

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF OREGON
UE 216**

In the Matter of)

PACIFICORP, dba PACIFIC POWER,)

2011 Transition Adjustment Mechanism)
_____)

**REPLY TESTIMONY
OF THE
CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD OF OREGON**

May 12, 2010



2011 Transition Adjustment Mechanism

² *Ibid.*

1 in this docket is \$69.2 million, which would result in an average overall rate increase of
2 7.0 percent³.

3 CUB understands that PacifiCorp is in a position where the bulk of its increased
4 power costs are the result of expiring or changing power purchase contracts. These
5 changes are straightforward and, while it would be CUB's preference that the new
6 contract terms be more favorable to customers, at this time we are not disputing their
7 prudence. However, this is an ongoing case, and issues related to these contracts might
8 develop as further evidence is discovered. In light of the foregoing, CUB's testimony will
9 focus on the following:

- 10 ▪ *PacifiCorp's changes to the treatment of wind integration costs*
- 11 ▪ *The need to change the current schedule of annual dockets to more evenly*
12 *spread the workload of intervenors and Commission Staff throughout the*
13 *year*

14 **II. Wind Integration Costs**

15 PacifiCorp's new cost estimate methodology generates a wind integration cost
16 estimate of \$6.97 / MWh for resources located within the Company's control area. This is
17 a significant increase from the \$5.10 / MWh cost estimate arrived at using PacifiCorp's
18 previous methodology. CUB strongly recommends that PacifiCorp be ordered to revert to
19 its 2007 IRP [LC 42] cost estimate methodology for the duration of the current wind
20 integration cost study (results are expected by Aug 2, 2010). This is because the
21 methodology put forth by the Company in the 2008 Integrated Resource Plan [LC 47]
22 was rejected by the Commission, and the resulting rate from that study should not be

³ UE 216 / PPL / 100 / Duvall / 3.

1 utilized during the current TAM or general rate case. This, therefore, necessitates a
2 reversion to a rate of \$5.10 / MWh, the rate agreed to in the Company's 2007 IRP [LC
3 42]. It is possible that the new study will recommend an increase in estimated wind
4 integration costs; however, until that evidence is provided, reviewed by Staff and
5 intervenors, and adopted by the Commission, PacifiCorp should refrain from passing
6 these increased costs on to customers.

7 Further refinement is needed for the methodology used by PacifiCorp to
8 determine its systemwide wind integration costs on its own system. There will be issues
9 with any forward-looking estimate of wind integration costs, as it is very difficult to
10 separate the costs that are strictly dedicated to wind integration from those that are
11 otherwise necessary to balance the general system load. The burden of proof is on
12 PacifiCorp to show that all of the costs associated with wind integration are properly
13 accounted for and are not duplicated elsewhere in the system. It may be that the only
14 reliable and fair way to assess the Company's wind integration costs is by using a
15 backward-looking methodology that calculates the actual costs at year end and uses this
16 to forecast future rates. CUB encourages PacifiCorp to develop a more reliable forward-
17 looking methodology or to consider using verified historic costs as the basis for the
18 charge.

19 PacifiCorp pays BPA for wind integration for resources that are located in BPA's
20 control area. The actual integration costs charged by BPA (\$5.70 / MWh) are
21 considerably lower than the Company's new cost estimate. BPA integration costs are
22 firm costs to the Company, as they are paid out directly to BPA rather than derived from
23 internal accounting methods. While adopting this rate for all of the Company's wind

1 integration costs would be a preferable fallback option to the Company's current cost
2 estimate proposal, even this methodology is still more expensive than the Company's LC
3 42 methodology. CUB therefore reiterates a preference for reverting to the Company's
4 LC 42 methodology until the results of the current cost study are made available.

5 **III. Issues with the Structure of the TAM**

6 The Transition Adjustment Mechanism [TAM] is intended to allow PacifiCorp to
7 update its net variable power costs and set the transition adjustment for direct access rates
8 for the upcoming calendar year. This mechanism is therefore intended to be a
9 straightforward accounting adjustment, lending itself to a fairly simple docket that should
10 require verification of costs by intervenors and Commission Staff, but should also avoid
11 larger disagreements. Since its inception, however, the TAM has grown to include
12 numerous issues that were originally intended to be resolved either in general rate cases
13 or in issue-specific dockets. It is time to return to a more parsimonious approach
14 regarding the scope of the TAM.

15 **A. The TAM's scope and scale have been expanded beyond its intended purpose**

16 In the six years since the TAM was introduced, the filing has gone from being a
17 small segment of the general rate case to its own, increasingly larger docket. In 2008, the
18 first year in which the TAM was diverted to its own docket [UE 191], the Company's
19 initial filing and attachments totaled 72 pages. The initial filing in this docket is 160
20 pages, and is accompanied by numerous large sets of workpapers. While there are
21 undoubtedly legitimate reasons that the docket could grow in complexity, the major cause
22 of this growth has been the incorporation of issues into the TAM that should be settled
23 elsewhere. Wind integration costs are a major component of this docket, and heat rates

1 and forced outage rates at thermal plants comprised the bulk of the arguments in the 2010
2 TAM [UE 207]. These issues warrant discussion and resolution, but oftentimes the TAM
3 is utilized by parties as a venue to revisit an issue from another docket. CUB respectfully
4 requests that the Commission adopt a more rigorous limitation of the scope of TAM
5 proceedings going forward.

6 There are two kinds of updates that affect rates in the TAM. The first update
7 comprises the information that the TAM was originally supposed to provide: changes in
8 the prices of fuel and purchased power and updates to load. While these items can be
9 large and can be controversial, they are straightforward attempts to update elements of
10 power costs. For example, when forecasting fuel costs, parties can look at the previous
11 year's costs and estimate the expected amount of change. After the test year is over,
12 parties can look back at what was done and determine whether further adjustments are
13 needed.

14 The second update type consists of items that now seem to consume the TAM
15 proceeding each year: items like wind integration, heat rates, forced outage rates, and
16 hydro modeling. These matters are anything but straightforward. Parties cannot look at
17 the Company's books and identify a discrete cost associated with these issues. This is
18 because the Company's forecasts are more driven by methodology than by the accuracy
19 of their results.

20 In the wind integration arena, costs grow out of modeling and assumptions rather
21 than markets and real data, and these models and assumptions have become the primary
22 issues of the TAM. Because these issues are based on modeling and assumptions, there is
23 not a single "right" answer, so the theories and assumptions get litigated again each year.

For example, Docket UM 1355 was opened in late 2007 with the goal of resolving the methodology issue for the calculation of forced outage rates. But, after two and a half years of proceedings, it still is not clear when that docket will be resolved, or whether its resolution will actually help us simplify the TAM.

B. The current schedule for annual dockets needs improvement

The TAM is just one of many annually recurring dockets that must be handled and reviewed by the Commission, Staff, and numerous intervenors. Whereas in decades past the dockets opened in any given year were often limited to annual general rate cases and occasional merger dockets, several utilities have each added a number of annual dockets to address accounting, power costs, and tax issues, among others. This trend has resulted in a significantly increased workload for intervenors, Commission Staff and the Commissioners.

i. There are a large number of annually recurring dockets

The following is a sampling (but not necessarily a complete listing) of annually recurring dockets for electric and natural gas utilities in Oregon:

- Portland General Electric
 - Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism [PCAM]
 - Annual Power Cost Update Tariff [AUT]
 - Renewable Resource Adjustment Clause [RRAC]
 - SB 408 Tax Adjustment
- PacifiCorp
 - Transition Adjustment Mechanism [TAM]
 - Renewable Resource Adjustment Clause [RRAC]
 - SB 408 Tax Adjustment
- Idaho Power
 - Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism [PCAM]
(this docket has 3 separate parts: forecast, update, and true-up)
- Northwest Natural

- SB 408 Tax Adjustment
- Purchased Gas Adjustment [PGA]
- Avista
 - SB 408 Tax Adjustment
 - Purchased Gas Adjustment [PGA]

Each of these dockets requires a significant investment of time and effort on the part of intervenors and Staff, who must investigate the issues raised and submit testimony and/or settlement proposals. In addition to these other dockets, utilities file integrated resource plans [IRPs] and renewable energy standards [RES] plans on two-year cycles and are also trending towards the filing of annual or biannual general rate cases. All of these dockets combine, along with mergers, deferrals, and other one-off dockets, to yield a massive amount of work for Staff and intervenors. While CUB is of the opinion that all parties involved have been doing a commendable job of keeping up with this heavy workload, we would like to propose a change that could help to spread the docket load more evenly throughout the year.

ii. PacifiCorp and PGE should submit dockets on different schedules

The two largest electric utilities in Oregon, PacifiCorp and PGE, both operate using rate schedules that conform to the calendar year (January 1 – December 31). The TAM and the AUT both require rate changes on January 1, so both companies attempt to adjust all of their rate elements on that date, yielding a single rate change each year. While limiting utilities to one rate change per year is good for customers who have to pay those rates and need to be able to budget in advance, the coincidental filing of these dockets creates a significant burden on intervenors, Staff and the Commission.

1 Having both of these companies submit rate cases and other dockets on the same
2 timeline makes for some impossibly busy weeks and months for all of the parties
3 involved. For CUB and other intervenors, this compressed schedule forces workshops,
4 testimony, settlement conferences, briefs, and hearings to be conducted simultaneously in
5 many dockets without respite. For the Commission, this means that there are a large
6 number of cases that must be ruled upon between Thanksgiving and New Years Day.
7 This workload is compounded by the addition of the TAM and other adjustments that are
8 filed on the same schedule as general rate cases.

9 *iii. CUB's proposed schedule change*

10 CUB would like to propose that PacifiCorp shift its rate schedule away from the
11 calendar year, so that it runs from July 1 through June 30. PGE would continue to target
12 January 1 for its rate changes. CUB is requesting that PacifiCorp make this shift because
13 it has historically had fewer direct access customers than PGE⁴. CUB's hope is that by
14 splitting the schedules of the two largest electric companies, the "coincidental peak" in
15 workload for intervenors, Staff and the Commission can be reduced (though we
16 understand that it cannot be entirely eliminated).

17 CUB's proposal is that the current TAM apply to the period from January 1, 2011
18 to June 30, 2012. This structure would allow the intervening parties to space out their
19 anticipated workload throughout the calendar year, rather than face a daunting workload
20 throughout the spring and summer months, as has been the experience of the past several
21 years.

22 CUB anticipates that PacifiCorp will object to keeping the rates for the current
23 TAM in place from December 31, 2011 to June 30, 2012. The Company would lose six

⁴ http://www.puc.state.or.us/PUC/electric_restruc/statrpt/2010/012010_status_report.pdf.

1 months of higher rates (as we can no longer even pretend that the TAM works in both
2 directions and can both increase and decrease rates). While this is true, we note that it
3 would be difficult to forecast power costs out for more than one year, as contracts are not
4 in place, the market is not very liquid, and forward price curves are not very accurate.
5 This is one reason that 12 month test years are the general rule for forecasting rates, even
6 when rates are expected to be in effect for more than 12 months, as we are proposing
7 here.

8 The rates coming out of this docket will be set at a level that the Commission
9 finds to be fair, just and reasonable for charges to customers for power used through the
10 last half of December, 2011. There is no reason to believe that that rate will suddenly
11 become unfair, unjust, and/or unreasonable during the first half of January 2012. Finally,
12 we note that when PacifiCorp proposed the TAM, the Company was proposing a
13 “straightforward” mechanism that updated a handful of costs that were necessary to
14 update for the purposes of direct access. Because the TAM has not lived up to the
15 Company’s promises, it is reasonable to ask them to delay the filing of the next TAM by
16 6 months in order to relieve regulatory burdens.

17 **IV. Other Issues**

18 **A. Forced Outage Rates**

19 CUB supports the resolution of the issue of forced outage rate calculations that
20 has been discussed in docket UM 1355 since late 2007. This issue has lingered far too
21 long without a final order from the Commission. PacifiCorp’s most recent request to file

1 additional testimony on this issue in UM 1355 was denied by the Commission⁵, an
2 indication that the Commissioners also feel that the issue has been explored as much as it
3 possibly can be. CUB fully supports the adoption of Staff's proposed "collar" approach
4 using NERC data, as well as the Commission's proposal to adjust forced outage outliers
5 to the median of a plant's historical performance as outlined in the Commission's Order
6 of April 26, 2010. This methodology should be incorporated into the current TAM before
7 rates go into effect in January.

8 **B. Rate shock from the combined effects of the TAM, the GRC and the Klamath**
9 **surcharge**

10 One consequence of adjusting rates through all kinds of automatic adjustment
11 clauses rather than general rate cases is that this process hides the true impact of the rate
12 changes. Rather than having a docket which focuses the parties on the impact of the total
13 change in rates, there are a series of dockets with smaller increases. A cost that might be
14 considered discretionary and a candidate for delay in the face of a 20% increase may not
15 get the same scrutiny when the utility has an 8% increase. However, that 8% increase
16 might be accompanied by increases of 10% and 5% in other dockets. The total price
17 change coming from a series of smaller dockets might therefore be greater than that
18 which would emanate from a single large docket.

19 PacifiCorp is looking for a large increase in net power costs in this docket to go
20 along with a large rate increase in the general rate case [UE 217] and the customer
21 surcharge for the decommissioning of the Klamath River dams [UE 219]. The combined
22 rate effect of these three dockets exceeds 20% for some rate classes. The Company had a

⁵ Commission Order No. 10-157.

1 general rate case approved last year. This year, the economy is in recession and power
2 prices and fuel costs are not increasing. CUB is concerned that the Company is not
3 effectively managing its costs, and is instead using general rate cases as an alternative to
4 managing its costs.

5 When the Commission sets rates, it is not approving costs, but is instead looking
6 at a sample year of costs to set a rate level. Costs will invariably be different than the
7 forecast, and the utility is expected to manage its business in light of the existing rates. In
8 this case, by stacking a lot of new rate base additions in a year when several contracts are
9 expiring and new rates have just taken effect, the Company has failed to manage its costs
10 to its rates.

11 Current market conditions are actually quite moderate. PacifiCorp had a general rate
12 case last year, which realigned its costs with its rates. For the Company to come back
13 again this year and ask for a 20% increase through a combination of dockets is really
14 quite extraordinary.

15 **V. Conclusion**

16 While updating fuel prices, power purchase costs, and loads on an annual basis is
17 generally reasonable (though with annual or biannual rate cases, it is unnecessary), CUB
18 reiterates its concerns that mechanisms such as the TAM allow creative utilities to
19 manufacture “costs” that have little to do with actual increases in power costs, and
20 respectfully requests that the Commission keep this in mind when reviewing this and
21 other dockets.

- 22 • The wind integration costs that PacifiCorp proposes (\$6.97 / MWh) are
23 insufficiently supported. Until a new wind integration study is approved,

1 CUB recommends adopting the rate arrived at by the Company's previous
2 methodology (\$5.10 / MWh) or using the rate charged by BPA (\$5.70 /
3 MWh).

- 4 • The scope and scale of the TAM have expanded greatly since its
5 inception, resulting in another burdensome docket that increases the
6 workload for intervenors, Staff, and the Commission and invariably raises
7 rates for customers. CUB encourages the Commission to steer utilities
8 towards a simpler approach to the TAM and similar dockets that focuses
9 on updating power costs and load updates.
- 10 • CUB proposes that PacifiCorp's rate year schedule be changed from
11 January 1 – December 31 to July 1 – June 30. This will help to ease the
12 burden on intervenors, Staff, and the Commission that often results from
13 numerous large dockets being argued simultaneously.
- 14 • CUB supports the resolution of the forced outage rate issue in UM 1355
15 by adopting the modified "collar" proposal put forth by the Commission in
16 its Order of April 26, 2010.
- 17 • There are currently two other dockets in which PacifiCorp is seeking
18 significant rate increases, resulting in an overall proposed increase of over
19 20%. CUB encourages the Commission to take current economic
20 conditions into account when considering the combined impact of these
21 three individual dockets on residential customers in Oregon.

WITNESS QUALIFICATION STATEMENT

NAME: Gordon Feighner

EMPLOYER: Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon (CUB)

TITLE: Utility Analyst

ADDRESS: 610 SW Broadway, Suite 308
Portland, OR 97205

EDUCATION: Master of Environmental Management, 2005
Duke University, Durham, NC

Bachelor of Arts, Economics, 2002
Reed College, Portland, OR

WORK EXPERIENCE: I have previously provided testimony in dockets UE 196, UE 204, UE 207, UE 210, UE 213, UM 1355 and UM 1431. Between 2004 and 2008, I worked for the US Environmental Protection Agency and the City of Portland Bureau of Environmental Services, conducting economic and environmental analyses on a number of projects. In November 2008 I joined the Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon as a Utility Analyst and began conducting research and analysis on behalf of CUB.

UE 216 – CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on this 12th day of May, 2010, I served the foregoing **REPLY TESTIMONY OF THE CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD OF OREGON** in docket UE 216 upon each party listed in the UE 216 OPUC Service List by email and, where paper service is not waived, by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and upon the Commission by email and by sending the original and 5 copies by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the Commission's Salem offices.

(W denotes waiver of paper service)

(C denotes service of Confidential material authorized)

W **MCDOWELL RACKNER &
GIBSON PC**
KATHERINE A MCDOWELL
520 SW SIXTH AVE - SUITE 830
PORTLAND OR 97204
katherine@mcd-law.com

W **PACIFICORP OREGON
DOCKETS**
825 NE MULTNOMAH ST
STE 2000
PORTLAND OR 97232
oregondockets@pacificorp.com

W **PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT**
C **JOELLE STEWARD**
REGULATORY MANAGER
825 NE MULTNOMAH STE 2000
PORTLAND OR 97232
joelle.steward@pacificorp.com

C **PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF OREGON**
KELCEY BROWN
PO BOX 2148
SALEM OR 97301
kelcey.brown@state.or.us

W JORDAN A WHITE
SENIOR COUNSEL
1407 W. NORTH TEMPLE, STE 320
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
jordan.white@pacificorp.com

C **DAVISON VAN CLEVE**
IRION A SANGER
ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY
333 SW TAYLOR - STE 400
PORTLAND OR 97204
ias@dvclaw.com

C **DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**
JASON W JONES, AAG
REGULATED UTILITY &
BUSINESS SECTION
1162 COURT ST NE
SALEM OR 97301-4096
jason.w.jones@state.or.us

W ENERGY STRATEGIES LLC
C KEVIN HIGGINS
PRINCIPLE
215 STATE ST - STE 200
SALT LAKE UT 84111-2322
khiggins@energystrat.com

C RFI CONSULTING INC
RANDALL J FALKENBERG
PMB 362
8343 ROSWELL RD
SANDY SPRINGS GA 30350
consultrfi@aol.com

W RICHARDSON & O'LEARY
C PLLC
PETER J RICHARDSON
PO BOX 7218
BOISE ID 83707
peter@richardsonandoleary.com

W MCDOWELL RACKNER &
C GIBSON PC
AMIE JAMIESON
ATTORNEY
520 SW SIXTH AVE - STE 830
PORTLAND OR 97204
amie@mcd-law.com

W RICHARDSON & O'LEARY
C GREGORY MARSHALL ADAMS
PO BOX 7218
BOISE ID 83702
greg@richardsonandoleary.com

W SEMPRA ENERGY SOLUTIONS
LLC
GREG BASS
401 WEST A STREET SUITE 500
SAN DIEGO CA 92101
gbass@semprasolutions.com

Respectfully submitted,



G. Catriona McCracken
Staff Attorney
The Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon
610 SW Broadway, Ste. 308
Portland, OR 97205
(503)227-1984
Catriona@oregoncub.org