorable to ratepayers.
15	2. <u>S</u>	Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
16	Q	Can you summarize your conclusions?
17	A	Yes. With respect to the installation of SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4, I conclude the
18		following:
19		1. PacifiCorp manufactured a compliance deadline that it understood was well
20		

20 ahead of EPA's requirements;


1	2.	PacifiCorp asserted that same compliance deadline without respect to
2		alternatives or the flexibility afforded under the Clean Air Act, at a cost to
3		ratepayers;
4	3.	PacifiCorp's election to move forward on the SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 on
5		December 1, 2013 was uninformed by changes in the projected cost of coal
6		and gas available to the Company, factors which would have shown a
7		substantially degraded value for the projects.
8	4.	A new mining plan in October 2013 materially changed the way that
9		PacifiCorp would procure coal for Jim Bridger, and increased the cost of coal,
10		and yet PacifiCorp failed to assess how that plan would impact its impending
11		SCR decision.
12	5.	PacifiCorp failed to assess new market price projections available to it prior to
13		December 1, 2013 that would have revealed lower market price forwards for
14		gas.
15	6.	PacifiCorp's use of a shortcut "breakeven" assessment to determine whether
16		the SCR still had economic value in September 2013 relied on modeling data
17		over 15 months old, and was unbefitting of a project of this magnitude.
18	7.	Prior to committing monies to the SCR projects at Jim Bridger, the Company
19		was aware that the economic value of the projects had degraded substantially,
20		and yet failed to conduct more extensive modeling.
21	8.	After committing monies to the SCR projects on December 1, 2013, the
22		Company failed to assess whether continuing with the projects was cost
23		effective or in the best interests of customers.

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1	9. The Company failed to terminate the SCR projects when the forward liability
2	of continuing the projects and operating Jim Bridger 3 & 4 on coal fell below
3	the cost of ceasing construction.
4	10. PacifiCorp's election to install SCRs in December 2013 and continue
5	operating Jim Bridger 3 & 4 has resulted in excess costs to ratepayers above
6	the cost of alternatives. Ratepayers have incurred damages more substantial
7	than the cost of the SCRs alone.
8	With respect to the installation of SCRs at Hayden 1 & 2, I conclude the
9	following:
10	1. The Company failed to engage successfully or meaningfully in PSCo's 2010
11	emission reduction plan, whereby PSCo opted to install SCRs at Hayden,
12	committing PacifiCorp to that same course of action.
13	2. The Company failed to assess the joint cost of signing a new coal contract for
14	Hayden and moving forward on the SCRs. By decoupling the SCR decision
15	from the coal contract decision, the Company made two separate elections that
16	should have been made jointly.
17	3. The Company failed to press PSCo to conduct updated cost effectiveness
18	studies on the Hayden SCRs, and did not pursue appropriate due diligence
19	documentation on the benefits or risks of pursuing the SCRs.
20	4. The Company failed to pursue an alternative retirement strategy with PSCo,
21	instead incorrectly agreeing toan
22	unenforceable premature compliance deadline.

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Sierra Club/100 Fisher/7



1 3. THE COMPANY'S ELECTION TO INSTALL SELECTIVE CATALYTIC REDUCTION 2 AT JIM BRIDGER IN DECEMBER 2013 WAS IMPRUDENT

3 Q Please describe the Jim Bridger plant.

4	Α	The Jim Bridger power plant is a 2,100 MW coal-fired plant made up of four units
5		(Jim Bridger units 1, 2, 3, and 4). PacifiCorp owns two-thirds of each unit and
6		Idaho Power Company owns the remaining one-third. Jim Bridger is located in
7		southwest Wyoming and contributes to haze pollution in several national parks
8		and wilderness areas: Yellowstone National Park, Grand Teton National Park,
9		Rocky Mountain National Park, Teton Wilderness Area, Bridger Wilderness
10		Area, Fitzpatrick Wilderness Area, Mt Zirkel Wilderness Area, Rawah
11		Wilderness Area, and Washakie Wilderness Area. ¹
12		Jim Bridger is a mine-mouth plant, which means that it receives the bulk of its
13		coal fuel from a mine that is adjacent to (or at least near) the plant. The majority
14		of Jim Bridger plant ("Bridger plant") is supplied by the Bridger coal mine
15		("Bridger mine"). The Bridger mine is comprised of two separate operations—a
16		surface mine and an underground mine, a distinction which will prove important.
17		The Bridger mine is operated by the Bridger Coal Company ("BCC"), itself a
18		jointly-owned subsidiary of PacifiCorp and Idaho Power Company. Bridger Coal
19		Company is one of the few remaining coal mining operations owned by a
20		regulated utility. The costs of operating BCC are recovered both through the fuel
21		costs of Jim Bridger plant, as well as recovered directly through rate base from

¹ Approval, Disapproval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Wyoming; Regional Haze State Implementation Plan; Federal Implementation Plan for Regional Haze, 79 Fed. Reg. 5032, 5041 (Jan. 30, 2014).

1		PacifiCorp's customers. This intimate relationship between the mine and the
2		plant, and the fact that both are rate-based means that PacifiCorp treats the mine
3		as an asset for which customers maintain all liability. Similarly, factors that affect
4		the mine impact the costs of operating the plant, and vise versa.
5	Q	Why did PacifiCorp install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4?
6	A	PacifiCorp installed the selective catalytic reductions ("SCR") in connection with
7		the Regional Haze Rule under the Federal Clean Air Act. As I will discuss later, a
8		core question for this Commission is whether PacifiCorp actually had an
9		enforceable obligation to install the SCRs by 2015 and 2016. In Section 3.b (page
10		17), I assert that the Company's timeline for the installation of SCRs was a
11		product of its own manufacture, and was not a matter of law.
11 12	Q	product of its own manufacture, and was not a matter of law. When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4?
	Q A	
12		When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4?
12 13		When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4? The Company agreed to install SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 in November 2010, as
12 13 14		When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4? The Company agreed to install SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 in November 2010, as an outcome of a settlement with the Wyoming Department of Environmental
12 13 14 15		When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4? The Company agreed to install SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 in November 2010, as an outcome of a settlement with the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality ("WYDEQ"). ² As I describe below in Section 3.b, the Company appears
12 13 14 15 16		When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4? The Company agreed to install SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 in November 2010, as an outcome of a settlement with the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality ("WYDEQ"). ² As I describe below in Section 3.b, the Company appears to have entered into that agreement voluntarily, even when offered the
12 13 14 15 16 17		When did PacifiCorp decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4? The Company agreed to install SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 in November 2010, as an outcome of a settlement with the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality ("WYDEQ"). ² As I describe below in Section 3.b, the Company appears to have entered into that agreement voluntarily, even when offered the opportunity to extend its compliance deadlines by the United States

² PAC/800 at Teply/32:1, Figure 1—Bridger SCRs Timeline.

1		Procurement and Construction ("EPC") contractors on December 1, 2013. ³ Prior
2		to signing that FNTP, the Company had the option to withdraw from the project
3		with relatively little consequence and cost. As I show, after that contract date the
4		Company still had the option to terminate the contract, but the cost of doing so
5		rose thereafter. The Company had an obligation to continue assessing its decision
6		to install the SCRs up through the signing of the FNTP on December 1, 2013, and
7		had a continuing obligation thereafter to continue assessing if the project had
8		merit, net of costs already sunk into the project.
9	Q	Were alternative compliance paths available to the Company?
9 10	Q A	Were alternative compliance paths available to the Company? Yes. The Regional Haze Rule's requirements are based on both a control
	-	
10	-	Yes. The Regional Haze Rule's requirements are based on both a control
10 11	-	Yes. The Regional Haze Rule's requirements are based on both a control technology and an emissions limit at each unit. PacifiCorp could therefore have
10 11 12	-	Yes. The Regional Haze Rule's requirements are based on both a control technology and an emissions limit at each unit. PacifiCorp could therefore have complied with the rule either by installing the required pollution controls
10 11 12 13	-	Yes. The Regional Haze Rule's requirements are based on both a control technology and an emissions limit at each unit. PacifiCorp could therefore have complied with the rule either by installing the required pollution controls necessary to meet that limit, or by shutting down, or by converting the Jim
10 11 12 13 14	-	Yes. The Regional Haze Rule's requirements are based on both a control technology and an emissions limit at each unit. PacifiCorp could therefore have complied with the rule either by installing the required pollution controls necessary to meet that limit, or by shutting down, or by converting the Jim Bridger units to run on fossil gas. There are several examples of coal plants

⁴ Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Arizona; Regional Haze State and Federal Implementation Plans; Reconsideration 80 Fed. Reg. 19,220 (Apr. 10, 2015 (Apache Unit 2); 79 Fed. Reg. at 5045 (Naughton Unit 3, Wyoming; (Muskogee 4 & 5, Oklahoma).

⁵ Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Oregon; Regional Haze State Implementation Plan and Interstate Transport Plan, 76 Fed. Reg. 38, 997 and 2008 Oregon Regional Haze Plan at 154-156 and) (PGE Boardman, Oregon); Transalta Centralia, Washington (Washington Department of Ecology, Order 6426, 2011)

 $^{^{3}}Id.$

1	Q	Did the Company assess alternatives to the installation of the SCRs at Jim
2		Bridger?
3	A	Just one. The Company performed an assessment, described by Mr. Rick Link, to
4		determine if it was more cost effective to install the SCRs, shut down or repower
5		Jim Bridger 3 & 4 with gas. ⁶
6		Notably, the Company had other forms of compliance that would have likely been
7		deemed acceptable by EPA, and that the Company has since sought to exercise
8		elsewhere. Prominent amongst these alternatives is the option to avoid costly
9		controls like SCR by committing to a shorter plant life. That shorter plant life
10		need not be the immediate shut down of the unit on the compliance deadline. I
11		discuss alternative compliance with the Regional Haze Rule in Section 3.c (page
12		28), below.
13		a. <u>Overview of PacifiCorp's Jim Bridger 3 & 4 SCR Assessment</u>
14	Q	Please summarize the Company's analysis process to determine if the SCRs
15		should be built at Bridger 3 & 4.
16	A	Since 2012, PacifiCorp has used the System Optimizer (sometimes abbreviated
17		"SO") model, its primary forward planning and integrated resource planning
18		platform, to determine whether large capital investments were economic at
19		existing coal-fired units. PacifiCorp typically uses the model to assess two
20		alternative worlds: one in which the retrofit is pursued, the other in which the
21		plant is retired or, as in this case, repowered. The use of a system-wide model is
22		critical because it assesses how other factors on the utility's system change in

⁶ PAC/700 at Link/86: 8-11.

REDACTED - PROTECTED INFORMATION SUBJECT TO GENERAL PROTECTIVE ORDER

1	response to a retire/retrofit decision, and not just the costs of the power plant
2	itself.
3	This methodology, like all other models, is highly sensitive to inputs and the
4	quality of the data used in the model. Specifically, the value of pursuing a retrofit
5	can change substantially as the market shifts, and decisions need to be evaluated
6	using the very best information available up to the moment the decision is
7	finalized, and even beyond.
8	The Company's initial filing in this case was a CPCN submitted to the Wyoming
9	Public Service Commission on August 1, 2012, and was based on an analysis
10	conducted using data from December 2011. ⁷ In that initial analysis, the Company
11	claimed that the Bridger 3 & 4 SCRs had a value of ⁸ Intervenors
12	pointed out that, amongst other flaws, PacifiCorp's initial analysis used outdated
13	data. On rebuttal, filed March 4, 2013, the Company provided an updated
14	analysis, populated with September 2012 data, showing a \$183 million value, ⁹
15	substantially lower than the Company's initial valuation. The results of that

 ⁷ PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.1(h) ("Yes, the CPCN application in Wyoming (Docket 20000-418-EA-12) used the December 2011 official forward price curve for the base case."). All public data responses referenced in this testimony are compiled and attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/102.
 ⁸ Direct Testimony of Mr. Rick Link, *In The Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Construct Selective Catalytic Reduction Systems on Jim Bridger Units 3 And 4 Located Near Point of Rocks, Wyoming Docket No.20000-418-EA-12 at 2:5. (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 2012) (provided as an attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.1(g)) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/103).*

⁹ Redacted Rebuttal Testimony of Mr. Rick Link, *In The Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Construct Selective Catalytic Reduction Systems on Jim Bridger Units 3 And 4 Located Near Point of Rocks, Wyoming* Docket No.20000-418-EA-12 at 1:22. (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 2013) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/104). Note that value is provided publicly in PAC/700, Link/86:15.

1		revised September 2012 analysis are before this commission today. ¹⁰ The
2		Wyoming Commission docket was concluded in May 2013.
3		The Company's "final" assessment conducted for the Wyoming CPCN rebuttal
4		used September 2012 data, and was conducted in January 2013 ¹¹ —it would be the
5		last time the Company ran the System Optimizer model to assess the retire/retrofit
6		decision.
7	Q	How did the Company assess the value of the retire/retrofit decision after
8		January 2013?
9	A	Mr. Link ran what he describes as a "breakeven" assessment of the retrofit. ¹²
10		Basically, the Company observed that the value of the retrofit decision appeared
11		to have a roughly ¹³ linear relationship with gas prices, and assessed that if the
12		levelized cost of gas fell below \$4.86/MMBtu, it would be more economical to
13		repower Jim Bridger with gas than install the SCRs.
14		Figure 1, below, shows Mr. Link's derived relationship between the value of the
15		SCR retrofit ¹⁴ relative to the levelized cost of gas from 2016-2030. It then shows
16		how the value of the Bridger SCR degraded from September 2012 through
17		December 2014 as gas prices rapidly approached and then fell below PacifiCorp's
18		own breakeven at \$4.86/MMBtu.


¹⁰ PAC/700, Link/86:15, Link/98:9.

 ¹¹ Date stamps on Mr. Link's System Optimizer work papers submitted in this docket.
 ¹² PAC/700 at Link/106:4-21

¹³ Roughly: Mr. Link's breakeven analysis relies on three data points to create a line of best fit. While the trend appears visually clear, from a statistical standpoint, the lack of additional modeling observations (i.e. degrees of freedom) actually renders this a weak relationship. At a 90% confidence interval, the projected "breakeven" could be as low as \$3.71/MMBtu, or as high as \$5.59/MMBtu.

¹⁴ Negative values being a benefit to the Bridger SCR decision.

Figure 1. Relationship between levelized gas prices and the (benefit) / cost of the SCR investments at Jim Bridger 3 & 4.¹⁵



Relationship between Gas Prices and the PVRR(d) (Benefit)/Cost of the SCR Investments at Jim Bridger Units 3 & 4 - Updated

4 Q How had the Company's analysis of the Bridger 3 & 4 SCRs changed from 5 the Company's CPCN proceeding in Wyoming until the time that the SCR 6 **FNTP** was signed in December 2013? 7 Α From the time the Company completed its rebuttal assessment in the Wyoming 8 CPCN, the value of the decision to install SCRs continued to fall substantially up 9 through the FNTP. Figure 2, below, shows the value of the Bridger 3 & 4 retrofit 10 through time leading up to the FNTP.

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¹⁵ PAC/710; Attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request "Attach Sierra Club 1.6.xlsx" [hereinafter "Attach Sierra Club 1.6.xlsx"] (additional OFPC author's calculation).




Figure 2. Benefit of SCRs at Bridger 3&4 over time, Company and Author calculations¹⁶

In the instant docket, Mr. Link testified that prior to executing the FNTP in
December 2013, he found that the margin had shrunk another 30% to \$130
million using September 2013 gas price projections in his breakeven
assessment.¹⁷

8 However, Mr. Link's updated analysis is still deficient because it relied on

- 9 inadequate and stale data when there was substantial evidence that the decision to
- 10 install SCR continued to rapidly lose value. In fact, by the time PacifiCorp
- 11 executed the FNTP on December 1, 2013, the SCR projects had effectively no
- 12 value to ratepayers.

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- 13 As I show in Section 3.d (page 32), PacifiCorp acknowledged that the costs of
- 14 coal provided to Jim Bridger had increased in October 2013, reducing the value to

¹⁶ [A] Ex. Sierra Club/103, Direct Testimony of Rick Link in Wyoming 20000-418-EA 12 at 2:5; [B] PAC/700 at Link/86:15; [C] PAC/700 at Link/107:13; [D] Author's calculation, see Adjustment #1; [E] Author's calculation, see Adjustment #2.

¹⁷ PAC/700 at Link/107:13

1	\$99 million—an adjustment neither disclosed nor discussed by Mr. Link. Below, I
2	show that the Company critically failed to assess how a new mine operations plan
3	for Jim Bridger would impair the decision to retrofit Jim Bridger 3 & 4.
4	Finally, late 2013 was the dawn of the hydraulic fracturing boom, and in the
5	months leading up to the FNTP, analysts and PacifiCorp were projecting
6	substantially lower forward-looking gas prices. As I describe in Section 3.e (page
7	44) information in the Company's hands prior to the execution of the FTNP led
8	the Company to conclude that gas prices had fallen within cents of Mr. Link's
9	\$4.86/MMBtu breakeven, ¹⁸ and a reasonable assessment of trends leading up to
10	that period would have concluded that there was a very real potential that the
11	project would fail economically. In December 2013, the value of the SCR retrofit
12	had, conservatively, fallen to \$6 million—effectively a wash.
13	As has been made clear in the industry, the economics of maintaining coal have
14	continued to fall drastically in the months and years since the Company finalized
15	its decision to proceed with the SCRs, to the extent that the Company recently
16	identified Jim Bridger 3 & 4 as candidates for early retirement in the 2019 IRP.
17	Finally, as I show in Section 3.f (page 58) the Company's own metric for the
18	economics of the Bridger 3 & 4 SCRs degraded so rapidly that the losses
19	attributed to the continued operations of the unit exceeded the termination cost of
20	the SCR project during the construction of the SCRs. In other words, the
21	Company erred not only in releasing contractors to build the SCRs, but it also

¹⁸ PAC/700 at Link/101:13-17.

1 erred in not re-evaluating—and ceasing construction—at the Bridger SCRs, to the 2 detriment of their ratepayers.

3 b. THE TIMELINE TO INSTALL SCR AT JIM BRIDGER BY 2015 AND 2016 WAS OF THE COMPANY'S OWN MANUFACTURE 4

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What is the basis for the SCRs at Jim Bridger, and how is the installation

6 connected to the Clean Air Act?

7 Α Regional haze results from small particles in the atmosphere that impair a 8 viewer's ability to see long distances and color. The main haze-forming pollutants 9 are sulfur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_X) and fine particulate matter (PM). 10 These air pollutants contribute to the deterioration of air quality and reduced 11 visibility in our national parks and wilderness areas, designated as Class 1 areas. 12 In 1977, Congress declared as the nation's goal, the "prevention of any future, and 13 the remedying of any existing, impairment of visibility in mandatory class I Federal areas which impairment results from manmade air pollution."¹⁹ In order 14 15 to meet this goal, states are required to adopt implementation plans ("SIPs") to 16 reduce, and ultimately eliminate, haze-causing pollution that may cause or 17 contribute to visibility impairment for any protected Class 1 area (i.e. wilderness 18 or national park) located within or beyond that state's boundaries. 19 The Clean Air Act imposes a legal obligation on both states and EPA to abate

haze pollution in such Class 1 areas.²⁰ One of the Clean Air Act's mechanisms for

achieving this goal was the requirement for certain haze-causing sources, like coal

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 20 Id

¹⁹ 42 U.S.C. §7491(a)(1).

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plants, to install "best available retrofit technology" ("BART").²¹ Bridger units 3 & 4 were subject to BART.

3 Under the BART-phase of the Regional Haze Rule, states were required to assess 4 which power plants were covered by the rule, and set emissions limits and require 5 control technology necessary to satisfy the particular requirements of BART, 6 including visibility monitoring and an assessment of cost. States would then 7 include these findings into a SIP, which would be submitted to EPA for final 8 approval. EPA had the option of approving, disapproving, or modifying state 9 plans. If EPA disapproved a plan (or a portion of a plan), it then promulgated a federal implementation plan ("FIP") to replace the disapproved SIP.²² Ultimately 10 11 regional haze plans were not enforceable until after EPA acted to either approve a 12 SIP or issue a FIP. Finally, under the Regional Haze Rule, an owner/operator was required to comply with a final BART rule within five years of rule issuance.²³ 13 14 In 2011, Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality ("WYDEQ") submitted 15 a revised state implementation plan to EPA to comply with the BART provisions 16 of the Regional Haze Rule. Within that SIP, the state proposed that Jim Bridger 3 17 & 4 be retrofit with SCRs in 2015 and 2016, respectively. After several years of 18 back and forth, EPA disapproved several elements of Wyoming's plan, which 19 triggered EPA's obligation to promulgate a federal implementation plan ("FIP") to replace those disapproved elements.²⁴ 20

²¹ Id. §§ 7491(a), (b)(2).

²² 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1)(A).

²³ 40 C.F.R. 51.308(e)(iv).

²⁴ 79 Fed. Reg. 5032 (Jan. 30, 2014).

1		EPA issued a FIP, which then became binding on Jim Bridger, on January 30,
2		2014 ²⁵ —nearly two months <u>after</u> the Company had already issued its FNTP for
3		the SCRs at Jim Bridger. In other words, the Company made its final
4		determination to proceed with the retrofit before the EPA had finalized the plant's
5		BART obligations.
6	Q	Did the Company decide to install SCRs at Jim Bridger in 2015/2016 before
7		EPA had even finalized its requirements?
8	A	Yes. In 2007, PacifiCorp provided data to Wyoming for Wyoming to incorporate
9		into its regional haze SIP. Wyoming adopted that first regional haze SIP on May
10		22, 2008, ²⁶ followed by a series of permit issuances from Wyoming DEQ
11		authorizing PacifiCorp to move forward with SCRs.
12		On November 2, 2010, PacifiCorp settled with WYDEQ, agreeing not to appeal
13		the SCR requirements for a number of coal units. ²⁷ In the settlement, PacifiCorp
14		agreed to install SCR at Jim Bridger 3 & 4 by 2015 and 2016, and install SCR at
15		Jim Bridger 1 & 2 by 2022 and 2021, respectively. The settlement, which is
16		briefly mentioned by Mr. Teply as the "2010 Wyoming Stipulation", ²⁸ was signed
17		by PacifiCorp's then Vice President of Generation, Dana Ralston.
18		In January 2011, WYDEQ submitted a revised SIP to EPA, including the
19		proposed settlement terms. Importantly, EPA did not make its final BART

²⁵ PAC/800 at Teply/32:1, Figure 1—Bridger SCR Timeline.

²⁶ Id.

 ²⁷ Exhibit RMP_(CSW-3R) Accompanying the Rebuttal Testimony of Cathy S. Woollums, November 2010 Wyoming DEQ Bart Appeal Settlement Agreement, Docket No. 20000-418-EA-12 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm' March, 2013) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/105).
 ²⁸ PAC/800 at Teply/28:10-11.

	determination for Wyoming until January 30, 2014. In its FIP, EPA was explicit
	that while it was accepting Wyoming's proposed deadlines, compliance was only
	required "within five years of our approval of the SIP," ²⁹ pushing PacifiCorp's
	deadline out to 2019. EPA noted that it was accepting the state's deadlines
	because they were likely more stringent than what the EPA itself would have
	otherwise required:
	In our proposal, we indicated that the State had neglected to reasonably assess the costs of compliance and visibility improvement for Jim Bridger in accordance with the BART Guidelines. We nonetheless proposed to approve the State's BART and reasonable progress determinations for Units 3 and 4 because the compliance deadlines to install SCR on these units were sufficient to meet the requirements of BART. ³⁰
	The Regional Haze rule provided up to five years to install BART retrofits. ³¹ In
	this case, however, PacifiCorp appears to have supported—or likely proposed—
	the 2015/2016 installation dates for Bridger 3 and 4 back in November 2010, as I
	describe below.
Q	To date, what had been the typical EPA-mandated compliance period for
	installing BART retrofits?
A	The Regional Haze rule expressly provides owners/operators with a five-year
	installation window. In this case, EPA finalized its FIP for Wyoming on January
	30, 2014 with an effective date of March 3, 2014. Therefore, the Jim Bridger 3
	& 4 projects would have had a compliance deadline of March 2019, not 2015
	-


²⁹ 79 Fed. Reg. at 5046.
³⁰ *Id*.at 5048.
³¹ 40 C.F.R. 51.308(e)(iv).

1		deadlines because PacifiCorp had agreed to or proposed those deadlines itself. In
2		no instance did PacifiCorp complain about the expedited construction schedule.
3	Q	Why was the Company's rush to achieve early compliance with the Regional
4		Haze Rule a problem in this case?
5	A	The Company's rush to achieve early compliance with an expensive
6		environmental obligation deeply reduced the Company's optionality. By pushing
7		forward to meet compliance well ahead of the federally mandated deadline-in
8		this case by a number of years-the Company forfeited any opportunity to assess
9		whether the expedited compliance schedule was economically advantageous for
10		its customers.
10 11	Q	its customers. Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger
	Q	
11	Q	Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger
11 12	_	Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger plant?
11 12 13	_	Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger plant? The record convincingly indicates that PacifiCorp viewed the installations as a
11 12 13 14	_	Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger plant? The record convincingly indicates that PacifiCorp viewed the installations as a way of extending investments in its coal plants, and identified from an early date
11 12 13 14 15	_	Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger plant? The record convincingly indicates that PacifiCorp viewed the installations as a way of extending investments in its coal plants, and identified from an early date the opportunity to invest \$2.7 billion dollars across its entire coal fleet.
11 12 13 14 15 16	_	Why did PacifiCorp support the 2015/2016 SCR installations at Jim Bridger plant? The record convincingly indicates that PacifiCorp viewed the installations as a way of extending investments in its coal plants, and identified from an early date the opportunity to invest \$2.7 billion dollars across its entire coal fleet. On November 2, 2010—the same day that PacifiCorp settled with WYDEQ,


 ³² PAC/800 at Teply/32:1, Figure 1—Bridger SCR Timeline.
 ³³ Exhibit A: PacifiCorp's Emission Reduction Plan (Nov. 2, 2010) (originally published as part of Regional Haze State Implementation Plan supporting materials at WYDEQ) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/106).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	From 2005 through 2010 PacifiCorp has spent more than \$1.2 billion in capital dollars [on emission reductions]. It is anticipated that the total costs for all projects that have been committed to will exceed \$2.7 billion by the end of 2022. The total costs (which include capital, O&M and other costs) that will have been incurred by customers to pay for these pollution control projects during the period 2005 through 2023, are expected to exceed \$4.2 billion, and by 2023 the annual costs to customers for these projects will have reached \$360 million per year. ³⁴
10	The 2010 Plan then showed a schedule of prior and anticipated spending,
11	including the substantial spending for the Bridger 3 & 4 SCRs in 2015 and 2016,
12	and the Bridger 1 & 2 SCRs in 2021 and 2022.
13 14 15	Figure 3. Figure from PacifiCorp 2010 Plan, showing capital expenditures anticipated at PacifiCorp's coal plants. ³⁵

Capital Expenditures to Add Pollution Control Equipment onPacifiCorp's Arizona, Utah & Wyoming Coal-Fired Units



16



Q	You testified above that PacifiCorp's Bridger 3 & 4 retrofit schedule was
	well ahead of the Regional Haze rule's regulatory compliance timetable.
	Was PacifiCorp aware that it was pushing for a construction schedule much
	faster than that required by federal regulations?
A	Yes. According to Company's 2010 Plan, "PacifiCorp began implementing its
	emission reduction commitments in 2005. This was well ahead of the emission
	reduction timelines under the regional haze rules which require BART to be
	installed no later than five years following approval of the applicable Regional
	Haze SIP." ³⁶ PacifiCorp was both aware that its compliance was premature and
	that the Regional Haze Rule itself specified a five year window after approval of
	the SIP by EPA.
	In addition, in PacifiCorp's CPCN proceeding for the retrofits in Wyoming, Sierra
	Club motioned to stay or continue the proceeding until after EPA had made its
	designations final. ³⁷
Q	What are the reasons that PacifiCorp states it was required to install the
	SCRs at Jim Bridger in 2015/2016?
A	PacifiCorp generates a list of reasons, none of which are the federally enforceable
	deadline—which was issued after the Company made its firm commitment to its
	EPC contractors.
	Mr. Teply testified that the Company filed an application requesting CPCN at the
	Wyoming Commission "in compliance" with the 2010 Wyoming Stipulation with

 ³⁶ *Id.* at 4 (emphasis added).
 ³⁷ Docket No. 20000-418-EA-12, Sierra Club Motion for a Stay or Continuance Pending Final EPA Action (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 21, 2012) [hereinafter "WY PSC, SC Motion for Stay"].

1		WYDEQ. ³⁸ As I'll describe, the SCRs are regulated—and enforced—under the
2		federal Clean Air Act. There is no record of how PacifiCorp made the
3		determination with WYDEQ that SCRs at Jim Bridger were reasonable, or should
4		be achieved by 2015-2016.
5		Mr. Teply also testified that the timeline was required by a "Best Available
6		Retrofit Technology (BART) permit issued by the state of Wyoming" ³⁹ in
7		December 2010. ⁴⁰ That permit was issued as an outcome of 2010 Wyoming
8		Stipulation. As I understand these permits, they allow for the stated modification
9		in a particular timeframe, but are not the records that establish an enforceable
10		deadline
10		deadline.
11	Q	Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with
	Q	
11	Q	Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with
11 12	Q	Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP." ⁴¹ The SIP was, until EPA's finalization,
11 12 13	Q	Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP." ⁴¹ The SIP was, until EPA's finalization, simply a draft plan. Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to
11 12 13 14	Q	Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP." ⁴¹ The SIP was, until EPA's finalization, simply a draft plan. Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP," ⁴² and provided a letter
11 12 13 14 15	Q	Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP." ⁴¹ The SIP was, until EPA's finalization, simply a draft plan. Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP," ⁴² and provided a letter from the Wyoming DEQ ⁴³ which he claimed verified the enforceability of the
 11 12 13 14 15 16 		Finally, Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP." ⁴¹ The SIP was, until EPA's finalization, simply a draft plan. Mr. Teply testified that "the Company was required to comply with the timelines set in Wyoming's SIP," ⁴² and provided a letter from the Wyoming DEQ ⁴³ which he claimed verified the enforceability of the Wyoming claim. Was he correct?

³⁸ PAC/800 at Teply/26:22-23, 28:9-13.
³⁹ PAC/800 at Teply/26:22.
⁴⁰ PAC/800 at Teply/32, Figure 1—Bridger SCRs Timeline.
⁴¹ PAC/800 at Teply/36:15.
⁴² PAC/800 at Teply/36:15.
⁴³ PAC/830.

1		rule, Wyoming DEQ had neither state nor federal authority to require compliance
2		with its draft SIP under the federal Regional Haze Rule.
3		PacifiCorp's letter to Wyoming DEQ (dated March 5, 2013) ⁴⁴ was sent the day
4		after the Company submitted rebuttal in the Wyoming CPCN (March 4, 2013), ⁴⁵
5		and was generated for the purposes of rebutting Sierra Club's assertion that the
6		Company did not have an enforceable deadline. The proper course of action by
7		PacifiCorp would have been to inform Wyoming that it understood its deadline to
8		be contingent on EPA's review and finalization, and that its deadlines would be
9		no earlier than five years after EPA's final approval.
10	Q	What options were open to the Company other than rushing SCR
10 11	Q	What options were open to the Company other than rushing SCR construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines?
	Q A	
11	-	construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines?
11 12	-	<pre>construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines? First, the Company should not have entered into a decade-long compliance</pre>
11 12 13	-	construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines? First, the Company should not have entered into a decade-long compliance schedule with WYDEQ in the 2010 Wyoming Stipulation. Secondly, Regional
11 12 13 14	-	construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines? First, the Company should not have entered into a decade-long compliance schedule with WYDEQ in the 2010 Wyoming Stipulation. Secondly, Regional Haze falls under the federal Clean Air Act, and as the years wore on, and
 11 12 13 14 15 	-	construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines? First, the Company should not have entered into a decade-long compliance schedule with WYDEQ in the 2010 Wyoming Stipulation. Secondly, Regional Haze falls under the federal Clean Air Act, and as the years wore on, and expensive retrofits became less economically viable, the Company should have
 11 12 13 14 15 16 	-	construction ahead of the federally mandated deadlines? First, the Company should not have entered into a decade-long compliance schedule with WYDEQ in the 2010 Wyoming Stipulation. Secondly, Regional Haze falls under the federal Clean Air Act, and as the years wore on, and expensive retrofits became less economically viable, the Company should have used the opportunity to adjust its plans through the appropriate channels with

⁴⁴ PAC/829.
⁴⁵ WY PSC, SC Motion for Stay.
⁴⁶ Even after it issued the FNTP, the Company still could have terminated the project with minimal costs. I discuss the termination provisions of the EPC contract in Section 3 f (starting page 58).

1		successfully obtained a stay of the FIP with respect to those other units, ⁴⁷ but it
2		did not challenge or seek a stay of the EPA's decision to require the Jim Bridger
3		SCRs. As of today, construction deadlines for those other units are still pending.
4	Q	Did the Company have the opportunity to ask EPA to make its deadlines for
5		Jim Bridger 3 & 4 later than 2015 / 2016?
6	A	Yes. In fact, the Company submitted comment to EPA while the agency was
7		analyzing these very deadlines, in August of 2013. But rather than contest
8		Wyoming's Bridger deadlines as inconsistent with Clean Air Act requirements,
9		the Company instead cited the fact that "engineering and permitting is underway
10		for the installation of SCR" at Jim Bridger, ⁴⁸ and even referenced the recent
11		CPCN process that it had gone through before the Wyoming Public Service
12		Commission ("WPSC") seeking approval to install these retrofits. ⁴⁹
13		It cannot be understated just how backwards, PacifiCorp's process was here. In
14		comments to EPA, the regulatory agency that would ultimately determine what its
15		compliance obligations would be, PacifiCorp instead elaborated on its intent-and
16		actions-to reach a presumptive form of compliance. Any form of urgency to
17		meet a 2015/2016 deadline was of PacifiCorp's own manufacture, and not a

⁴⁷ See PacifiCorp v.EPA, No. 14-9534 (10th Cir.)(filed Mar. 31, 2014) (PacifiCorp's motion to stay implementation of the FIP granted September 9, 2014 and implementation of the FIP remains stayed as of this writing).

 ⁴⁸ PacifiCorp Comments on Wyoming's Regional Haze Plan, ID EPA-R08-OAR-2012-0026-0149 at 7 (Aug. 26, 2013) (excerpts attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/107).
 ⁴⁹ Id. at 35.

product of the federally enforceable requirements of the federal Regional Haze
 Rule.⁵⁰

3	Q	What are your conclusions with respect to the Company's timeline to install
4		the SCRs at Jim Bridger 3 & 4?
5	A	I conclude that the Company manufactured a compliance deadline that it
6		understood was well ahead of EPA's requirements, and continued to assert that
7		compliance deadline without respect to alternatives or flexibility afforded under
8		the Clean Air Act, and at cost to its ratepayers.
9		Rather than a 2015/2016 deadline, PacifiCorp had an enforceable 2019 deadline.
10		The additional four to five years of compliance would have afforded PacifiCorp
11		the opportunity to assess additional alternatives, and continue to assess the need to
12		retrofit Jim Bridger 3 & 4, as opposed to either retiring or repowering the units.
13		And as I'll show in Section 3.e (page 44) and Section 3.f (page 58) that additional
14		timeline would have revealed unequivocally that the Company's election to move
15		forward on the retrofits was not in the interests of ratepayers.
16		The Company's failure to ask EPA for a federally enforceable deadline
17		commensurate with the five-year requirements under the Regional Haze Rule was
18		imprudent.

^{50 40} C.F.R. 51.308(e)(iv).

1 2 3

c. <u>The Company's Assessed Alternatives to Constructing SCRs</u> <u>at Jim Bridger was Fundamentally Faulty</u>

Q You testified that the Company had alternative compliance options available 4 to it other than the immediate shut down or repowering of the coal-fired unit 5 in order to meet regional haze obligations. What kinds of alternatives were 6 available to states and generators under the Regional Haze Rule? 7 Α EPA worked with states to propose alternative compliance pathways that achieved 8 the same or better cumulative emissions reductions, what is known as "better than 9 BART." For example, in the recent approval of an alternative compliance 10 pathway for PacifiCorp's Naughton 3 coal-fired station, EPA was clear that its 11 guidance on alternative compliance extended back to 2006, stating: 12 In 2006, the EPA finalized regulations that govern alternatives to 13 source-specific BART determinations such as that contemplated in the Wyoming SIP revision for Naughton Unit 3. These regulations 14 15 "make clear that the emissions reductions that could be achieved 16 through implementation of the BART provisions at $\S 51.308(e)(1)$ 17 [for source-by-source BART] serve as the benchmark against 18 which States can compare an alternative program." In turn, the 19 emissions reductions that could be achieved through source-by-20 source BART are calculated in accordance with the Guidelines for 21 BART Determinations Under the Regional Haze Rule.⁵¹ 22 0 Is the Company today aware of the alternative compliance options available 23 to it under the Regional Haze Rule? 24 Α Yes, very much so. In fact, much of the 2017 Integrated Resource Plan ("IRP") 25 focused on alternative regional haze compliance options, including unit 26 retirements and conversions to gas; pathways that the Company believed would

⁵¹ 84 Fed. Reg. 55, 10433 (Mar. 21, 2019) (internal citations omitted).

provide potentially lower cost options for compliance than installation of
 pollution controls.⁵²

3	Q	Should the Company have been aware in 2013 that there were alternative
4		compliance options available to it rather than the five year compliance
5		window under the Regional Haze Rule?
6	A	Yes. On July 5, 2011, EPA approved Oregon's Regional Haze SIP, which
7		amongst other items, proposed to shut Portland General Electric's ("PGE")
8		Boardman coal-fired power plant by December 2020, well after the five-year
9		compliance deadline under the Regional Haze Rule. ⁵³ In proposing to accept the
10		alternative approach, EPA cited a specific process conducted by PGE and the
11		Oregon Department of Environmental Quality ("ODEQ"):
12 13 14 15 16 17		In a letter from PGE to ODEQ dated October 22, 2010, PGE requested that ODEQ reopen the Regional Haze BART rulemaking to consider an alternative BART approach for PGE Boardman. This alternative approach would allow PGE Boardman to commit to cease burning coal by December 31, 2020, and in the interim operate with less expensive control technology. ⁵⁴
18		EPA approved this process and finding, an outcome that would have—or should
19		have-been clear to PacifiCorp. And in fact, organizations such as the Citizens'
20		Utility Board ("CUB") of Oregon strove to make it quite clear to PacifiCorp that
21		this type of alternative compliance should be reviewed by the Company. In both

⁵² PacifiCorp, 2017 Integrated Resource Plan, at 21 (April 4, 2017), *available at* https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/integrated-resource-plan html ("Compliance associated with Regional Haze requirements continued to be a key area of focus for the 2017 IRP. PacifiCorp developed resource portfolios among seven potential Regional Haze scenarios (including a reference case), assessing how different inter-temporal and fleet-tradeoff compliance outcomes might influence new resource needs and system costs.").

⁵³ 76 Fed. Reg. 38997.

⁵⁴ 76 Fed. Reg. 12651, 12660 (Mar. 8, 2011).

1		opening comments, and then reiterated in final comments on PacifiCorp's 2011
2		IRP, CUB explicitly raised this alternative compliance opportunity, stating:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13		To the degree that the clean air costs are associated with Regional Haze (BART) SIPs, the range of options that the Company has considered must also be disclosed, since BART contains a fair amount of flexibility tied to the lifetime of the plant. This flexibility allows for a utility to shorten the life of a plant rather than prolong it by adding additional clean air investments, as the total amount of pollution emitted from a plant is greatly reduced by early closure. As such, if a plant is closed early, the shorter life will mean that less pollution control investment is cost-effective and the utility can move towards finding a more efficient replacement resource. ⁵⁵
14		Inexplicably, PacifiCorp ignored CUB's recommendation. Instead, PacifiCorp
15		affirmatively chose not to assess any alternative compliance options for Jim
16		Bridger 3 & 4. It is entirely feasible that a commitment to retire Jim Bridger at a
17		later date, like 2020 or 2022, would have resulted in lower costs in a forward-
18		looking assessment.
19	Q	Has the Commission previously recognized that the Regional Haze Rule
20		provides utilities with flexibility in its timing?
21	A	Yes. In December 2012, this Commission ruled on PacifiCorp's implementation
22		of retrofits at the (still operating) Naughton 1 & 2 coal-fired power plants, finding
23		that the Company's decision and process to build emission controls was
24		analytically and structurally flawed. ⁵⁶ Specifically, the Commission noted that the
25		inherent flexibility in the Regional Haze Rule as afforded to PGE should have

⁵⁵ Opening Comments of the Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon, *In the Matter of PacifiCorp dba Pacific Power 2011 Integrated Resource Plan*, Docket No. LC 52, at 7-9 (Aug. 25, 2011).

⁵⁶ Order No. 12-493, *In the Matter of PacifiCorp, dba Pacific Power Request for a General Rate Revision*, Docket No. UE 246, at 29 (Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter "Order No. 12-493"].

1 been employed by PacifiCorp in contemplating those retrofits, to the benefit of

2 ratepayers:

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17		In addition, if Pacific Power had properly explored the potential flexibility in the timing of its options under the RHR, as we believe it had the opportunity to do, the utility and ratepayers would have benefited from additional information that could have been incorporated into cost-effectiveness analyses. That additional information, at a minimum, could have supported later potential shut down dates for use in the PVRR(d) analysis as suggested by CUB and Sierra Club. Indeed, had Pacific Power planned to delay investments at some of its plants, then the utility would have been clearly aware of the "phase-out" analysis conducted by PGE for its Boardman plant and prompted to evaluate the economics of a similar phase-out. As noted by CUB, that analysis permitted PGE to consider a phase-out of its Boardman plant geared toward shutting the plant in 2020, rather than investing in more costly upgrades necessary to allow the plant to operate past that date. ⁵⁷
18	Q	What are your conclusions with respect to the alternatives that were
19		available to the Company under the Regional Haze Rule?
20	A	I conclude that the Company failed to assess any alternatives towards lower cost
20 21	Α	I conclude that the Company failed to assess any alternatives towards lower cost compliance as authorized under the Regional Haze Rule, as conducted by PGE for
	A	
21	A	compliance as authorized under the Regional Haze Rule, as conducted by PGE for
21 22	Α	compliance as authorized under the Regional Haze Rule, as conducted by PGE for the Boardman plant, and as recommended by CUB in 2011. These alternatives
21 22 23	Α	compliance as authorized under the Regional Haze Rule, as conducted by PGE for the Boardman plant, and as recommended by CUB in 2011. These alternatives would have allowed the Company to seek a later firm retirement date for Jim
21 22 23 24	Α	compliance as authorized under the Regional Haze Rule, as conducted by PGE for the Boardman plant, and as recommended by CUB in 2011. These alternatives would have allowed the Company to seek a later firm retirement date for Jim Bridger 3 & 4 rather than install the SCRs. This pause would have ultimately

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 30.

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

1 2

d. <u>COSTS AND OPERATIONS AT THE BRIDGER MINE CHANGED</u> <u>MATERIALLY IN THE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE FNTP</u>

3 Q How does the Bridger coal plant receive fuel, and how is that relevant to this 4 case? 5 Α The Jim Bridger coal plant receives coal both from the Bridger Coal Company 6 ("BCC"), a mine and company jointly owned by PacifiCorp and Idaho Power 7 Company; and the Black Butte Mine, a commercial coal producer. BCC 8 exclusively serves Jim Bridger plant, while Black Butte mine also serves a small 9 amount of coal to Idaho Power Company's North Valmy station. 10 Over the last decade, Jim Bridger has received about 2/3rds of its coal supply 11 from BCC, with the remainder coming from Black Butte. My testimony focuses 12 on the Bridger Coal Company mine, and material changes that occurred in mining 13 operations between the time that Mr. Link ran his September 2013 "breakeven" 14 assessment and the signing of the FNTP. 15 The BCC mine is divided into a surface and underground operation. Over the last 16 decade, the underground mine has contributed around 60 percent of the coal from 17 BCC to Bridger (see Figure 4, below).




Figure 4. Deliveries of coal to Jim Bridger plant (M tons).⁵⁸

2

1

The BCC underground mine was opened in 2004, and was meant to extend the
longevity of the Bridger mine at a lower cost than the surface.

5 When doing long-term planning, PacifiCorp constructs what it terms "long-term

6 fueling forecasts," ("fuel forecast") and for the Jim Bridger plant, those forecasts

7 seek to account for the costs of procuring coal from the surface mine, the

- 8 underground mine, and from Black Butte over a period of decades. For the
- 9 Bridger SCR assessment, the Company used a fuel forecast from January 2013
- 10 (the "January 2013 Fuel Plan").⁵⁹
- However in the period between January 2013 and October 2013—i.e. preceding
 the FNTP date of December 1, 2013—the Company's plan for acquiring fuel at

⁵⁸ EIA Form 923, *available at* https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/.

⁵⁹ See Exhibit No. DR-1CT, Confidential Rebuttal Testimony of Dana Ralston, *Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Complainant, v. Pacific Power & Light Company, Respondent*, Docket No. UE-155253, at 2:14-16 (Wash. Util. Transp. & Comm'n Apr. 2016) [hereinafter "UTC Ralston Rebuttal Testimony"] (provided as an attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.8(c) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/108).

1		Jim Bridger was thrown into disarray, ultimately causing the Company to come
2		up with a completely different fueling plan for the plant and a very different
3		outlook for the Bridger Mine. The Company admits that as an outcome of this
4		new fueling plan, the costs of maintaining Jim Bridger as a four-unit coal-fired
5		plant increased by \$31 million. ⁶⁰ This increased cost materially devalued the SCR
6		retrofit project, and was not accounted for by the Company at all in its re-
7		assessment of the SCR project prior to executing the FNTP.
8		Below I explain the basis of the Company's adjustment.
9	Q	How did the Company assess the cost of coal for the Jim Bridger SCR
10		assessment?
11	А	First, it's notable that the fuel costs for Jim Bridger are actually reflected in two
12		different places in the Company's modeling. Because PacifiCorp partially owned
13		the mine, the Company actually incorporated capital costs ⁶¹ through a completely
14		different avenue than what it referred to as the "cash costs," which are reflected in
15		the per MMBtu cost of coal. ⁶² For clarity, I refer to the all-in cost of coal (i.e.
16		including capital) as the "full cost" of coal, while I use the Company's term for
17		the variable cost, the "cash cost."
18		In assessing both the cash cost as well as the full cost of coal at Bridger for the
19		SCR analysis, the Company developed two completely different fuel forecasts.
20		The first forecast assessed how coal would be procured if all four Jim Bridger
21		units were to run until 2037 (the "four-unit scenario"). The second forecast

 ⁶⁰ See id at 8:15.
 ⁶¹ See PAC/707;
 ⁶² See PAC/705;

1	assessed the cost of coal if only two units ran through 2037 (the "two-unit
2	scenario"). ⁶³
3	Mr. Link briefly described that under a two-unit scenario, the Company had a
4	different set of assumptions for the Bridger coal mine, and requisite costs. ⁶⁴ He
5	also showed some of the differences between the resulting costs in his
6	accompanying exhibits. ⁶⁵
7	What Mr. Link failed to describe was that under a two-unit scenario, the
8	Company assumed that it would close the surface mine in 2017, ⁶⁶ relying instead
9	on the underground mine for the remainder of the plant's life, through 2037. The
10	Company assumed that the expedient closure of the surface mine (in the two-unit
11	scenario) would result in the acceleration of the mine reclamation costs. ⁶⁷
12	Critically, that acceleration of mine reclamation costs (shown by Mr. Link in
13	Exhibit PAC/706)
14	between 2013 and 2018, the period when all four Bridger units
15	are still operating. ⁶⁸
16	In contrast, the four-unit scenario assumed that both the surface and underground
17	mine would persist through 2037. ⁶⁹

⁶³ In its initial CPCN the Company also developed a three-unit scenario assessment that it dismissed as a higher cost alternative.

⁶⁴ PAC/700 at Link/91:20-93:3.

⁶⁵ See PAC/705; PAC/706; PAC/707.

 ⁶⁶ See Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.8(b).
 ⁶⁷ See Exhibit No. CAC-1CT, Redacted Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of Cindy Crane, Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Complainant, v. Pacific Power & Light Company, Respondent, Docket No. UE-152253, at 11:18- 12:1 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n May 2016) [hereinafter "UTC Crane Supplemental Rebuttal"] (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/109).

⁶⁸ Author's calculation from Exhibit PAC/705.

⁶⁹ See Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club 1.8(b).

1		Paradoxically, in the Company's view, it is more expensive to operate the Bridger
2		Coal Company (in absolute terms) when it is producing less coal. These
3		incremental costs were not imposed on the four-unit scenario.
4	Q	What was the total incremental cost that was imposed in the two-unit
5		scenario for assumed accelerated reclamation at the Bridger mine?
6	A	The accelerated reclamation cost was actually imposed as a contribution to a
7		"sinking fund," ⁷⁰ or a pool of cash the Company allocates for the use of eventual
8		mine closure. The Company collects an amount every year, determined as the
9		amount necessary, after growth through interest, to fund closure activities at the
10		end of the mine's life. In the four-unit scenario, the Company is able to simply
11		collect \$ per year, ⁷¹ while in the two-unit scenario the Company
12		requires contributions of per year through 2018 to fund the closure
13		of the surface mine. ⁷²
14		Overall, the acceleration of remediation in the two-unit scenario drove up the
15		present value of closure by \$ (present value, 2014\$) relative to the
16		four-unit scenario. ⁷³
17		Effectively, the Company had assumed through 2013 that it would continue
18		collecting sufficient revenue through 203774 sufficient to fund the massive closure
19		in 2037. Specifically, the Company assumed that compounding interest—and
20		—would generate

⁷⁰ See Sierra Club/109, UTC Crane Supplemental Rebuttal at 6:3-5.
⁷¹ See Exhibit PAC/706.
⁷² Id.

 ⁷³ Author's calculation from Exhibit PAC/706
 ⁷⁴ See PAC/700 at Link/92:15-18

1		enough to fund of reclamation activities, the bulk of which would
2		. This assumption that the Company could effectively self-
3		bond its own closure was interrupted by the two-unit scenario, where the
4		Company's requirement for cash was suddenly accelerated. And while the overall
5		closure cost was much lower – at only
6		impact on the cost of coal increased dramatically.
7	Q	You stated that between January 2013 and October 2013, prior to the
8		completion of the FNTP, circumstances changed dramatically at the Bridger
9		coal mine. How so?
9 10	A	
	A	coal mine. How so?
10	A	<pre>coal mine. How so? In March/April of 2013, Bridger Coal Company conducted drilling that resulted in</pre>
10 11	A	coal mine. How so? In March/April of 2013, Bridger Coal Company conducted drilling that resulted in a finding that a panel in the <u>underground mine</u> had excessive ash content, ⁷⁷ a
10 11 12	Α	coal mine. How so? In March/April of 2013, Bridger Coal Company conducted drilling that resulted in a finding that a panel in the <u>underground mine</u> had excessive ash content, ⁷⁷ a finding that led to a substantial change in mining operations and ultimately
10 11 12 13	Α	coal mine. How so? In March/April of 2013, Bridger Coal Company conducted drilling that resulted in a finding that a panel in the <u>underground mine</u> had excessive ash content, ⁷⁷ a finding that led to a substantial change in mining operations and ultimately contributed to a rate increase request before the Utah Public Service Commission.

⁷⁶ Author's calculation from Confidential Attachment "BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules CONF.xslx" to PacifiCorp response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.7/Two Unit Rev2. [hereinafter "1.7 Attach_Two Unit Rev 2_ CONF BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules"].

 ⁷⁸ See In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations, Docket No. 13-035-184 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n filed Jan. 3, 2014).
 ⁷⁹ See Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.8(a).

⁷⁵ PacifiCorp 2/3 share. Sum nominal 2013-

Author's calculation from Confidential Attachment "BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules.xlsx" to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.7/Two DL Rev [hereinafter "1.7 Attach_Two DL Rev,_CONF BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules"].

⁷⁷ See Docket No. 13-035-184, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 4.9(b) (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 15, 2014) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/110).

1		The October 2013 four-unit mine plan ("October 2013 mine plan") shows that the
2		Company had significantly changed its expectations for the Bridger mine since
3		January of 2013. While the January 2013 fuel plan (for four-unit operation)
4		assumed that both the surface and underground mines would be utilized through
5		2037, ⁸⁰ the October 2013 mine plan indicated that the Bridger <u>underground mine</u>
6		would cease operations in 2022, ⁸¹ and only utilize surface operations through
7		2037. ⁸²
0	0	
8	Q	Why was the change in closure dates for the underground mine in the
9		October 2013 mine plan significant?
9 10	A	October 2013 mine plan significant? The January 2013 fuel plan had assumed that the surface mine would close in
	Α	
10	A	The January 2013 fuel plan had assumed that the surface mine would close in
10 11	A	The January 2013 fuel plan had assumed that the surface mine would close in 2017 in a two-unit scenario, requiring an immediate—and costly—remediation.
10 11 12	Α	The January 2013 fuel plan had assumed that the surface mine would close in 2017 in a two-unit scenario, requiring an immediate—and costly—remediation. By October 2013, the Company clearly no longer believed that the underground
10 11 12 13	A	The January 2013 fuel plan had assumed that the surface mine would close in 2017 in a two-unit scenario, requiring an immediate—and costly—remediation. By October 2013, the Company clearly no longer believed that the underground mine had the capacity to provide cost-effective coal through the end of the
10 11 12 13 14	A	The January 2013 fuel plan had assumed that the surface mine would close in 2017 in a two-unit scenario, requiring an immediate—and costly—remediation. By October 2013, the Company clearly no longer believed that the underground mine had the capacity to provide cost-effective coal through the end of the analysis period. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Company would have

 ⁸⁰ See id. at 1.8(b).
 ⁸¹ See id.
 ⁸² See id.

1

Q Was the October 2013 mine plan significant?

2	Α	Yes, the October 2013 mine plan was the basis for a new business plan at the
3		mine. ⁸³ In a Washington UTC docket on this same issue, the Company verified
4		that "[t]here is no doubt that the October 2013 mine plan reflects changes in the
5		relationship between the surface and underground mining operations at BCC." ⁸⁴
6		The change in disposition of the underground mine in October 2013 was a
7		substantial shift with respect to the Bridger Coal mine. In late March 2013—
8		before the coal ash problems were discovered at the underground mine-Cindy
9		Crane, then CEO of Interwest Mining Company, the PacifiCorp subsidiary which
10		partially owns and operates the Bridger Coal Company, verified that if two units
11		were to shut down the Company would assuredly rely on the underground mine in
12		perpetuity. ⁸⁵
13		By October 2013, the Company was projecting that it would shutter the
14		underground mine by 2022, ⁸⁶ and that assumption persists. In fact, the Company's

15 recent 2019 IRP verified that in its preferred scenario the underground mine

⁸³ Docket No. 13-035-184, Redacted Rebuttal Testimony of Cindy A. Crane on Behalf of PacifiCorp dba Rocky Mountain Power, at 11: 193-197 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 4, 2014) ("In this test period, based on drilling in March/April 2013, Bridger Coal personnel spent several months re-engineering the mine plan to bypass the 12th right longwall panel. This re-engineered plan is the basis of the 2014 Bridger Coal Business Plan produced in October 2013.").

⁸⁴ Sierra Club/108, UTC Ralston Rebuttal Testimony at 8: 5-6.

⁸⁵ *See* Docket No. 20000-418-EA-12, Hearing Transcript of Ms. Cindy Crane, at 130:6-16 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter "WY Crane Hearing Transcript"] (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/111).

⁸⁶ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.8(b).

 2 December 2021 closure.⁸⁸ 3 Q What was the impact of the new mining plan on the Bridger SCR 	
3 Q What was the impact of the new mining plan on the Bridger SCR	
4 assessment?	
5 A The surface mine is a high cost operation. ⁸⁹ In the Company's January 20	13 fuel
6 plan, the Company assessed that the total cost of the surface mine is	
7 , as shown in Confident	ial
8 Figure 5, below. On a levelized cost basis (2016-2030), the surface mine	is
9 .90	
10Confidential Figure 5. Baseline total cost of coal at Bridger Coal Company surface11and underground mines from January 2013, four unit scenario (\$/MMBtu)	

12

⁹⁰ Author's calculation from 1.7 Attach_Two DL Rev_CONF BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules. Levelized cost of the surface mine is **a state of the surface mine** is

⁸⁷ See Docket No. LC 70, Attachment "Attach Sierra Club 3.27" to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 3.27 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 27, 2019) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/112).
⁸⁸ Andrew Graham, *Life beneath the earth in Wyo's only underground coal mine*, WyoFile (Sept. 3 2019 available at https://www.wyofile.com/life-beneath-the-earth-in-wyos-only-underground-coal-mine/ (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/113.

⁸⁹ See Sierra Club/111, WY Crane Hearing Transcript at 125: 3-11.

1		Therefore, when the Company elected to close the underground mine early, and
2		then shift to the surface mine, it was electing to use a higher cost of coal in the
3		four-unit scenario—a circumstance that would disadvantage the decision to
4		retrofit Jim Bridger with SCR.
5	Q	Did the Company re-assess the value of pursuing the SCR retrofit in light of
6		the need for a new and revised mining plan?
7	A	No. There is no evidence that the Company reviewed, assessed, or even discussed
8		the new mining plan.
9		Ironically, Ms. Crane had testified just months before that in assessing the value
10		of the SCR the Company strove to use the most up-to-date data, stating:
11 12 13 14		In addition, the company has been very diligent in its mine planning to ensure that we have included in the analysis in this proceeding the absolute most current detailed mine planning data available for the decision relating to the SCR installations. ⁹¹
15		While that may have been true when the Company sought a CPCN in 2012, it was
16		not the case when the Company actually committed customer funds and signed
17		the FNTP.
18	Q	What was the monetary impact of the new October 2013 mining plan on the
19		Bridger SCR decision?
20	A	An independent assessment of the monetary impact is almost impossible from a
21		third-party perspective. The Company did not translate the new mine plan into a
22		comprehensive "fueling plan" until November 2014, in preparation for the 2015

⁹¹ Sierra Club/111, WY Crane Hearing Transcript at 125:19-23.

1	IRP, ⁹² and the Company never created a two-unit scenario with the new October
2	2013 mining plan. ⁹³

3 While both UTC Staff ⁹⁴ and I^{95} have previously attempted to create an estimate

⁴ four- and two-unit coal cost scenarios in the past, the Company's source

5 workbooks for Bridger fuel costs are a warren of broken links,⁹⁶ circular

6 references,⁹⁷ inscrutable structures,⁹⁸ and the Company's characterization of costs

- 7 as either "cash costs" or that flow to capital are both ill-defined and changing.⁹⁹
- 8 In its Washington presentation of this case, the Company rebutted my assessment
- 9 of the impact of the new mining plan, but affirmed that the new mine plan

10 represented "changes in the relationship between the surface and underground

11 mining operations at BCC."¹⁰⁰ Company witness Dana Ralston, Vice President of

12 Thermal Generation at PacifiCorp, provided a revision to my assessment, and

13 estimated that the new October 2013 mine plan had resulted in an increased cost

See 1.7 Attach_Two DL Rev_CONF BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules.

⁹² See Sierra Club/108, UTC Ralston Rebuttal Testimony at 10:2-3.

⁹³ *Id.* at 10:19-20.

 ⁹⁴ UE-152253, Supplemental Testimony of Jeremy B. Twitchell on Behalf of UTC Staff (Exhibit JBT-19HCT), at 9-15 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n May 6, 2016) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/114).
 ⁹⁵ UE-152253, Direct Testimony Jeremy Fisher on Behalf of Sierra Club, at 20:22-21:19 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n Mar. 17, 2016).

⁹⁶ Opening the Company's fuel plan workbook entitled "BRIDGER Rev 1-18-13 CONF. xlsx" (provided as a confidential attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.7) produces an unreadable content flag, and flags a number of broken links.

⁹⁷ Opening the Company's Bridger Coal Company core workbook "BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules. xlsx" produces a circular reference warning. *See* 1.7 Attach_Two DL Rev_CONF BCC Production-Operating Cost Schedules.

⁹⁸ For example, in the Bridger mine workbook,

⁹⁹ See Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.7(f) (listing line items included in "cash costs" and noting that "reclamation contributions were included in cash costs in these scenarios, however, they are not included in the 2019 Integrated Resource Plan cash cost."). ¹⁰⁰ Sierra Club/108, UTC Ralston Rebuttal Testimony at 8:5-6.

of \$31 million to the Bridger SCR retrofit decision¹⁰¹—thereby degrading the
 value of the SCR by \$31 million.

3	Notably, Mr. Ralston's assessment was conducted post hoc. He calculated his
4	adjustment to the value of the SCR projects using work papers that I had
5	constructed to assess the potential change in value. There was no affirmative
6	Company assessment or adjustment conducted between October 2013 and the

- 7 signing of the FNTP in December 2013.
- Layered on top of Mr. Link's re-assessment using September 2013 gas prices, the
 value of the SCR retrofit would have fallen by another 24%, to \$99 million.

10	Q	Is it your opinion that Mr. Ralston's estimate of the cost increase associated
11		with the shift to surface mining may have been a lowball estimate?
12		Yes. As I noted earlier, the Company's two-unit scenario assumed that the surface
13		mine would need to be remediated immediately, requiring an increase in
14		reclamation payments of \$28.3 million (present value, 2014\$) relative to the four-
15		unit scenario. ¹⁰² Once the surface mine was the exclusive source of coal, there
16		was relatively little difference between the timing of the closure obligation for the
17		two-unit scenario and the four-unit scenario. In addition, the two-unit scenario
18		would presumably have disturbed less landscape, requiring less reclamation. Mr.
19		Ralston did not factor in the lack of accelerated reclamation nor the reduction in
20		total reclamation associated with a surface-based two-unit scenario. Accounting
21		for these changes would have increased the discrepancy between the two-unit and

¹⁰¹ See id. at 8:14-15.

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¹⁰² Author's calculation from Exhibit PAC/706.

four-unit scenarios by potentially \$59.3 million,¹⁰³ to the detriment of the Bridger
 SCR projects.

3	Q	What are your conclusions with respect to the new mine plan at Bridger
4		mine in October 2013?
5	A	I conclude that the Company failed to properly or timely assess the impact that its
6		new October 2013 mining plan would have on the value of the Bridger SCR
7		decision. That new plan resulted in a degradation of value by anywhere from \$31
8		to \$59.3 million, but the Company ignored this information in the run-up to
9		signing the FNTP.
10		The Company acted imprudently in failing to account for the new mine plan,
11		available prior to the December 1, 2013 FNTP.
12		e. <u>Gas Prices Fell Rapidly in the Months Leading Up to the FNTP</u>
12 13	Q	e. <u>GAS PRICES FELL RAPIDLY IN THE MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE FNTP</u> You earlier testified that in the months leading up to the FNTP, industry
	Q	
13	Q	You earlier testified that in the months leading up to the FNTP, industry
13 14	Q	You earlier testified that in the months leading up to the FNTP, industry analysts and PacifiCorp were projecting substantially lower forward-looking
13 14 15	Q	You earlier testified that in the months leading up to the FNTP, industry analysts and PacifiCorp were projecting substantially lower forward-looking gas prices which PacifiCorp ignored when assessing the value of Jim Bridger
13 14 15 16		You earlier testified that in the months leading up to the FNTP, industry analysts and PacifiCorp were projecting substantially lower forward-looking gas prices which PacifiCorp ignored when assessing the value of Jim Bridger when the Company executed the FNTP. Please explain.
13 14 15 16 17		You earlier testified that in the months leading up to the FNTP, industry analysts and PacifiCorp were projecting substantially lower forward-looking gas prices which PacifiCorp ignored when assessing the value of Jim Bridger when the Company executed the FNTP. Please explain. PacifiCorp's records at the time show that when it signed the FNTP, it

¹⁰³ Addition of the Ralston's \$31 million mine plan adjustment and an incremental \$28.3 million adjustment to account for the lesser near-term reclamation costs.

1	Mr. Link described that the Company elected to move forward on the Bridger
2	SCR retrofits on the basis of his "breakeven" assessment, in which he assessed
3	that the levelized cost of local gas prices from 2016 to 2030 would have to drop
4	below \$4.86/MMBtu ¹⁰⁴ in order for the Company to re-assess its retrofit decision.
5	In constructing that assessment, Mr. Link described that he used a September
6	2013 gas price forecast, which still projected gas prices at \$5.35/MMbtu, ¹⁰⁵ above
7	his breakeven. Mr. Link testified that at this price point, the SCRs benefited
8	customers by approximately \$130 million. ¹⁰⁶
9	It is notable that from a statistical standpoint, the \$5.35/MMBtu gas price was not
10	a robust indicator that the retrofit was cost effective, even relying on Mr. Link's
11	shortcut breakeven assessment. In fact, at a 90 percent confidence interval, the
12	SCRs either continued to be a benefit to consumers, or were already a liability.
13	And since gas prices are inherently uncertain, ¹⁰⁷ there was a distinct potential—
14	particularly if gas prices trended downward—that the SCRs would pose a liability
15	to consumers.
16	The Company did not conduct any further analysis with respect to gas prices and
17	did not conduct further modeling on the value of pursuing the retrofit.
18	The "September 2013" gas price forecast that Mr. Link relied on is the
19	Company's own internal "Official Forward Price Curve" ("OFPC"), a quarterly
20	30-year projection compiled by Mr. Link and for which Mr. Link bears

¹⁰⁴ PAC/700 at Link/101:13-17; Link/106:4-21.
¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at Link/107:6-9.
¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at Link/107:6-13.
¹⁰⁷ *Id.* at Link/107:15.

1		responsibility. ¹⁰⁸ As far as I can discern, Mr. Link develops the OFPC gas price
2		forecast by consulting forecasts from three private vendors, ¹⁰⁹ the Energy
3		Information administration, and forwards on commodity exchanges.
4		When Mr. Link produced the Company's December 2013 OFPC on December
5		31, 2013, the levelized price of gas at Opal had dropped to \$5.00/MMBtu. ¹¹⁰
6		According to Mr. Link's "breakeven" assessment, that would have left the value
7		of the Bridger SCRs at just \$36.7 million—or a drop of 80% from Mr. Link's
8		"base case" of \$186 million. ¹¹¹
9		Below, I show why assessing the cost of gas using a projection that theoretically
10		wasn't available until December 31, 2013 is consistent with the information
11		available to the Company at December 1, 2013.
12	Q	Mr. Link testified that "PacifiCorp also considered that natural-gas
13		prices cannot trend downward indefinitely." ¹¹² To what trend is Mr. Link
14		referring?
15	A	Mr. Link was referring to the fact that from the time of the Company's August of
16		2012 CPCN application before the Wyoming PSC, which relied on a gas price
17		forecast from December 2011, ¹¹³ the Company's projection of future gas prices
18		had fallen steadily, dropping by \$1.18/MMBtu by December 2013. In fact, just
19		projecting forward from the Company's own projections of prices at the Opal hub

 ¹⁰⁸ See Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.6(a)-(b).
 ¹⁰⁹ See Sierra Club/102. PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.5(b) (Vendors are PIRA, CERA, and Woods Mackenzie.).

¹¹⁰ Authors calculation from data provided in Attach Sierra Club 1.6.xlsx .

¹¹¹ PAC/700 at Link/86:15-17.

¹¹² *Id*.at 107:14-16.

¹¹³ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.1(h).

1 would have showed that the project would cross Mr. Link's notional "breakeven"

2 of \$4.86/MMbtu in September 2014 (see Figure 6).




Figure 6. PacifiCorp projections of Opal gas prices Dec 2011- Dec 2013 (blue) and

show in Section 2.g (page 62), below, gas prices in fact fell faster than the

exited the contract mid-project and still provided customer benefits.

Company's termination provisions from the contract, meaning that it could have

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¹¹⁴ Author's calculation from, Attach Sierra Club 1.6.xlsx, using Link formulation for real levelized cost.

1	Q	The Company signed the FNTP on December 1 st , 2013, but you testify that
2		the Company's lower projection wasn't produced until December 31 st . Did
3		the Company have sufficient information by December 1 st to know that
4		prices were falling?
5	A	Yes. It is notable that the OFPC is produced internally from information that the
6		Company had on hand. On December 1, 2013, PacifiCorp had the following new
7		information:
8		• Two new forecasts from third-party vendors, CERA (accessed November
9		21, 2013) and Wood-Mackenzie (accessed October 22, 2013). ¹¹⁵ Relative
10		to prior forecasts (in and and , respectively ¹¹⁶), both vendors
11		were projecting across the 2016-2030 analysis window
12		, respectively).
13		• Commodity trading forwards for natural gas. A retrieval for Henry Hub
14		prices, a heavily traded gas hub, indicates that between the 2^{nd} and 3^{rd}
15		quarters of 2013, gas price forwards for January 2018 fell by 6-10%, from
16		between \$4.6-\$5.1/MMBtu in July-September to \$4.3-4.5/MMBtu in
17		September to December. This sustained projected price fall, repeated for
18		every year 2014-2020, would have been apparent to PacifiCorp.

¹¹⁵ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.5(b). ¹¹⁶ See Confidential Attachments1.5-2 to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.5 (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/115.




Figure 7. NYMEX Futures for 2018 HH, 2012-2016, indicating fall in forecast during 2013. ¹¹⁷

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projected in the August STEO (August 6, 2013).¹¹⁹

9 The next Annual Energy Outlook ("AEO") "early release" product was not
10 available until December 16, 2013.

2013)¹¹⁸ projected prices about three percent lower in 2014 than had been

¹¹⁸ EIA Short Term Energy Outlook, November 2013, available at

¹¹⁷ CME Group, January 2018 Henry Hub gas futures with one-week average open, high, low, close (accessed Mar. 15, 2016.).

https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/nov13.pdf.

¹¹⁹ EIA Short Term Energy Outlook, August 2013, available at

https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/aug13.pdf.

1		The new information available to PacifiCorp between September 2013 and
2		December 1, 2013 all indicated a downward trend in forward gas prices. This
3		trend was ultimately reflected in the Company's December OFPC, and should
4		have been reflected at the start of that month, had the Company sought to consult
5		its standard data sources.
6	Q	How stale was the data PacifiCorp used to inform the September 2013
7		OFPC?
8	A	PacifiCorp doesn't provide insight into its black box process of developing
9		OFPCs, but it did provide the two prior vendor forecasts presumably used in the
10		September 2013 OFPC. While CERA is dated , Wood-Mackenzie is
11		dated . This means that if these vendor forecasts were a substantial part
12		of the OFPC, elements of the OFPC were old by the time
13		PacifiCorp finalized the FNTP.
14	Q	Did PacifiCorp recognize that gas prices were dropping rapidly through
15		2013?
16	A	Yes. In an October 29, 2013 workshop on a natural gas RFP process, PacifiCorp
17		developed a slide with a series of then-recent OFPCs, dropping from 2008
18		through the September 2013 OFPC. ¹²⁰ That slide, shown below in Figure 8,
19		indicated that "forward price curves have decreased almost steadily from 2008 to

¹²⁰ PacifiCorp,2012 Natural Gas Request for Proposals Workshop (Oct. 29, 2013)(also provided in UTC docket UE-152253 as Exhibit No. JIF-8) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/116).

- 1 2013."¹²¹ The curves show that the Company, in fact, had revised gas price
- 2 futures downwards in recent OFPCs as well, and was therefore aware of the trend.




Figure 8. PacifiCorp slide on Forward Price Curves. October 29, 2013.

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5	In addition, the Company produced two short-term OFPC, dated October 31, 2013
6	and November 8, 2013. ¹²² These forecasts only extended through December
7	2016, and are thus of limited value, but provide a sense of directionality. In
8	October, 2013 PacifiCorp projected that gas prices would be nearly 3 percent
9	lower through 2016 than the September 2013 OFPC, and in November 2013,
10	PacifiCorp was already projecting that gas prices would be nearly 5 percent lower
11	through 2016 than the September 2013 OFPC.

¹²¹ *Id.* at 14.

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

¹²² See Attach Sierra Club 1.6. xlsx at tab "11-08-2013" and tab "10-31-2013".

1		PacifiCorp clearly understood that forward gas prices were falling after the
2		September 2013 OFPC. Nonetheless, PacifiCorp failed to construct a new
3		assessment of forward gas prices or uncertainty in those prices, failed to conduct
4		new or additional modeling, and failed to convey internally or externally that the
5		economics of the Bridger SCR had degraded.
6	Q	Is the fact that the Company only produces long-run OFPCs on a quarterly
7		basis relevant?
8	A	No. The Company's election to create OFPC on a quarterly basis is useful, but
9		arbitrary. There are no specific pieces of information that are only available to the
10		Company on a quarterly basis—the Company simply elects to finalize its OFPC
11		on that schedule.
12		The information driving the lower gas prices projected in PacifiCorp's December
13		2013 OFPC would have been available to PacifiCorp on and before December 1,
14		2013. A reassessment using the Company's own mechanism and own projection
15		of levelized gas prices (2016-2030) at \$5.00/MMBtu would have revealed that-
16		according to a gas price adjustment alone-the benefit would have dropped to
17		\$36.7 million, ¹²³ or a reduction of \$146 million from the Company's assessed
18		\$183 million "Base Case" in the instant docket. ¹²⁴

¹²³ Based on Mr. Link's linear relationship between the levelized cost of gas and the SCR benefit, B_{SCR} = * P_{NG} where B_{SCR} is the benefit of SCR decision (PVRR(d)) in millions of 2014 dollars, and P_{NG} is the levelized cost of gas at Opal hub from 2016-2030 at a 7.15% discount rate. ¹²⁴ PAC/700 Link/86:15-17.

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/53

1	Q	Mr. Link testified that "[b]efore issuing the FNTP PacifiCorp was aware that
2		EPC costs for the Jim Bridger SCR emission control systems had been
3		reduced by" which resulted in "in additional
4		benefits to the SCR compliance alternative." ¹²⁵ How does this factor into
5		your assessment?
6	A	Even taking into account the incremental benefit of event , the final overall
7		value of the projects were not substantial going into the FNTP. Layered on top of
8		the Company's own admitted change in coal prices received from the Bridger
9		mine, which had already reduced the benefit of the SCRs to \$99 million, ¹²⁶ the
10		Bridger SCRs were reduced to basically a wash—from the perspective of a
11		system the size of PacifiCorp's— with a benefit of only by
12		December 1, 2013. In other words, when the Company signed the FNTP, the
13		SCRs presented no ratepayer benefit.
14	Q	Mr. Link also testified that "there was a reasonable possibility that actual
15		natural-gas prices could be higher than then-current base-case
16		projections." ¹²⁸ Do you have a response?
17	A	Yes. It is true that gas prices could have trended higher than the Company's then-
18		current base-case projections. And gas prices could also have trended lower than
19		the Company's then-current base-case projections, which is the value proposition

¹²⁵ *Id.* at Link/108:3-6.

¹²⁶ Company's September 2013 breakeven assessment value of \$130 million less Ralston's \$31 million October 2013 coal price adjustment = \$99 million.

¹²⁷ Company's breakeven assessment applied to Company's December 2013 OFPC, resulting in \$36.7 million benefit for the SCR, less Ralston's \$31 million October 2013 coal price adjustment, plus Mr. Link's

SCR cost reduction = ¹²⁸ PAC/700 at Link/107:16-18.

1		behind sensitivities and characterizing risk. But the risk bands that Mr. Link
2		discussed in his testimony, ¹²⁹ shown graphically in Figure 14, are from September
3		2012 and were 15 months stale—and moot—by the time the Company signed the
4		FNTP. The Company did not produce risk bands associated with its September
5		2013 OFPC.
6	Q	Given the marginal outcome for the Bridger SCR project in December 2013,
7		what action should the Company have taken?
8	Α	The rapidly declining benefit of the Bridger SCR project should have galvanized
9		the Company to perform a far more rigorous assessment of the benefits or costs of
10		continuing with the SCR projects. It should have paused the execution of the
11		FNTP, if necessary, in order to conduct a final rigorous analysis.
12	Q	What are your conclusions with respect to falling gas price leading up to the
13		FNTP?
14	Α	I have several conclusions:
15		1. The Company failed to assess new market price projections available to it
16		prior to December 1, 2013 that would have revealed lower market price
17		forwards for gas.
18		2. The Company's use of a shortcut "breakeven" assessment, which relied on
19		modeling data more than 15 months old at the time of the FNTP was
20		unbefitting for a project of this scale and magnitude.

¹²⁹ PAC/700 at Link/102:18-105:

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

1		3. The Company was aware that the margin for the Bridger SCRs was
2		tightening, and failed to conduct more extensive or intensive modeling to
3		determine if the decision was still in the best interests of ratepayers prior to
4		the signing of the FNTP.
5		In sum, the Company acted imprudently by failing to produce an adequate
6		assessment prior to signing the FNTP, and the Company acted imprudently in
7		failing to assess up-to-date gas price forwards at the time it made the decision to
8		move forward with SCR construction.
9	Q	Did the Company re-assess the value of the Bridger SCR on the basis of
10		falling gas prices or increasing coal costs?
11	A	No. The Company conducted no modeling on the benefit of the Bridger 3 & 4
12		SCRs after January 2013, ¹³⁰ and did not re-assess the value of the Bridger SCR
13		after September 2013 through any mechanism.

¹³⁰ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.4(d).

1	Q	The Company now claims that before issuing the FNTP, "PacifiCorp
2		reviewed 10-year budget projections based on the October 2013 mine plan
3		showing that Jim Bridger coal costs were not expected to increase
4		significantly," ¹³¹ and claims that "[Mr]. Teply personally performed the
5		review of these factors, in regular consultation with Mr. Link and members
6		of PacifiCorp's fuels group." ¹³² What is your opinion of these assertions?
7	A	The Company has not provided any evidence that it actually reviewed these
8		projections. Sierra Club requested that the Company provide evidence indicating
9		that the coal and changed gas prices had been considered. The Company objected
10		that it had no obligation to provide contemporaneous documentation of any its
11		decisions. ¹³³ When asked to provide notes or emails discussing these changes, the
12		Company responded that all such records would have been erased. ¹³⁴
13		In fact, in its Washington presentation of this case, Mr. Teply—no longer
14		employed by PacifiCorp, but responsible for the SCR installation-stated that any
15		such reviews would have been informal, testifying:
16 17 18 19 20 21		[T]he reviews that we would have completed here prior to issuing full notice to proceed would have been literally sitting down at a desk, looking at the screen, looking at the actual data, and making a decision as to whether there was any material change there that would have then triggered a reason to go back and reassess compliance approaches. In this instance there were none []

¹³¹ *Id.* at 1.4(b). ¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ Id.

¹³⁴ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request SC 4.3(a)-(b).("Internal emails are not routinely saved but are automatically deleted in the normal course of business after 90 days unless deliberately saved by a user. PacifiCorp is conducting an internal review of responsive emails. None have been identified to date.").

1 2	There would be no memo documenting these three particular decision points in one place, no. ¹³⁵
3	There is additional evidence showing that the Company did not consult up-to-
4	date gas prices or the new fueling plan.
5	1. In the spring of 2014, Sierra Club was engaged in PacifiCorp's general rate
6	case in Utah, and asked if the changed coal costs from October 2013 had been
7	assessed with respect to the Jim Bridger SCRs. The Company responded that:
8 9 10 11 12	A comparison of [2014] test period [coal] costs to the CPCN approval docket for the Bridger 3 & 4 SCR has not been completed . Since the CPCN analysis, Bridger Coal Company mine costs and quality have been updated as part of the annual mine planning process. ¹³⁶
13	2. The Company provided an internal memorandum written December 5, 2013
14	explaining the Company's decision to ultimately sign the FNTP. The
15	memorandum,
16	but made no
17	mention of either gas or fuel price changes, or even Mr. Link's economic
18	analysis supporting the decision to move forward. ¹³⁷
19	3. In its Washington presentation of this same case, the Company rebutted my
20	assertion that the coal price differential between the two- and four-unit
21	scenarios had increased, using a <i>post</i> hoc analysis, as I described on page 43,
22	above. The fact that the Company's analysis, performed by Mr. Ralston, was

¹³⁵ Order 12, Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Complainant, v. Pacific Power & Light Company, a Division of PacifiCorp, Respondent, Docket No. UE-152253, at ¶92 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n Sept. 1, 2016) [hereinafter "Order 12"].

¹³⁶ Docket No. 13-035-184, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 4.10(d) (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n) (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/117).

¹³⁷ PacifiCorp, December 5, 2013 Memorandum (provided as confidential attachment "Attach Sierra Club 1.4-3 CONF.pdf" to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.4, (attached as Sierra Club/118).

1		conducted as a modification to my already heavily modified work papers, and
2		was not provided as an assessment conducted by the Company at the time
3		clearly indicates that the Company had not assessed the coal price differential
4		at the time.
5		From the evidence here, I conclude the Company never actually reviewed the
6		changes in gas or coal prices after September 2013, and prior to signing the FNTP
7		on December 1, 2013.
8 9 10		f. <u>The Liability of the Jim Bridger SCRs Exceeded the Cost of</u> <u>Contract Termination Well Before the project Reached</u> <u>Completion</u>
11	Q	Was the drop in gas prices and reduction in value of the Bridger SCRs a
12		temporary downturn restricted to December 2013, or did lower gas prices
12 13		temporary downturn restricted to December 2013, or did lower gas prices persist?
	A	
13	A	persist?
13 14	A	persist? With the exception of a three-quarter excursion in mid-2014, the Company's
13 14 15	Α	persist? With the exception of a three-quarter excursion in mid-2014, the Company's projected gas prices continued to fall after the execution of the FNTP (see Figure
13 14 15 16	Α	persist?With the exception of a three-quarter excursion in mid-2014, the Company'sprojected gas prices continued to fall after the execution of the FNTP (see Figure6, page 47). By December 2014, the Company projected that the forward cost of
13 14 15 16 17	Α	persist? With the exception of a three-quarter excursion in mid-2014, the Company's projected gas prices continued to fall after the execution of the FNTP (see Figure 6, page 47). By December 2014, the Company projected that the forward cost of gas at the Opal hub had fallen to \$4.47/MMBtu (2016-2030), or \$0.39/MMBtu
 13 14 15 16 17 18 	Α	persist? With the exception of a three-quarter excursion in mid-2014, the Company's projected gas prices continued to fall after the execution of the FNTP (see Figure 6, page 47). By December 2014, the Company projected that the forward cost of gas at the Opal hub had fallen to \$4.47/MMBtu (2016-2030), or \$0.39/MMBtu below Mr. Link's breakeven. Had the Company assessed the SCRs as a new
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 	Α	 persist? With the exception of a three-quarter excursion in mid-2014, the Company's projected gas prices continued to fall after the execution of the FNTP (see Figure 6, page 47). By December 2014, the Company projected that the forward cost of gas at the Opal hub had fallen to \$4.47/MMBtu (2016-2030), or \$0.39/MMBtu below Mr. Link's breakeven. Had the Company assessed the SCRs as a new project in December 2014, it would have made the determination that the SCRs

¹³⁸ See PAC/700 at Link/107:9-10.

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

REDACTED - HIGHLY PROTECTED INFORMATION SUBJECT TO GENERAL PROTECTIVE ORDER NO. 20-131

1		contract by late 2014—but the value proposition kept plunging as gas prices sank
2		further and further.
3		Just three months later, in March 2015, Mr. Link's breakeven assessment would
4		have shown a liability of -\$215 million. Accounting for the now-solidified
5		Bridger fueling plan (which assumed the near-term closure of the underground
6		mine) and the assessed slightly lower cost of the SCR projects, a
7		contemporaneous assessment would have shown an SCR liability of
8		
9	Q	Even if the Company had already spent a large fraction of the Bridger SCR
10		budget, was there a point in the construction process where it still would
11		have been prudent to terminate the project prior to completion?
12	A	Yes. The Company's obligation under a prudence standard is not only to make a
13		rational and competitive decision on the basis of the most up-to-date information
14		at its disposal at the time that it makes a commitment, but to continuously assess
15		whether its decisions are serving the best interests of ratepayers. The Company's
16		contract with the SCR construction firm included "termination rights and an
17		associated cancellation schedule," ¹³⁹
18		140
19		At any point when the liability of continuing to
20		pursue the project exceeded the cost of terminating the contract, the Company
21		should have scrutinized the value of ceasing the project.

 ¹³⁹ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.3(d).
 ¹⁴⁰ See Highly Confidential Attachment 1.4-3, "Exh B to EPC Contract" to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club 1.3(e) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/119).

REDACTED - HIGHLY PROTECTED INFORMATION SUBJECT TO GENERAL PROTECTIVE ORDER NO. 20-131

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/60

1	This inflection point occurred between January 2015 and April 2015. By April
2	2015, the liability of the Bridger SCRs at exceeded the
3	contractor's
4	. ¹⁴² From this rough assessment,
5	terminating in April 2015 would have saved ratepayers . Highly
6	Confidential Figure 9, below, shows the
7	value of the Bridger SCR projects.
8 9 10 11	Highly Confidential Figure 9. SCR contractor associated cancelation schedule (i.e.) versus the value of the Bridger SCR projects from December 2013 (including adjustment for coal and SCR cost savings) through the completion of the project. ¹⁴³
12	
13	The subject to change on the
14	basis of the actual project costs. It is possible that termination could have been
15	invoked earlier in a cost effective manner, as well.

 $^{^{141}}$ Author's calculation from OFPC provided in Attach Sierra Club 1.6.xlsx, tab "0314" 142 Id

¹⁴³ Author's calculation, and Sierra Club/119, "Exh B to EPC Contract" to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club 1.3(e).

1		To continue with a failed project is to succumb to the sunk cost fallacy. Not only
2		should the project not have commenced, it should never have been completed.
3	Q	Did the Company provide detailed modeling or assessment of the Jim
4		Bridger SCRs after they commenced?
5	A	No. Sierra Club asked the Company if it re-assessed the Bridger SCRs using the
6		System Optimizer model at any time after February 2013, and the Company
7		confirmed that it did not. ¹⁴⁴
8		The Company did not include any assessments of Jim Bridger 3& 4 in its
9		contemporaneous IRP either. On March 31, 2015 the Company submitted its 2015
10		IRP. Each and every assessed case included an assumption that Jim Bridger 3 & 4
11		would be retrofit with SCR and run through 2037. ¹⁴⁵
12	Q	What conclusions do you draw about the Company's assessment of the
13		Bridger SCRs after the FNTP?
14	A	After signing the FNTP, the Company failed to assess whether continuing with
15		the Bridger SCRs was cost effective and in the best interests of customers. My
16		analysis demonstrates that customers would have benefited by had the
17		Company elected to terminate the projects—and the units—in early 2015.

¹⁴⁴ See Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.4(d).

¹⁴⁵ PacifiCorp, 2015 Integrated Resource Plan, Vol. II, at 148, Figure 7.2 (Mar. 31, 2015), available at https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/integrated-resource-plan html ("Common to all scenarios: Carbon 1&2 shut down 2015; Colstrip 3&4 SCR 2023/2022, respectively; Craig 1&2 SCR 2021/2018, respectively; Hayden 1&2 SCR 2015/2016, respectively; Naughton 1&2 shut down 2029; Naughton 3 gas conversion 2018, shutdown 2029; Hunter 1&3 SCR 2021/2024, respectively; and Bridger 3&4 SCR 2015/2016, respectively").

1		The Company acted imprudently by failing to terminate the SCR projects, once
2		the forward liability of continuing the projects and operating Jim Bridger 3 & 4 on
3		coal fell below the cost of ceasing construction.
4 5		g. <u>The Continued Operations of Jim Bridger Have Imposed</u> <u>Substantial and continuing Harm on PacifiCorp's Ratepayers</u>
6	Q	Have ratepayers continued to be harmed by Jim Bridger 3 & 4 and the
7		Company's election to install SCR at these units?
8	A	Yes. I estimate that, using Mr. Link's "breakeven" assessment, adjusting for coal
9		and SCR costs, ratepayers would have benefited by \$353 million by December
10		2015 if the Company had retired Jim Bridger 3 & 4 in 2015/2016, rather than
11		installing SCRs. This value is remarkably close to a damage value derived from
12		the Company's most recent IRP, and then accounting for the costs of the SCRs. In
13		October 2019, the Company submitted its 2019 IRP, which assessed the
14		economics of specific coal units, and for the first time assessed the value of
15		maintaining coal units not facing large new capital expenditures. The IRP showed
16		a ratepayer benefit of \$141million (present value 2019\$) if the Company sought
17		the retirement of Jim Bridger 3 & 4, ¹⁴⁶ with the SCRs already a sunk cost. Adding
18		the total cost of those SCRs, ¹⁴⁷ at \$235.44 (inflated from 2015\$ to 2019\$)
19		amounts to \$376 million (2019\$) in savings allocated to customers if the Bridger
20		SCRs had been avoided.

¹⁴⁶ PacifiCorp, 2019 Integrated Resource Plan, Volume II, Appendix M, at 274 -275 (Oct. 18, 2019), *available at* https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/integrated-resource-plan html (Comparing case P-35 ("Jim Bridger 3&4 Retirement 2022") at \$21,732 million and "parent" case P-11 ("Cholla 4 Retirement 2020") at \$21,873 million.).

¹⁴⁷ PAC/800 at Teply/24:7, 33:22 (\$102.8 million for the Jim Bridger 3 SCR); PAC/800 at Teply/24:9, 35:17 () (\$115.8 million for Jim Bridger 4 SCR).

1	Q	Does this Commission have an established standard for disallowing
2		imprudent expenditures?
3	А	Yes. In 2012, the Commission ruled that "[b]ecause the purpose of a prudence
4		review is to hold ratepayers harmless from any amount imprudently invested, a
5		disallowance should equal the amount of the unreasonable investment." ¹⁴⁸
6		Here, the "amount imprudently invested" was the totality of the SCRs at Jim
7		Bridger 3 & 4, and subsequent capital and operating expenses that continue to
8		harm ratepayers relative to the Company's alternative options.
9	Q	Do you have a recommendation as to how the Commission should assess
10	C	damages associated with the implementation of the Bridger SCRs?
10		damages associated with the implementation of the Druger Serks.
11	Α	Yes. The Company has provided sufficient evidence to show that customers will
12		incur harm well above the cost of the SCRs themselves. In December 2015, that
13		total harm was \$353 million (as shown above), while a rough estimate in 2019 is
14		that the total harm is roughly \$376 million.
15		One portion of the estimated harm are the costs already incurred through the
16		Company's election to construct the Bridger SCRs; namely, the cost of the SCRs
17		and the excessive cost of operating Jim Bridger from 2015/2016 to the present
18		day. Another portion of that harm is the costs incurred should the Company
19		continue to operate Jim Bridger 3 & 4 through 2037 with the SCRs in place. The
20		costs that are avoidable through the further operation of Jim Bridger 3 & 4 are

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

¹⁴⁸ Order No. 12-493 at 31.

1	still avoidable. Those costs are not yet ratepayer harm, but will be should the
2	Company continue to operate these units above the cost of cheaper alternatives.
3	The costs the Commission should assess for disallowance are the totality of costs
4	incurred to date (including both SCR and other capital) against the Company's
5	alternative to either have converted the units to gas, or invoking an alternative
6	under the Regional Haze Rule. The harm that will incurred by ratepayers through
7	the continued use of Jim Bridger is still avoidable through the cessation of
8	operations at Jim Bridger 3 & 4. ¹⁴⁹
9	We do not have a ready mechanism for assessing which costs make up the
10	difference between the Company's chosen course of action and the lower cost
11	option from 2015 through today at realized fuel, gas, and market prices.
12	Therefore, I offer two alternatives:
13	1. The Commission could require the Company to assess the costs of having
14	converted to gas in 2015/2016 or having delayed retirement or repowering
15	until 2019, and assess damages as the difference between actual and
16	theoretical capital plus operational costs incurred from 2013 to the present
17	day; or

¹⁴⁹ The Commission, however, should consider any harms pressed upon ratepayers by the Company's inability or unwillingness to retire the Jim Bridger 3 & 4 units in a timely fashion if such inability or unwillingness was otherwise avoidable through the conversion or retirement of these units at an earlier date.

1		2. The Commission could elect to identify the costs of the SCRs, \$218.6 million,
2		or \$56.9 million on an Oregon-allocated basis, ¹⁵⁰ as the imprudent investment,
3		and disallow the costs of the SCRs in full.
4		In my opinion, based on the 2019 IRP results, the avoidable forward-looking
5		damages associated with continuing to run Jim Bridger 3 & 4 are the same order
6		of magnitude as the SCR costs, and therefore the damages resulting from options
7		1 and 2 are probably proximate. In addition, because option 1 relies on a
8		hypothetical, option 2 may be the simpler option. Therefore, I recommend that the
9		Commission disallow the full costs of the SCRs.
10	Q	You stated earlier that the Company made a similar presentation of this case
10 11	Q	You stated earlier that the Company made a similar presentation of this case before the Washington Utilities and Transport Commission ("WUTC") in
	Q	
11	Q	before the Washington Utilities and Transport Commission ("WUTC") in
11 12		before the Washington Utilities and Transport Commission ("WUTC") in 2016. What was the finding of the WUTC?
11 12 13		before the Washington Utilities and Transport Commission ("WUTC") in2016. What was the finding of the WUTC?The WUTC found that PacifiCorp failed to show that it had taken new
11 12 13 14		 before the Washington Utilities and Transport Commission ("WUTC") in 2016. What was the finding of the WUTC? The WUTC found that PacifiCorp failed to show that it had taken new information about gas and coal prices into account when making its decision to
 11 12 13 14 15 		 before the Washington Utilities and Transport Commission ("WUTC") in 2016. What was the finding of the WUTC? The WUTC found that PacifiCorp failed to show that it had taken new information about gas and coal prices into account when making its decision to proceed with the FNTP,¹⁵¹ specifically citing the substantial change in coal

¹⁵⁰ PAC/800at Teply/24:7, 33:22 (\$26.8 million for the Jim Bridger 3 SCR on an Oregon-allocated basis); PAC/800 at Teply/24:10, 35:17 (\$30.1 million for Jim Bridger 4 SCR on an Oregon-allocated basis). ¹⁵¹ Order 12.

- ¹⁵² Id. ¶ 104.
 ¹⁵³ Id. ¶ 105.
 ¹⁵⁴ Id. ¶ 102.
 ¹⁵⁵ Id. ¶ 116.

The evidence shows that a broader disallowance including the cost of the SCRs
 themselves is warranted to make whole Oregon ratepayers.

3 4. <u>PACIFICORP'S ELECTION TO ALLOW ENVIRONMENTAL RETROFITS AT HAYDEN WAS</u> 4 <u>INCONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN ASSESSMENTS</u>

5 Q Please provide background on the environmental retrofits at the Hayden 6 power plant.

7	A	Mr. Teply briefly described two selective catalytic converter ("SCR") projects
8		installed at Hayden units 1 & 2, in Colorado, ¹⁵⁶ with a cost to PacifiCorp
9		ratepayers of \$24.2 million, or \$6.3 million on an Oregon-allocated basis. ¹⁵⁷ For a
10		number of reasons, it is notable that PacifiCorp is a minority owner at Hayden,
11		with a 24.5 percent ownership fraction at Hayden 1 (or 44 MW) and a 12.6
12		percent ownership fraction at Hayden 2 (or 13 MW). ¹⁵⁸ The units are majority
13		owned and operated by Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo"). For
14		perspective, at these fractions, the total SCR projects at Hayden 1 and 2 were
15		large-scale projects, at \$59.2 million and \$77 million, respectively. ¹⁵⁹
16		While the SCRs are ultimately a requirement under the Regional Haze Rule, the
17		Regional Haze rule requirement post-dates a series of fleet-wide decisions made
18		by PSCo, in which PacifiCorp simply followed PSCo's elections. In my opinion,
19		this passive role was unjustifiable given the magnitude of the SCR retrofits, and
20		lies in stark contrast with an evaluation of the project conducted by PacifiCorp.

¹⁵⁶ PAC/800 at Teply/48:4-51:14.

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at Teply/24:15-19 (\$14.5 million for SCR at Hayden 1, and \$9.7 million for SCR at Hayden 2).

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* at Teply/50:10.

¹⁵⁹ Author's calculation. PacifiCorp project cost divided by ownership fraction.

1	Mr. Teply provided a few key dates of the Hayden project, but like all Regional
2	Haze projects, timelines are important in understanding drivers and opportunities
3	for alternative decisions. In addition, several of Mr. Teply's dates were incorrect.
4	Below, I compile a more complete and corrected timeline of the Hayden SCR
5	project.

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/68

" to

installation Date	Milestone
April 19, 2010	Colorado Clean Air Clean Jobs Act is passed (HB 10-1365)
April 21, 2010	Colorado PUC opens Emission Reduction Plan docket, 10M-245E
August 13, 2010	PSCo submits Emissions Reduction Plan to Colorado PUC, including a proposal to install SCR at Hayden by the end of 2016. ¹⁶⁰
December 9, 2010	Colorado PUC determines a need for SCR at Hayden (Colorado PUC Order C10-1328) ¹⁶¹
November 14, 2011	PSCo applies for CPCN in Colorado (Colorado PUC docket 11A-917E) PSCo announces that it has signed a new long-term coal contract ¹⁶² with Peabody coal. Contract is 163 for sixteen-years, expiring December 1, 2027 ¹⁶⁴
July 18, 2012	Colorado PUC approves PSCo CPCN for SCR at Hayden (Colo PUC Order C12-0843)
November 18, 2012	PacifiCorp runs internal analysis in retrofitting Hayden 1. ¹⁶⁵ No explicit analysis of Hayden 2.
November 29, 2012	166
November 30, 2012	
December 31, 2012	EPA's approval of Colorado Regional Haze SIP ¹⁶⁸
January 30, 2013	Effective date for EPA's approval of Colo. SIP
June 1, 2013	169
May, 2015	Unit 1 in-service
August, 2015	Unit 2 in-service

Table 1. Timeline and milestones for Hayden Unit 1 and 2 SCR decisions andinstallation

166 See Confidential Attachment "

1

2

¹⁶⁰ Public Service Company of Colorado's Notice of Filing, In the Matter of Commission Consideration of Public Service Company of Colorado Plan In Compliance With House Bill 10-1365, "Clean Air - Clean Jobs Act.", Docket No. 10M-245E, at 4 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n Aug. 13, 2010).

¹⁶¹ Corrects Mr. Teply's date of January 26, 2011. PAC/800 at Teply/49:14.

 ¹⁶² Direct Testimony of Susan Arigoni on Behalf of PSCo, In the Matter of the Application of Public Service Company of Colorado for a Certificate Of Public Convenience and Necessity for the Hayden Emissions Control Project, Docket No. 11A-917E at 12: 12-14 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 14, 2011)
 [hereinafter "Arigoni Direct Testimony"] (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/120).

at 4 (Aug. 5, 2014) (provided as a confidential attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club 2.6 [hereinafter "Hayden/Craig Confidential Workshop"] (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/121).

 ¹⁶⁴ EIA Form 923, fuel receipts, EIA Form 923, *available at* https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia923/.
 ¹⁶⁵ See Confidential Attachment """ to

PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.6(b) (summary A and B attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/ 122).

PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.4 [hereinafter "Confidential Hayden SCR Memo" (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/123).

¹⁶⁷ Id.

¹⁶⁸ Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Colorado; Regional Haze State Implementation Plan, 77 Fed. Reg. 76871 (Dec. 31, 2012) (Corrects Mr. Teply's date of December 31, 2012.).

¹⁶⁹ See Confidential Attachment to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request Sierra Club 2.4 CONF/Hayden 1, (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/124).

1	Q	What's the relevance of the Colorado Clean Air Clean Jobs Act ("CACJA")?
2	A	The CACJA was a unique Colorado state program to encourage the state's
3		utilities to reduce air pollution through a combination of unit retirements and
4		retrofits. The bill contemplated the state's need to propose an implementation
5		plan for EPA's regional haze rule, and proposed that a "coordinated" approach to
6		emissions reductions would be superior for the state, rather than a piecemeal
7		approach. ¹⁷⁰
8		Importantly, CACJA did not mandate specific controls or emissions reductions at
9		specific units. Rather it identified that the two investor-owned utilities, Black
10		Hills and PSCo, should submit plans to the Colorado Public Utilities Commission
11		("PUC") proposing emissions reductions across their entire fleets. If the plans
12		were pre-approved by the Colorado PUC, the utilities would be legislatively
13		entitled to earn a return on any investments, or costs stranded through unit
14		retirement.
15		The incentive is described by a PSCo witness in that utility's subsequent CPCN.
16 17 18 19 20		The CACJA pushed two investor owned utilities (Black Hills and Public Service) to invest significant capital and retire existing plants for the greater good of the people of Colorado. In exchange, the companies were assured that they would recover their prudently incurred costs. ¹⁷¹
21		The Colorado legislature set up a mechanism to provide an incentive to achieve
22		rapid emissions reductions from Colorado's utilities through retrofits or
23		retirements. While the plans required the approval of Colorado's utility

¹⁷⁰Colo. Rev. Code § 40-3.2-202.
¹⁷¹ Docket No. 11A-917E, Direct Testimony of Karen T. Hyde on Behalf of PSCo, at 15:1-5 (Colo Pub. Util. Comm'n Nov. 14, 2011).

1		commission, there were relatively few guardrails. And the incentive—an
2		assurance of recovery-was not granted to the Colorado utilities' partners at co-
3		owned power plants, like PacifiCorp at Hayden.
4		In other words, while PSCo was encouraged to create a comprehensive emissions
5		reduction plan, of which Hayden was simply a small segment, these same
6		incentives were not extended or even applicable to PacifiCorp.
7	Q	Did PSCo's emissions reduction plan explicitly assess the value of installing
8		retrofits at Hayden versus retiring the plant?
8 9	A	retrofits at Hayden versus retiring the plant? No. In its 2010 application before the Colorado PUC, PSCo reviewed nine
	A	
9	A	No. In its 2010 application before the Colorado PUC, PSCo reviewed nine
9 10	Α	No. In its 2010 application before the Colorado PUC, PSCo reviewed nine different scenarios. None of those scenarios assessed the retirement of Hayden.
9 10 11	Α	No. In its 2010 application before the Colorado PUC, PSCo reviewed nine different scenarios. None of those scenarios assessed the retirement of Hayden. Rather, the scenarios baked in the assumption that the Hayden units would be

Figure 10. Table from PSCo Emission Reduction Plan scenarios before the CoPUC, showing the assumption that Hayden would be retrofit with SCR in each scenario.¹⁷²

Table	JFH-2
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				Scenarios					
Plant	Benchmark 1	Benchmark 1.1	2	3	4	5	6	6.1	7
Cherokee 1	SNCR 2014	SNCR 2014	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011
Cherokee 2	SNCR 2014	SNCR 2014	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011	Shutdown 2011
Cherokee 3	SCR 2017	SCR 2017	SCR 2017	Shutdown 2017	SCR 2017	Shutdown 2017	Shutdown 2015	Shutdown 2017	Fuel Switch 2014 Shutdown 2015
Cherokee 4	SCR 2016	SCR 2016	SCR 2016	SCR 2016	SCR 2016	SCR 2016	Shutdown 2018	SNCR 2012 Shutdown 2022	Fuel Switch 2014 Shutdown 2018
Valmont 5	SCR 2015	SCR 2015	SCR 2015	SCR 2015	Shutdown 2017	Shutdown 2017	Shutdown 2017	Shutdown 2017	Fuel Switch 2013 Shutdown 2017
Pawnee 1	SCR 2014		SCR 2014	SCR 2014					
Hayden 1	SCR 2015		SCR 2015	SCR 2015					
Hayden 2 1	SCR 2016		SCR 2016	SCR 2016					
Retired MW	0	0	213	365	399	551	903	903	903
Controlled MW	1645	903	1432	1280	1246	1094	742	742	742
Total MW	1645	903	1645	1645	1645	1645	1645	1645	1645
% NOx reduction 2018 ³	72%	70%	81%	83%	83%	85%	69%	76%	84%
% Nox reduction when all actions complete ³	72%	70%	81%	83%	83%	85%	89%	89%	89%

Notes:

(1) Analyses also performed with no emission controls on Pawnee or Hayden

(2) Actions in Bold font occur beyond December 31, 2017

(3) Low NOx burner upgrades on Cherokee 2 and 4, Hayden 1 and 2, Pawnee 1 and Valmont 5 are included in the NOx reductions.

4

5 Q Did PacifiCorp have a choice in the matter with respect to PSCo's emission

6 reduction plan under the CACJA?

7 A Yes. Arguably, PSCo's interest in creating an approvable plan for its own

- 8 Commission should have been substantially negotiated with PacifiCorp, and
- 9 subject to PacifiCorp's approval at the time that PSCo was seeking to make a
- 10 commitment. PacifiCorp bore a due diligence responsibility at every turn with
- 11 respect to its ownership share of Hayden.

¹⁷² Docket No. 10M-245E, Direct Testimony of James Hill on Behalf of PSCo, at 6. Figure JFH-2 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n Aug. 13, 2010) (attached as Exhibit Sierra Club/125).

1	Q	Is there evidence that PacifiCorp sought to negotiate with PSCo with respect
2		to its decision to retrofit Hayden with SCRs as part of its CACJA emissions
3		reduction plan?
4	A	No. Sierra Club asked PacifiCorp to identify and then "provide any analyses,
5		assessments, presentations, memoranda, communications or the like provided by
6		PSCo to PacifiCorp regarding its assessment that the installation of SCR at
7		Hayden Units 1-2 were in the best interests of customers." ¹⁷³ The only
8		information PacifiCorp provided was a series of invoices and change orders for
9		the actual SCR projects, devoid of any meaningful information aside from
10		incurred or projected costs. ¹⁷⁴ PacifiCorp neither identified nor produced any
11		documents prior to May 2, 2011.
10	0	
12	Q	Do the documents from PSCo provide any basis for the retrofits?
13	Α	No. These documents simply provide a description stating that they are consistent

14 with Xcel Energy's (a.k.a PSCo's) emission reduction plan under the CACJA.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Sierra Club/102, Sierra Club Data Request to PacifiCorp 2.4(d).

¹⁷⁴ See Confidential Attachments to PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.4.

¹⁷⁵ Specifically, each document bears only the following description, if a description is provided: "On December 15, 2010 the Colorado Public Utilities Commission issued a formal written ruling of the commission's decision on Xcel Energy's emissions-reduction plan to meet Colorado's Clean Air-Clean Jobs Act. The plan proposed to retrofit about 450 MW of coal-fired generation at the Hayden power plants with additional emission control technology. The objective of this proposal is to install SCR controls at Hayden Unit 1 [2] for emission reduction purposes."

1	Q	Do the documents from PSCo provide any justification, benefits, or risk
2		assessments for the retrofits?
3	A	No. The section of the forms that would otherwise be used to describe
4		justification, benefits, and risks are either blank or state "meet environmental
5		compliance requirements."
6	Q	Do the documents from PSCo provide any discussion of alternatives?
7	A	No. The section of the forms that would otherwise be used to describe alternatives
8		are blank.
9	Q	Does PacifiCorp's correspondence with PSCo indicate any inquiry on the
10		value, benefit, or risks of the projects?
11	A	No. While PacifiCorp provided a set of email correspondence between PSCo and
12		PacifiCorp, the entire correspondence is dedicated to obtaining signatures on
13		work orders.
14	Q	Mr. Teply testified that "[0]n January 26, 2011, the Colorado Public Utilities
15		Commission approved the installation of SCR systems on Hayden Units 1-
16		2." ¹⁷⁶ Did that order establish an enforceable deadline for the SCRs?
17	A	No. The order, dated December 9, 2010, simply approved the elements of PSCo's
18		emissions reduction plan, providing a cost recovery assurance for PSCo under the
19		Clean Air-Clean Jobs act. It did not establish an enforceable deadline or
20		requirement.

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¹⁷⁶ PAC/800 at Teply/49:14-17.

1	Q	You noted that on November 11, 2014 PSCo's application for a CPCN before
2		the CoPUC, stated that it had signed a new coal contract for Hayden, and
3		that the contract extended to 2027. What's the relationship between the
4		CPCN application and this coal contract?
5	A	The signing of a major long-term fuel contract is paramount to a capital
6		commitment, requiring its own in-depth assessment. While this is not an
7		assessment of Colorado's process, I find it extraordinary (a) that PSCo decoupled
8		its decision to sign a new long-term coal contract from the CPCN, and (b) that
9		PSCo elected to sign a coal contract in advance of the Colorado commission's
10		approval of its SCR CPCN. Assessing the value of the coal contract and the SCR
11		separately, and without respect to each other-after all, both the SCR and the
12		contract would have been avoidable if the plant were to have shut down-is
13		inappropriate and inconsistent with reasonable utility practice.
14		It is further remarkable that the PSCo witness describing the newly-signed
15		contract admitted that it would be 24 percent more expensive (on a levelized cost
16		basis, 2012-2018) than anticipated when the Company put together its emissions
17		reduction plan. ¹⁷⁷ And yet neither the cost increase nor the decoupling of the coal
18		contract from the PSCo decision seem to have been of concern PacifiCorp.

¹⁷⁷ Sierra Club/120, Arigoni Direct Testimony at 12:1. Author's calculation, based on notional 7% nominal discount rate.

1	Q	Did PacifiCorp have a role in evaluating or negotiating that new fuel contract
2		in November 2011?
3	A	According to PSCo, yes. In Arigoni's testimony before the Colorado PUC in the
4		CPCN, PSCo's witness on the fuel cost increase testified that the decision on both
5		the SCR and the coal contract were made in consultation with PacifiCorp:
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13		Public Service jointly owns Hayden with two other utilities: PacifiCorp and Salt River Project Agricultural and Irrigation and Power District ("SRP"). Although Public Service is the Operating Agent for Hayden, major decisions, like coal supply and the installation of emissions controls have been jointly made by the participants. Therefore, Public Service has worked with SRP and PacifiCorp to negotiate the coal-supply arrangements for Hayden. ¹⁷⁸
14	Q	Was the Colorado PUC's approval of PSCo's CPCN in July 2012 the final
15		point at which a decision was irrevocable?
16	A	Not at all. PSCo's CPCN was simply an indication that PSCo had a reasonable
17		chance of receiving cost recovery if it elected to move forward with the SCRs
18		under the Regional Haze rule. It did not eliminate the need for ongoing diligence
19		by the operator, or ongoing scrutiny by PacifiCorp.
20	Q	Mr. Teply testified that "the Hayden Units 1-2 SCRs were required by the
21		State of Colorado's Regional Haze SIP to be installed no later than December
22		31, 2016." ¹⁷⁹ Is he correct?
23	A	No. While Colorado's Regional Haze SIP identified emission limits for Hayden
24		consistent with SCR, it did not identify a specific deadline of December 31, 2016.
25		That deadline was established by PSCo as a target in its Emissions Reduction


¹⁷⁸ Sierra Club/120, Arigoni Direct Testimony at 2:19 -3:2. ¹⁷⁹ PAC/800 at Teply/48:18-19.

Plan, but was not specifically enforceable as a deadline under the federal Clean
 Air Act.

3	Q	Did EPA's final approval of Colorado's Regional Haze SIP identify an
4		enforceable deadline of December 31, 2016?
5	A	No. EPA issued both a proposed and final regional haze rule for Colorado. In both
6		instances EPA was clear that the facilities under consideration would have a five
7		year deadline to retrofit coal units. ¹⁸⁰ EPA's approval of Colorado's Regional
8		Haze SIP had an effective date of January 30, 2013. ¹⁸¹ Therefore, the binding
9		installation date was January 30, 2018—more than a year after PSCo's internally-
10		driven date.
11	Q	Did PacifiCorp conduct an independent assessment of the Hayden SCR
12		decision after the CPCN was issued to PSCo?
13	A	Yes. While Mr. Teply described PacifiCorp's the independent analysis on the
14		Craig SCRs, his testimony did not include details of a PacifiCorp analysis of the
15		Hayden SCR projects. In response to discovery, PacifiCorp stated:
16 17 18		PacifiCorp independently assessed and analyzed its options under the participation agreement for the Hayden Unit 1 and Hayden Unit 2 SCR system projects. The analysis contains commercially
19 20		sensitive and highly confidential information. The analysis ultimately had no bearing on the Company's Hayden Unit 1 and
21		Hayden Unit 2 SCR systems installation assessment, with the
22		equipment being installed to comply with the Colorado Clean Air-

¹⁸⁰ Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Colorado; Regional Haze State Implementation Plan. Proposed Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 18052, 18056 (Mar. 26, 2012) ("Once a state has made its BART determination, the BART controls must be installed and in operation as expeditiously as practicable, but no later than five years *after the date of EPA approval of the RH SIP*.") (Emphasis added). ¹⁸¹ 77 Fed. Reg.76871.

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/77



¹⁸² Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.4(e).

¹⁸³ See Sierra Club/122, Confidential Hayden 1 PVRR Study.

1		
2		
3	Q	What actions did PacifiCorp take as a result of these findings?
4	Α	PacifiCorp took no actions at all. According to the Company's response to
5		discovery, "the analysis ultimately had no bearing on the Company's Hayden Unit
6		1 and Hayden Unit 2 SCR systems installation assessment." ¹⁸⁵
7		In my
8		opinion, this was an error.
9	Q	Did the Company's Hayden analysis independently assess the value of
10		retrofitting Hayden 2?
11	A	No. While the analysis looked at the value of retiring Hayden 2 in conjunction
12		with Hayden 1 the assessment did not review the
13		independent economics of retrofitting Hayden 2.
14	Q	Why did the Company not act on its findings that the SCR at Hayden 1 was
15		not in the best interests of ratepayers?
16	A	The Company has provided two different rationales, as I discuss below.
17		• First, the Company assessed that it had no leverage to prevent PSCo from
18		moving forward with the retrofits.

¹⁸⁴ See id,
¹⁸⁵ Sierra Club/102, PacifiCorp Response to Sierra Club Data Request 2.4(e).

	• Secondly, the Company assessed that the costs of the take-or-pay contract
	signed in November 2011 could overwhelm the value of shutting down
	Hayden.
	Both of these rationales were flawed, and showed a lack of oversight, rather than
	a carefully considered analysis of ratepayer impacts. I address them in reverse
	order.
	a. <u>PacifiCorp's Flawed Assessment of the Take-or-Pay Coal</u> <u>Contract at Hayden</u>
Q	How did you learn that the Company had assessed the costs of the take-or-
	pay coal contract at Hayden and had decided it degraded the value of
	retiring Hayden 1?
A	In August, 2014 the Company conducted a confidential workshop to review its
	existing analysis on the planned Craig and Hayden environmental investments. ¹⁸⁶


¹⁸⁶ See PacifiCorp, 2015 Integrated Resource Plan, Vol. II, App. B at 29 (filed Mar. 31, 2015), available at https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/integrated-resource-plan html. A redacted form of the presentation is available in Docket No. LC 57 as PacifiCorp's Response to a Ruling Requiring Redesignation of the Workshop Presentation, (Oct. 23, 2014), available at

https://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HAC/lc57hac124711.pdf.

¹⁸⁷ Sierra Club/121, Hayden/Craig Confidential Workshop at 8.

¹⁸⁸ Id.

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/80




¹⁸⁹ Id. at 4.

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

¹⁹⁰ Id. at 8.

¹⁹¹ See Sierra Club/122, Confidential Hayden 1 PVRR Study


Sierra Club/100 Fisher/81



192 See Sierra Club/121, Hayden/Craig Confidential Workshop at 5.

¹⁹³ In 2012, Michael Dunn was President and CEO of PacifiCorp. Today he is the CEO of Williams, an oil production company. PacifiCorp witness Mr. Teply is now also at Williams.

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/82



 ¹⁹⁴ Sierra Club/123, Confidential Hayden SCR Memo.
 ¹⁹⁵ Id.


Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

1		cost retrofits as late as feasible. Instead, PSCo moved forward to sign a
2		contract to install the SCRs with Hitachi before EPA had even finalized
3		the SIP (refer to Table 1, above), establishing an installation deadline
4		inconsistent with federal law.
5	•	PSCo's election to install SCR at Hayden was not a cost-effectiveness
6		decision. As shown in Figure 10, PSCo did not assess alternative scenarios
7		in which Hayden was retired when it created its 2010 emissions reduction
8		plan. When PSCo applied for CPCN in 2011, it did not conduct a cost
9		effectiveness assessment at all.
10	•	Any assessments conducted by PSCo in 2010 or 2011 would have been
11		woefully out of date by the time PSCo was seeking to move forward on
12		the retrofit . As shown in the
13		Jim Bridger section of my testimony, forward gas prices were consistently
14		falling through 2011 and 2012.
15		
16		
17	•	A December 2016 installation date for SCRs at Hayden was not required
18		under the Regional Haze SIP, especially because EPA had not yet
19		approved the state plan Like at Jim Bridger, PSCo had alternative options
20		to comply with the Regional Haze rule, including retirement rather than
21		installation, or a commitment to retire at a later date, the effect of which
22		would have shown the SCRs to not be cost-effective under the Regional
23		Haze Rule. PSCo examined neither option.

1		• The SCR retrofits at Hayden were not specifically required under the
2		Clean Air Clean Jobs Act, which instead sought a system-wide approach
3		to achieving emissions reductions. Such reductions could have either been
4		achieved at other facilities or through unit retirements.
5		Overall, I believe that PacifiCorp had a number of options at its disposal to
6		effectively contest PSCo's decision to move forward with the SCRs, and succeed
7		in appealing that decision as inconsistent with generally accepted practices for
8		electric utilities.
9	Q	Are there any other reasons to think that PacifiCorp should have pressed
10		forward with arbitration to contest the SCR decision at Hayden?
11	A	Yes. The costs of arbitration would have certainly paled in comparison to the
12		costs—and negative valuation—of the SCRs.
13	Q	Do you have any other opinions on PacifiCorp's November 2012 assessment
14		concerning the Hayden SCRs?
15	A	Yes, I have several.
16		• First, the Company's assessment failed to review the independent value, or
17		cost, of retrofitting Hayden 2, but focused instead on Hayden 1 only. ¹⁹⁶
18		• Second, the Company's assessment failed to review the joint value, or
19		cost, of retrofitting or retiring both Hayden 1 and Hayden 2

¹⁹⁶ See public version of workshop presentation, available in Docket No. LC 57 as PacifiCorp's Response to a Ruling Requiring Redesignation of the Workshop Presentation (Oct. 23, 2014), *available at* https://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HAC/lc57hac124711.pdf.

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/85






Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

Sierra Club/100 Fisher/86

".



Confidential Figure 11. November 2012 Assessment of Hayden and Craig value, as conducted by PacifiCorp,¹⁹⁸ and as corrected.




3

4	Q	Please summarize your findings with respect to the Company's decisions for
5		the Hayden SCR retrofits.
6	A	Overall, the Company failed to intervene effectively or meaningfully with respect
7		to its participation and co-ownership of Hayden for either the SCRs or the
8		election to move forward on a long-term fuel contract.
9		4. The Company failed to engage successfully or meaningfully in PSCo's 2010
10		emission reduction plan, whereby PSCo opted to install SCRs at Hayden,
11		committing PacifiCorp to that same course of action.
12		5. The Company failed to assess the joint cost of signing a new coal contract for
13		Hayden and moving forward on the SCRs. By decoupling the SCR decision
14		from the coal contract decision, the Company made two separate elections that
15		should have been made jointly.

198 Sierra Club/122, Confidential Hayden 1 PVRR Study, line "

Corrected Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher



1	The Company acted imprudently by failing to take action to prevent the
2	installation of the SCRs at Hayden 1 & 2. Because the cost of alternatives has
3	fallen substantially since PacifiCorp make this decision, ratepayers have
4	experienced losses greater than the cost of the retrofits themselves. I recommend
5	that the Commission disallow the costs of the Hayden retrofits on an Oregon
6	allocation basis, or \$6.3 million. In addition, I recommend that the Commission
7	consider disallowing costs associated with the minimum take provision of the
8	take-or-pay Hayden coal contract entered into in 2011.

9 Q Does this conclude your testimony?

10 It does.

Docket No. UE 374 Exhibit Sierra Club/106 Witness: Jeremy Fisher

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

UE 374

ERRATA SIERRA CLUB EXHIBIT 106

Exhibits Accompanying the Opening Testimony of Jeremy Fisher

PacifiCorp Emission Reduction Plan

Exhibit A

PacifiCorp's Emissions Reductions Plan

In connection with its Best Available Retrofit Technology ("BART") determinations and its other regional haze planning activities, the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Air Quality Division ("AQD") asked PacifiCorp to provide additional information about its overall emission reduction plans through 2023. The purpose is to more fully address the costs of compliance on both a unit and system-wide basis. PacifiCorp is committed to reduce emissions in a reasonable, systematic, economically sustainable and environmentally sound manner while meeting applicable legal requirements. These legal requirements include complying with the regional haze rules which encompass a national goal to achieve natural visibility conditions in Class 1 areas by 2064

Summary

PacifiCorp owns and operates 19 coal-fueled generating units in Utah and Wyoming, and owns 100% of Cholla Unit 4, which is a coal-fueled generating unit located in Arizona. PacifiCorp is in the process of implementing an emission reduction program that has reduced, and will continue to significantly reduce emissions at its existing coal-fueled generation units over the next several years. From 2005 through 2010 PacifiCorp has spent more than \$1.2 billion in capital dollars. It is anticipated that the total costs for all projects that have been committed to will exceed \$2.7 billion by the end of 2022. The total costs (which include capital, O&M and other costs) that will have been incurred by customers to pay for these pollution control projects during the period 2005 through 2023, are expected to exceed \$4.2 billion, and by 2023 the annual costs to customers for these projects will have reached \$360 million per year.

Environmental benefits, including visibility improvements will flow from these planned emission reductions. PacifiCorp believes that the emission reduction projects and their timing appropriately balance the need for emission reductions over time with the cost and other concerns of our customers, our state utility regulatory commissions, and other stakeholders. PacifiCorp believes this plan is complementary to and consistent with the state's BART and regional haze planning requirements, and that it is a reasonable approach to achieving emission reductions in Wyoming and other states.

PacifiCorp's Long-Term Emission Reduction Commitment

Table 1 below identifies the emission reduction projects and related construction schedules as currently included in PacifiCorp's reduction plan.

Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010 Page 2 of 10


Plant Name	SO2 Scrubbers Installation - I	Low NOx Burner Installations	Baghouse Installations	Status of SO2 / LNB / Baghouse	Selective Catalytic
Hunter 1	Upgrades - U 2014 - U	2014	2014	Permitting Permitted	Reduction
Hunter 2	2014 - U 2011 - U	2014	2014	Under Construction	
Hunter 3	Existing	2008	Existing	Completed	
Huntington 1	2010 - U	2010	2010	Under Construction	
Huntington 2	2007 - I	2007	2007	Completed	
Dave Johnston 3	2010 - I	2010	2010	Completed	
Dave Johnston 4	2012 - I	2009	2012	Under Construction	
Jim Bridger 1	2010 - U	2010		Completed	2022
Jim Bridger 2	2009 - U	2005		Completed	2021
Jim Bridger 3	2011 - U	2007		Permitted	2015
Jim Bridger 4	2008 - U	2008		Completed	2016
Naughton 1	2012 - I	2012		Under Construction	
Naughton 2	2011 - I	2011		Under Construction	
Naughton 3	2014 - U	2014	2014	Baghouse Permitted	2014
Wyodak	2011 - U	2011	2011	Under Construction	
Cholla 4	2008 - U	2008	2008	Completed	

Table 1: Long-Term Reduction Plan

The following charts represent the reductions in emissions that will occur at units owned by PacifiCorp in Utah, Wyoming and Arizona¹. It is significant to note that permitting has been completed for all but the SCR projects; permitting for the SCR projects will be completed as needed in advance of project construction. The emission estimates shown in these charts have been calculated using projected unit generation and heat rate data in conjunction with each unit's permitted emission rate. In those cases were the units do not have emissions controls the estimates have been based on projections of the future coal quality. All projections used are from PacifiCorp's ten-year business plan. Actual future emissions will be less than those estimated in these charts since the units will operate below their permitted rates.

¹ PacifiCorp is also a joint owner of coal-fueled facilities in Colorado and Montana that are subject to regional haze planning requirements and for which PacifiCorp will incur associated costs of emissions controls.

Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010 Page 3 of 10





2004 - 2009 Actual and 2010 - 2023 Projected NOx Emissions PacifiCorp's Arizona, Utah & Wyoming Coal-Fired Units




Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010 Page 4 of 10

Project Installation Schedule

Emission reduction projects of the number and size described above take many years to engineer, plan and build. When considering a fleet the size of PacifiCorp's, there is a practical limitation on available construction resources and labor. There is also a limit on the number of units that may be taken out of service at any given time as well as the level of construction activities that can be supported by the local infrastructures at and around these facilities. Such limitations directly impact both the overall timing of these projects as well as their timing in relation to each other. Additional cost and construction timing limitations include the loss of large generating resources during some parts of construction and the associated impact on the reliability of PacifiCorp's electrical system during these extended outages. In other words, it is not practical, and it is unduly expensive, to expect to build these emission reduction projects all at once or even in a compressed time period. The pressure on emission reduction equipment and skilled labor is likely to be exacerbated by the significant emission reduction requirements necessitated by the Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Air Transport Rule which requires emission reductions in 31 Eastern states and the District of Columbia beginning in 2012 and 2014. The Environmental Protection Agency has indicated that a second Transport Rule is likely to be issued in 2011, requiring additional reductions in the Eastern U.S. beyond those effective in 2014. The balancing of these concerns is reflected in the timing of PacifiCorp's emission reduction commitments.

Priority of Emission Reductions

PacifiCorp's initial focus has been on installing controls to reduce SO_2 emissions which are the most significant contributors to regional haze in the western US. In addition, PacifiCorp continues to rely on the rapid installation of low NO_x burners to significantly reduce NOx emissions. Also, the installation of five SCRs (or similar NOx-reducing technologies) will be completed by 2023 and reduce NOx emissions even further. PacifiCorp's commitment also includes the installation of several baghouses to control particulate matter emissions. For those units which utilize dry scrubbers, baghouses have the added benefit of improving SO2 removal. Baghouses also significantly reduce mercury emissions.

In addition to reducing emissions at existing facilities, PacifiCorp has avoided increasing emissions by adding more than 1,400 megawatts of renewable generation between 2006 and 2010. In order to meet growing demand for electricity, PacifiCorp added non-emitting wind generation to its portfolio at a cost of over \$2 billion and has dismissed further consideration of a new coal-fueled unit.

Emission Reductions and BART Deadlines

As depicted in the table and charts above, PacifiCorp began implementing its emission reduction commitments in 2005. This was well ahead of the emission reduction timelines under the regional haze rules which require BART to be installed no later than five years following approval of the applicable Regional Haze SIP. This also provides a graphic demonstration of the construction schedule and other limitations described above, as PacifiCorp was required to begin installing emission control projects at some units earlier in order to complete projects at other

Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010


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
units within the five years after SIP approval. The table above demonstrates that most of the projects to be built between 2010 and 2014, likewise, will be installed in advance of the required completion date under BART requirements.

Customer Impacts

The following charts identify the timing and magnitude of the capital and O&M expenses that will be incurred due to the projects identified in Table 1. The charts identify:

- 1. The timing and magnitude of the capital costs.
- 2. The O&M expenses that will be incurred due to these projects.
- 3. The expected annual costs² through 2023 that customers will be incur as a result of these specific pollution control projects.







² PacifiCorp has made every attempt to provide an accurate estimate of the anticipated increase in annual revenue requirements that will ultimately be translated to increases in customers' electricity rates. However, there are several variables such as interest rates, inflation rates, discount rates, depreciation lives, and final construction costs and operating and maintenance expenses that will be considered at the time these projects actually go into rate base and will influence the actual revenue requirements associated with these capital projects.

Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010 Page 6 of 10

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Annual Increase to Customers Due to Additional Pollution Control Equipment on Arizona, Utah & Wyoming Coal-Fired Units




Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010 Page 7 of 10

As can be seen from the previous charts, the rate increases for PacifiCorp customers associated with PacifiCorp's emission reduction strategy alone will be significant. In the event that PacifiCorp is required to accelerate or add to the planned emission reduction projects, the cost impacts to our customers can be expected to increase incrementally, particularly as plant outage schedules are extended and the need for skilled labor and material increases in the near term.

Of particular note, the projected costs reflect only the installation of the noted emission reduction equipment. These cost increases do not include other costs expected to be incurred in the future to meet further emission reduction measures or address other environmental initiatives, including but not limited to (see Attachment 1):

- 1. Implementation of Utah's Long Term Strategy for meeting regional haze requirements during the 2018-2023 time period.
- 2. The addition of mercury control equipment under the requirements of the upcoming mercury MACT provisions. PacifiCorp estimates that \$68 million in capital will be incurred by 2015 and annual operating expenses will increase by \$21million per year to comply with mercury reduction requirements. In addition, anticipated regulation to address non-mercury hazardous air pollutant (HAPs) emissions may require significant additional reductions of SO₂, as a precursor to sulfuric acid mist, from non-BART units that currently do not have specific controls to reduce SO₂ emissions.
- 3. Mitigating and controlling CO₂ emissions. While Congress has not yet passed comprehensive climate change legislation, in December 2009, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency made a finding that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere threaten the public health and welfare of current and future generations. Having made the so-called "endangerment finding," EPA issued the final greenhouse gas tailoring rule, effective January 2, 2011, which will require greenhouse gas emissions to be addressed under PSD and Title V permits³. Likewise, mandatory reporting of greenhouse gas emissions to the Environmental Protection Agency commenced beginning in January 2010.
- 4. In addition, there are a number of regional regulatory initiatives, including the Western Climate Initiative that may ultimately impact PacifiCorp's coal-fueled facilities. PacifiCorp's generating units are utilized to serve customers in six states Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, Washington, Oregon and California. California, Washington and Oregon are participants in the Western Climate Initiative, a comprehensive regional effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 15% below 2005 levels by 2020 through a cap-and-trade program that includes the electricity sector; each state has implemented state-level emissions reduction goals. California, Washington and Oregon have also adopted greenhouse gas emissions performance standards for base load electrical generating resources under which emissions must not exceed 1,100 pounds of CO₂ per megawatt

³ The Environmental Protection Agency has not yet published its proposed guidance on what constitutes Best Available Control Technology for greenhouses gases.

Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010

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hour. The emissions performance standards generally prohibit electric utilities from entering into long-term financial commitments (e.g., new ownership investments, upgrades, or new or renewed contracts with a term of 5 or more years) unless the base load generation supplied under long-term financial commitments comply with the greenhouse gas emissions performance standards. While these requirements have not been implemented in Wyoming, due to the treatment of PacifiCorp's generation on a system-wide basis (i.e., electricity generated in Wyoming may be deemed to be consumed in California based on a multi-state protocol), PacifiCorp's facilities may be subject to out-of-state requirements.

- 5. Regulations associated with coal combustion byproducts. In June 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency published a proposal to regulate the disposal of coal combustion byproducts under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's Subtitle C or D. Under either regulatory scenario, regulated entities, including PacifiCorp, would be required, at a minimum; to retrofit/upgrade or discontinue utilization of existing surface impoundments within five years after the Environmental Protection Agency issues a final rule and state adoption of the appropriate controlling regulations. It is anticipated that the requirements under the final rule will impose significant costs on PacifiCorp's coal-fueled facilities within the next eight to ten years.
- 6. The installation of significant amounts of new generation, including gas-fueled generation and renewable resources.
- 7. The addition of major transmission lines to support the renewable resources and other added generation.
- 8. Increasing escalation rates on fuel costs and other commodities

BART and Regional Haze Compliance

PacifiCorp firmly believes that the commitments described above meet the letter and intent of the regional haze rules, including the guidance provided by the EPA known as "Appendix Y." The regional haze program is a long-term effort with long-term goals ending in 2064. It must be approached from that perspective. It was never intended to require SCR on BART-eligible units within the first five years of the program. Rather, it calls for a transition to lower emissions exactly as PacifiCorp has implemented to date and as it has proposed going forward through 2023.


In its evaluation of emission reductions for regional haze purposes, the state should also consider several other variables which will significantly affect emissions and costs over the next ten years. These include such things as the development of new emission control technology, anticipated new emission reduction legislation and rules, the new ozone standard, the one hour SO₂ and NO₂ standards, the PM_{2.5} standard, potential CO₂ regulation and costs, an aging fleet, and changing economic conditions. All of these variables matter and will affect the long-term viability of each PacifiCorp coal unit and will contribute to the reduction of regional haze in the course of the

Exhibit A - PacifiCorp's Emissions Reduction Plan November 2, 2010 Page 9 of 10

implementation of these programs. This, in turn, will affect the controls, costs and future operational expectations associated with these generating resources.

Conclusion

PacifiCorp has made a significant, long-term commitment to reducing emissions from its coalfueled facilities and requests that the AQD consider this commitment as a reasonable approach to achieving emission reductions in Wyoming.



November 2, 2010

Sierra Club/106 Fisher/10