

1 **BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**  
2 **OF OREGON**

3 UG 221

4 In the Matter of  
5 NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS  
6 COMPANY, dba NW NATURAL,  
7 Request for a General Rate Revision

STAFF PREHEARING BRIEF

8 I. INTRODUCTION

9 The Public Utility Commission of Oregon Staff (Staff) takes this opportunity to file its  
10 prehearing brief consistent with the schedule established in this proceeding. On July 9, 2012, the  
11 parties filed a partial stipulation resolving some issues within this proceeding. On August, 14,  
12 2012, the parties filed a letter advising the Public Utility Commission of Oregon (Commission)  
13 of a settlement in principle on many other issues within this proceeding. After the second partial  
14 stipulation has been filed and the evidentiary hearing held, Staff will outline the terms of the two  
15 partial settlements in its post-hearing opening brief.

16 In this prehearing brief, Staff will focus on some of the main arguments related to the five  
17 remaining contested issues, which are: 1) establishing the appropriate cost of capital; 2)  
18 establishing a fair and reasonable environmental cost recovery mechanism; 3) Northwest Natural  
19 Gas Company's (NW Natural or Company) proposed future amortization of out-of-period cash  
20 contributions to pensions as well as whether or not the Commission should change its established  
21 treatment of pensions, which would also potentially impact all other traditionally rate regulated  
22 utilities in Oregon; 4) NW Natural's proposed future amortization of out-of-period state taxes; 5)  
23 and two prematurely constructed mid-Willamette valley feeder projects.

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1 II. DISCUSSION

2 COST OF CAPITAL

- 3 1. NW Natural's proposed 10.0 return on equity (ROE) is overstated and not supported by  
4 the record.

5 In its surrebuttal testimony, NW Natural requests an ROE of 10.0 percent.<sup>1</sup> NW  
6 Natural's cost of capital witness, Dr. Hadaway, supports this value with results from three  
7 discounted cash flow (DCF) models producing average or "mean" estimated ROEs ranging from  
8 9.6 percent to 10.0 percent.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the NW Natural 10.0 percent requested ROE is at the top  
9 of Dr. Hadaway's DCF model results.

10 **A. The Commission should give little or no weight to the results of Dr. Hadaway's**  
11 **constant growth models.**<sup>3</sup>

12 Dr. Hadaway relies on two DCF models that employ the "Gordon growth" or "constant  
13 growth" formulation.<sup>4</sup> The Commission has previously rejected consideration of results from  
14 these single-stage DCF models.<sup>5</sup> In order to rely on constant growth models, NW Natural would  
15 have to have demonstrated that the required industry stability is present. Instead, NWN asserts  
16 that "[t]he long term nature of the DCF model's input requirements simply cannot reflect all the  
17 market elements that are currently affecting the cost of equity capital."<sup>6</sup> Consistent with the  
18 Commission's past orders and reasoning on this issue, the Commission should reject and give no  
19 weight to the results of Dr. Hadaway's single stage DCF models.

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23 <sup>1</sup> See NWN/3200; Hadaway/3, lines 4-5; NWN/2900; Anderson/1, lines 16-17.

24 <sup>2</sup> See NWN/3202; Hadaway/1 (These models produce "median" estimated ROEs ranging from 9.4 percent  
to 10.1 percent).

25 <sup>3</sup> See Staff/1300; Storm/73, lines 3-4.

25 <sup>4</sup> See NWN/500; Hadaway/33, lines 7-14.

25 <sup>5</sup> See Order No. 01-777 at 27; Order No. 01-787 at 24.

26 <sup>6</sup> See NWN/500; Hadaway/10, lines 4-12; see also NWN/500; Hadaway/8, line 23 through Hadaway/9  
line 5.

1           **B. The Commission should give little or no weight to the results of Dr. Hadaway’s**  
2           **risk premium analysis.**

3           The Commission has long given little or no weight to risk premium analysis (and single  
4 stage DCF models), instead preferring multistage DCF models.<sup>7</sup> In Dr. Hadaway’s risk premium  
5 analysis, he regresses the difference between average values of ROEs authorized primarily in  
6 other jurisdictions and contemporaneous averages of Moody’s (Mergent) public utility bond  
7 yields for companies rated Aa, A, and Baa on those same contemporaneous averages of Moody’s  
8 public utility bond yields.<sup>8</sup> The incorporation of ROEs authorized primarily in other jurisdictions  
9 as an input into Dr. Hadaway’s risk premium analysis producing his estimates of ROE for NW  
10 Natural represents circular reasoning and an approach the Commission has previously stated  
11 “should not be used as an independent method on which to base” and ROE authorized by the  
12 Commission.<sup>9</sup> Consistent with the Commission’s past orders and reasoning on this issue, the  
13 Commission should give no independent weight to the results of Dr. Hadaway’s risk premium  
14 analyses using as inputs ROEs authorized in primarily other jurisdiction.

15           **C. NW Natural’s “outboard” adjustment increasing the results of its multistage**  
16           **DCF by 30 basis points is unwarranted and should be rejected.**

17           Dr. Hadaway makes an implicit “outboard” upward adjustment of 30 basis points to his  
18 multistage DCF model results for risks not reflected in the stock prices of the peer utilities he  
19 uses.<sup>10</sup> Removal of this unwarranted and insufficiently substantiated adjustment immediately  
20 reduces the high-end of Dr. Hadaway’s estimated ROE range to the 9.7 percent average result of  
21 his multistage DCF model.<sup>11</sup>

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23 <sup>7</sup> See Order No. 99-697 at 23; Order No. 01-777 at 33-34.

24 <sup>8</sup> See NWN/500 Hadaway/37 line 19 through Hadaway/38 line 2 and NWN/505 Hadaway/3.

25 <sup>9</sup> See Order No. 99-697 at 23; Order No. 01-777 at 33-34.

26 <sup>10</sup> Dr. Hadaway’s 30 basis point upward adjustment to the results of his multistage DCF model was not  
always implicit. See NWN/500; Hadaway/3, lines 17-20 (“under present conditions I believe an ROE  
above some of the quantitative results is appropriate”); see also NWN/2100; Hadaway/12, lines 7-8  
 (“specific consideration for the unique market conditions”).

<sup>11</sup> See NWN/3202 Hadaway/1.

1 Dr. Hadaway's addition of 30 basis points to the average estimated ROE of his multistage  
2 DCF model results requires him to argue that the market assessment of the values of the peer  
3 utilities he employed in his sample selection is inaccurate and overstated.<sup>12</sup> Staff fundamentally  
4 disagrees that market assessments are inaccurate. Instead, the recent market prices of NW  
5 Natural's peer utilities accurately reflect the markets' perspective on the future stream on cash  
6 flows and their attendant risks.<sup>13</sup> The Commission should exclude Dr. Hadaway's unwarranted  
7 addition of 30 basis points to the results of his multistage DCF results.

8 **D. The annual average rate of growth of 5.7 percent used by Dr. Hadaway in his**  
9 **multistage DCF model for year 6 through year 150 is overstated and not**  
10 **adequately supported by the record.**

11 Dr. Hadaway's use of a 5.7 percent average annual rate of growth is the most significant  
12 difference between Dr. Hadaway's multistage DCF model and Staff's two multistage DCF  
13 models.<sup>14</sup> Although Dr. Hadaway attempts to convolute the issue of growth rates in the  
14 multistage DCF models in surrebuttal testimony,<sup>15</sup> he previously admitted that "the only  
15 substantive difference in our analytical results stems from the alternative long-term growth rates  
16 in GDP."<sup>16</sup>

17 Dr. Hadaway develops his 5.7 percent historical growth rate in nominal Gross Domestic  
18 Product (GDP) rate on a weighted average of annual rates over the period 1951 through 2011.<sup>17</sup>  
19 Dr. Hadaway's use of 5.7 percent annual rate of growth in nominal GDP for year 5 (2017)  
20 through year 150 (2162) in his multistage DCF model significantly overstates expected future  
21 growth rates and, thus, unreasonably increases the estimated ROE results of his multistate DCF  
22 model.

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24 <sup>12</sup> See generally NWN/500; Hadaway/9-10.

25 <sup>13</sup> See generally Staff/2200 Storm/26 line 5 through Staff/31 line

26 <sup>14</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/9, lines 2-8.

<sup>15</sup> See generally NWN/3200; Hadaway/9-11.

<sup>16</sup> See NWN/2100; Hadaway/12, lines 17-19.

<sup>17</sup> See NWN/2105.

1 Dr. Hadaway's long-term average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent is significantly  
2 overstated due to his 5.7 percent rate having an underlying embedded inflation rate (GDP Price  
3 Inflation) of 3.0 percent.<sup>18</sup> Staff demonstrates that a future long-term inflation rate of 3.0 percent  
4 is overstated by 89 basis points, or 0.9 percent.<sup>19</sup> Essentially, Dr. Hadaway uses a method that  
5 embeds the inflation rates of a historically high inflation period (e.g. 1973 – 1981) and assumes  
6 that such periods of high rates of inflation will be proportionately represented in the future,  
7 which increases his estimate of ROE, but ignores and materially exceeds well-supported current  
8 estimates of future inflation rates.

9 2. The Commission should adopt Staff's recommended ROE of 9.4 percent, which is at the  
10 high end of Staff's 8.8 percent to 9.5 percent recommended range of ROE.

11 Staff's recommended range of ROE, based upon two multistage DCF models, is 8.8  
12 percent to 9.5 percent. Staff recommends an ROE of 9.4 percent,<sup>20</sup> which is near the top of  
13 Staff's range of ROE.<sup>21</sup> Using the Commission preferred multistage DCF models (Staff's two  
14 multistage DCF models and Dr. Hadway's multistage model), then removing the unwarranted 30  
15 basis point "outboard" adjustment to Dr. Hadway's results of his multistage DCF model, we are  
16 left with the Commission's preferred models resulting in estimates of 9.4 percent and 9.7 percent  
17 ROE (i.e. Staff's recommendation of 9.4 percent that is near the top of Staff's recommended  
18 range and NW Natural's 9.7 percent, which is its 10.0 recommended ROE minus its unwarranted  
19 30 basis point outboard adjustment). Staff's recommended ROE of 9.4 should be adopted  
20 because its multistage DCF models are based upon realistic and fair estimates of long-term  
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22 <sup>18</sup> See NWN/2106 Hadaway/4.

23 <sup>19</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/20, Table 4.

24 <sup>20</sup> In addition, Staff recommends a reduction to authorized ROE if the Commission adopts the decoupling  
25 mechanism. See Staff/200; Storm/4, lines 9-16 and fn 1.

26 <sup>21</sup> For purposes of its recommended ROE, Staff accepts NW Natural's proposed capital structure, which is  
50 percent long-term debt and 50 percent common equity. See Staff/2200; Storm/3, lines 4-6. In addition,  
the Parties have reached a settlement in principle on the cost of long-term debt. See Letter filed on  
August 14, 2012. However, the prudence of NW Natural's hedge is still an issue and will be discussed  
herein.

1 growth rates, whereas Dr. Hadaway’s estimated long-term growth rates, as discussed above, are  
2 overstated and not adequately supported in the record. The difference between Staff’s multistage  
3 results of 9.4 percent and NW Natural’s multistage results of 9.7 percent are almost solely  
4 related to the different estimated long-term GDP growth rate.<sup>22</sup>

5 **A. Staff’s multistage DCF models employ the most current information available to**  
6 **estimate a long-term growth rate and is superior to NW Natural’s overstated**  
7 **and under-supported long-term growth rates.**

8 Staff’s multistage DCF models use estimated dividends from Value Line (the Value Line  
9 information is from the June 8, 2012 report on each of the peer utilities) for the third quarter of  
10 2012 through 2017. For the next period of 2018 through 2022, the estimated dividends transition  
11 from those based upon Value Line’s estimates to dividends growing at a rate equaling the  
12 estimated long-term growth rate in GDP. Then, from 2023 forward Staff assumes that dividends  
13 of each natural gas utility in the peer group will grow at the rate of GDP.<sup>23</sup> Importantly, the only  
14 credible source of estimated long-term growth in natural gas retail expenditures has revenues of  
15 natural gas utilities growing by materially less than the expected growth of GDP.<sup>24</sup>

16 In determining the appropriate long-term growth rates, Staff used three different  
17 estimates of long-term annual GDP growth rates for the dividend growth rates for the 2023  
18 through 2052 period. First, Staff used 4.51 percent, which represents an average of forecasts  
19 from Blue Chip Consensus (4.65 percent), the Congressional Budget Office (4.4 percent), the  
20 Energy Information Agency (4.67 percent), the Office of Management and Budget (4.3 percent),  
21 and the Social Security Administration (4.55 percent).<sup>25</sup>

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24 <sup>22</sup> See NWN/2100; Hadaway/12, lines 17-19

25 <sup>23</sup> See Staff/2200 Storm/10 line 19 through Storm/11 line 4.

26 <sup>24</sup> See Staff/1300; Storm/62, line 2 through Storm/63 including Figure 9.

<sup>25</sup> Staff notes that where recent forecasts for multiple years or periods of years are available from one source, Staff uses the forecast most closely matching the 2023 through 2052 period to which the long-term growth rate applies in Staff’s DCF models, e.g. uses the Social Security Administration’s 2022 forward estimate.

1           Second, Staff used 5.14 percent. This estimate of future long-term GDP growth rate is  
2 based upon a regression analysis of real GDP for the first quarter of 1951 through the fourth  
3 quarter of 2011, which equals a 2.96 percent average annual growth rate in real (without  
4 inflation) GDP. Then Staff calculates two estimates of long-term future rates of change in the  
5 GDP Price Inflation which is the applicable index of inflation.<sup>26</sup> The first estimate of the long-  
6 term future annual rates of change in the GDP Price Inflation is 2.13 percent based upon the TIPS  
7 break-even approach.<sup>27</sup> The second estimate of long-term future rates of change in the GDP  
8 Price Inflation is 2.11 percent based upon an average of estimated long-term annual rates of  
9 change in the GDP Price Inflation from Blue Chip (2.1 percent), Congressional Budget Office  
10 (2.2 percent), Energy Information Agency (2.06 percent), Office of Management and Budget  
11 (1.8 percent), and the Social Security Administration (2.4 percent).<sup>28</sup>

12           Third, Staff used an estimated annual rate of 4.83 percent. This annual growth rate was  
13 developed using the weighted average of the historical rate (50 percent) and the four federal  
14 agencies plus Blue Chip estimated rates (10 percent each).<sup>29</sup>

15           Each of Staff's three estimates of long-term annual GDP growth rates (4.51 percent, 5.14  
16 percent, and 4.83 percent, respectively) are substantially lower than Dr. Hadaway's estimate of  
17 5.7 percent. As discussed above, the reason that Dr. Hadaway's estimate is higher than the  
18 record supports is because he significantly overstates the estimate of long-term future rates of  
19 change in the GDP Price Inflation at 3.0 percent, even though Staff's testimony demonstrates that  
20 the best estimate is 2.11 percent.<sup>30</sup>

21           The Commission's preferred multistage DCF models result in estimated ROEs ranging  
22 from Staff's 9.4 percent to NW Natural's proposed 9.7 percent (the requested 10.0 percent minus

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23 <sup>26</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/11, line 6 through Storm/12, line 12; *see also* Staff/1300; Storm/60-61, fn. 84.  
24 Dr. Hadaway gives the appearance of supporting this methodology. *See* NWN/2100; Hadaway/16, lines  
25 9-11.

25 <sup>27</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/23, lines 1 through Storm/25, line 13.

26 <sup>28</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/16, lines 2 through 10; Storm/20, table 4.

26 <sup>29</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/18, table 3.

26 <sup>30</sup> See Staff/2200; Storm/20, table 4.

1 the 30 basis point “outboard” adjustment). The difference in Staff’s 9.4 percent and NW  
2 Natural’s 9.7 percent recommended ROE is related to the use of different long-term growth rates  
3 in the multistage DCF models. The Commission should establish ROE at 9.4 percent because  
4 Dr. Hadaway’s use of 5.7 percent as the estimate of long-term growth rates is overstated and not  
5 adequately supported in the record. On the other hand, Staff’s testimony demonstrates through  
6 three separate estimates that the annual long-term growth rate is substantially lower than that  
7 proposed by Dr. Hadaway.

8 3. The Commission should disallow some portion of NW Natural’s financial hedge loss  
9 Staff recommends that the Commission disallow \$2,248,000 of an interest rate hedge  
10 loss.<sup>31</sup> This amount is half of \$4,496,000, and therefore reflects equal sharing between ratepayers  
11 and the Company for the portion of the hedge loss at issue.<sup>32</sup> If the Commission disallows some  
12 portion of the financial hedge loss, the reduction should be implemented by reducing cost of a  
13 debt issuance and lower the cost of long-term debt.<sup>33</sup>

14 At a high level, this issue revolves around whether or not NW Natural made errors in  
15 judgment that they knew or should have known about at the time they entered into the interest  
16 rate hedge. Staff is not recommending that the entire interest rate hedge loss should be  
17 disallowed as imprudent, but instead is recommending that some portion of the interest rate  
18 hedge loss should be disallowed to reflect that NW Natural needs to do better. For example, NW  
19 Natural did not perform probabilistic, high-impact low-frequency or decision tree analysis prior  
20 to entering into the hedge, it did not modify the generic hedge contract to limit losses, and it did  
21 not document that it considered alternatives to the interest rate hedge.<sup>34</sup> The Commission should  
22 disallow up to one-half of the interest rate hedge loss to establish that NW Natural did not  
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24 <sup>31</sup> See Staff/2300; Muldoon/4, lines 16-17.

25 <sup>32</sup> See Id. at Muldoon/5, lines 1-5.

26 <sup>33</sup> See Id. at Muldoon/5, line 19 to Muldoon/6, line 2.

<sup>34</sup> See Id. at Muldoon/5, line 19 to Muldoon/6, line 2; NWN/401; Feltz/1, line 9, 5.370 series that includes  
in its issuance costs \$10,096,000 costs paid in the interest rate hedge.

1 conduct the required level of risk analysis when entering into its first financial hedge. Staff's  
2 testimony went un rebutted regarding NW Natural using outside consultants for certain risk  
3 estimation and yet not undertaking similar analysis for the debt hedging.

4 To summarize Staff's position on cost of capital, Staff contends that the Commission  
5 should continue its past practice of preferring the results of the multistage DCF models and give  
6 no weight to single stage DCF models and risk premium analyses. After removing NW  
7 Natural's unwarranted 30 basis point "outboard" adjustment, the difference between Staff's  
8 recommended 9.4 percent return and equity and NW Natural's 9.7 percent return on equity  
9 revolves around long-term growth rates for GDP. The Commission should adopt Staff's  
10 recommendation of 9.4 percent return on equity because the record establishes that NW  
11 Natural's estimate for long-term growth in GDP is substantially overstated and under-supported.  
12 Finally, the Commission should disallow some portion of NW Natural's interest rate hedge based  
13 upon the fact that NW Natural did not prudently manage all of the risks involved in a complex  
14 financial transaction.

15 ENVIRONMENTAL COST RECOVERY

16 NW Natural proposes a rate adjustment mechanism, which it proposes calling the Site  
17 Remediation Recovery Mechanism (SRRM). As of September 30, 2011, NW Natural had  
18 deferred about \$64.5 million in environmental costs, which includes \$51.8 million in total  
19 expenditures plus accrued interest of \$18.1 million, partially offset by \$5.4 million of  
20 environmental costs expensed in prior years.<sup>35</sup> In addition, NW Natural makes a low-end  
21 estimate of future environmental remediation costs of \$58 million.<sup>36</sup>

22 NW Natural's proposed SRRM would pass through prudently incurred costs of  
23 environmental remediation on a five year rolling basis,<sup>37</sup> adjusted for future costs and for the

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25 <sup>35</sup> See NWN/1500; Miller/2, lines 13-16.

26 <sup>36</sup> See Id. at Miller/2, line 17 through Miller/3, line 1.

<sup>37</sup> In surrebuttal testimony, NW Natural does state that so long as the Commission allows them to accrue interest at its authorized cost of capital, it would be amenable to modifying the proposed SRRM from the current five year rolling average to a seven year rolling average. See NWN/3700; Miller/12, lines 13-18.

1 receipt of insurance proceeds and other potential recoveries.<sup>38</sup> The first year the rolling average  
2 would include one-fifth of all amounts deferred through September 30, 2012, less any offsetting  
3 or other proceeds related to remediation activities. In future years, the SRRM rolling five-year  
4 average would be adjusted for future costs and offset by the receipt of insurance proceeds and  
5 other recoveries.<sup>39</sup> The SRRM would stay in effect until five years after the year in which the  
6 last remediation expenses were incurred.<sup>40</sup>

7 NW Natural also proposes a schedule to review the prudence of future costs, which  
8 results in the inclusion of one-fifth of the balance of the SRRM passed along to customers every  
9 year on the Purchased Gas Adjustment effective date.<sup>41</sup> Finally, NW Natural proposes to accrue  
10 interest at its authorized rate of return on the deferred environmental remediation balance until  
11 the costs (one-fifth of the balance) are transferred to the SRRM account and amortized under that  
12 mechanism, NW Natural would collect the Modified Blended Treasury Rate.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, there  
13 will be a large balance accruing interest at the authorized rate of return and once one-fifth of that  
14 amount (i.e. 20 percent of the total deferred amount plus accrued interest at the authorized rate  
15 of return) which will then move to the SRRM where NW Natural would earn the Modified  
16 Blended Treasury Rate on that amount (the total deferred amount plus accrued interest at  
17 authorized rate of return divided by five).

18 1. While Staff proposed certain conditions to the proposed SRRM, it was generous in its  
19 overall support for a mechanism that would substantially lower NW Natural's risk.

20 NW Natural proposes a mechanism that would allow it dollar-for-dollar recovery on past  
21 and future substantial environmental remediation costs, plus recovery of accrued interest at its  
22 authorized rate of return, without any consideration of its overall earnings. Typically, regulated  
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24 <sup>38</sup> See Id. at Miller/8-9.

25 <sup>39</sup> See Id.

26 <sup>40</sup> See Id. at Miller/9, lines 2-3.

<sup>41</sup> See Id. at Miller/10.

<sup>42</sup> See Id. at Miller/12, line 14 through Miller/13 at line 3.

1 utilities experience regulatory lag and file a general rate revision when overall results require an  
2 increase in customer rates.

3 In Oregon, there is a well-known and oft-used statute that provides an exception to  
4 retroactive ratemaking and allows deferral of certain items for later inclusion into rates.  
5 However, that deferred accounting statute - ORS 757.259 - has certain conditions such as  
6 requiring an earnings review be conducted to confirm that amortization of deferred balances are  
7 appropriate considering the utilities earnings at the time the deferred amounts were incurred.  
8 In this context of traditional rate regulation in Oregon, Staff considers general support of the  
9 concept of an environmental cost recovery mechanism during a general rate proceeding to be  
10 generous. Because an automatic adjustment clause under ORS 757.210 allows the automatic  
11 recovery of expenses without any consideration for concepts such as regulatory lag and the  
12 overall earnings level of the utility, Staff deemed it reasonable to suggest modifications to NW  
13 Natural's proposed SRRM to account for the type of special risk-reducing treatment an  
14 automatic adjustment clause provides.

15 2. The law requires an earnings review before the currently deferred environmental  
16 remediation accounts may be considered for amortization.

17 ORS 757.259 is the deferred accounting statute. ORS 757.259(e)(5) provides in relevant  
18 part:

19 Unless subject to an automatic adjustment clause under ORS 757.210(1),  
20 amounts described in this section shall be allowed in rates only to the extent  
21 authorized by the commission in a proceeding under ORS 757.210 to change rates  
22 and upon review of the utilities earnings at the time of the deferral.

23 Staff proposed both that the currently deferred costs and proceeds of the environmental  
24 remediation deferral and that future amounts that go into the SRRM deferral would be subject to  
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1 an earnings test using the years when the costs were incurred.<sup>43</sup> NW Natural replied that an  
2 earnings test should not be required for either past or future amounts.<sup>44</sup>

3 NW Natural's reply testimony relies on ORS 757.259(e)(5) to argue that earnings tests do  
4 not apply to automatic adjustment clauses.<sup>45</sup> Staff agrees that an earnings test is not lawfully  
5 required after an automatic adjustment clause is established under ORS 757.210(1). However,  
6 NW Natural's response ignores the fact that no such automatic adjustment clause has been  
7 established.

8 As of September 30, 2011, NW Natural had approximately \$64.5 million in a deferred  
9 account related to environmental remediation costs and proceeds. There is no automatic  
10 adjustment clause for those past amounts. Even if the Commission creates an automatic  
11 adjustment clause in the future, it cannot lawfully move previously deferred accounts into a  
12 newly established automatic adjustment clause account without following the legal requirements  
13 of ORS 757.259(e)(5). The Commission has no lawful option but to require an earnings review  
14 prior to amortizing the deferred amounts.

15 3. If the Commission establishes an automatic adjustment clause mechanism for  
16 environmental remediation, it should order that the balance accrue interest at the  
17 Modified Blended Treasury Rate.

18 Under NW Natural's proposed SRRM, the Commission would be agreeing to allow for  
19 certain cost recovery, subject to an abbreviated prudence review. Similarly, if the Commission  
20 adopted Staff's recommended modifications, NW Natural would receive certain cost recovery of  
21 90 percent of the prudently incurred future costs of environmental remediation offset by  
22 proceeds, subject to an earnings test. An automatic adjustment clause that allows for certain  
23 recovery of all or some portion of prudently incurred costs means substantially less risk for NW  
24 Natural. The risk associated with an automatic adjustment clause is more akin to risk once  
25 amortization is approved than the risk related to uncertain recovery in an uncertain and

26 <sup>43</sup> See Staff/200; Johnson/7 at line 18 through Johnson/8 at line 3.

<sup>44</sup> See NWN/2600; Miller/18, line 16 through Miller/20, line 8.

<sup>45</sup> See NWN/2600; Miller/19, lines 1-7.

1 potentially long period of time. Consistent with the rationale of the Commission in Order No.  
2 08-263 on appropriate interest rates for deferred accounts, if the Commission approves an  
3 automatic adjustment clause it should require that the Modified Blended Treasury rate adopted in  
4 that Order apply to the account balance in the new mechanism.

5 4. If the Commission establishes an automatic adjustment clause mechanism for  
6 environmental remediation, it should require some level of sharing.

7 Staff recommends that the balance of past and future environmental remediation costs  
8 offset by insurance and other proceeds be shared in a manner that 90 percent of the costs are paid  
9 for by ratepayers and 10 percent of the costs are borne by NW Natural's shareholder.<sup>46</sup> In  
10 support of its recommendation on sharing, Staff attached an exhibit demonstrating what some  
11 other state commissions have determined relative to sharing of environmental remediation  
12 costs.<sup>47</sup>

13 In addition to Staff's recommendation on sharing percentages, NWIGU-CUB's expert  
14 witness, Mr. Larkin, supports a sharing percentage of 50 percent ratepayer and 50 percent to be  
15 borne by NW Natural's shareholders. If the Commission was to approve an environmental  
16 remediation cost recovery mechanism, it should apply sharing percentages within the range  
17 suggested by the parties in this proceeding.

18 5. If the Commission establishes an automatic adjustment clause mechanism for  
19 environmental remediation, it should require an earnings test before amortizing future  
20 amounts as a matter of policy.

21 Staff recommends that future costs added to an automatic adjustment clause should be  
22 subject to an earnings test based upon regulatory policy.<sup>48</sup> As discussed above, the law requires  
23 that past deferred accounts be amortized subject to an earnings review. Although not legally  
24 required, Staff also recommends that future costs be subject to an earnings test.<sup>49</sup> Without such a

24 <sup>46</sup> See generally Staff/200; Johnson/7-8.

25 <sup>47</sup> See Staff/202; Johnson/12-15.

26 <sup>48</sup> See Staff/200; Johnson/8, lines 1-3.

<sup>49</sup> Staff also proposed a condition that recovery would be limited to an amount equal to three percent of  
NW Natural's revenues for the preceding year. See Staff/200; Johnson/7, lines 21-22. Based upon the  
legal requirements of ORS 757.259, this is already required for the deferred account amounts. As far as

1 condition, NW Natural would have the ability to recover its prudently incurred remediation costs  
2 regardless of its overall earnings. Creating automatic cost recovery mechanisms that substantially  
3 reduce NW Natural's risk in conjunction with allowing recovery regardless of total earnings  
4 would be inappropriate.

5 NW Natural seemingly offers three arguments against making future cost recovery  
6 subject to an earnings test. First, NW Natural argues "that limiting recovery of such expenses in  
7 the event that the Company exceeded its return on equity would be inappropriate and punitive,  
8 and that given the magnitude of the costs in would affect a permanent cap on earnings."<sup>50</sup> Staff  
9 does not believe a mechanism that substantially reduces NW Natural's risk of future recovery,  
10 but limits recovery of such expenses if the Company is exceeding its return in equity is  
11 inappropriate or punitive in a regulated environment.

12 Second, NW Natural argues that if an earnings test is applied it would be necessary to  
13 include the environmental expenses in the earnings tests for the applicable years in order to gain  
14 an accurate picture of whether or not NW Natural was over-earning in the applicable year.<sup>51</sup> It is  
15 not necessary to resolve this issue in this proceeding, but it seems that NW Natural misconstrues  
16 the purpose of an earnings test in that an earnings test is necessary to determine whether or not  
17 expenses incurred outside of a general rate review could or should have been absorbed by the  
18 utility because overall rates were sufficient to satisfy ORS 756.040. The entire objective is an  
19 overall review of earnings, not an account-by-account comparison.

20 Finally, NW Natural argues that "[i]t would be unfair to cut off recovery of these  
21 amounts through application of an earnings test, when the Company could have opted to seek  
22 recoveries through rate base additions which would not be subjected to an annual earnings  
23 review."<sup>52</sup> This is a perplexing argument. Presumably, NW Natural means it could have filed a

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25 future balances in the proposed mechanism, NW Natural agrees with this condition. *See* NWN/2600;  
Miller/20, lines 10-19.

26 <sup>50</sup> *See* NWN/2600; Miller/19, lines 8-13.

<sup>51</sup> *See* NWN/2600; Miller/19, lines 14-18.

<sup>52</sup> *See* NWN/2600, Miller/20, lines 1-8.

1 deferred account or general rate case and requested that the Commission include these costs  
2 through rate base additions. In fact, if the Commission does not approve an automatic  
3 adjustment clause in this proceeding, NW Natural is able to request future rate treatment and the  
4 Commission can make a decision at that time. In any event, whether it is a deferred account or a  
5 general rate revision to consider additions to rate base, both would consider the overall earnings  
6 of NW Natural. It is specifically because NW Natural is requesting a special regulatory  
7 mechanism that does not contain the protections of deferred accounting or general rate revisions  
8 that Staff recommends the Commission require an earnings test on the future amounts in an  
9 SRRM, if it establishes such a mechanism.

10 To summarize Staff's position on environmental cost recovery mechanism, it is important  
11 to consider the context of typical rate-making in Oregon. In this context, Staff's conditions on  
12 NW Natural's proposed environmental cost recovery mechanism are reasonable and could be  
13 viewed as generous. First, the Commission is legally obligated to require an earnings review on  
14 the costs currently in deferred accounts. Second, the Commission should require an earnings test  
15 on future amounts, even though not legally required, based upon solid regulatory policy. Third,  
16 if the Commission approves an environmental cost recovery mechanism, the balance should  
17 accrue interest at the Modified Blended Treasury Rate established in Order No. 08.-263. Finally,  
18 if the Commission approves an environmental cost recovery mechanism, it should include a level  
19 of sharing within the range supported by the parties to this proceeding.

#### 20 OUT-OF-PERIOD PENSION COSTS

21 Since 1986, the Commission has established the appropriate level of pension expenses<sup>53</sup>  
22 included in rates by relying upon the actuarial calculation of the applicable utility's Net Periodic  
23 Pension Cost (NPPC). The NPCC is calculated as of December 31<sup>st</sup> of the previous year by  
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25 <sup>53</sup> Although NW Natural repeatedly refers to cash contributions to pensions as an investment, Staff notes  
26 that the annual expense of the pension contribution should be (and currently is through FAS 87) treated as  
an expense and included as such in the revenue requirement model.

1 using the standards established by the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in its  
2 Financial Account Statement (FAS) 87.<sup>54</sup>

3 The NPPC calculation is made by an independent actuary and includes consideration of  
4 variables such as the fair value of the plan, actual/estimated value of the plan, benefits paid,  
5 funding status, service costs, interest costs, expected return on assets, amortization of the  
6 transitions asset, amortization of prior service cost, and recognition of gains or losses. A primary  
7 benefit of the NPCC calculation is that it smoothes out the losses and gains over time associated  
8 with some of the market volatility in equity markets.<sup>55</sup>

9 In addition to the Commission's use of NPCC for the last 25 years to determine  
10 appropriate pension expenses to be included in rates, the Commission recently approved a  
11 stipulation in Docket No. UM 1475 that allowed NW Natural to establish a balancing account to  
12 track differences between its actual pension expense and the amount recovered through rates.<sup>56</sup>  
13 In this balancing account, NW Natural records its FAS 87 expense, net of amounts recovered in  
14 rates for pension expense, and the account accrues interest at NW Natural's currently authorized  
15 rate of return.<sup>57</sup> The parties to the stipulation explained that this balancing account would benefit  
16 both NW Natural and customers by allowing NW Natural the opportunity to collect its actual  
17 pension expenses while maintaining rate stability for customers.<sup>58</sup>

18 Staff's recommendation is to continue the Commission's established practice, as applied  
19 consistently to other utilities, of calculating NW Natural's 2013 test year pension expense  
20 consistent with the actuarially calculated NPPC according to FAS 87. In addition, Staff  
21 recommends that the balancing account established in Docket No. UM 1475 continue, which  
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25 <sup>54</sup> See Staff/900; Cimmiyoti/2, line 22 through Cimmiyoti/3, line 7.

26 <sup>55</sup> See Staff/900; Cimmiyoti/3, lines 7-16.

<sup>56</sup> See Order No. 11-051 at 1.

<sup>57</sup> See Id. at 3.

<sup>58</sup> See Id.

1 allows NW Natural to account for, and earn a rate of return on, the differences between pension  
2 costs in rates and actual pension costs.<sup>59</sup>

3 NW Natural proposes changes to the calculation of appropriate pension expense in this  
4 general rate case to account for out-of-period cash contributions it has made to its pension fund.  
5 First, NW Natural argues it should be allowed to add to rate base the average unrecovered  
6 investor contribution amount of \$21,930,000 net of deferred taxes, which represents  
7 contributions that NW Natural made to its defined benefit plans in the years 2004 through the  
8 test year.<sup>60</sup> Second, NW Natural argues that it should be allowed to include in rates an annual  
9 revenue requirement for the return of unrecovered investor contributions amortized over eight  
10 years, which it estimates that annualized amount to be \$4,569,000.<sup>61</sup>

11 Finally, NW Natural argues that if the Commission declines to adopt its primary proposal  
12 then the Company should still be allowed to recover the return of its past contributions through a  
13 revision of the balancing account approved in Docket No. UM 1475. In this proposal, NW  
14 Natural argues that the balancing account should be changed to suspend refunds to customers  
15 once the balance becomes negative at which point the negative balance would be allowed to  
16 grow until it equals the excess shareholder contributions.<sup>62</sup>

17 1. The Commission should not allow the recovery of out-of-period pension cash  
18 contributions.

19 Taken together, NW Natural proposes in future rates to recover a return “on” and “of”  
20 out-of-period cash contributions to pensions made between rate cases. The return “on” would be  
21 amortized over eight years. As an alternative, NWN proposes in future rates to recover a return  
22 “of” out-of-period cash contributions to pensions through changes to the balancing account  
23 approved in Docket No. UM 1475. NW Natural requests this future recovery in rates “on” and  
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25 <sup>59</sup> See Staff/2100, Cimmiyoti/1 at line 22 through Cimmiyoti/2, line 13.

26 <sup>60</sup> See Staff/900; Cimmiyoti/2; see also NWN/400; Feltz/31, lines 8-9; NWN/409; Feltz/1.

<sup>61</sup> See Staff/900; Cimmiyoti/2, lines 16-21; see also NWN/400; Feltz/31, lines 10-12.

<sup>62</sup> See generally NWN/2000; Feltz/33.

1 “of” past cash contributions from 2004 through the test year irrespective of a review of its  
2 earnings at the time the past expenses were incurred.

3 The Commission’s practice of establishing pension costs included in rates based upon the  
4 NPPC and FAS 87, in conjunction with the approved balancing account in Docket No. UM 1475,  
5 constitute an appropriate amount of pension costs from ratepayers. Staff’s fundamental  
6 objection to NW Natural’s proposal is that it constitutes “cherry picking” of a single issue used  
7 to establish overall reasonable rates without any consideration for overall rates at the time the  
8 costs were incurred. NW Natural’s proposal would take out-of-period cash contributions -  
9 ignoring both the financial stability of the Company at the time the cash contributions were made  
10 and ignoring every other aspect that made up past rates – and collect these past cash  
11 contributions from future customers, including a rate of return.

12 When rates are established in a general rate proceeding, it is to be expected that some of  
13 the costs and expenses may go up, while others may go down. For example, after the last NW  
14 Natural rate case in 2003, NW Natural restructured and reduced levels of full-time equivalent  
15 employees,<sup>63</sup> but ratepayers did not receive refunds for the higher amount of full-time  
16 equivalents included in rates. Presumably, NW Natural would not agree that its future revenue  
17 requirement should be lowered based upon these past savings and would correctly argue that  
18 while the costs and expenses for full-time equivalents decreased, other costs and expenses  
19 increased. And that is exactly the same point that Staff makes regarding out-of-period cash  
20 contributions to pensions. It is not appropriate to choose a single expense category, while  
21 ignoring all other categories, and argue that because that single item increased it should be  
22 amortized in future rates with a rate of return, even though at the time the item increased the  
23 Company was financially stable and doing financially well overall.<sup>64</sup> Rate-making is holistic in  
24 nature and the Commission should decline to consider a single cost item in a vacuum.

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26 <sup>63</sup> See generally NWN/200; Anderson/10-13.

<sup>64</sup> See Staff/900; Cimmiyoti/5, lines 1-9; see also Staff/900; Cimmiyoti/5, line 16 through Cimmiyoti/6,  
line10.

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2 2. Changing Commission policy on an issue that has far-reaching impacts on other Oregon  
3 rate-regulated utilities and customers of those utilities should not been done in the context  
4 of this general rate proceeding.

5 As discussed above, the NPPC and FAS 87 calculation that Staff employs for Oregon  
6 regulated utilities remains appropriate and should be continued. In requesting a change to the  
7 Commission's historic use of NPPC and FAS 87, NW Natural acknowledges that other utilities  
8 may currently be collecting less in rates than their current contributions to their pension plans.<sup>65</sup>  
9 If the Commission were inclined to give NW Natural special treatment for past cash  
10 contributions to pensions, it is probable that other utilities will request similar treatment. At a  
11 minimum, the Commission should consider the impact that this decision may apply as well to  
12 other utilities.

13 To summarize Staff's position on out-of-period pension expenses, Staff maintains that the  
14 Commission's historic reliance on NPPC and FAS 87 to determine the appropriate pension  
15 expense to be included in customer rates remains appropriate. Furthermore, removing one  
16 expense that increased between rate cases without considering expenses that decreased is  
17 inappropriate and unfair to future ratepayers. Finally, through the use of the balancing account,  
18 NW Natural is able to reasonably recover pension accounts above and beyond that present in  
19 rates.

20 OUT-OF-PERIOD STATE TAXES

21 NW Natural proposes an adjustment to allow it to collect \$4.48<sup>66</sup> million over a five year  
22 amortization schedule, or approximately \$895,000 annually.<sup>67</sup> The \$4.48 million represents a  
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24 <sup>65</sup> See NWN/2000; Feltz/25, lines 7-9.

25 <sup>66</sup> Staff/500, Garcia/9, line 4 states the amount is \$4.8 million. However, NWN/1900; Siores/24, line 12  
states the amount to be \$4.48 million. Staff accepts the \$4.48 million number and it is consistent with the  
annual amount requested to be amortized of \$895,000.

26 <sup>67</sup> See Staff/500; Garcia/9, lines 2-6.

1 regulatory asset that NWN created in 2009.<sup>68</sup> NW Natural states that the adjustment is necessary  
2 to reflect the impact of the 2009 Oregon state income tax rate change on the accumulated  
3 deferred tax balance.<sup>69</sup> During the 2009 tax year, Senate Bill 408, which has since been repealed,  
4 was in effect.<sup>70</sup> When Senate Bill 408 was in effect, there were automatic adjustment clause  
5 mechanisms that were responsible for establishing the appropriate tax expense. This process was  
6 used for NW Natural's 2009 tax year and the appropriate tax expense was established in Order  
7 No. 11-117.<sup>71</sup>

8 1. The Commission should not allow the recovery of an out-of-period regulatory asset.

9 Similar to out-of-period pension expenses, NW Natural requests that the Commission  
10 allow recovery for a regulatory asset that occurred between rate cases. As discussed regarding  
11 out-of-period pension expenses, the Commission should not allow NW Natural to self-select  
12 single issues where the cost increased between rate cases and strip them out for future recovery.  
13 The exception to collecting expenses between rate cases is deferred accounting. But here, NW  
14 Natural did not file an application for a deferral to create this regulatory asset. Furthermore, at  
15 the time the regulatory asset was created SB 408 and its automatic tax adjustment clause was in  
16 effect. Finally, the Commission should not allow NW Natural to self-select single items where  
17 expenses increased between rate cases and provide for future recovery when NW Natural's  
18 overall earnings at the time the expenses were incurred is ignored.<sup>72</sup>

19 To summarize Staff's position on out-of-period state taxes, the Commission should not  
20 allow amortization of a regulatory asset that occurred between rate cases and for which no  
21 deferred accounting application was granted.

22

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24 <sup>68</sup> See NWN/1900; Siores/24, lines 1-4.

25 <sup>69</sup> See NWN/300; McVay-Siores/8, lines 8-10.

26 <sup>70</sup> See Staff/1800; Garcia/13, lines 12-13.

<sup>71</sup> See Staff/1800; Garcia/13, lines 13-16.

<sup>72</sup> See Staff/200; Johnson/4; Staff/900, Cimmiyoti/5, line 19 through Cimmiyoti/6, lines 1-10; NWIGU-CUB/200; Larkin/11.

1                   THE TWO PREMATURELY CONSTRUCTED MID-WILLAMETTE VALLEY  
2                   FEEDER PROJECTS

3                   NW Natural proposes to include the Perrydale to Monmouth and Monmouth  
4                   Reinforcement segments of the Mid-Willamette Feeder (MWVF) project into rates in this  
5                   proceeding.<sup>73</sup> NW Natural’s recently acknowledged Modified Integrated Resource Plan  
6                   (Modified IRP) considered the MWVF project and NW Natural admits that the earliest date that  
7                   the Modified IRP would select the MWVF would be 2019 based upon reliability and 2025/2026  
8                   based upon load growth.<sup>74</sup> While NW Natural attempts to explain why constructing the projects  
9                   now is not premature despite the conclusions of the Modified IRP, it offers no financial analysis,  
10                  benefit-cost analysis or other studies to support a conclusion that the MWVF is a cost-effective  
11                  solution to meet peak day demand, i.e. improve system reliability,<sup>75</sup> in contradiction to the results  
12                  of the Modified IRP. Instead, NW Natural generally refers to certain sections of the Modified  
13                  IRP and stated that the additional benefits of building the project prematurely are qualitative in  
14                  nature.<sup>76</sup>

- 15                  1. NW Natural has failed to meet its burden of proof that these two segments of the  
16                  MWVF project are prudent during this timeframe when the recently acknowledged  
17                  Modified IRP does not demonstrate a need until at least 2019.

18                  These two segments of the MWVF are built prematurely. The recently Modified IRP  
19                  does not select this project until at least 2019. To understand why NW Natural would build a  
20                  project that is seemingly premature, Staff requested additional information from NW Natural to  
21                  justify the need of the projects.<sup>77</sup> In spite of the fact that the Modified IRP does not select this  
22                  project until at least 2019, when asked for financial analysis of the need for constructing the  
23                  projects now Staff was told that “[a] financial analysis of the investment was not conducted by

24                  <sup>73</sup> See NWN/2200; Yoshihara/1, lines 20-21.

25                  <sup>74</sup> See Staff/1900; Zimmerman/5, lines 1-4; NWN/2200; Yoshihara/6, lines 3-14.

26                  <sup>75</sup> See Staff/1100; Sobhy/15, lines 16-21.

<sup>76</sup> See Id. at lines 21-23.

<sup>77</sup> See Staff/1100; Sobhy/8, lines 11-21; Staff/1104; Staff/1100; Sobhy/15, lines 16-23; Staff/1103;  
                  Staff/1106; Staff/1107.

1 the Company of these projects. The decision to invest in these projects is based upon system  
2 reliability, replacement of bare steel and system reinforcement.”<sup>78</sup>

3 Staff recommends that the Commission adopt its alternative recommendation and  
4 disallow these projects from rates at this time, but preserve NW Natural’s ability to ask for  
5 inclusion of these projects when it can demonstrate that the projects are needed based upon an  
6 IRP analysis or when it can meet its burden of proof through provision of other quantitative  
7 analysis.<sup>79</sup> Allowing the inclusion of these projects at this time, which are inconsistent with the  
8 conclusions of the Modified IRP and are not supported by any quantitative analysis, would send  
9 the wrong message that utilities could ignore the results of their recently acknowledged IRP,  
10 offer no quantitative support for deviating from the results of the IRP, and expect recovery based  
11 solely upon qualitative considerations.

12 To summarize Staff’s position on the prematurely built segments of the MWVF project,  
13 Staff recommends that the Commission disallow inclusion of these costs in this rate proceeding,  
14 but preserve NW Natural’s ability to ask for inclusion when it can demonstrate that IRP results  
15 or quantitative analysis support the need for the project.

16 III. CONCLUSION

17 For the foregoing reasons, Staff respectfully requests that the Commission:

- 18 1) Establish the appropriate ROE of 9.4 percent and disallow up to half of NW  
19 Natural’s interest rate hedge;
- 20 2) Order reasonable conditions to NW Natural’s proposed environmental recovery  
21 mechanism, if the Commission approves such a mechanism;
- 22 3) Continue to follow its past policies of relying on NPPC and FAS 87 to calculate  
23 pension costs included in rates and deny NW Natural’s request to include out-of-  
24 period pension costs in future rates;

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26 <sup>78</sup> See Staff/1107; Sobhy/2.

<sup>79</sup> See Staff/1900; Zimmerman/6, lines 10-14.

