1	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION		
2	OF OREGON		
3	UM 1081		
4	In the Matter of an Investigation into Direct Access Issues for Industrial and Commercial Customers under SB 1149.		
5		STAFF REPLY BRIEF	
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7	The Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities (ICNU) argue that PacifiCorp's		
8	operational response to reduced load from direct access, both short-term and long-term, supports		
9	imposition of a transition adjustment incorporating ICNU's "market plus" proposal. Staff		
10	disagrees. Staff also disagrees with ICNU's assertion that for purposes of determining an		
11	appropriate transition adjustment, the value of PacifiCorp's resources should be determined from		
12	the direct access customer perspective.		
13	Operational Response.		
14	Although ICNU acknowledges that PacifiCorp's short-term operational response will be		
15	mixed, it asserts that at low levels of direct access participation, PacifiCorp will experience more		
16	than twice as many avoided purchases than short-term increased sales. (ICNU Brief at 18.)		
17	ICNU asserts that this operational response supports its proposed transition adjustment that in all		
18	instances, is based on avoided purchased power costs plus avoided transmission costs. ICNU		
19	also appears to suggest that to the extent its market plus proposal does not perfectly capture		
20	PacifiCorp's operational response, it is still be the best option because it is the only proposal		
21	before the Commission that will not create a barrier to direct access. (ICNU Brief at 20-23.)		
22	The flaw in ICNU's argument is that it disregards the fact that PacifiCorp's operational		
23	response will include reducing generation in addition to avoiding purchases and increasing sales		
24	Valuing reduced generation as though it is equivalent to reduced power purchases would		
25	overstate the value and the transition adjustment.		
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1	The GRID runs included in Staff Exhibit 102 indicate that reduced generation and
2	increased sales are forecast to account for at least 58 percent of PacifiCorp's operational response
3	to direct access. The exhibit also indicates that PacifiCorp's advance short-term firm purchases
4	were excluded from the model runs. Including PacifiCorp's advance purchases in the GRID runs
5	would have increased the volume of sales or further reduced generation.
6	As Staff testified, the totality of PacifiCorp's likely operational response to direct access
7	suggests that a market-even approach is a less extreme proposal, and a better approximation of
8	PacifiCorp's operational response, than either a market-minus or market-plus approach, on an
9	interim basis.
10	Staff also disagrees with ICNU's assertion that its short-term proposal for a transition
11	adjustment is supported by PacifiCorp's long-term operational response, and other long-term
12	circumstances. ICNU argues that to the extent PacifiCorp may respond to lost load due to direct
13	access with a mixture of operational responses in the short-term, this will not be the case in the
14	long-term. ICNU argues that this is because PacifiCorp will be able to plan for the departed
15	load, and will therefore, be able to respond to the lost load almost exclusively with avoided
16	purchases. (ICNU Brief at 17.) This argument is not persuasive.
17	Assumptions regarding PacifiCorp's long-term operational response to direct access are
18	too speculative to be probative as to the correct transition adjustment in the short term. Staff has
19	recommended an extensive investigation into the best transition adjustment for the long-term. It
20	is in this future investigation that the Commission should examine the reasonableness of any
21	argument such as that raised by ICNU regarding PacifiCorp's planning for reduced load to direct
22	access.
23	Currently, there are too many unanswered questions regarding ICNU's assumption that
24	PacifiCorp will plan for departing direct access load for that assumption to be a pertinent factor
25	in whether the Commission adopts ICNU's market plus approach in the short term. Those
26	questions include, for example, whether it would be appropriate to shift costs of short-term

1	purchases that Pacificorp may ficur to make up for any shortrans associated with an incorrect		
2	assumption regarding departing load?		
3	Finally, ICNU's argument that the Commission should adopt its market plus proposal		
4	because this is the only proposal that will not create a barrier to direct access is not well taken for		
5	the reasons discussed in Staff's Opening Brief.		
6	Perspective		
7	ICNU argues that the definition of economic utility investment is focused on the value of		
8	the utility's resources from the perspective of the direct access customer, not the utility or its		
9	remaining ratepayers. Based on it's reading of ORS 757.600(10), ICNU argues that PacifiCorp's		
10	transition adjustment should compensate the direct access customer for the benefits they no		
11	longer receive because they have ceased purchasing electricity from PacifiCorp. (ICNU Brief at		
12	11.) Again, ICNU's argument is untenable.		
13	Contrary to ICNU's assertion, the definition of economic utility investment is focused on		
14	the direct result, or impact, of direct access on the utility, the direct access customer, and the		
15	remaining cost-of-service customers. The focus is on the shift in the distribution of the benefits		
16	of economic utility investments. From the perspective of a direct access customer, the logic of		
17	the definition is that absent a transition credit, the direct access customer will no longer receive		
18	any of the benefits of economic utility investments. From the perspective of the utility and its		
19	remaining customers, the logic is that absent a transition credit, the utility and the remaining		
20	customers will receive all of the benefits of economic utility investments.		
21	The definition of uneconomic utility investment is focused on the shift in the allocation of		
22	the costs of uneconomic investments. (ORS 757.600(35).) From the perspective of the utility		
23	and its remaining customers, the logic is that absent a transition charge, the utility and the		
24	remaining customers will receive all of the costs of uneconomic utility investments.		
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1	Contrary to ICNU's arguments, the Commission should not adopt the perspective of any		
2	one participant in this case. The Commission should adopt a public interest perspective and		
3	focus on the overall allocation of the benefits and costs of the company's investments.		
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6	DATED this day of August 2004.		
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8		Respectfully submitted,	
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