

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

**OF OREGON**

**UE 179**

In the Matter of

PACIFICORP,

Request for a general rate increase in the  
company's Oregon annual revenues.

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**DIRECT TESTIMONY ON THE RATE CASE  
OF THE  
CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD OF OREGON**

July 12, 2006



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OF OREGON**

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In the Matter of	)	
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PACIFICORP,	)	DIRECT TESTIMONY
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1           Our names are Bob Jenks and Lowrey Brown, and our qualifications are listed in  
2   CUB Exhibits 101 and 201 respectively.

3   **I. Introduction**

4           PacifiCorp is in the midst of a transition from ScottishPower ownership to  
5   MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company (MidAmerican) ownership. The original filing  
6   was based on a projected 2007 test year with PacifiCorp owned by ScottishPower.  
7   Obviously this has changed. As some costs get updated as this case progresses, any  
8   given item in the Company's rate case filing could be based on ScottishPower,  
9   MidAmerican, or a mixture. Regardless of each individual cost, the fundamental  
10   question remains of whether the overall revenue requirement established just last year,  
11   based on PacifiCorp costs under ScottishPower ownership, is insufficient for PacifiCorp  
12   under MidAmerican ownership. We recommend the Commission deny PacifiCorp's

1 application for a general rate increase, and grant only the power cost increase it finds  
2 appropriate.

3 Should the Commission choose to examine the Company's filing on a cost-by-  
4 cost basis, we propose a few adjustments to PacifiCorp's forecast. CUB's adjustments by  
5 no means represent the universe of appropriate adjustments to the Company's filed case,  
6 and we expect Staff and other parties to raise other problems with PacifiCorp's filing and  
7 propose adjustments to remedy them. We recommend a Commission decision that  
8 includes not only CUB's, but appropriate Staff and other party adjustments, as well.

## 9 **II. No Rate Increase Warranted Beyond Power Cost Update**

10 PacifiCorp has the burden of proof in demonstrating that the Company's current  
11 rates, supplemented by the 2007 power cost update, are not adequate, and the Company  
12 has not met that burden. PacifiCorp gives us no reason to believe that the Company's  
13 costs under ScottishPower ownership are not sufficient to operate PacifiCorp under  
14 MidAmerican ownership. Last October, the Commission granted the Company a 3.2%  
15 increase,<sup>1</sup> and, in the 2007 power cost update alone, power costs may jump 11.5%,<sup>2</sup> if the  
16 Company receives its requested power cost increase in its April filing. Rates went up last  
17 year, will go up this year, and will most likely continue to go up, through the Company's  
18 annual power cost updates, regardless of this – or any – general rate case. PacifiCorp has  
19 not shown that its operations under MidAmerican ownership need another non-power  
20 cost increase after its increase under ScottishPower ownership last fall, and it is the  
21 Company's obligation to demonstrate another increase is necessary.

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<sup>1</sup> UE 170 Order No. 05-1050, page 1.

<sup>2</sup> Current power costs: \$797 M (PPL/500/Widmer/2). April requested power costs: \$889 M (April TAM Update).

1    **A. Which Costs Are Whose And What Are They?**

2           PacifiCorp filed this rate case in February, and MidAmerican officially took the  
3   helm in March. Since MidAmerican took over, there have been numerous changes in the  
4   company, including a different corporate structure and a different CEO. Two of the  
5   witnesses in this case (McRichie and Rosbourgh) are no longer with PacifiCorp, and at  
6   least three of the witnesses from UE 170 are no longer with the Company (Omohondro,  
7   Martin and Rosbourgh). As the docket progresses, the forecast of any given item is more  
8   and more of a mishmash of costs under ScottishPower and costs under MidAmerican.  
9   After only four months of MidAmerican ownership, operational changes can only just be  
10   starting to take shape, and forecasting an individual 2007 cost under MidAmerican is  
11   difficult at best. PacifiCorp's understanding of how specific costs will be different under  
12   MidAmerican than they were under ScottishPower is just developing, and the Company  
13   certainly couldn't have foreseen such line-item changes back in February.

14           As Mr. Gale pointed out when addressing MidAmerican's then-potential  
15   acquisition of PacifiCorp:

16           We cannot quantify these opportunities until after MEHC better  
17           understands the operations and circumstances of PacifiCorp, and that  
18           cannot occur until MEHC owns PacifiCorp.

19   UM 1209 PPL/312/Gale/14.

20           Without the experience that can be gained by operating the business,  
21           MEHC is not able to quantify savings that can be gained by changes in  
22           business practices.

23   UM 1209 PPI/312/Gale/12.

24           PacifiCorp's costs specifically under MidAmerican are still in the early stages of  
25   emergence, which undermines the Company's attempted justification that its Oregon

1 revenue requirement must grow by more than 13%<sup>3</sup> from the amount it was granted last  
2 October under ScottishPower ownership.

### 3 **B. An Employee Level Example**

4 PacifiCorp's employee levels, both in comparisons of actual levels to budgeted  
5 levels, as well as in a comparison of reported actual levels in different data responses,  
6 demonstrate the difficulty of forecasting costs smack in the middle of the MidAmerican  
7 transition. The comparisons also demonstrate a consistent over-forecasting of employee  
8 levels. The following table compiles PacifiCorp's employee levels as provided in various  
9 data responses.

**PacifiCorp Employee Levels In Data Responses**

	Oct 2005	Dec 2005	Apr 2006	Jun 2006
Actual <sup>4</sup>	5,974		5,967 - 5,986	5,941.5
Actual <sup>5</sup>	5,974	6,011	5,998.5	
Budgeted <sup>6</sup>	7,099	7,120	6,956.5	6,966.5
Delta - Budget to Actual	1,125	1,109	958.0	1,025.0

\* Full-Time Equivalents

10 The case was filed assuming 5,974 employees, but by June of 2006, employee  
11 levels were well below this level. Clearly, employee levels are over-forecasted, and it is  
12 not clear if or by how much they may decline before the beginning of the test year. This  
13 example shows that PacifiCorp's employee level, which is a moving target to begin with,  
14 is changing so quickly that the timing of the Company's data responses can result in

<sup>3</sup> UE 179 Trail Brief, Exhibit A.

<sup>4</sup> PacifiCorp response to OPUC 299(b)2, which is confidential. The Company gave CUB permission to use these numbers publicly. We appreciate the Company considering and granting our request.

<sup>5</sup> CUB Exhibit 202. PacifiCorp response to ICNU data request 11.5.

<sup>6</sup> CUB Exhibit 202. PacifiCorp response to OPUC data request 209.

1 different answers. It also demonstrates that the record does not support an employee  
2 level of 5,974.

3 The context for the Company's rate case filing is morphing rapidly, and which  
4 costs will rise and which costs will fall has not yet settled out of the mix. Regardless of  
5 this ScottishPower–MidAmerican mélange, the fundamental question remains: Has  
6 PacifiCorp demonstrated that the overall revenue requirement the Company was granted  
7 last year under ScottishPower, updated for power costs, is not sufficient for the Company  
8 under MidAmerican ownership?

9 No, and how could PacifiCorp demonstrate such an increase in costs when it can't  
10 yet have established what the Company's costs will be? We recommend the Commission  
11 deny PacifiCorp's application for a rate increase in the Company's general rate case  
12 filing, and recognize only those power cost changes it deems appropriate. If the  
13 Commission chooses to recognize PacifiCorp's filing, such as it is, the specific  
14 adjustments we recommend follow. In addition, CUB has co-sponsored a cost-of-capital  
15 witness with the Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities (ICNU), Michael Gorman,  
16 and his testimony is CUB-ICNU/400/Gorman.

### 17 **III. Allocating The Cost Of Taxes**

18 The permanent rules implementing Senate Bill 408 have not yet been established,  
19 and those rules may well render a tax adjustment in PacifiCorp's rate case, unnecessary,  
20 as the automatic adjustment clause may pick up such an adjustment. In the absence of  
21 permanent rules we feel it necessary to correct PacifiCorp's tax forecast here, especially  
22 in light of Staff's opinion that general rate cases are the appropriate venue for a SB 408

1 tax adjustment.<sup>7</sup> While this adjustment is less than what we have proposed in AR 499, it  
2 is important to better align taxes collected with taxes paid as dictated by  
3 SB 408;<sup>8</sup> more importantly, CUB's adjustment better aligns the Company's tax forecast  
4 with the actual tax cost that will eventually be paid.

5 **A. Taxes Are A Consolidated Cost Paid By The Corporate Family**

6 When a utility is brought into a corporate family, there are costs the utility no  
7 longer has to shoulder alone. Affiliates within a holding company structure can share  
8 such costs as corporate secretarial services, shareholder services, insurance, and  
9 accounting services. The consolidated tax liability is also a cost paid by the corporate  
10 group. It is irrational to attribute the cost of the consolidated tax liability in a manner that  
11 is entirely inconsistent with the way other shared costs are attributed, and with no regard  
12 to the utility's share of the consolidated tax cost within the corporate structure.

13 ***i. Stand-Alone Tax Attribution Is A Perverse Way To Allocate A Cost***

14 Taxes are a cost. Oregon practices cost-based regulation. For a utility within a  
15 holding company structure, the cost is not what the utility's stand-alone tax liability  
16 would have been, because the utility is not stand-alone and does not pay taxes as a stand-  
17 alone company. The tax cost is the tax liability of the corporate family as paid on a  
18 consolidated basis. Under cost-based regulation, some portion of the consolidated tax  
19 liability (the cost) should be attributed to the utility.

20 If a utility were to suggest that any other shared cost (*e.g.* shareholder services)  
21 should be charged to a utility as if the cost were not shared – using the rationale that, had  
22 the utility been stand-alone, the utility would have paid the entirety of the stand-alone

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<sup>7</sup> AR 499 Staff's Comments On Straw Proposals, page 4.

<sup>8</sup> Senate Bill 408, Section 2(1)(a).

1 expense on its own – customers would rightly judge this to be unfair. This may help  
2 explain why Oregonians have been angry over the amount they are charged for taxes in  
3 utility rates.

4 Allocating a shared cost, taxes or otherwise, such that utility customers pay the  
5 entire amount they would have paid had the utility been stand-alone, is perverse. It  
6 presumes a cost that doesn't actually exist because the utility is not stand-alone, and it  
7 denies utility customers the benefit of cost-sharing among affiliates in a conglomerate.  
8 Not only is it perverse, but it stands in conflict with cost-based regulation.

9 *ii. Stand-Alone Tax Attribution Provides Perverse Incentives*

10 Stand-alone tax imputation, as preferred by the utilities and by Staff, provides  
11 incentives for utility ownership that are not appropriate. First, it makes a utility more  
12 valuable to shareholders through a holding company structure than through a stand-alone  
13 structure. It is perverse for Oregon regulation to encourage investors to purchase an  
14 Oregon utility through a conglomerate, as opposed to purchasing it as a stand-alone  
15 utility. Such an incentive makes it less likely that Oregon utilities will be stand-alone or  
16 locally headquartered. Second, stand-alone tax attribution encourages holding companies  
17 to acquire and maintain debt – in order to benefit from interest tax deductions – which is  
18 not beneficial to the financial strength of the utility's corporate family.

19 **a. Favors A Utility In A Holding Company Structure Over A Stand-Alone Structure**

20 Stand-alone tax attribution makes a utility more valuable in a holding company  
21 structure than it would be as a stand-alone company, because a stand-alone utility will not  
22 only forecast its taxes on a stand-alone basis, but will also pay its taxes on a stand-alone  
23 basis. While actual taxable income is sometimes higher and sometimes lower than



1 forecast, there isn't a whole lot of room for stand-alone utility shareholders to profit from  
2 this arrangement.

3 A holding company, on the other hand, can use a utility with stand-alone tax  
4 attribution to absorb tax deductions, such as the interest deductions on its debt, while still  
5 collecting tax payments from customers as if those tax deductions had never been taken.  
6 The holding company's consolidated tax liability (the actual cost in cost-based  
7 ratemaking) is the real cost, but for purposes of charging utility customers, stand-alone  
8 tax attribution allows the holding company to pretend the tax cost is something else.

9 **b. Encourages Debt In A Utility's Holding Company**

10 Not only does stand-alone tax attribution encourage conglomerate ownership of  
11 Oregon utilities, but, for the very same reason, stand-alone tax attribution encourages an  
12 Oregon utility's holding company to acquire and maintain debt. The more debt a holding  
13 company carries, the greater its interest tax deduction will be, and the more profit it can  
14 make from utility customer tax payments. This hardly encourages strong, equity-rich  
15 holding company structures. This situation is highlighted by MidAmerican and  
16 PacifiCorp's association with extremely cash-heavy Berkshire Hathaway. Berkshire  
17 could easily put an enormous amount of equity into MidAmerican, but keeping debt at  
18 MidAmerican provides the interest tax deductions that reduce MidAmerican's  
19 consolidated tax liability. If customers are charged PacifiCorp's theoretical stand-alone  
20 tax liability, millions of dollars in additional tax payments from PacifiCorp's captive  
21 customers are fed into MidAmerican coffers.

22 It is not appropriate for Oregon regulation to prefer conglomerate ownership of  
23 Oregon utilities over direct investor ownership. It is also not appropriate for Oregon  
24 regulation to encourage and reward holding companies for carrying debt.

**B. Adjusting PacifiCorp Tax Forecast Toward The Actual Tax Cost**

MidAmerican carries a large debt burden that provides the holding company with a significant amount of interest-related tax deductions. These deductions reduce the consolidated tax liability of the MidAmerican sub-group of Berkshire Hathaway. As this reduction in tax liability is known and measurable, it should be included when forecasting the taxes to be included in customer rates.

CUB Exhibit 203 shows the calculation we used to forecast the impact of interest tax deductions at MidAmerican on PacifiCorp's share of the MidAmerican consolidated tax liability.<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately, in the Company's response to our data request, PacifiCorp did not provide the interest rate MidAmerican pays on its debt to Berkshire. The Company's reason for this omission is that any interest paid by MidAmerican to Berkshire is taxed at Berkshire, and that these offset each other. We disagree.

The appropriate way to determine PacifiCorp's share of its corporate family's consolidated tax liability is to work systematically, from the bottom of the ownership structure. PacifiCorp's share of the consolidated tax payment should be established by determining its share of its immediate parent's, MidAmerican's, consolidated tax liability, which includes a significant, easy-to-forecast interest tax deduction.

We disagree with PacifiCorp that we should ignore debt at MidAmerican when that debt is a loan from Berkshire Hathaway. While Berkshire has tax liability on its earnings and some of those earnings come from interest on loans to MidAmerican, this does not change our calculation. If Berkshire's cash were not earning interest from

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<sup>9</sup> As everyone is well aware, how customers are charged for taxes is a sensitive issue. We appreciate PacifiCorp providing the information to make this calculation as non-confidential. The Company's choice makes the adjustment easier to discuss, makes the paperwork of testimony easier, and demonstrates thoughtful, sparing use of the protective order.

1 MidAmerican or MidAmerican were not paying interest to Berkshire, Berkshire would  
2 still be earning interest and MidAmerican would still be paying it. The principle of utility  
3 customers being charged the lower of cost or market dictates that this loan should not  
4 create a higher revenue requirement to customers by not accounting for the interest tax  
5 deductions associated with it, merely because the loan is between affiliates.

6 The tax adjustment we propose should be updated with MidAmerican's actual  
7 weighted average cost of debt, instead of a theoretical, almost-weighted average cost of  
8 debt. While adjusting PacifiCorp's tax forecast to account for MidAmerican's interest  
9 tax deduction will not fully capture the benefit of sharing a consolidated tax burden with  
10 the many affiliates of Berkshire Hathaway, it is a reasonable adjustment that can be  
11 forecast for a future test year. It will bring the tax forecast closer to what the Company's  
12 share of the consolidated tax liability will be, and will specifically help to align the  
13 benefit and burden of debt at PacifiCorp's parent company.

14 PacifiCorp's tax forecast should be reduced by \$14.3 million on an Oregon basis,  
15 \$23.8 million when grossed-up to revenue requirement, to account for the interest-related  
16 tax deductions at MidAmerican.

#### 17 **IV. Uncollectible Expense**

18 PacifiCorp's proposed uncollectible expense more than doubles from less than  
19 \$3 million in the Company's UE 170 filing to \$6.2 million in this filing.<sup>10</sup> The  
20 Company's testimony offers no explanation for why this expense should increase so  
21 dramatically. PacifiCorp's uncollectible expense is based on fiscal year 2005, the  
22 Company escalates this amount for inflation, and then escalates it again for the rate

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<sup>10</sup> UE 170/Weston/1.2 and UE 170/Weston/2.13 & PPL/901/Wrigley/4.0.11 (\$5,510,756) and PPL/901/Wrigley/1.2 (\$729,551).

1 increase proposed in this case. However, the Company's uncollectible expense can be  
2 quite volatile, and using only one year of data to forecast this expense makes the forecast  
3 very susceptible to the base year used.

**PacifiCorp Uncollectible Expense**

2003	\$ 6,183,270
2004	\$ 2,451,632
2005	\$ 5,241,997
Average '03-'05	\$4,625,633
Proposed in UE 179	\$ 6,240,307

CUB Exhibit 204

4 As can be seen for the years 2003 to 2005, the uncollectible expense jumped  
5 around quite a bit. It would make more sense, in forecasting for a future test year, to use  
6 a rolling average to better normalize the uncollectible expense. A rolling average both  
7 smoothes the uncollectible expense over time, and makes this variable less sensitive to  
8 the timing of a rate case filing. CUB recommends using the average of PacifiCorp's  
9 uncollectible expense from 2003 through 2005 as a better forecast than the use of one  
10 year of data, 2005.

11 In addition to the problem of using only one year of data to forecast a volatile  
12 expense, PacifiCorp's forecast double-escalates the uncollectible expense. First the 2005  
13 value is escalated to 2007 for inflation, then the uncollectible expense is escalated again  
14 for the rate increase, but isn't the rate increase supposed to capture escalating costs and  
15 inflation? If the Company's theory behind escalating for inflation is that customers will  
16 have a harder time paying as prices go up, then it does not make sense to adjust for  
17 inflation on top of the actual price increase. Problems with this theory are that it doesn't  
18 account for a concurrent increase in personal and business income with inflation, and

1 customers' ability to pay is not a raw good or service that would be measured directly by  
2 inflation. Under the above theory, either the uncollectible expense could be escalated for  
3 inflation or it could be escalated with the rate increase, but not both. That being said, the  
4 actual data suggests that it should be adjusted for neither. The uncollectible expenses in  
5 2004 and 2005 were less than 2003, which demonstrates that this expense does not  
6 directly increase with inflation or rate increases.

7 CUB recommends that PacifiCorp's proposed uncollectible expense be reduced to  
8 \$4.6 million from the \$6.2 million proposed by the Company, thereby reducing the  
9 Company's requested increase by \$1.6 million on an Oregon basis.

## 10 **V. Incentives & Bonuses**

11 The bonuses in PacifiCorp's rate case filing are based upon the bonus system used  
12 by ScottishPower, but there is no reason to believe that MidAmerican will adopt  
13 ScottishPower's bonus system. Regardless, the basic premise that bonuses are awarded  
14 based on a mixture of accomplishments that benefit shareholders and accomplishments  
15 that benefit customers remains valid. In addition, while many employee  
16 accomplishments that benefit the Company also benefit customers, this is not always the  
17 case. A successful rate case from the Company's perspective may not be seen by  
18 customers as a success. Likewise, PacifiCorp might see the repeal of SB 408 as a  
19 success, but customers are unlikely to share that sentiment. Finally, bonuses are awarded  
20 with considerable discretion, such that it is difficult for the Commission to judge the  
21 actual basis upon which a bonus was awarded.

22 We recommend the disallowance percentages Oregon has traditionally used for  
23 bonuses: 100% of executive bonuses and 50% of non-executive bonuses.

## **VI. Rent Of Electric Property**

Rent of electric property is tracked in FERC Account 454, and represents the revenue PacifiCorp receives from other parties for the use of the Company's property. A significant portion of this comes from pole attachments which include telephone and cable television wires and other equipment.<sup>11</sup> For this rate case, PacifiCorp forecasts its revenue from the rent of electric property to be the same as it was in fiscal year 2005 (which was predominantly calendar year 2004).<sup>12</sup> This is unreasonable. The past few years show an upward trend in the Company's revenue from rent of electric property, and the Company has not demonstrated that a static level of such revenue is realistic.

In PacifiCorp's fiscal year 2004, April 2003 through March 2004, the Company collected \$6.1 million on an Oregon basis in revenue from rent for electric property. In its fiscal year 2005, the Company collected \$6.9 million for rent of electric property. This is the number the Company filed in this case.<sup>13</sup> By the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 2006, the Company had already collected \$7.8 million. These fiscal 2004 and 2005 revenues represent a 13% and 14% increase, respectively, and the 14% increase represents only three-quarters of a year.<sup>14</sup> There is no basis to forecast this number for all of calendar year 2007 to be less than it was for just the last 9 months of calendar year 2005.

In order to calculate a more-accurate forecast of PacifiCorp's rent of electric property, we updated the figure by using the most recent 12 months of data available, calendar year 2005, and then escalated this amount to calendar year 2007. Using the

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<sup>11</sup> ORS 757.270.

<sup>12</sup> CUB Exhibit 205.

<sup>13</sup> PPL/901/Wrigley/3.0.2. Oregon + (26.63%)(SG) + (28.44%)(SO).

<sup>14</sup> CUB Exhibit 205.

1 most recent data better responds to the evidence showing an upward trend in revenue  
2 from rent of electric property. CUB Exhibit 205 shows these calculations.

3 Using CUB's calculation, PacifiCorp's 2007 revenue from rent of electric  
4 property should be \$10.7 million, not \$6.9 million. This probably underestimates what  
5 the actual rent will be in 2007, because we used Global Insight's Utility Cost Escalator  
6 for Distribution Plant – 2.5% for 2006 and 1.6% for 2007 – to escalate the 2005 amount  
7 to 2007, and this escalator is well below the recent trend line. In addition, the distribution  
8 escalators are lower than most other escalators used in the Company's filing.<sup>15</sup> However,  
9 because the rent primarily comes from distribution plant, the distribution plant escalator  
10 is reasonable for this forecast.

11 PacifiCorp's forecast for rent of electric property should be raised to  
12 \$10.7 million on an Oregon basis.

## 13 **VII. Conclusion**

14 We recommend that the Commission:

- 15 • Deny PacifiCorp's application for a general rate increase; and
- 16 • Accept only those power cost increases the Commission deems appropriate.

17 If the Commission chooses to address PacifiCorp's proposed rate increase on an  
18 item-by-item basis, we recommend that the Commission:

- 19 • Reduce PacifiCorp's revenue requirement by \$23.8 million to account for the  
20 interest tax deductions at MidAmerican;
- 21 • Reduce the Company's uncollectible expense forecast by \$1.6 million based on  
22 a three-year rolling average;

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<sup>15</sup> PPL/901/Wrigley/4.0.19.

- 1       • Disallow 100% of executive bonuses and 50% on non-executive bonuses as a  
2       reasonable split between shareholders and customers;
- 3       • Increase PacifiCorp's projected revenue from rent of electric property by  
4       \$3.8 million to \$10.7 million on an Oregon basis by using more recent data  
5       than used for the Company's filing, and escalating this amount to the forward  
6       test year; and
- 7       • Adopt appropriate adjustments recommended by Staff and other intervenors.



## WITNESS QUALIFICATION STATEMENT

**NAME** Lowrey R. Brown

**EMPLOYER** Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon

**TITLE** Utility Analyst

**ADDRESS** 610 SW Broadway, Suite 308  
Portland, OR 97205

**EDUCATION** Master of Science, Engineering  
Bachelor of Science, Civil Engineering  
Stanford University, Stanford California

**EXPERIENCE** Provided comments and participated in settlement discussions in OPUC dockets AR 495, UE 161, UE 173, UM 1014, UM 1147, UM 1158, UM 1169, UM 1206, and UM 1209. Presented testimony and engaged in settlement proceedings in UE 165, UE 167, UE 170, UM 1121, and UM 1187. Participated in technical subcommittees for the Governor's Advisory Group on Global Warming, and in the Regional Representatives Group for Grid West. Currently involved in the development of PacifiCorp's and PGE's integrated resource plan.

Prior to this, worked as a consultant with KEMA-Xenergy in Portland from 2002 to 2003 on energy and energy efficiency issues. Between 1997 and 2001, freelanced in Colorado for The Valley Journal, Solar Energy International, Energy Systems Engineering, and Resource Engineering providing writing and technical assistance.

UE-179/PacifiCorp  
June 1, 2006  
ICNU 11<sup>th</sup> Set Data Request 11.5

**ICNU Data Request 11.5**

Please provide the level of manpower that is equivalent to the level included in the Company's test year revenue requirement for the following dates:

- a. October 31, 2005;
- b. December 31, 2005; and
- c. June 30, 2006.

**Response to ICNU Data Request 11.5**

- a. Actual Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) at the end of October 2005 was 5,974. The labor adjustment included in the revenue requirement for the test period is based on this level of FTEs.
- b. Actual Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) at the end of December 2005 was 6,011.
- c. No employee count data is available for June 30, 2006. Actual Full Time Equivalents at the end of April 2006 was 5,998.5.

Attach OPUC 209

<i>FY-2006 Budget</i>	<i>Period</i>											
	<i>Apr 2005</i>	<i>May 2005</i>	<i>Jun 2005</i>	<i>Jul 2005</i>	<i>Aug 2005</i>	<i>Sep 2005</i>	<i>Oct 2005</i>	<i>Nov 2005</i>	<i>Dec 2005</i>	<i>Jan 2006</i>	<i>Feb 2006</i>	<i>Mar 2006</i>
<i>Total FTEs</i>	6,865.0	6,890.0	6,919.0	6,983.0	7,021.0	7,047.0	7,099.0	7,110.0	7,120.0	7,134.0	7,122.0	7,125.0
<i>FY-2007 Budget</i>	<i>Period</i>											
	<i>Apr 2006</i>	<i>May 2006</i>	<i>Jun 2006</i>	<i>Jul 2006</i>	<i>Aug 2006</i>	<i>Sep 2006</i>	<i>Oct 2006</i>	<i>Nov 2006</i>	<i>Dec 2006</i>	<i>Jan 2007</i>	<i>Feb 2007</i>	<i>Mar 2007</i>
<i>Total FTEs</i>	6,956.5	6,951.5	6,966.5	6,974.5	6,982.0	6,985.0	6,973.0	6,978.5	6,959.5	6,950.5	6,950.5	6,950.5

## PacifiCorp Parent Interest Tax Deduction

MEHC Debt	\$6,065,000,000
Average Interest Rate	6.24%
Interest Amount	\$378,456,000
State & Federal Interest Deduction (37.95%)	\$143,624,052
PacifiCorp Share (35%)	\$50,268,418
Oregon Allocation (28.44%)	\$14,296,338
Gross-Up To Revenue Requirement (166.22%)	\$23,763,373

### Notes

MEHC Debt - From data response to CUB data request 14.

Average Interest Rate - From data response to CUB data request 14.

Average Interest Rate - This interest rate is based on the weighted average cost of debt excluding debt to

Berkshire Hathaway. MidAmerican debt includes \$1.289 million in debt to its parent, Berkshire.

In providing CUB the interest rate on MidAmerican's debt, PacifiCorp did not provide the interest rate on the debt to Berkshire, arguing that any interest deduction is offset by taxes on that interest at Berkshire, and should not be subject to an interest deduction.

We disagree, and expect to update this interest rate to include the interest rate on all MidAmerican debt.

State & Federal Interest Deduction (37.95%) - PPL/901/Wrigley/2.1.

PacifiCorp Share (35%) - S&P Credit FAQ, PacifiCorp will be about 35% of MEHC operating income.

Oregon Allocation (28.44%) - System Overhead Allocation Factor.

Gross-Up To Revenue Requirement - PPL/901/Wrigley/1.2.

UE-179/PacifiCorp  
July 6, 2006  
CUB Data Request 14

### CUB Data Request 14

Please provide the following information concerning debt and interest at MEHC:

- a. Please identify the debt at MEHC (stand-alone) using the most current figure available.
- b. Please identify how much of this debt has credit support from Berkshire Hathaway.
- c. Please identify how much of this debt is owed to Berkshire Hathaway.
- d. Please identify the current interest rate associated with this debt, and any forecasted interest rate for 2007.

### Response to CUB Data Request 14

- a. The MEHC stand-alone information as of March 31, 2006 is shown below.

<u>Component</u>	<u>MEHC</u> <u>Historical</u> <sup>1</sup> (\$ in millions)
<u>Debt</u>	
Parent Company Senior Debt	\$4,476.3
Parent Company Subordinated Debt	<u>1,588.7</u>
Parent Company Senior and Subordinated Debt	<u>\$6,065.0</u>

<sup>1</sup>MEHC Historical represents the 3/31/2006 parent only debt obtained from MEHC's March 31, 2006 Form 10-Q, page 5.

- b. All of the debt has either explicit or implicit credit support from Berkshire Hathaway. Explicitly, Berkshire Hathaway has made an equity commitment to MEHC to purchase up to \$3.5 billion of common equity, upon request, by the MEHC Board of Directors. Proceeds from such a purchase may be used to pay MEHC's debt obligations or fund the general corporate purposes and capital requirements of MEHC's regulated subsidiaries, including PacifiCorp. The commitment expires February 28, 2011. Implicit credit support is recognized by the rating agencies due to Berkshire Hathaway's voting interest increasing to 88.2% of outstanding common shares following the repeal of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the willingness of a highly rated parent to provide on-going support based upon that parent's strong economic incentive to protect its investment in a consolidated subsidiary and public statements by Berkshire Hathaway regarding its strategic focus on the regulated side of the utility business. The credit ratings of PacifiCorp reflect this credit support by Berkshire Hathaway, as well as the ring fencing structure put in place by MEHC around PacifiCorp. See Standard & Poor's,

“Summary: MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.”, June 20, 2006; Moody’s Investors Service, “Credit Opinion: MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co.”, March 1, 2006; Standard & Poor’s, “Summary: PacifiCorp”, June 19, 2006; and Moody’s Investors Service, “Credit Opinion: PacifiCorp”, March 1, 2006.

- c. \$1,289.2 million of the MEHC parent company subordinated debt is owed to Berkshire Hathaway. As such, any interest expense paid by MEHC is merely interest income to Berkshire Hathaway. The practical effect of this relationship is that the income of one affiliate is offset by the expense of another and there is no taxable income or tax deduction available to the consolidated entity. The remaining portion of the subordinated debt also has equity characteristics. Thus, while it is appropriate to technically include the subordinated debt in the response to part (a) above, all the subordinated debt have been excluded from the cost of debt shown in the response to part (d) below due to the equity characteristics of these securities.
- d. The current debt interest rate and the 2007 forecasted debt interest rate are shown below.

**MEHC: Interest Rate on Debt at March 31, 2006**

	<u>Amount</u> (\$000's)	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Nominal</u> <u>Cost</u>	<u>Weighted</u> <u>Average</u> <u>Cost</u>
<b><i>Parent Company Senior Debt</i></b>				
4.625% Senior Notes, due 2007	199,708	4.4637%	4.6250%	0.2064%
7.63% Senior Notes, due 2007	350,000	7.8228%	7.6300%	0.5969%
3.50% Senior Notes, due 2008	449,674	10.0506%	3.5000%	0.3518%
7.52% Senior Notes, due 2008	550,723	12.3091%	7.5200%	0.9256%
5.875% Senior Notes, due 2012	499,917	11.1736%	5.8750%	0.6564%
5.00% Senior Notes, due 2014	249,805	5.5834%	5.0000%	0.2792%
8.48% Senior Notes, due 2028	475,000	10.6167%	8.4800%	0.9003%
6.125% Senior Notes, due 2036	1,699,269	37.9802%	6.1250%	2.3263%
Purchase Accounting Adjustment	<u>2,216</u>			
Total Parent Company Senior Debt	4,476,312			<u>6.2429%</u>

**MEHC: Forecast Interest Rate on Debt for 2007**

	<u>Amount</u> (\$000's)		<u>Weight</u>	<u>Nominal</u> <u>Cost</u>	Weighted <u>Average Cost</u>
<b><i>Parent Company Senior Debt</i></b>					
4.625% Senior Notes, due 10/1/2007	149,781	(1)	3.2700%	4.6250%	0.1512%
7.63% Senior Notes, due 10/15/2007	277,083	(1)	6.0493%	7.6300%	0.4616%
3.50% Senior Notes, due 2008	449,674		9.8173%	3.5000%	0.3436%
7.52% Senior Notes, due 2008	550,723		12.0234%	7.5200%	0.9042%
5.875% Senior Notes, due 2012	499,917		10.9142%	5.8750%	0.6412%
5.00% Senior Notes, due 2014	249,805		5.4538%	5.0000%	0.2727%
8.48% Senior Notes, due 2028	475,000		10.3702%	8.4800%	0.8794%
6.125% Senior Notes, due 2036	1,699,269		37.0985%	6.1250%	2.2723%
5.5% Senior Bonds, to be issued August, 2007	229,167	(1)	5.0032%	6.0000%	0.3002%
Purchase Accounting Adjustment	<u>7,634</u>				
Total Parent Company Senior Debt	4,588,053				<u>6.2263%</u>

(1) Pro rated for portion applicable in  
year 2007.

## Excerpt

STANDARD  
& POOR'S

# CREDIT FAQ

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Publication Date  
March 21, 2006

## Mid-American's Acquisition Of PacifiCorp—Implications For PacifiCorp's Bondholders

MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co. (MEHC; A-/Stable/—) today closed its acquisition of PacifiCorp. (A-/Stable/A-2). MEHC purchased all of PacifiCorp's outstanding shares for about \$5.1 billion in cash from Scottish Power plc (A-/Stable/A-2), which was funded from an investment by its parent, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (AAA/Stable/A-1+). Subsequent to the purchase, MEHC is expected to repurchase \$1.7 billion of Berkshire Hathaway's common stock in MEHC. PacifiCorp's long-term debt and preferred stock, which stood at about \$4.1 billion as of Dec. 31, 2005, remains outstanding.

On March 6, in anticipation of the transaction being completed, Standard & Poor's affirmed the 'A-' corporate credit rating (CCR) on PacifiCorp and removed its ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications. The outlook is stable. This article addresses in further detail the acquisition from the perspective of PacifiCorp's bondholders and discusses the expected ramifications of the sale on PacifiCorp's future credit quality.

### Frequently Asked Questions

**Q:** *How has PacifiCorp's financial performance been in recent years?*

**A:** PacifiCorp's credit quality has benefited from the otherwise strong consolidated operations of Scottish Power, which purchased the utility in 1999 for \$10.7 billion. On a standalone basis, financial performance has been weak but recovering. Scottish Power purchased PacifiCorp just prior to the western U.S. energy crisis, which, given the company's sizable short position as well as unplanned outages, resulted in deferred power costs of approximately \$525 million, of which about \$325 million was ultimately authorized for recovery in retail customer rates. Since then, the company has struggled to achieve cash flows commensurate with performance seen before the crisis. Funds from operations (FFO) has only stabilized in the last two fiscal years to levels on par with fiscal 2000, when FFO was



*Mid-American's Acquisition Of PacifiCorp—Implications For PacifiCorp's Bondholders*

\$728 million; for the 12 months ending Dec. 31, 2005, FFO improved to about \$818 million. Earned return on equity (ROE), which has been around 7% in the past two years, has fallen chronically short of authorized levels, which range from 10%-10.5%, depending on the state. With respect to cash coverage metrics, PacifiCorp's 12 months ending Dec. 31 adjusted FFO to interest coverage was 3.5x, with adjusted FFO to total debt at 17.1%. Adjusted debt to total capitalization was 56%. These ratios consider PacifiCorp's substantial purchased power obligations, which contributes to off balance sheet adjustments of \$537 million for the purposes of credit ratio calculations.

Multiple factors contributed to PacifiCorp's weakened financial performance over the last five years, and include the absence of fuel and purchase adjusters, except in Wyoming, where one was approved in February 2006; dry hydro conditions; increasing administrative and general costs, including escalating pension and health care costs; and regulatory lag in resolving sizable general rate cases. In addition, Scottish Power has projected that PacifiCorp requires \$6.4 billion in capital expenditures over the next five years, which would have likely necessitated higher leverage at the parent to support the utility's infrastructure needs. These factors resulted in Scottish Power's decision in May 2005 to sell PacifiCorp.

**Q:** *Given these issues, why did MEHC buy PacifiCorp?*

**A:** Berkshire Hathaway has sizable amounts of equity to invest, and has identified regulated utility assets as desirable because of the opportunity to deploy its capital in return for what the company expects will be reasonable and stable returns. PacifiCorp is also attractive because of its earnings upside if MEHC can improve actual ROEs to allowed levels.

The acquisition should fit well with MEHC's existing energy holdings, which are predominately in the regulated space and consist of MidAmerican Energy Co. (MEC; A-/Stable/A-1), an Iowa-based utility that serves 1.3 million electric and gas customers; CE Electric U.K. Funding Co. (BBB-/Stable/A-3), which serves 3.7 million electric customers (via the distribution companies of Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric); and two U.S. pipelines, Kern River Gas Transmission Co. (A-/WatchNeg/—) and Northern Natural Gas Co. (A/Stable/—) that are under the jurisdiction of the FERC. In 2005, these regulated entities contributed about 78% of MEHC's earnings (MEC was 26%, the U.K. operations were 25%, and the two pipelines accounted for 27%). MEHC's largest unregulated subsidiary is a real estate brokerage firm, HomeServices (not rated), which in 2005 provided about 13% of earnings. Through various subsidiaries, MEHC also owns additional independent power generation facilities, including hydroelectric and geothermal assets in the Philippines. Collectively, these unregulated energy companies contributed about 9% of 2005 earnings.

Despite the significant number of companies under MEHC, PacifiCorp is a sizable acquisition. The company operates under the legal names of Pacific Power and Utah Power, serving 1.6 million retail customers in six western U.S. states. Its total assets were \$12.8 billion at year-end 2005, and at the 12 months ending Dec. 31, 2005, cash flow from operations was nearly \$900 million. In comparison, MEHC's total asset value was \$20.2 billion in 2005, and cash flow from operations was \$1.3 billion.

Going forward, about 35% of MEHC's operating income is expected to come from PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp will push the proportion of MEHC's operating income earned from regulated businesses to about 91% by 2007. The acquisition also provides MEHC with substantial U.S. market and regulatory diversification. The majority of MEC's retail revenues are from customers in Iowa, but the utility also operates in portions of Illinois, South Dakota and Nebraska. PacifiCorp's territories include parts of Utah, Oregon, Wyoming, Washington, Idaho, and California. As shown in Table 1, while PacifiCorp's sales are concentrated in Utah and

### **PacifiCorp Uncollectible Expense**

	2003 Sep-03	2004 Sep-04	2005 Sep-05	Average 03 - '05	PacifiCorp as Filed
Oregon					
Uncollectible Ex. FERC 904 (\$)	6,183,270	2,451,632	5,241,997	4,625,633	6,240,307

2003, 2004, and 2005 data from OPUC data request 244.

PacifiCorp's filed number is the sum of \$5,510,756 and \$729,551.

From PPL/901/Wrigley/4.0.11 and PPL/901/Wrigley/1.2 respectively.

UE-179/PacifiCorp  
April 19, 2006  
OPUC Data Request 244

### OPUC Data Request 244

Please refer to UE 170, J. Ted Weston Exhibit 801, page 1.2 and UE 179, Paul M. Wrigley's Exhibit 901, page 1.2. Uncollectibles in net to gross factor - more than doubled, from .278% to .652%. (a) Why? (b) Please supply this same factor for 12 Months ending December 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005? (c) In addition, please provide on a CD the formula that PacifiCorp used to calculate .278% and .652% and be sure to show the proof of the work.

### Response to OPUC Data Request 244

- (a) The increase in the rate is directly related to an increase in account 904.
- (c) The Oregon uncollectibles rate is calculated by dividing Oregon uncollectibles (FERC 904) by Oregon General Business revenues. The calculation is shown in the table below:

	UE-170	UE-179
A. Oregon - Uncollectibles - FERC 904	2,263,751	5,510,756
B. Oregon - General Bus. Revenues	815,355,929	845,831,346
Oregon - Uncollectibles Rate (A/B)	0.278%	0.652%

- (b) Below are the rates for the semi-annual reports closest to December of each of the years requested:

	2002 Mar-03	2003 Sep-03	2004 Sep-04	2005 Sep-05
A. Oregon - Uncollectibles - FERC 904	5,966,590	6,183,270	2,451,632	5,241,997
B. Oregon - General Bus. Revenues	728,674,563	781,864,154	783,785,118	718,255,108
Oregon Uncollectibles Rate (A/B)	0.819%	0.791%	0.313%	0.730%

### Revenues from Rent of Electric Property (\$)

	Fiscal Year 2004		Fiscal Year 2005		Fiscal Year 2006 Quarters 1-3		Calendar Year 2005	
	System	Oregon	System	Oregon	System	Oregon	System	Oregon
Oregon 100% to Oregon	4,741,946	4,741,946	5,114,897	<b>5,114,897</b>	6,572,643	6,572,643	8,470,049	8,470,049
SG 26.63% to Oregon	4,935,126	1,314,120	4,988,017	<b>1,328,204</b>	3,901,071	1,038,773	5,209,742	1,387,245
SO 28.44% to Oregon	145,213	41,301	1,499,608	<b>426,517</b>	838,190	238,397	1,380,421	392,618
Total	6,097,368		<b>6,869,618</b>		7,849,813		10,249,911	

***Bold italic*** highlights PacifiCorp's filed numbers

Source Data: OPUC Data Request 198

Escalation of Calendar 05 to Calendar 07		
CY 05	CY 06	CY 07
10,249,911	10,506,159	<b><u>10,674,257</u></b>

Escalation factors are 2.5% for 2006 & 1.6% for 2007

Global Insight's Utility Cost Escalator for Distribution Plant, PPL/910/Wrigley/4.0.19.

Attachment OPUC 198

			FY2004											
			Apr-03	May-03	Jun-03	Jul-03	Aug-03	Sep-03	Oct-03	Nov-03	Dec-03	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04
450			530,412	497,582	447,196	460,526	439,086	548,134	519,687	388,663	454,084	505,644	576,331	455,972
451			621,170	650,372	653,522	636,583	511,696	549,268	451,732	471,390	390,848	468,587	472,121	481,922
454	All Others	CA	142	223	2,241	150	142	142	62	642	142	142	142	142
		IDU	17,959	17,990	525	9,454	18,090	535	17,668	10,237	9,958	871	9,560	8,953
		NUTIL	2,748	3,478	2,728	3,403	3,176	7,267	6,028	3,148	3,204	7,054	5,988	(13,042)
		OR	79,784	72,104	78,741	76,701	58,636	78,996	94,059	79,554	72,895	78,574	74,465	74,399
		SG	391,631	379,169	325,372	510,301	527,671	318,866	396,436	412,589	456,284	542,644	260,945	413,217
		SO	70,814	44,237		30,161								
		UT	74,036	79,043	96,634	102,584	137,942	93,026	95,634	158,777	115,374	155,358	190,801	266,768
		WA	10,613	10,613	10,613	10,149	9,138	18,112	11,597	11,544	17,624	11,267	17,416	356
		WYP	2,157	2,363	1,962	2,299	14,039	2,027	2,363	2,163	1,962	2,325	2,201	2,163
	WYU	2,145	3,234	742	1,932	1,622	2,797	2,260	415	1,932	742	1,928	1,932	
	Joint Use (Pole Attachments)	CA	51,370	530	622	254,022	2,843		61,959		(157,725)	33,216	32,865	36,465
		IDU	30,383	96	1,340	61,242	708		35,981	860	(51,501)	11,749	11,685	12,963
		OR	721,958	1,954	(8,174)	2,129,088	38,396	(588)	886,178	25,366	(994,280)	316,012	315,871	391,256
		SG												
		SO												
		UT	784,956	297,043	393,188	874,205	95,690	2,546,861	1,091,472	(199,490)	(1,432,662)	(77,705)	335,116	165,151
		WA	344,777	68,944	82,921	548,794	(20,575)	22,697	208,269	68,394	(180,286)	270,313	(144,377)	83,784
		WYP	76,658	(1,894)	92,290	(92,185)	3,392	59,560	152,177	46,617	(546,262)	20,999	74,433	24,958
		WYU	5,253	1,000	66,396	463,138	26,931				(10,911)	1,314	(51,996)	1,865
454 Total			2,667,386	980,127	1,148,142	4,985,438	917,839	3,150,297	3,062,143	620,815	(2,694,250)	1,374,876	1,137,043	1,471,332
Grand Total			3,818,969	2,128,080	2,248,861	6,082,547	1,868,621	4,247,700	4,033,562	1,480,868	(1,849,318)	2,349,107	2,185,495	2,409,227

Attachment OPUC 198

			FY2005											
			Apr-04	May-04	Jun-04	Jul-04	Aug-04	Sep-04	Oct-04	Nov-04	Dec-04	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05
450			337,284	417,995	382,974	403,471	452,684	497,732	483,123	392,190	417,671	472,561	562,423	448,269
451			537,107	630,604	640,254	678,333	674,575	657,903	523,138	500,188	426,847	481,017	504,787	458,744
454	All Others	CA	142	142	142	142	142	142	142	(7,957)	(358)	142	142	142
		IDU	8,945	8,958	8,944	9,999	9,300	318	8,910	17,500	8,903	8,903	8,869	329
		NUTIL												
		OR	66,111	70,818	96,006	78,790	95,423	86,654	78,257	84,550	100,019	76,633	73,720	89,434
		SG	424,566	448,517	359,437	495,285	459,496	323,812	465,440	350,057	352,736	597,406	411,744	299,521
		SO		42,638			208,291	268,348	50,692	234,748	152,661	150,962	174,103	217,166
		UT	92,764	430,858	322,259	283,270	111,589	132,377	272,868	149,699	144,252	171,566	114,809	116,815
		WA	9,375	12,563	(11,290)	11,364	(3,764)	3,808	9,870	4,120	9,960	3,754	10,106	3,732
		WYP	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,897	2,027	1,831	2,093	1,962	1,962	1,167	1,244	1,206
	WYU	150,095	417	749	2,246	737	1,925	1,925	3,115	1,925	1,925	1,925	1,925	
	Joint Use (Pole Attachments)	CA	36,462	36,462	36,502	(103,446)	48,780	48,837	46,026	47,857	(209,491)	97,029	370,018	769,245
		IDU	12,954	12,954	12,975	5,260	13,736	13,806	13,614	14,993	(15,803)	20,375	73,332	120,998
		OR	286,847	292,314	317,377	148,758	311,827	341,771	338,777	343,896	79,296	612,951	670,073	374,594
		SG												
		SO												
		UT	732,046	135,253	161,789	435,773	105,238	102,636	238,277	198,755	173,050	587,957	248,465	75,590
		WA	(534,190)	73,758	73,069	112,674	78,721	78,702	77,438	81,201	57,937	(612,542)	233,343	96,233
		WYP	23,900	14,160	7,239	21,980	18,867	18,831	48,410	27,315	10,311	43,423	114,825	169,224
		WYU	(6,131)	3,464	3,464	(22,578)	3,847	3,847	(5,747)	3,847	3,847	3,301	3,846	3,846
454 Total			1,305,850	1,585,236	1,390,625	1,481,413	1,464,256	1,427,645	1,646,992	1,555,658	871,207	1,764,953	2,510,565	2,339,999
Grand Total			2,180,241	2,633,835	2,413,853	2,563,217	2,591,516	2,583,280	2,653,254	2,448,036	1,715,726	2,718,531	3,577,775	3,247,012


Attachment OPUC 198

			FY2006								
			Apr-05	May-05	Jun-05	Jul-05	Aug-05	Sep-05	Oct-05	Nov-05	Dec-05
450			444,475	449,481	445,431	380,446	448,522	516,031	510,393	425,856	431,359
451			582,292	647,961	708,657	1,043,953	841,149	755,382	730,200	444,625	482,750
454	All Others	CA	142	142	142	(65)	1,542	1,480	1,542	1,542	1,542
		IDU	8,871	8,884	8,870	17,946	661	8,867	8,860	17,390	8,858
		NUTIL									
		OR	86,905	97,587	91,433	101,624	137,428	143,344	100,062	76,343	100,273
		SG	413,371	412,339	376,110	557,891	348,046	327,259	433,716	422,279	351,530
		SO	223,129	206,729	215,283	201,539		(14,277)	30,400	(25,000)	
		UT	111,474	81,479	111,071	121,130	289,738	277,034	266,000	320,474	281,529
		WA	22,811	16,581	1,963	5,508	6,866	11,523	8,617	6,983	13,285
		WYP	7,497	7,654	1,206	1,481	4,834	4,834	4,834	4,934	4,834
	WYU	1,925	1,925	1,917	1,917	1,917	727	3,107	727	1,916	
	Joint Use (Pole Attachments)	CA	50,981	49,268	49,277	61,131	50,242	51,893	49,957	48,960	(746,408)
		IDU	14,889	14,932	17,688	19,196	20,173	40,360	18,239	21,319	165,557
		OR	323,384	375,379	428,373	375,076	410,870	575,471	378,291	428,941	2,341,858
		SG									258,530
		SO						387			
		UT	222,513	164,542	175,521	216,493	292,145	344,084	164,283	214,720	2,857,488
		WA	(16,683)	82,695	66,272	82,066	95,553	199,111	90,335	114,955	2,745,151
		WYP	51,424	28,269	32,700	55,034	66,886	(198,092)	44,339	44,448	811,700
		WYU	(5,739)	3,844	3,844	(21,384)	3,736	3,736	(5,852)	3,737	3,737
454 Total			1,516,894	1,552,249	1,581,672	1,796,583	1,730,637	1,777,743	1,596,730	1,702,754	9,201,382
Grand Total			2,543,661	2,649,691	2,735,760	3,220,982	3,020,308	3,049,156	2,837,324	2,573,235	10,115,491

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 12<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2006, I served the foregoing Direct Testimony on the Rate Case of the Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon in docket UE 179 upon each party listed below, by email and, where paper service is not waived, by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and upon the Commission by email and by sending 6 copies by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the Commission's Salem offices.

Respectfully submitted,



---

Jason Eisdorfer #92292  
Attorney for Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon

**W=Waive Paper service, Q=Confidential**

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