# **McDowell Rackner & Gibson PC**

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March 31, 2011

# **VIA ELECTRONIC AND U.S. MAIL**

**PUC Filing Center** Public Utility Commission of Oregon PO Box 2148 Salem, OR 97308-2148

#### Re: UM 1182 – Opening Comments of Idaho Power

Enclosed for filing in docket UM 1182 is an original and one copy of Idaho Power's Opening Comments. A copy of this filing has been served on all parties to this proceeding as indicated on the attached certificate of service.

Very truly yours,

Wendy McInder Wendy McIndoo

**Enclosures** cc: Service List 1

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in Docket UM 1182 on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below by email and first-class mail addressed to said person(s) at his or her last-known address(es) indicated below.

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	DATED: March 31, 2011	
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1	BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON			
2	U	UM 1182(1)		
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4	In the Matter of			
5	PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF	Opening Comments of Idaho Power Company		
6	OREGON,	Company		
7	Investigation Regarding Competitive Bidding.			
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9 Pursuant to Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Sarah K. Wallace's Prehearing 10 Conference Memorandum, Idaho Power Company ("Idaho Power" or "Company") submits 11 the following Opening Comments regarding the two specific issues that are the subject of 12 this phase of the docket.

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# I. INTRODUCTION

The Public Utility Commission of Oregon ("Commission") reopened this docket "to further examine issues related to [the] competitive bidding guidelines."<sup>1</sup> The Commission identified three specific issues to be addressed in this reopened docket: (1) whether the role of the independent evaluator ("IE") should be expanded by retaining the IE through the utility's negotiations and final resource selection; (2) determination of the analytic framework and methodologies that should be used to evaluate and compare resource ownership to purchasing power from an independent power producer; and (3) whether the threshold for a major resource should be lowered.<sup>2</sup>

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 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> <sup>1</sup> Re Public Utility Commission of Oregon Investigation Regarding Performance-Based Ratemaking
 <sup>25</sup> Mechanisms to Address Potential Build-vs.-Buy Bias, Docket UM 1276, Order No. 11-001 at 6 (Jan. 3, 2011).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> <sup>2</sup> Order No. 11-001 at 6-7.

1 At the January 26, 2011, prehearing conference, the parties agreed to divide the 2 proceedings into two phases. The first would address the first and third issues identified by 3 the Commission and the second phase would address the second issue.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, these 4 comments address only the potential expanded role of the IE in the competitive bidding 5 process and the appropriate capacity threshold for purposes of determining the applicability 6 of the Commission's competitive bidding guidelines.

7 On March 11, 2011, the parties participated in a workshop and the schedule calls for 8 the parties to file closing comments on April 22, 2011. The Company appreciates this 9 opportunity to work with Staff and the various stakeholders and looks forward to the 10 opportunity to file reply comments in this phase of the docket and participate in the process 11 adopted for the second phase.

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#### II. DISCUSSION

# 13 A. The Role of IE Should Not Be Expanded.

14 Idaho Power is generally supportive of including an IE in the competitive bidding 15 process because it provides transparency and ensures fairness. These, in turn, encourage 16 potential bidders to participate in the process. The result of this participation is a truly 17 competitive acquisition process that results in lower overall costs to customers. The 18 competitive bidding process requires balancing. On the one hand, it must be transparent 19 and fair; on the other, it must achieve these goals without being overly burdensome to 20 bidders or overly costly to customers. The existing role of the IE in the competitive bidding 21 process achieves this balance. Thus, while Idaho Power does not support expanding the 22 role of the IE, it is not because IEs have no place in the competitive bidding process. 23 Rather, it is because the Company believes that the additional costs outweigh the potential 24 benefits.

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- <sup>26</sup> <sup>3</sup> Prehearing Conference Memorandum at 1.

#### 1 **1.** Expanding the IE's Role Creates Significant Costs.

The costs associated with the retention of an IE for the bidding process are already substantial and increasing that participation through final negotiations will be significant for several reasons. First, the compensation costs for the IE to monitor final negotiations and prepare a second report will be significant. Second, the IE's participation is likely to draw out the negotiation process itself because of the practical obstacles to coordinating negotiations among the utility, the vendor, and the IE. The longer this process takes, the greater the costs.

9 In addition to the cost impact of extended negotiations, creating a more burdensome 10 and lengthy process may also inhibit certain vendors from participating in the competitive 11 bidding process at all. Oregon's current resource acquisition process is already a 12 procedurally intense process. Making the process longer and more complicated may act as 13 a deterrent to potential bidders, who may be hesitant to commit their resources and efforts 14 to such a process. This will weaken the competitive bidding process and negate some of 15 the process's customer benefits.

16 The presence of an IE during final negotiations may also have a chilling effect on 17 those negotiations. Bidders may be hesitant to disclose compromise positions to an IE 18 when they know that they may be involved with that same IE in future competitive bidding 19 processes. If parties cannot negotiate the transaction freely and at arm's length, then the 20 process will be compromised.

# 21 **2.** Expanding the IE's Role Produces Limited Benefits.

While the Company believes that the costs associated with an expanded IE role are concrete and significant, the potential benefits are more illusory. Before adopting additional process for competitive bidding, there should be a demonstration that the additional process provides real benefits to customers. At this time, it is unclear how the IE's participation will result in a meaningful report with information and analysis that parties could not otherwise

1 obtain when investigating the prudence of the acquisition. The Commission's process for 2 determining the prudence of a resource acquisition by a public utility is thorough and 3 comprehensive and addresses the same issues that are likely to be addressed by the IE. 4 Thus, the existing process is sufficient to determine the fairness of the final negotiations 5 without the need for an IE's participation. Indeed at the workshop in this docket, Staff 6 indicated that when it had received an IE report detailing the final negotiations, the report 7 provided little information that Staff would not have obtained or developed when conducting 8 its prudence analysis during a ratemaking proceeding.

9 It is also unclear whether IEs used in the current competitive bidding process 10 possess the necessary expertise with respect to final negotiations to make their participation 11 meaningful. Negotiating a final contract is a fundamentally different process than the 12 process of developing a short-list and an IE competent to participate in the development of 13 the short-list is not necessarily competent to participate in the final negotiations.

Further complicating this issue is the lack of criteria for analyzing the final Further complicating this issue is the lack of criteria for analyzing the final negotiations. At the workshop, parties advocating for an expanded IE role proposed that the IE would submit a final report to the Commission discussing the fairness of the negotiation process. Lacking from this proposal were criteria the IE would use to determine fairness. Because the utility and customer interests are aligned during this phase of the process, what is in their interests is not necessarily in the interests of the bidding party. Thus, it is unclear whether "fairness" would be determined by reference to customers or bidders. And unlike the IE's role in the bid scoring and evaluation process, there are no clear metrics that can be applied to determine fairness in this process. Without a clearly defined method for determining fairness, the final report may not be meaningful. Coupled with the belief that the substance of the report is unlikely to provide anything that would not otherwise become known during a prudency investigation, it is unclear what value is provided by expanding the role of the IE into the negotiation process.

#### 1 B. The Major Resource Threshold Should Not Be Lowered.

Based on the representations made at the workshop, it does not appear that any a party is advocating a reduction to the major resource threshold. The Company does not support lowering this threshold because it will make more projects subject to the competitive bidding guidelines, which will drive up costs to customers. And based upon the representations made at the workshop, there does not appear to be a compelling reason to lower the threshold.

8 While parties did not support lowering the threshold, Staff did suggest that parties 9 comment on how individual resources should be defined for purposes of determining if the 10 resource is above or below the threshold. The Company proposes the following standards 11 that may be applied to determine if a project is a single resource for purposes of the 100 12 MW threshold. Multiple projects will be considered single resources if the following three 13 criteria are satisfied:

14 1) The projects have common, or substantially the same, ultimate ownership.

15 2) The projects share a common location, *i.e.* the projects are on the same or
adjacent parcels of land.

17 3) The projects were recognized as a single project in a license or permit from a
18 federal, state, county, city, or local authority.

Moreover, if a project is to be developed or expanded in phases, if each phase is expected to be completed more than one year apart, they will be considered distinct resources. Any options for future expansion of the project included in resource acquisition contracts will not be included when calculating the resource capacity.

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  - 5 OPENING COMMENTS OF IDAHO POWER COMPANY

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1			III.	CONCLUSION
2		Idaho Power appreciates the	е орроі	rtunity to file these comments and looks forward to
3	continuing to work with Staff and stakeholders to ensure the competitive bidding process			
4	provid	provides the greatest net benefits to customers.		
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