

1 **BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**
2 **OF OREGON**

3 UE 191

4 In the Matter of

5 PACIFICORP, dba PACIFIC POWER &
6 LIGHT COMPANY PacifiCorp's 2008
7 Transition Adjustment Mechanism.

8 STAFF'S REPLY BRIEF

8 **INTRODUCTION**

9 Consistent with the briefing schedule in this proceeding, the Public Utility Commission
10 of Oregon Staff (Staff) submits its reply brief.

11 As discussed in Staff's Opening Brief, Staff's remaining issues involve Staff's witness,
12 Mr. Wordley's, proposed adjustment for the margin from wholesale market transactions not
13 included in PacifiCorp's GRID power cost model or accounted for in customer rates ("margin
14 adjustment") and agreement with the Industrial Customers of the Northwest Utilities (ICNU)
15 proposed adjustment to recognize the correct amount of power costs in current rates.

16 The margin adjustment is proposed to correct a problem with PacifiCorp's power cost
17 model, which attempts to simulate actual power system operation. The problem with
18 PacifiCorp's power cost model is systematic and cannot be corrected within the current model or
19 by stochastic power costs modeling. Staff identified this systematic problem seven years ago
20 and has since proposed similar margin adjustments in all PacifiCorp rate proceedings that have
21 included power costs. In all of those previous cases, the parties have resolved the issues with
22 stipulations approved by the Public Utility Commission of Oregon (Commission).

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1 **DISCUSSION**

2 1. Staff's margin adjustment is necessary to correct a systematic failing of PacifiCorp's
3 GRID power cost model.

4 The problem that Staff has identified with PacifiCorp's power cost model is that it does
5 not capture anywhere near all of the expected and, then, actual wholesale sales and purchase
6 transactions that occur on PacifiCorp's expansive power system, which has been paid for by rate
7 payers. Staff's margin adjustment is measured from three years worth of data, the only available
8 years when there is data both from a GRID forecast for a year and the actual power operations
9 results for that year. The analysis demonstrates a systematic and significant modeling problem.
10 The actual MWhs of short-term sales and purchases exceed forecast by nearly 300%. Looking at
11 Staff/201, Wordley/3, you can see that in the three separate years of modeled and actual data.
12 Purchases are an average of 370.2% above what was modeled and sales were 207.7% above
13 modeled. Overall the average sales or purchases comes to 16,733,031 MWh (51,198,251 divided
14 by 3 plus 49,199,936 divided by three all divided by two). To provide some perspective, the
15 volume of sales or purchases omitted (from the GRID forecast) wholesale transactions equals in
16 excess of 25% of the company's entire system load. See Staff/201, Wordley/3 and PPL/201,
17 Widmer /5 – $(16,733,031)/58,006,889 = .28$ or 28% of system load. The margin adjustment has
18 been calculated as the average of the three individual margin adjustments for the model years
19 stated, on an Oregon allocated basis. Each model year's margin is the difference of the year's
20 excess sales divided by excess MWh less the year's excess purchases divided by the excess
21 MWh s purchased, times the average of that year's excess sales or purchases. Staff's proposed
22 adjustment is \$16.2 million and reflects Oregon's allocated share of this omitted margin.

23 2. PacifiCorp's use of other margin calculations is misplaced.

24 PacifiCorp responds to Staff's proposed margin adjustment with alternative calculations
25 of its own. However, none of these calculations are relevant because they use years for which
26 both a GRID forecast and actual data are not available (See PPL/208), or they use a different

1 definition of margin – the company references the \$/MWh margin on total short-term wholesale
2 activity versus the relevant omitted wholesale transactions. *See* PPL/204, Widmer/18, lines 13-
3 19.

4 3. PacifiCorp has failed to refute Staff’s adjustment.

5 PacifiCorp contends that Staff’s adjustment is not supported by substantial evidence in
6 the record. *See* PacifiCorp Opening Brief at 14, lines 7-9. Staff adjustment was explained in
7 direct testimony, supplemental testimony, and during cross examination at the August 20, 2007
8 hearing.¹ PacifiCorp has failed to refute the data or the accuracy of Staff’s calculation.
9 Furthermore, PacifiCorp did not provide a comparable or relevant calculation.

10 PacifiCorp purports to rely on “system balancing” to explain why its power costs model
11 grossly under forecasts actual volumes of wholesale transactions. PacifiCorp implies, but fails to
12 factually demonstrate, that positive margins cannot result from the “dynamic process” of system
13 balancing. *See* PacifiCorp Opening Brief at 18, lines 1 through 19, line 2.

14 On the other hand, Staff’s analysis demonstrates positive margins are not only possible,
15 but are systematic. A positive margin is produced on the wholesale transactions not captured by
16 the GRID model, because of the advantageous nature of the company’s diverse and spread out
17 power system, combined with the company’s competent management and operation of the
18 system. *See* Staff/100, Wordley/5, line 21 through Staff/5, Wordley/6, line 17; PPL/500,
19 Apperson/1. Combining the information on PPL/500, Apperson/1 and Staff/201, Wordley/1
20 indicates that PacifiCorp’s system balancing activity for 2006 yielded \$25.6 million of positive
21 margin as allocated to Oregon. (\$26.6 million for “UE 170,” which was for 2006 from Staff/201,
22 Wordley/1, less \$1.0 million from PPL/500, Apperson/1 for “Oregon Share” of “Arbitrage and
23 Trading programs”).

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¹ Staff responded in detail to every data request propounded by PacifiCorp.

1 4. PacifiCorp’s comparisons of Net Variable Power Costs (NVPC) in rates and actual
2 results are diversionary and irrelevant to Staff’s margin adjustment.

3 PacifiCorp’s repeated use of comparisons between of NVPC in rates and actual results,
4 and assertion that the company’s power costs in rates are understated, does not provide any
5 meaningful information relative to Staff’s proposed margin adjustment. *See* PacifiCorp Opening
6 Brief at 19, lines 3-16. PacifiCorp’s total actual power costs are impacted by many random
7 factors, such as weather, hydro levels, market power and natural gas prices, power plant forced
8 outages, and system load. The variation of these important random variables is what will be
9 addressed by stochastic power cost modeling. Contrarily, Staff’s proposed margin adjustment
10 addresses the systematic, non-random, positive margin produced by the ever-present, intrinsic
11 advantageous characteristics of PacifiCorp’s power system.

12 5. Staff’s margin adjustment is unrelated to PGE and the Commission order in UE 180.

13 While Staff has proposed a margin adjustment for PacifiCorp in each of PacifiCorp’s last
14 six rate cases, Staff has never proposed a margin adjustment for PGE. Staff has concluded that
15 PGE and PacifiCorp are in different situations regarding the capability of their power systems to
16 systematically produce positive margins on the “additional” wholesale transactions not captured
17 by their respective power cost models. *See* Staff/201, Wordley/1. Simply stated, PacifiCorp
18 makes a positive margin and PGE does not.

19 In addition, Staff disagrees with PacifiCorp that the margin adjustment is in any way
20 related to an extrinsic value adjustment. This point was demonstrated by Staff/202, Wordley/3.
21 In PacifiCorp’s rebuttal testimony (at PPL/204, Widmer/18-21), PacifiCorp suggests that
22 different levels of resources and different levels of planned maintenance between the GRID filed
23 and actual results, and updates of “as filed” GRID cause a mismatch of costs and benefits. These
24 factors are “noise,” and do not effect in any significant way the margin on wholesale transactions
25 not included in GRID. Staff’s exhibit demonstrates that all the “additional” MWh of energy to
26 make “additional” sales not included in GRID is provided by the “additional” MWh of purchases

1 not included in GRID. This exhibit also demonstrates the independence of the margin
2 adjustment from any extrinsic value considerations, because extrinsic value comes from
3 undispatched flexible power resources, not from wholesale sales and purchase activity.

4 In this case, Staff did not propose an extrinsic value adjustment for PacifiCorp,
5 anticipating that the company will continue to pursue the development of stochastic power cost
6 modeling. Because the Commission's order in UE 180 dealt with extrinsic value, and not
7 margin, any suggestion of a comparable situation between UE 180 and UE 191 is incorrect. *See*
8 Staff/200, Wordley/1, line 17 through Staff/200, Wordley/2, line 13; Staff/200, Wordley/3, lines
9 6-20.

10 6. Staff's margin adjustment is not poor regulatory policy.

11 PacifiCorp contends that Staff's margin adjustment is poor regulatory policy. However,
12 Staff's margin adjustment is necessary to account for the systematic problem with the
13 normalized regulatory paradigm. When a systematic problem exists, it should be addressed.

14 PacifiCorp's contention that Staff's margin adjustment is not valid because Staff did not
15 consider such things as new resources not yet included in rates, is incorrect. *See* PacifiCorp
16 Opening Brief at 20, line 17 through 21, line 17. Staff demonstrated the insignificant impact of
17 new resources not yet included in rates. I, including the resources PacifiCorp identified as not in
18 rates, changes Staff's adjustment from \$16.2 million to \$15.8 million. *See* Tr.² at 125, line 14
19 through 126, line 4.

20 7. Staff supports and agrees with ICNU's proposed adjustment to reflect the correct
21 amount of NVPC in current rates.

22 Staff agrees with ICNU's interpretation of the appropriate base for net variable power
23 costs (NVPC) in this docket. Docket No. UE 170 yielded an undisputed \$215 million Oregon
24 allocated NVPC. *See* ICNU/116, Falkenberg/1; *see also* ICNU/100, Falkenberg/2. The addition
25 of the \$10 million that PacifiCorp received from UE 179 produces a current level of NVPC in

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² "Tr." refers to the official transcript of hearing held on August 20, 2007.

1 rates of \$225 million, which is the appropriate base from which to determine any change in UE
2 191.

3 ICNU is correct when it states that the total system NVPC of \$834.4 million in the
4 UE 179 stipulation “really served no purpose, other than to determine whether the \$10 million
5 increase was going to be granted or not” (Tr. 69; ICNU/100, Falkenburg/5). Order No. 06-564,
6 Appendix A, Exhibit A, illustrates that the \$834.4 million total system NVPC was only used to
7 determine the \$10 million NVPC increase cap. Note that the estimated 26.40% Oregon
8 allocation factor in the Exhibit is incorrect; the actual factor was 26.06% or 0.2606; (PPL/101,
9 Kelly/1) “Oregon UE-179 Net Power Cost” of \$217,479,553 divided by “Total Company Net
10 Power Cost” of \$834,400,000. If the \$834.4 million would have been used to determine the total
11 NVPC to be allocated to Oregon, instead of being used just to determine the increase, then the
12 Oregon allocated NVPC would have been \$217.5 million (UE Oregon allocator of
13 $0.2606 * \$834.4$ million), instead of the \$225 million the company received. *See* PacifiCorp
14 Opening Brief at 23, lines 10-23.

15 In this proceeding, PacifiCorp argues that it should continue receiving this additional \$7.5
16 million per year (\$225 million less \$217.5 million) by using the incorrect (lower) \$217.5 million
17 NVPC as the base for “NVPC in rates.” Staff agrees with and supports ICNU's proposed \$7.5
18 million adjustment, which will account for the correct NVPC in current base rates and allow for
19 the appropriate reflection of the impact of a lower allocation of power costs to Oregon in UE 191
20 because of the continuing higher load growth in Utah.

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1 **CONCLUSION**

2 Staff respectfully requests that the Commission adopt Staff’s margin adjustment. If the
3 Commission wishes to provide PacifiCorp an incentive to continue its prudent operation of its
4 advantageous power system, Staff requests the Commission adopt a sharing of Staff’s margin
5 adjustment. Staff also respectfully request that the Commission adopt ICNU’s proposed \$7.5
6 million adjustment for NVPC in rates.

7 DATED this 17th day of September 2007.

8 Respectfully submitted,

9 **HARDY MYERS**
10 Attorney General

11 s/Jason W. Jones_____

12 Jason W. Jones, #00059
13 Assistant Attorney General
14 Of Attorneys for Staff of the Public Utility
 Commission of Oregon

1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

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3 I certify that on September 17, 2007, I served the foregoing upon all parties of record in
4 this proceeding by delivering a copy by electronic mail and by mailing a copy by postage prepaid
5 first class mail or by hand delivery/shuttle mail to the parties accepting paper service.

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