

June 13, 2005

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
Filing Center
Oregon Public Utility Commission
550 Capitol Street NE #215
PO Box 2148
Salem, OR 97308-2148

Re: UE 167 – Idaho Power Company's Opening Brief

Dear Sir or Madam:

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced docket is the original and five copies of Idaho Power Company's Opening Brief. Please contact me with any questions.

Very truly yours,



Jessica A. Centeno

Enclosures

cc: UE 167 Service List
Bart Kline

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
UE 167

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of **IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S OPENING BRIEF** was served via U.S. Mail on the following parties on June 13, 2005:

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
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Jessica A. Centeno

1 **BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**
2 **OF OREGON**

3 **UE 167**

4 In the Matter of

5 IDAHO POWER COMPANY

6 Application for General Rate Increase in the
7 Company's Oregon Annual Revenues of \$4,418,908,
8 or 17.52 Percent Overall

**IDAHO POWER COMPANY'S
OPENING BRIEF**

9 **INTRODUCTION**

10 Idaho Power Company ("Idaho Power" or the "Company") has filed an application with
11 the Public Utility Commission of Oregon ("OPUC" or the "Commission") for authority to raise
12 its rates in the approximate amount of \$4,418,908, a 17.52% increase over its current base rates
13 ("Application"). Idaho Power last filed for general rate relief in the State of Oregon based upon
14 a 1993 test year. With the passage of approximately ten years, the company has experienced
15 numerous changes associated with the expenses of providing electric service, primarily due to:
16 (1) overall increases in the Company's operating expenses due to load expansion; (2) substantial
17 additional investment in transmission and distribution plant needed to continue to supply reliable
18 service to customers; and (3) the addition of plant investment and operating expenses associated
19 with the commercial operation of the Danskin combustion turbine generating plant.

20 The parties have settled most of issues presented by this case, resulting in an agreement
21 for an overall reduction in the requested increase to 12.09%.¹ The major issue remaining in
22 dispute is the appropriate normalized power supply expenses ("NPSE") to be included in the test
23 year expenses. On this point the issue presented to the Commission is straightforward: What
24 expenses associated with power supply can Idaho Power reasonably expect to incur during the
25

26 ¹ Idaho Power/Staff/CUB/Industrial Customers/100, Owings/Reading/Brown/Jenks/Gale/3 ("Joint Testimony")

1 period the rates adopted in this case will be in effect? Idaho Power has recommended NPSE of
2 \$47.7 million, while Commission Staff (“Staff”) contends that the number should be a *negative*
3 \$15.3 million. Similarly, Citizens Utility Board (“CUB”) has recommended NPSE of *negative*
4 \$18.6 million, and the Oregon Industrial Customers of Idaho Power (“OICIP”) has generally
5 joined Staff’s recommendation.

6 The basis of the divergent estimates is the parties’ differing methodologies for
7 normalizing power expenses. Idaho Power’s NPSE estimates are based upon a normalization
8 methodology approved and relied upon by this Commission and the Idaho Public Utilities
9 Commission (“IPUC”) to set Idaho Power’s rates for over twenty years. This methodology is
10 consistent with sound ratemaking principles and has produced estimates in this case that are
11 reasonable and consistent with historical experience. In contrast, Staff, CUB, and OICIP
12 recommendations represent a complete departure from Commission-approved power supply
13 expense normalization principles. Significantly, the methodologies employed by Staff and the
14 other parties result in the unreasonable assumption that during the period the rates will be in
15 effect Idaho Power will actually make more money selling excess power than it will incur
16 producing and purchasing power for its customers benefit—a situation that has occurred in only
17 two of the past twenty-one years. History, along with knowledge of current drought conditions,
18 demonstrates that the projections of NPSE proposed by Staff, CUB, and OICIP cannot
19 reasonably be expected to occur during the period of time rates will be in effect. As a result, if
20 Staff, CUB, or OICIP’s recommendations for net power supply expenses are adopted by this
21 Commission, Idaho Power will have no realistic opportunity to recover its reasonably incurred
22 power expenses or earn its rate of return. For these reasons, this Commission should reject the
23 recommendations for NPSE made by Staff, CUB, and OICIP. Instead, Idaho Power’s
24 recommended NPSE should be adopted for inclusion in rates by this Commission.

1 In addition to their arguments regarding power supply expenses, CUB and OICIP take
2 issue with the Company's filing in several other respects. Specifically, OICIP recommends that
3 the Commission disallow expenses associated with Idaho Power's Danskin Power Plant and
4 reject Idaho Power's proposed time-of-use rates for its industrial customers taking service under
5 Schedule 19. CUB asks that the Commission reject Idaho Power's proposed seasonal rates for
6 residential customers taking service under Schedule 1. Idaho Power requests that the
7 Commission reject these arguments and affirm and adopt the rates proposed by Idaho Power in
8 its Application, as modified by the Stipulation, and adopt the rate design proposed by Idaho
9 Power in its entirety.

10 BACKGROUND

11 Idaho Power filed its Application requesting a general rate increase and revised tariff
12 schedules on September 21, 2004. In support of its request, the Company filed the testimony of
13 ten witnesses and supporting exhibits. The Commission suspended the tariff schedules for nine
14 months to allow for an investigation into the reasonableness of the filing.² CUB and OICIP have
15 intervened and fully participated in the case.

16 On February 2, 2005, Staff, CUB, and OICIP circulated settlement proposals to all
17 parties, and the parties met for settlement negotiations on February 14 and 24. As a result of
18 those settlement negotiations, the Parties entered into a Stipulation to resolve most of the issues
19 raised.³ Among the issues settled were numerous revenue requirement issues including rate of
20 return, net to gross factors, and various expenses, including those related to employee incentive
21 pension, pay and salary structure expenses, legal expenses, and nonlabor and A&G expenses.
22 The parties also settled various non-revenue requirement issues, including marginal expense
23
24

25 ² On June 6, 2005, Idaho Power agreed to extend this suspension until July 29, 2005. *See Idaho Power's Revised*
Statement Agreeing to Extend Tariff Suspension Period, filed June 6, 2005.

26 ³ *See Stipulation*, filed May 20, 2005.

1 adjustment, service establishment charge, audit recommendations, and conservation. The only
2 issues identified as not settled were the following:

- 3 1. *Idaho Power's normalized power supply expenses.* Staff, OICIP, and CUB all
4 take issue with Idaho Power's proposed NPSE to be included in rates;
- 5 2. *Seasonal rates for residential customers.* CUB does not agree to the seasonal
6 rates proposed by the Company for residential customers taking service under
7 Schedule 1; and
- 8 3. *Time-of-use rates for industrial customers.* OICIP does not agree to the time-of-
9 use rates proposed for customers taking service under Schedule 19.⁴

10 In addition, OICIP raises three issues that were not initially addressed by Idaho Power's
11 Application and continue to be at issue. Specifically, OICIP contends that: (1) Idaho Power's
12 power quality in its Oregon service territory is insufficient; (2) the Commission should order
13 Idaho Power to work with interested parties to investigate the potential of integrating emergency
14 generators into Idaho Power's system for additional generating capacity; and (3) expenses for the
15 Danskin generating plant should be excluded from rate base.⁵

16 Staff, CUB, and OICIP filed direct testimony on March 15, 2005. Idaho Power filed its
17 rebuttal testimony on April 8, 2005. Staff, CUB, and OICIP filed surrebuttal on April 29, 2005,
18 and the Company filed sursurrebuttal on May 13, 2005. The hearing was held on May 12, 2005.

19 **LEGAL STANDARD**

20 The Commission's function in a rate case involves two primary steps: (1) determining the
21 amount of revenue that the utility is entitled to receive (the utility's "revenue requirement"); and
22 (2) allocating the revenue requirement among the utility's customer classes and designing rates
23 within classes.⁶ The utility's revenue requirement is determined on the basis of the utility's

24 ⁴ *Joint Testimony* at 2.

25 ⁵ *Id.* at 2.

26 ⁶ *In the Matter of the PacifiCorp's Proposal to Restructure and Reprice its Services in Accordance with the Provisions of SB 1149*, OPUC Docket No. UE 116, Order No. 01-787 at 5.

1 investment and expenses.⁷ The purpose of a test year is to provide a basis for determining the
2 revenue requirement. When, as in this case, the test year is based on a historical period, that
3 period is only a starting point for determining the revenue requirement. To ensure that the
4 historical period is reasonably representative of the period during which rates will be in effect,
5 adjustments are made to the test year to include recurring increase in revenues and expenses that
6 are reasonably certain to occur. The same standard is used to exclude nonrecurring revenues and
7 expenses.⁸

8 ARGUMENT

9 A. Idaho Power's Normalized Power Supply Expenses (NPSE) Should be 10 Accepted

11 "Power supply expenses" or normalized power supply expenses ("NPSE") refers to the
12 sum of fuel expenses and purchased power expenses⁹, *minus* the revenue generated from surplus
13 power sales to other entities.¹⁰ In its filing, Idaho Power has included \$47.7 million for power
14 supply expenses. This represents a one percent decrease in power supply expenses from those
15 accepted in 1995 in the Company's last rate case—UE 92. In contrast, Staff has recommended
16 negative \$15.3 million for power expenses, which represents a 132% decrease, while CUB has
17 recommended negative \$18.6 million, which represents a 139% decrease. Fundamentally, Staff
18 and CUB are contending that over the period of time that rates adopted in this case will be in
19 effect, Idaho Power will actually make more money from excess power sales than it will expend
20 producing and purchasing power. This position is completely at odds with historical experience
21 and expected water conditions, and is the result of flawed normalization methodologies.

22
23 ⁷ *Id.*

24 ⁸ *In the Matter of the Application of US West Communications, Inc., for an Increase in Revenue*, OPUC Docket No.
UT 125/UT 80, Order No. 00-191 at 14-15.

25 ⁹ Power supply expenses exclude purchased power expenses associated with PURPA qualifying facilities ("QFs"),
which for ratemaking purposes are quantified separately from other power supply expenses and are treated as fixed
inputs to power supply modeling rather than variable outputs. Idaho Power/121, Said/4.

26 ¹⁰ Idaho Power/12T, Said/4.

1 1. Idaho Power's Normalization Methodology is Consistent with this
2 Commission's Accepted Ratemaking Policies and Produces Reasonable
3 Results.

4 In order to determine its NPSE, Idaho Power utilized a normalization methodology that it
5 has successfully employed in Oregon since 1982. The Company established a representative
6 distribution of annual power expenses by examining 76 hydro supply scenarios (based on water
7 years from 1928-2003) that could occur given 2003 test year loads. The Company then used the
8 mean of that distribution as the NPSE representative of the "normal" central tendency for power
9 supply expenses. The average power supply expense developed through this analysis should be
10 representative of what the company will experience over time.¹¹

11 The market prices for the 76 hydro scenarios were produced by the AURORA model,
12 which incorporates basic economic principles governing the effect of hydro conditions on market
13 prices.¹² Sound economic principles and historical data dictate that there is a close relationship
14 between hydro conditions and the market price of energy in the Pacific Northwest region. When
15 the region – and the Company – have abundant water, higher cost generating plants are not
16 required to satisfy loads. The marginal resource at such times is likely a lower cost coal-fired
17 unit, or even occasionally hydro generation. As a result, the market price for energy will fall to
18 the incremental cost of the marginal resource. Conversely, when the region is in a drought
19 condition, as it is currently, higher cost coal-fired units and gas-fired units will be the marginal
20 resources influencing market prices.¹³

21 It is worth noting that prior to 1982, both the Oregon and Idaho Commissions evaluated a
22 single supply-side scenario assuming a median water condition and a corresponding median
23 water market price curve in order to determine power supply expenses. If power expense
24 variations associated with drought and high water conditions produced symmetrical expense

25 ¹¹ Idaho Power/12T, Said/16.

26 ¹² Idaho Power/200, Said/3; Idaho Power/700, Peseau/3.

¹³ Idaho Power/200, Said/5.

1 impacts, such a methodology could be successfully employed. However, drought conditions in
2 the 1970s demonstrated power expenses and different hydro conditions are not symmetric or
3 linearly related.¹⁴ Instead, expense variations associated with drought conditions varied from the
4 median to a greater extent than expense variations associated with abundant water. That is to
5 say, the expense associated with multiple conditions was different and higher than the average
6 expense associated with a single median condition.¹⁵ It is for precisely this reason that both
7 Commissions rejected the “single supply-side scenario” (such as the method proposed by Staff in
8 this case) and instead adopted the methodology proposed by Idaho Power.

9 It is significant that the Company’s use of the AURORA model produced modeled power
10 supply expenses that are generally consistent with actual power supply expenses the Company
11 has experienced in the past. In fact, the model is conservative in its results. For example, the
12 lowest modeled annual net power supply expense of negative \$7.0 million is within \$13.6
13 million of the amount actually experienced by the Company. On the other end, the highest
14 annual net power supply expense the Company has experienced is \$279.5 million, which is
15 \$131.7 million above the modeled extreme.¹⁶

16 Near-term historical data provides strong evidence that rates modeled by the Company
17 can reasonably be expected to occur in the future. The data shows that the range of modeled
18 power supply expenses is consistent with power supply expenses the Company has actually
19 experienced.¹⁷

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21 ///

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23 ///

24 ¹⁴ Idaho Power/700, Peseau/3.

25 ¹⁵ Idaho Power/200, Said/4.

26 ¹⁶ Idaho Power/200, Said/8; Idaho Power /201, Said/1.

¹⁷ Idaho Power/600, Said/7-8; Idaho Power/702, Peseau/1.

1 2. Staff's and Intervenors' Proposed Normalization Methods are Inconsistent
2 with this Commission's Approved Methodology and Produce
3 Unreasonable Results.

4 Staff proposes to decrease the Company's overall NPSE by \$63.0 million, which would
5 result in a normalized NPSE of negative \$15.3 million.¹⁸ CUB recommends a reduction of \$66
6 million, with pricing based on NWPPC's projections for the Southern Idaho Region.¹⁹ OICIP
7 recommends rejection of power supply modeling, but proposed repricing as per conversations
8 with Staff.²⁰ The positions of these parties should be rejected.²¹

9 Rather than use the Commission-approved methodology for computing the Company's
10 normalized NPSE, Staff urges the Commission to return to a pre-1982 approach to compute
11 variable power expenses using a single average water year. In addition, Staff recommends that,
12 instead of using the AURORA model to compute power supply expenses for a range of
13 conditions, the Commission should use a single "average" water year scenario using April 30,
14 2004 forward price curves for the year 2005.

15 The so-called average transaction prices produced by Staff's methodology are much
16 higher than those produced by AURORA and, more significantly, are at the extreme of historical
17 experience, excluding 2000-2001 when market prices were distorted in California and the
18 western United States. Using the Company's modeling over the full range of water conditions,
19 the annual transaction rate was \$22.90 per MWh. The annual modeled transaction rate for a
20 single median water year (the 1967 water condition) was \$23.85 per MWh. In contrast, Staff's
21 forward price curves for the calendar year 2005 use average on-peak prices of \$47.33 per MWh
22 and off-peak prices of \$39.72 per MWh.²² Staff's forward transaction price assumptions result in

23 ¹⁸ Staff/200, Galbraith/15.

24 ¹⁹ CUB/100, Jenks-Brown/3-4.

25 ²⁰ Idaho Power/200, Said/18; OICIP/Direct1, Reading/24.

26 ²¹ Because the positions of CUB, OICIP, and Staff on normalized net power supply expenses do not materially differ, Idaho Power's arguments with regard to Staff's proposals apply equally to CUB and OICIP. Idaho Power/200, Said/18.

²² Idaho Power/200, Said/12-13.

1 a level of net power expenses that has only been experienced by the Company twice in the past
2 21 years, the two highest water years on record.²³

3 Staff's methodology also yields a result that is inconsistent with Staff's stated goal. In the
4 2003 test year, the actual annual transaction price for purchases and sales was \$41.18 per
5 MWh.²⁴ Notably, this test year was a drought year, and one of the primary goals of Staff's
6 normalization analysis was to move from these drought conditions to an average water year.²⁵
7 But in fact, the annual transaction rate for purchases and sales under Staff's normalization
8 scenario was \$42.21 per MWh, \$1.03 more per MWh than the actual.²⁶ In other words, Staff's
9 analysis does not result in a test year that is representative of an "average" water year, but rather
10 results in a test year that assumes higher transaction rates than those actually experienced by
11 Idaho Power during a drought year.

12 These anomalous results are the product of two basic flaws in Staff's normalization
13 methodology. First, Staff's proposed methodology ignores the asymmetric nature of the
14 relationship between hydro expenses and water supplies, and would return the Commission to a
15 means of computing power expenses rejected more than twenty years ago as not representative
16 of actual power expenses. Second, Staff's proposal uses a single market price derived from
17 forward price curves in the place of modeled market prices. This approach fundamentally
18 mismatches a single projected hydro supply scenario's "average" that is unlikely to occur during
19 the period in which the rates will be in effect with a price forecast based upon current hydro
20 conditions that are not average. A number of problems flow from this apples-to-oranges
21 comparison that are described in more detail below.

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²³ Idaho Power/300, Peseau/8.

²⁴ Idaho Power/203, Said/1; Hearing Tr. at 17.

²⁵ Hearing Tr. at 17.

²⁶ Hearing Tr. at 17.

1 a. Staff's Single Average Water Year Analysis Underestimates
2 Power Supply Expenses

3 Staff proposes to use a single average water year, rather than multiple water year
4 scenarios, to compute NPSE. This methodology will always underestimate power expenses
5 because of asymmetric distribution of expenses associated with drought conditions. As
6 described above, power expenses and hydro conditions are not linearly related.²⁷ The average
7 expense associated with multiple water scenarios is, in fact, different and *higher* than the
8 expenses associated with a single average water year. This is precisely the reason that the
9 Company and OPUC rejected the use of a single median water supply scenario in favor of a
10 multiple water year scenario analysis.²⁸

11 Staff admits that the use of a single scenario reduces the impact of variability of water
12 conditions on a load resource balance computation.²⁹ Staff further admits that it would be
13 preferable to take into account multiple water year scenarios than to use a simple average
14 scenario to compute NPSE.³⁰ To address these flaws in its analysis, Staff proposes the use of
15 Staff's inputs to the AURORA model in the 76 scenarios developed by the Company as an
16 alternative to its use of a single average water year.³¹ Significantly, this change would result in
17 an almost \$40 million dollar difference in Staff's proposed adjustment to the Company's NPSE,
18 to a decrease of \$23.2 million. The Company believes that Staff's inputs to the model are
19 themselves flawed, and Staff has made no attempt to justify the accuracy of its inputs.³²
20 However, the nearly \$40 million dollar adjustment to Staff's proposed adjustment does
21 demonstrate that importance of the use of a multiple-year scenario analysis to capture the impact
22 of the asymmetric distribution of expenses associated with variable hydro supplies.

23 ²⁷ Idaho Power/700, Peseau/3.

24 ²⁸ Idaho Power/200, Said/4-6; Idaho Power/700, Peseau/4.

25 ²⁹ Hearing Tr. at 11.

26 ³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ Staff/300, Galbraith/15.

³² Idaho Power/600, Said/11-12; Staff/300, Galbraith/15.

1 Another problem with the use of forward price curves is that this “flat” pricing (the
2 average of on- and off-peak pricing) does not reflect that surplus would likely be sold off-peak,
3 where pricing is lower.³⁶

4 Finally, the use of forward curves represents a mismatching of types of data. Price
5 curves are best understood as a forecast of pricing that can realistically be expected to occur in
6 the near-term.³⁷ However, Staff applies this forecast data to a single, average water year that is
7 not likely to occur in the near-term.³⁸ This mismatching of data results in inaccurate results
8 which cannot be realistically used as a normalization of the test year.

9 3. Staff’s Adjustment to the Company’s NPSE Should be Rejected Because
10 it Results in Expenses that are Unreasonable and Unlikely to Occur
During the Period in which Rates Will be in Effect.

11 Clearly, as shown above, Staff’s (and CUB’s) proposed NPSE should be rejected as the
12 product of a faulty methodology. In addition, a realistic assessment of the region’s current
13 drought conditions underscores the unreasonableness of Staff’s recommendation. In 2003, the
14 Company incurred actual power expenses of approximately \$150 million; 2004 actual power
15 expenses were \$141.8. No party has disputed the Company’s current year power expense
16 estimate of \$169 million.³⁹ Moreover, none of the parties dispute that current drought conditions
17 will substantially *increase* power supply expenses over the next two years. In fact, Staff admits
18 that it does not expect the Company to achieve in 2005 or 2006 the level of surplus sales that
19 would be necessary to achieve the level of NPSE Staff recommends.⁴⁰

20 Moreover, the Company has stated its intention, both in this case and in its application for
21 deferred accounting (UM 1198), to file a new rate case in 2005.⁴¹ Therefore, the rates adopted in

22 ³⁶ Idaho Power/300, Peseau/17-18.

23 ³⁷ Idaho Power/600, Said/4-5.

24 ³⁸ Idaho Power/600, Said/7.

25 ³⁹ Idaho Power/600, Said/2.

26 ⁴⁰ Hearing Tr. at 24-27.

⁴¹ *In the Matter of Idaho Power Company Authorization to Defer for Future Rate Recovery of Certain Net Excess Power Supply Expenses*, OPUC Docket No. UM 1198, Testimony of Michael J. Youngblood, Idaho Power/1, Youngblood/1-9 (filed March 2, 2005).

1 this case are likely to be in effect only during 2005 and 2006. And yet remarkably, even though
2 actual power expenses are expected to be in excess of this year's \$169 million, Staff
3 recommends a normalized NPSE of negative \$15.3 million. Power expenses at this level have
4 actually been incurred by Idaho Power in only two of the past twenty-one years, 1983 and 1984,
5 which are the two highest water years on record.⁴² Clearly, then, Staff's theoretical objections to
6 the Company's AURORA model have resulted in Staff proposing an adjustment to the
7 Company's NPSE that is completely out of line with realistic projections of actual power
8 expenses the Company is likely to incur. Quite simply, Staff's proposal would create a situation
9 where the Company would have no reasonable opportunity to recover its power supply expense
10 or earn its authorized rate of return.⁴³

11 Staff's "alternative recommendations," offered in its surrebuttal testimony, highlight the
12 flaws in Staff's suggested methodology. First, Staff suggests the Commission use *Staff's*
13 AURORA projections to normalize NPSE to address Staff's failure to recognize the effect of
14 variations in market pricing. As noted in Section A(2)(a) above, making this adjustment would
15 reduce Staff's recommended decrease to NPSE from \$63.0 million to \$23.2 million.⁴⁴ Second,
16 Staff makes two suggestions to address problems with its use of forward price curves. One
17 would be to reprice project power sales by pricing purchases at on-peak pricing and sales at off-
18 peak pricing. This change would decrease Staff's recommended change to NPSE by \$13.5
19 million (from \$63 to \$49.5). The other would be to use an average of three months of forward
20 price curves instead of a single day's curve. This change would decrease Staff's recommended
21 change to NPSE by \$27.7 million (from \$63 to \$35.3 million).

22 Importantly, each attempt by Staff to "fix" the problems associated with its methodology
23 results in a significant decrease to Staff's recommended change to NPSE. Thus, Staff's
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25 ⁴² Idaho Power/700, Peseau/7; Idaho Power/702, Peseau/1.

⁴³ Idaho Power/600, Said/10.

⁴⁴ Staff/300, Galbraith/13-14.

1 alternative recommendations actually bolster the Company’s arguments by illustrating the fact
2 that Staff’s own methodology consistently underestimates NPSE. For these reasons, Staff’s
3 proposed NPSE should be rejected.

4 **B. The Danskin Plant Should be Included in the Company’s Rate Base**

5 The Danskin Power Plant (“Danskin”) is a gas-fired peaking facility that was built by the
6 Company to respond to increasing system peaks and reliability concerns.⁴⁵ Danskin is typically
7 operated only as a “resource of last resort,” meaning that it is operated when there is no
8 transmission available or when the market prices are high enough to justify its use.⁴⁶ The
9 Company built the plant after its 2000 and 2002 Integrated Resource Plans (“IRPs”) identified
10 the need for a simple-cycle natural gas-fired combustion turbine as a expense-effective means of
11 meeting summer peaks. These IRPs were acknowledged by the Idaho and Oregon Commissions,
12 and the Idaho Commission granted a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for
13 Danskin in 2001. More recently the Idaho Commission approved the inclusion of the plant in the
14 Company’s rate base.⁴⁷

15 Danskin provides a variety of benefits to the Company’s customers. As a peaking
16 resource, it enables the Company to meet loads and provides the capacity margin necessary to
17 avoid outages and interruptions during high summer peaks.⁴⁸ Because Danskin is close in
18 proximity to the Company’s load center, it provides voltage support, which is important to
19 prevent voltage collapse (a situation that may lead to customer outages).⁴⁹ Danskin also serves
20 as a hedge against extremes of wholesale prices, such as those seen during the Western Power
21 Market crisis in 2000 and 2001.⁵⁰ Finally, even though the Company expects that Danskin will

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23 ⁴⁵ Idaho Power/12T, Said/7-14; Idaho Power/200, Said/22.

24 ⁴⁶ Idaho Power/12T, Said/7-14.

25 ⁴⁷ *In the Matter of the Application of Idaho Power Company for Authorization to Increase its Interim and Base Rates and Charges for Electric Service*, IPUC Docket No. IPC-E-03-13, Order No. 29505.

26 ⁴⁸ Idaho Power/12T, Said/16-17; Idaho Power/200, Said/20, 24-25.

⁴⁹ Idaho Power/200, Said/25.

⁵⁰ Idaho Power/200, Said/25.

1 be operated less frequently when the new Bennett Mountain Plant becomes operational, it will
2 still dispatch during peak times, particularly because of increasing summer peaks.⁵¹

3 Danskin should be added to Idaho Power's rate base because it is a used and useful
4 facility that continues to provide important peak power supplies.⁵² A plant should be considered
5 useful if it provides current benefits and there is an expectation that the plant's output will be
6 necessary within a reasonable period of time. The plant should be considered used if it has been
7 connected to the utility's system and has transmitted power to the utility.⁵³ Danskin is clearly
8 both used and useful. It has been a key peaking resource for Idaho Power in prior years and has
9 enabled the company to meet loads and prevent outages. The company expects that it will
10 continue to supply power in this manner.

11 OICIP argues that Danskin should not be included in rate base because of the expense
12 associated with the facility. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, as a peaking
13 facility, the expenses associated with Danskin cannot appropriately be compared with a base-
14 loaded generation plant. Second, the Danskin plant provides a number of important benefits to
15 customers, including necessary capacity margin and voltage support. Depending on the hydro
16 supplies for summer 2005, the capacity margin provided by Danskin may be necessary to avoid
17 outages or interruptions of service.⁵⁴ Finally, it is important to note that the Idaho Commission,
18 which had an in-depth understanding of the Danskin plant and the events leading up to the
19 decision to develop the plant, rejected OICIP's identical arguments in the Company's last rate
20 case.⁵⁵

21 It is also important to keep in mind that the decision to develop Danskin must be assessed
22 according to the facts that were known at the time. In 2000 and 2001, the price for wholesale

23 ⁵¹ Idaho Power/200, Said/25.

24 ⁵² ORS 757.355 (2005); see *In re Portland General Electric Co.*, UE 47, Order 87-1017, 86 PUR 4th 463 (page
numbers not available) (Sept. 30, 1987) (discussing used and useful standard).

25 ⁵³ *Id.*

26 ⁵⁴ Idaho Power/200, Said/20.

⁵⁵ Idaho Power/200, Said/20-21.

1 power was extremely high. Though we may now consider those prices to be aberrations, in
2 2001, when the decision to proceed with the plant was finalized, there was no certainty that the
3 prices would retreat significantly, particularly given the uncertainty over the future of FERC-
4 imposed market price caps and the adverse impact of low water conditions.⁵⁶ A decision to stop
5 work on the plant in 2001, as OICIP argues the Company should have made,⁵⁷ would have been
6 imprudent and unreasonable given the remaining uncertainties in the market, continued high
7 forward prices, and the considerable amount of expenses already incurred.⁵⁸

8 **C. Proposed Changes in Rate Design**

9 The Company proposes two changes to its rate design intended to further the general goal
10 of more closely matching rates with the expenses incurred to provide the services: (1) the
11 Company proposes to move certain customer classes (Schedules 1, 7, 9, 19) to a seasonal rate
12 design; and (2) the Company proposes to implement time-of-use rates for all Schedule 19
13 industrial customers.⁵⁹ These changes should give customers clearer price signals, reduce
14 subsidies within customer classes, and result in a more equitable recovery of the expenses
15 incurred to provide the services.⁶⁰

16 1. Seasonal Rate Design

17 Idaho Power faces its greatest load peaks during the months of June, July, and August.
18 Load demands during these months are driving the Company's efforts to seek new peaking
19 resources and try to reduce usage at peak times by implementing more demand-side management
20 programs.⁶¹ Peaking resources, such as the Danskin Plant discussed in Section B, are generally
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23 ⁵⁶ Idaho Power/200, Said/21, 23.

24 ⁵⁷ OICIP/Direct1, Reading/11.

25 ⁵⁸ Idaho Power/200, Said/22-24.

26 ⁵⁹ Idaho Power/29T, Pengilly/4-7.

⁶⁰ Idaho Power/29T, Pengilly/4.

⁶¹ Idaho Power/29T, Pengilly/5; Idaho Power/400, Pengilly/1-2.

1 more expensive than the Company's base load resources. For this reason, power supply
2 expenses are also highest for the Company during these three summer months.⁶²

3 The proposed seasonal rate would raise rates during the summer months to reflect these
4 higher expenses. By raising prices during June, July, and August, the Company hopes to send
5 more accurate price signals to its customers that illustrate, quite simply, that electricity expenses
6 are higher during the summer. The Company intends for these price signals to encourage
7 conservation of electricity during high peak months and to further the Company's overall rate
8 design goals of more closely matching rates and expenses.⁶³

9 CUB argues against the proposed seasonal rate because CUB "believes" that the seasonal
10 rate will not prompt greater conservation among Oregon residential customers.⁶⁴ CUB's
11 intuitive theory is that it is only the amount of the bill that matters, not the amount of the rate.⁶⁵
12 Because Oregon residential customers' load peaks in the winter, CUB thinks that the large size
13 of the winter bills will overshadow any price signals stimulated by higher summer bills. In
14 addition, CUB posits that raising the rates in summer bills could undermine price signals sent by
15 winter bills, because a reduction in the difference between the bills would lessen the impact of
16 the winter bill.⁶⁶ CUB is also concerned that introducing a seasonal rate would complicate bills
17 and confuse customers.⁶⁷

18 The Company has seen no evidence to suggest that customers focus exclusively on the
19 size of their bill and ignore changes in rates, or that higher summer rates will lessen the impact of
20 winter bills. Rather, the Company's experience is that customers respond to both bills *and*
21 rates.⁶⁸ The Company's experience with seasonal rates in Idaho also contradicts CUB's
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23 ⁶² Idaho Power/29T, Pengilly/5.

24 ⁶³ Idaho Power/800, Pengilly/2.

25 ⁶⁴ CUB/200, Jenks-Brown/3.

26 ⁶⁵ CUB/100, Jenks-Brown/5-6.

⁶⁶ CUB/200, Jenks-Brown/3.

⁶⁷ CUB/100, Jenks-Brown/6.

⁶⁸ Idaho Power/800, Pengilly/2.

1 contention that customers will find seasonal rates confusing.⁶⁹ Moreover, CUB's intuitive
2 arguments do not address the Company's essential premise that rate design should strive to more
3 closely link rates and expenses. Conservation is not the only reason to implement a seasonal
4 rate. The seasonal rate furthers the goal of creating rates that are more closely linked with
5 expenses, which in turn reduces subsidies within classes and provides for more equitable
6 recovery of expenses over time.⁷⁰ These goals are independent of whether more accurate price
7 signals result in greater conservation.

8 CUB's arguments against the proposed seasonal rates are unsupported and should be
9 rejected.

10 2. Time-of-Use Rates

11 The Company proposes to implement seasonal time-of-use rates for Schedule 19
12 customers that will more accurately reflect the fact that expenses to provide energy vary during
13 the day and from season to season. The time-of-use rates will be higher during the summer than
14 during the rest of the year and will be higher during the peak time of day to reflect that Idaho
15 Power incurs higher expenses to provide the service during these times. Seasonal time-of-use
16 rates have been in place for Schedule 19 customers in Idaho since December 1, 2004. However,
17 this rate design has not been in place in Idaho long enough to draw conclusions about the effect
18 of the new rate on customers' usage patterns.⁷¹

19 OICIP argues that the purpose of the time-of-use rates is to cause customers to curtail
20 consumption during on-peak hours and that the rate is ineffective for this purpose. OICIP
21 contends that Schedule 19 customers are unlikely to respond to price signals because they are
22 high-load customers who operate around the clock. Like CUB's arguments with regard to
23 seasonal rates, this argument fundamentally misunderstands the purpose of implementing this
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25 ⁶⁹ Idaho Power/400, Pengilly/3.

26 ⁷⁰ Idaho Power/29T, Pengilly/4.

⁷¹ Idaho Power/400, Pengilly/4.

1 new rate design. Like the Company's proposed seasonal rate, the proposed time-of-use rates are
2 intended to more closely match the prices customers pay with the expenses incurred by the
3 Company to provide the service, thereby improving equitable distribution of expenses over
4 time.⁷² One consequence of time-of-use rates is that they will provide more accurate price
5 signals to customers. However, this does not mean the purpose of implementing the rate is to
6 curtail use. In fact, the rate has been designed not to penalize customers who do not alter their
7 patterns of use, but instead to offer an incentive to customers who do change.

8 In Idaho, "dummy" bills with a comparison between flat seasonal rates and seasonal
9 time-of-use rates were in place for Idaho Schedule 19 customers from June 1 to December 1,
10 2004, as a phase-in to the implementation of actual time-of-use pricing. OICIP contends that the
11 "dummy" billing in place in Idaho demonstrated that time-of-use rates will not be effective in
12 curtailing load.⁷³ The Company has seen no evidence that time-of-use rates will not be effective
13 in influencing customers' usage patterns. The primary purpose of time-of-use rates is to provide
14 a more accurate match between price and expense with the expectation that the better matching
15 may lead to changes in usage over time.⁷⁴ Even if curtailing load at peak times was the primary
16 purpose of time-of-use rates, the "dummy" billing process simply cannot be used to draw
17 conclusions. While the "dummy" bills informed customers what the time-of-use rates would be,
18 the customers were not billed actual time-of-use rates. Therefore, the "dummy" bills did not
19 send a true price signal.⁷⁵

20 The Company does not intend or expect that time-of-use rates will produce changes in
21 customers' usage patterns in the short term. The hope is that over the long term, customers that
22 are able will make changes in their business to take advantage of the price incentives.⁷⁶ This
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24 ⁷² Idaho Power/800, Pengilly/4.

25 ⁷³ OICIP/Direct1, Reading/17-19

26 ⁷⁴ Idaho Power/19T, Pengilly/4

⁷⁵ Idaho Power/800, Pengilly/5.

⁷⁶ Idaho Power/400, Pengilly/3.

1 goal is consistent with the Company's long-range planning objectives. The time-of-use rates
2 should therefore be adopted.

3 **D. Power Quality in Idaho Power Service Territory**

4 OICIP claims Schedule 19 customers have experienced "poor power quality" and that the
5 Commission should work with Idaho Power to address this issue.⁷⁷ Idaho Power believes that it
6 supplies service that meets or exceeds Oregon requirements and believes that the circumstances
7 described by OICIP can best be handled by direct communication between the Company and any
8 concerned customers.⁷⁸

9 In support of its claim, OICIP provides "outage" data from one customer, Ore-Ida Frozen
10 Foods ("Ore-Ida"), which is difficult to reconcile with data assembled by the Company. Part of
11 the problem is that the term "outage" is used differently by OICIP and the Company. The
12 Company uses "outage" to describe a situation in which power is not supplied to a customer. In
13 the case of Ore-Ida, OICIP uses the term much more broadly to apply to an event that causes
14 Ore-Ida's production lines to cease operation or shut down. Production line shut-downs such as
15 this may be caused by events both internal and external to Ore-Ida's facility, including anomalies
16 in supply voltage delivered by Idaho Power. However, according to standards developed by the
17 Computer Based Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) and measured by the ION
18 meter at the Ore-Ida Substation, many of the "outages" described by OICIP occurred while the
19 voltage supplied by Idaho Power was within the range at which Ore-Ida's equipment should not
20 have gone off-line. That said, the Company has previously expressed a willingness to work with
21 Ore-Ida to rectify production line problems and is committed to continuing its ongoing program
22 of working proactively with Ore-Ida, and its other customers, to resolve power quality problems
23 in the future.⁷⁹

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25 ⁷⁷ OICIP/Direct 1, Reading/25.

26 ⁷⁸ Idaho Power/900, Kolar/1.

⁷⁹ Idaho Power/900, Kolar/4.

1 For these reasons, the Commission should reject OICIP's arguments regarding service
2 quality.

3 **CONCLUSION**

4 Respectfully submitted this 13th day of June, 2005.

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