BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

UM 1226

UTILITY REFORM PROJECT and KEN LEWIS,

Complainants/Applicants,

٧.

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.,

Defendant.

COMPLAINANTS' RESPONSE TO PGE'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS, ABATE, OR MAKE MORE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN

I. OVERVIEW.

PGE'S Amended Motion to Dismiss, Abate, or Make More Definite and Certain [hereinafter "PGE Motion" or just PGE and a page reference], p. 2, claims that it cannot understand the Complaint, because the Complaint states that PGE's rates are unjust and unreasonable, as of September 5, 2005, only once. Brevity is the hallmark of clarity. In light of subsequent developments, however, including the Commission's issuance of OPUC Order No. 06-379 and the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in *Dreyer v. Portland General Electric Company*, --- P.3d ---, 2006 WL 2507055, Complainants ("we") do not object to filing an amended complaint to make our claims more definite and certain.

All of PGE's arguments should be evaluated in light of OPUC Order No. 06-379 and *Drever*. In OPUC Order No. 06-379, the Commission granted the creation

of a deferred account in nearly the precise circumstances presented here, except that the deferred account contained money to the credit of the utility, while the deferred account we seek will contain money to the credit of the ratepayers. In both cases, the amount to be deferred for later recovery/crediting in rates is the same: The difference between the amount to be charged to ratepayers for "federal income taxes" and "state income taxes" under (a) the OPUC's past methodology¹ and (b) the requirements of SB 408 during the period commencing during the period after the effective date of SB 408 but before the effective date of the automatic adjustment clause for the utility that the OPUC must eventually create under the terms of SB 408.

It is not known what effective date the Commission will choose for the amounts to be accounted for in the SB 408 automatic adjustment clauses. Section 4 (2) of SB 408 requires that "the automatic adjustment clause shall apply only to taxes paid to units of government and collected from ratepayers on or after January 1, 2006." The Commission could attempt to make the effective date some date later than January 1, 2006, as that would semantically qualify as "on or after January 1, 2006." So we do not know for what period of time the automatic adjustment clauses will kick in.

^{1.} The Commission has referred to this as the "stand-alone" methodology, but other commissions, including FERC, refer to it as the "separate return" methodology.

If the Commission does adopt January 1, 2006, as the effective date, then we can disregard all of PGE's arguments about ownership by Enron, as the entire period at issue in this case will be during the 100% Enron ownership of PGE phase. If the Commission adopts some date later than April 2006, then this case will need to separately examine the differences between taxes charged to ratepayers and taxes actually paid during (1) the Enron 100% ownership period and (2) the Enron 57% ownership period. But the extent to which Enron owned or owns PGE is not material. What is material is the difference between taxes charged to ratepayers and taxes actually paid.

SB 408 creates a new category or species of unacceptable rates, which the Commission recognized in OPUC Order No. 06-379 and in OPUC Order No. 05-1050: Rates which include an amount for income taxes other than "taxes that are paid to units of government." OPUC Order No. 06-379, p. 2. By deeming that "fair, just and reasonable" rates can include only such amounts to be charged to ratepayers for income taxes, SB 408 effectively deems unacceptable rates which include larger amounts than the utility (or its consolidated tax filer) actually pay in such taxes. SB 408 thus significantly changes the entire concept of "fair, just and reasonable," as applied by the Commission. The Commission has used these terms to evaluate the overall fairness or justness or reasonableness of rates but not to determine whether rates are acceptable or even allowable based on the presence of absence of one particular element of cost (or alleged cost). SB 408

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changes those terms, however, so that rates which include a particular item of cost (assumed taxes higher than actually paid taxes) are automatically not "fair, just and reasonable" and therefore are not allowed under Oregon statutes and are beyond the power of the OPUC to authorize the utility to charge. A term that accurately describes such an element of cost that cannot lawfully be included in rates is "unlawful."

Thus, when our Complaint (p. 1) alleged that "PGE's rates, since September 2, 2005, and continuing to the present, are not just and reasonable and are in violation of SB 408 (2005), because they contain approximately \$92.6 million in annual charges for state and federal income taxes that are not being paid to any government," we were using "just and reasonable" in the new sense--the sense required by SB 408. SB 408 does not envision or even allow the usual overall balancing test applied to determine whether utility rates are "just and reasonable" as a whole, and our allegations were not related to any sort of overall balancing test. Instead, our allegations were focused on the element of alleged cost that SB 408 deems to be not allowed in rates under Oregon law: amounts for income taxes that the utility or consolidated tax filer does not actually pay. Perhaps clarity would be served by referring to rates which include the forbidden amount as "unlawful charges" or "unauthorized rates," so that there is no confusion between the old "just and reasonable test" and the new "fair, just and reasonable" exclusion of unpaid taxes from rates. Our Amended Complaint will seek to maintain such clarity.

Page 4 COMPLAINANTS' RESPONSE TO PGE AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS, ABATE, OR MAKE MORE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN

II. PGE'S SPECIFIC STATEMENTS.

PGE (p. 2) claims "Enron no longer owns PGE." This is not material to the Complaint. We assume that the automatic adjustment clause will properly account for the divergence between PGE's income tax charges to ratepayers and its income tax payments to government, commencing January 1, 2006, or perhaps a later date. Under that assumption, the period of time addressed by the Complaint is September 2, 2005, until the effective date of an implemented automatic adjustment clause that removes the unpaid "income tax" charges from rates.² The OPUC in the AR 499 proceeding has indicates that such an automatic adjustment clause will have an effective date of January 1, 2006, although that could change. We shall refer to this as the "Pre-Adjustment Clause Period" or PACP. During that time, PGE remained wholly-owned by Enron.

Also, it remains to be seen whether PGE will, as it claims, "file its own federal and state tax returns and make no payments to a parent entity." So far, that has not happened. If and when any entity actually pays to units of government the "income taxes" PGE is charging to ratepayers, the situation will indeed be different than it is now. But that has not happened.

PGE then refers to the administrative rules to implement the automatic adjustment clause portion of SB 408. That is also irrelevant, because the

^{2.} Alternatively, the starting date for amounts to be credited to the deferred account may be the date of the request for deferred accounting, which was October 5, 2005.

Commission has already determined that a different part of SB 408 took effect on September 5, 2005, which requires that "rates must reflect the taxes paid to units of government in order to be fair, just and reasonable." OPUC Order No. 05-1050, p. 18. This section of SB 408 is in addition to the parts requiring the adoption of automatic adjustment clauses. PGE (p. 2) claims:

The automatic adjustment clause, based upon prior year collections and tax payments, is the exclusive ratemaking method under SB 408 for making income tax adjustments.

Obviously, PGE's statement completely contradicts the conclusion of the Commission in OPUC Order No. 05-1050 and OPUC Order No. 06-379. Further, the automatic adjustment clause portion of SB 408 is limited to the period commencing January 1, 2006.

PGE then refers to its next general rate case. Again, that is irrelevant to the Complaint, which refers to the unlawful status of PGE's rates since September 5, 2005. This Complaint is not relevant to rates which PGE wishes to implement on January 16, 2007.

PGE (p. 3) contends that "allegations regarding the past are irrelevant," but clearly they are not. Our challenge to the lawfulness of the charges in the past, after September 2, 2005, has been preserved by our filing of the Complaint and timely request for deferred accounting. If "allegations regarding the past are irrelevant," then PGE should immediately forfeit all funds owed to it by ratepayers in

existing deferred accounts, and PGE should be prohibited from ever requesting deferred accounts in the future. PGE can't have it both ways.

PGE (p. 4) appears to believe that a Complaint initiates a rate case, but it need not, and the Complaint does not request a rate case. It requests a contested case hearing, which is not the same. The Complaint seeks an OPUC conclusion that the rates charged by PGE for the PACP are unlawful, under SB 408.³ The Oregon Supreme Court has recently made clear that such a legal conclusion may either trigger the availability of refunds or other relief from the Commission or may form the basis for ratepayer suit pursuant to ORS 756.185. The implementation of either remedy does not require a rate case or changes to rates. As the Court noted:

If the PUC determines that it can provide a remedy to ratepayers, then the present actions may become moot in whole or in part. If, on the other hand, the PUC determines that it cannot provide a remedy, and that decision becomes final, then the court system may have a role to play. Certainly, after the PUC has made its ruling, plaintiffs will retain the right to return to the circuit court for disposition of whatever issues remain unresolved, including the question of a fee award.

Dreyer v. Portland General Electric Company, --- P.3d ----, 2006 WL 2507055 (Or 2006) [hereinafter *Dreyer*]. The determination of a refund or damages in a subsequent suit under ORS 756.185 does not amount to "ratemaking," said the Court.

^{3.} If necessary, we will file an Amended Complaint with this included in the relief requested list at the end.

PGE argues, finally, that dismissal is required because plaintiffs' claims pertain to matters of utility regulation that are the exclusive province of the PUC (and, thus, are beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit court). PGE begins that argument with a proposition that is beyond serious dispute-that ratemaking is a quasi-legislative function that is vested in the PUC by statute. But PGE then moves on to a more debatable proposition, namely, that any resolution of the present action necessarily will involve ratemaking. PGE contends that that is so because "the jury will have to decide what rates the PUC would or should have set if it had not made an error in [PUC] Order [No.] 95-322."

We disagree. Although a jury theoretically could go about deciding the damage question in the manner suggested, *i.e.*, by determining what a "fair and reasonable" rate would have been if the objectionable return on Trojan had been excluded and then comparing that rate to the one actually charged during the relevant period, it also could simply attempt to determine what part of the rates that the PUC had approved as "fair and reasonable" in fact represented a return on PGE's investment in Trojan and, therefore, were unlawful under ORS 757.355 (1993), as interpreted in *Citizens' Utility Board*, 154 Or.App. 702. The first approach arguably would invade the PUC's exclusive ratemaking authority, but we are not persuaded that the latter approach would involve a similar trespass.

Id. (emphasis added). The Complaint does not seek to initiate a rate case, based on any test year, but to recover for ratepayers PGE's unlawful charges during the PACP. As the Court in **Dreyer** made absolutely clear, rates which the OPUC deems to be "fair and reasonable" can nevertheless be unlawful and therefore entitle ratepayers to relief in some forum.

The Complaint has no concern about PGE's corporate structure; it concerns only the lack of correlation between PGE's tax charges to ratepayers and the tax payments by PGE or on behalf of PGE to government entities during the PACP.

The Complaint does allege that PGE is charging ratepayers for income taxes that

are not being paid, contrary to PGE's flatly wrong assertion. If PGE needs clarification, then Complainants refer PGE to Complaint, p. 1.

PGE's citation (pp. 4-5) of an URP filing in UM 1206 is irrelevant, as it has nothing to do with the PACP.

PGE (p. 5) asserts that the SB 408 automatic adjustment clause rules "will address the issue the Complaint raises." Clearly not. Those rules apply to rates collected on or after the effective date of the automatic adjustment clause, which may be January 1, 2006 or some later date. Those rules do not apply to the PACP. The Commission in OPUC Order No. 06-379 rejected a similar argument by PacifiCorp. To the extent such automatic adjustment clauses are actually implemented and actually reduce or eliminate the divergence between the "income taxes" PGE charges to ratepayer and the "income taxes" PGE actually pays to government, then ratepayers will be entitled to less relief under this Complaint. But, since the automatic adjustment clause cannot reach back prior to January 1, 2006, ratepayers will be entitled to at least some relief under this Complaint.

PGE (pp. 6-7) tries to shoehorn the Complaint into the UE 180 rate case. But the Complaint addresses the period commencing September 2, 2005, not the period commencing sometime in 2007. Whatever PGE charged to ratepayers, commencing September 2, 2005, would surely be ruled irrelevant in UE 180, as it involves future rates under a future test period. This is, of course, a version of the

"intervenors must participate in every OPUC rate proceeding and must appeal every order" argument that the Oregon Supreme Court soundly rejected in *Dreyer*.

PGE (p. 7) claims that the last 4 months of 2005 are "irrelevant to URP's complaint," because "we are more than nine months past the date on which the SB 408 automatic adjustment clause became operative." In the real world, there are no SB 408 automatic adjustment clauses operative, as the Commission has adopted none. And, of course, those clauses cannot address the period prior to January 1, 2006. The Complaint need not "turn back the clock to the fall of 2005," because it was filed in the fall of 2005 and properly requested creation of a deferred account. The only reason time has passed is because the Commission decided to abate this docket, pending the outcome of rehearing and reconsideration in UE 170.

PGE (p. 8) raises the specter of "retroactive ratemaking." Because we timely filed for deferred accounting, the statutes expressly authorize such ratemaking. Having established the deferred account and placed in it the amounts PGE charged in violation of SB 408, prior to the effective date of the automatic adjustment clause, if and when that is adopted by the Commission, the amount owed to ratepayers in the deferred account could be returned to ratepayers in any rate proceeding.

The UCB 13 proceeding is not relevant to Complaint, which alleges violation of SB 408, which did not exist in 2003. PGE's references to UCB 13 are misplaced.

The orders cited by PGE were reversed by the Marion County Circuit Court. The

1	case was later, on remand, resolved by a voluntary withdrawal of the complaint,
2	which did not resolve any issues.
3	To the extent relevant, we incorporate by reference the Complainants'
4	Response to PGE Motion to Dismiss, Abate, or Make More Definite and Certain,
5	filed December 5, 2005.
6 7	Dated: September 26, 2006 Respectfully Submitted,
8	DANIEL W. MEEK OSB No. 79124 10949 S.W. 4th Avenue Portland, OR 97219 (503) 293-9021 fax 293-9099 dan@meek.net
9	Attorney for Complainants/Applicants

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6 7	Dated: September 26, 2006 Respectfully Submitted,
8	DANIEL W. MEEK OSB No. 79124 10949 S.W. 4th Avenue Portland, OR 97219 (503) 293-9021 fax 293-9099 dan@meek.net
9	Attorney for Complainants/Applicants