CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: JOHN CRIDER

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 100

Opening Testimony

REDACTED
July 8, 2016

Q. Please state your name, occupation, and business address.

A. My name is John Crider. I am a Utility Analyst for the Public Utility Commission of Oregon (Commission or OPUC). My business address is 201 High Street SE, Suite 100, Salem, Oregon 97301.

Q. Please describe your educational background and work experience.

A. My witness qualification statement is found in Exhibit Staff/101.

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

A. I will discuss two issues related to PacifiCorp's filing: Energy Imbalance Market Benefits and Costs, and Treatment of Wind Production Tax Credits.

Q. Did you prepare an exhibit for this docket?

A. Yes. I prepared the following Exhibits:

Exhibit	Title	Description	Pages
Staff 102	EIM Benefit Summary	Summary of four quarterly EIM benefit reports from CAISO	1
Staff 103	Average Production Cost	Calculated production cost for PacifiCorp generation assets	1
Staff 104	Average Bid Prices	PacifiCorp bids for generation assets supplied to the CAISO	1
Staff 105	Units Supplying EIM	Compiled Company data showing which units supplied energy to the EIM in January-September 2015	1

Staff 106	E3 EIM Benefits Report	PacifiCorp benefits study performed prior to joining the EIM	51
Staff 107	Data Request CUB 45	Company response to CUB data request 45 concerning EIM benefits	2
Staff 108	CAISO EIM Methodology	CAISO Technical Bulleting explaining the EIM benefit calculation methodology	7
Staff 109	Statement from Gravely	Interview with Company spokesperson Bob Gravely	1

Q. How is your testimony organized?

A. My testimony is organized as follows:

ISSUE 1: ENERGY IMBALANCE MARKET BENEFITS AND COSTS

Q. What is the Energy Imbalance Market?

A. The Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) is an automated dispatch system that allows for efficient balancing of load and generation resources for participants, which provides both reliability and renewable integration benefits to the grid, and economic benefits to participants. The EIM allows for very efficient and automated re-dispatch of generators to precisely and continuously meet load in a sliding, five-minute window. Generation and load must be balanced within strict parameters at all times in order for the electric grid to remain stable. A large sustained imbalance between generation and load will cause both voltage and frequency instability on the grid. This balancing and coordination of generation assets is performed on several time scales, starting from months or weeks ahead with generation unit planning, to next-day planning, and then to real-time balancing.

Q. Who participates in the EIM?

A. The EIM was established by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) on November 1, 2014, with PacifiCorp as the first external participant. NV Energy in Nevada joined on December 1, 2015. Puget Sound Energy and Arizona Public Service will join in October, 2016. Portland General Electric is planning on joining in the last quarter of 2017. Idaho Power Company plans to join the EIM beginning April 2018, pending regulatory approval.[1]

Q. Why did PacifiCorp join the EIM?

[1] https://www.idahopower.com/NewsCommunity/News/NewsReleases/showPR.cfm?prID=3796

A. According to the Company, "[b]y participating in the EIM, the Company's participating generation units are optimally dispatched using the CAISO's computerized security constrained economic dispatch model. The EIM's automated, expanded footprint, co-optimized dispatch replaced the Company's largely isolated and manual dispatch within its two BAAs. Participation in the EIM produces benefits to customers in the form of reduced NPC, partially offset by costs for initial start-up and ongoing operation."[2]

Q. What kinds of operational benefits did PacifiCorp expect from participating in the EIM?

A. According to the Company's benefit study,[3] the EIM offers benefits to PacifiCorp in three areas.[4] The Company partitions the benefits as: 1) inter-regional; 2) intra-regional; and 3) flexibility reserves.[5]

Q. What are inter-regional benefits?

A. By connecting PacifiCorp's transmission system and generating assets to CAISO, the pool of generators available to serve both CAISO load and PacifiCorp load is greatly increased. This means that both PacifiCorp's and CAISO's balancing areas can benefit by allowing the least cost resource in either area to serve load anywhere across the EIM footprint. The Company can realize a benefit when it utilizes energy from a lower cost CAISO resource instead of its own generator. Conversely, the Company can also realize a

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[2] PAC/100, Dickman/26.
[3] Energy + Environmental Economics, "*PacifiCorp-ISO Energy Imbalance Market Benefits*", March 13, 2013 ("E3 Study"). See Staff Exhibit 106.
[4] A fourth benefit of the EIM, renewable curtailment, was also identified in the E3 Study, but is attributed solely to the ISO. E3 Study at 34.
[5] PAC/100, Dickman/26-27.

benefit by selling energy from its economic generators into the higher priced CAISO market. The EIM solves for the most economic solution in each five minute interval and automatically re-dispatches generation appropriately. The Company refers to these benefits related to importing and exporting energy with CAISO as “inter-regional” benefits.

Q. What are intra-regional benefits?

A. In addition to providing imports and exports between CAISO and PacifiCorp, the automated dispatch system also allows for re-dispatching of generation within PacifiCorp’s two balancing authority areas (BAAs) – PacifiCorp West (PACW) and PacifiCorp East (PACE) on a five minute sliding window. Prior to joining the EIM, PACW and PACE balanced load and generation on an hourly basis, which is less efficient. The automated EIM system realizes benefits for the Company through more efficient and economic use of resources.

Q. What are the flexibility reserve benefits?

A. The interconnection between CAISO and PACW not only allows for import and export of energy, but also allows both entities to use the capacity from either balancing area to hold as shared reserves for reliability. The sharing of reserve capacity resources provides a benefit in the form of avoided capacity costs.

Q. Did the Company estimate the dollar amount of benefits from joining the EIM prior to its participation?

A. Yes. Prior to joining the EIM, the Company engaged the consulting firm Energy + Environmental Economics (E3) to estimate the level of benefits. E3 projected the benefits to be:[6]

Table 2. Low and high range annual benefits under low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW) PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability scenarios (million 2012$)

Benefit Category	Low transfer capability Low range	Low transfer capability High range	Medium transfer capability Low range	Medium transfer capability High range	High transfer capability Low range	High transfer capability High range
Interregional dispatch	$14.1	$11.0	$22.3	$17.7	$22.4	$17.8
Intraregional dispatch	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0
Flexibility reserves	$4.0	$20.8	$11.0	$51.3	$13.4	$77.1
Renewable curtailment	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8
Total benefits	**$21.4**	**$65.6**	**$36.7**	**$102.8**	**$39.2**	**$128.7**

Notes: Individual estimates may not sum to total benefits due to rounding. Section 2.4 describes why interregional dispatch savings are lower in the high range than the low range.

Since the current transfer capability is actually approximately 200 MW,[7] Staff assumes the E3 derived benefits would fall between the "Low Transfer Capability" and "Medium Transfer Capability" values in the table.

Q. Have there been any other estimates of the benefits of PacifiCorp joining the EIM?

A. Yes. CAISO performs quarterly estimates of the benefits for all EIM participants. The four quarterly CAISO benefits estimates from calendar year 2015 are contained in Staff Exhibit 102. According to CAISO, the total-company estimated benefit for PacifiCorp for the 2015 calendar year was about $26.2 million.

Q. Has the Company given a public statement regarding the benefits after having joined the EIM?

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[6] E3 Study at 9.
[7] See PacifiCorp Exhibit PAC/104, Dickman/1 "Transmission Left Open (aMW)", line 6.

A. Yes, on at least one occasion. Recently, Company spokesperson Bob Gravely was quoted in the industry newsletter "Clearing Up" claiming that PacifiCorp's customers

> *"realized almost $16 million in benefits from the EIM during the first three months of 2016, an amount that increased from previous quarters"* [8]

Q. How do these estimates compare to the Company's forecasted benefits in the current case?

PacifiCorp estimates benefits of participating in the EIM in 2017 to be $13.9 million, total-company. The Company's estimate is only slightly higher than the benefits estimated for the 2016 TAM, which totaled $10.1 million. These estimates are summarized below from the Company's initial filing:[9]

Table 2
Total-Company EIM-Related Benefits and Costs

$ millions	**2016 TAM**	**2017 TAM**
Inter-regional dispatch	$8.4	$11.3
Flexibility Reserves	$1.7	$2.6
Test-period EIM benefits	**$10.1**	**$13.9**
Test-period EIM costs	**$5.1**	**$6.4**

Q. Does Staff have concerns regarding these estimates?

A. Yes. The issue for Staff is that the benefit as calculated in both the 2016 TAM and the current filing is significantly lower in value than both the E3 and CAISO benefit estimates. The estimate is also not in agreement with public statements from the Company regarding the level of benefits. It is not immediately

[8] Exhibit Staff/109, California Energy Markets "Clearing Up" newsletter, June 17, 2016, No. 1753, p8.
[9] PAC/100, Dickman/26.

apparent why there would be such a large discrepancy in values. The difference in estimates is summarized in the table below.

Source	Annual Benefits Estimate (millions)
E3 Study commissioned by PAC	~$21-$65, conservatively
CAISO benefit study (2015)	$26.2
PacifiCorp through Bob Gravely	$16, first quarter 2016 only
2016 TAM	$10.1
2017 TAM	$13.9

Q. Has the Company addressed this discrepancy between estimates directly?

A. Yes. In response to CUB DR 45,[10] the Company clearly addresses this discrepancy. In this data request, CUB asked the Company to reconcile Table 2 from Witness Dickman's initial testimony (PAC/100, Dickman/26) with the most recent CAISO benefits estimate. The Company responds:

> *"Table 2 only includes two EIM-related benefits: (1) inter-regional dispatch, and (2) flexibility reserves. Intra-regional dispatch benefits result from more optimal dispatch of the Company's resources to meet its own requirements within each hour. The intra-regional benefit is relative to the Company's more manual dispatch process used in actual operations prior to participation in the EIM."*

[10] Staff Exhibit/107.

The Company goes on to explain that *"GRID employs a linear program optimization – i.e., optimal dispatch …Consequently, the EIM does not create additional intra-regional dispatch benefits relative to GRID."*[11]

Q. Please explain how CAISO determines benefits.

A. According to CAISO, the benefits are determined by two modeling runs of the CAISO production cost model.[12] One run includes the EIM market and one does not. CAISO refers to the run without the EIM market functionality as the "counterfactual." The counterfactual is clearly described as essentially the same EIM modeling run but without transfers allowed between the participants and the EIM.

Q. Does CAISO break out the benefits by functional area?

A. Only partially. CAISO presents the benefits in two categories – transfer benefits and flexibility reserve benefits.[13] The transfer benefits include both inter- and intra-regional benefits combined.

Q. In light of this description, does Staff agree with Witness Dickman's assessment of why the discrepancy between PacifiCorp's estimate and CAISO's estimate of benefits exists?

A. No. Witness Dickman asserts that the primary reason for the discrepancy is that the CAISO counterfactual captures an intra-regional benefit that is already

[11] "Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision tools," the production cost model used by PacifiCorp in all TAM proceedings.
[12] See Exhibit Staff/108, CAISO Technical Bulletin "Quantifying the Benefits for Participating in EIM" August 28, 2014, p5.
[13] Id.

accounted for by the Company's GRID model.[14] He further explains that the counterfactual represents an optimized solution which realizes a benefit when compared to the "manual" *operational* dispatch used by the Company prior to EIM.[15] However, CAISO describes the counterfactual as an optimized production cost model, identical to the modeling used for the EIM solution except that EIM transfers are not allowed.[16] That is, the counterfactual is not a comparison of the manual operational solution to a more efficient automated system. Instead, the counterfactual is a comparison of two security-constrained, economic dispatch solutions – one which allows transfers between the two balancing authorities and one without. Both modeling runs are based on five minute balancing intervals.

Q. How does PacifiCorp describe the GRID model?

A. As described by Company Witness Dickman in his testimony, GRID is an economic production cost model that produces a balance of load and generation which is optimized for least cost[17]. Based on the Company's description, the GRID model and the CAISO counterfactual are functionally identical. The primary difference between the two is that the GRID model balances on an hourly basis and the CAISO model balances on a five minute basis.

Q. How would Staff compare the CAISO counterfactual and the GRID models?

[14] PAC/100, Dickman/27.
[15] See PacifiCorp response to DR CUB 45, also included as Staff Exhibit 107.
[16] CAISO Technical Bulletin "Quantifying the Benefits for Participating in EIM" August 28, 2014, p5.
[17] PAC/100, Dickman/6 at 15-16.

A. Staff believes the models are functionally equivalent – that the counterfactual represents the optimized security-constrained, economically-dispatched solution to balancing load with generation in the absence of the EIM. As described by the Company, this is exactly what GRID represents.

Q. What is the significance of this equivalence?

A. If the CAISO counterfactual balancing model performs essential the same function as the GRID model, the expectation is that the costs calculated by each model should be comparable given that both have the same inputs. If this is true, then the GRID solution does not, in fact, capture the intra-regional benefits (as claimed by the Company) and these benefits must be estimated outside the GRID model, in the same manner that inter-regional and flexibility reserve benefits are estimated and included.

Q. From this description, does Staff recognize an area where benefits are not captured in GRID?

A. Yes. One area where benefits are accrued, but not accounted for, is in the efficiency of the five-minute balancing that the EIM model offers. GRID only balances on an hourly basis, which is not as efficient. The EIM counterfactual is balanced on a five minute basis, which represents an inherent efficiency improvement over GRID and thus should embody financial benefits that are not currently captured by the Company.

Q. Has the Company offered a methodology to estimate and capture the intra-regional benefits?

A. No. The Company has claimed that all intra-regional benefits are captured within the GRID model solution and no further additional benefits exist.

Q. Does Staff agree with this assessment?

A. No. Both E3 and CAISO estimate significant intra-regional benefits. The Company has not provided evidence that the GRID model captures any of these benefits, and has not adequately explained the discrepancy between E3 and CAISO benefit estimates and the Company's calculations.

Q. Please describe how the Company estimates inter-regional EIM benefits.

A. The Company has analyzed the actual EIM transfer data from 2015, the first full year of EIM participation. The Company has tracked actual revenues from imports and exports of energy with the CAISO on a daily basis for both the five minute market and the fifteen minute market. The Company estimates the revenue as the amount of energy transferred multiplied by the average of the price assigned to CAISO and that assigned to PACW at the particular time the transaction occurred. The prices that get assigned are derived from the CAISO pricing model, which takes into account price adjusters such as transmission congestion and emissions requirements. Specifically, each generator that the Company wishes to participate in the EIM has a bid price which the Company develops and offers to the market. Based on these bids, the CAISO model develops a single aggregated price for energy delivered to CAISO, a single aggregated price for energy delivered to PACW, and a single price for PACE.

The Company uses these three prices to derive benefits estimation. Simplistically, the benefit is estimated as:

Benefit = Revenue from transfer – cost to generate transfer energy

Q. Does Staff agree with this methodology?

A. In a general sense, yes. Staff agrees that the benefit is essentially equal to the revenue minus the cost of production.

Q. Does Staff have a concern with the calculation of inputs for this methodology?

A. Yes. Staff has a concern with how the Company establishes the cost portion of the equation.

Q. Please describe Staff's concern.

A. The highest value benefit of the EIM comes from the economical re-dispatching of generation units so that the lowest cost resources can be used to balance the load and generation in real time. Most of the value of the benefit comes from the difference between the price paid for energy by CAISO and the actual production cost incurred by the Company for generating the transfer energy. However, when determining costs, the Company calculates the difference between the price paid by CAISO for the transfer and the *aggregated bid price* at the PACW trading hub, rather than calculating the difference between the price paid for energy by CAISO and the actual production cost incurred by the Company. The Company offers no evidence that the bid price is representative of its actual production cost.

Q. Does the Company provide actual production cost for its generators in this filing?

A. Not directly, but the average production cost can readily be calculated from the GRID output (NPC report) provided by the Company in the Excel spreadsheet "ORTAM17 NPC Study_2016 03 18 CONF" provided as a Company workpaper. Staff has performed the calculation to derive the average production cost and supplies this in Staff Exhibit/103.

Q. Has Staff compared these production costs with the average bid prices supplied by the Company to CAISO?

A. Yes. Staff has summarized these results in Staff Exhibit/104.

Q. What conclusions does Staff draw from this table?

A. The aggregate pricing determined by CAISO for PACW is found in the column labelled PACW. Both simple average and median price are calculated based on the data supplied by the Company. The aggregate pricing is based on the bids submitted to CAISO by the Company. The pricing ranges from a low monthly average of [redacted] to a high of [redacted] with most months in [redacted] range. For comparison, excluding the peaking combustion turbines at Gadsby[18], the highest production cost in the Company fleet is for [redacted], with all other units at [redacted] in production cost. Clearly, the aggregate pricing based on

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[18] Average production cost for peaking natural gas units is not comparable to that for baseload units. By design, the peaking units only operate when needed, so their costs are distributed over a very small number of hours. This fact artificially inflates the per-unit production cost on a "per MWh" basis, making it inappropriate to reasonably compare to baseload units.

bids from the Company are significantly higher [redacted] – than the actual generation unit production costs.

Q. Which units actually produce energy for the EIM transfer?

A. The Company can voluntarily bid any generating units for use in the EIM after reserving enough generation to reliably serve its load, so the actual make-up of the contributing generators may change for different time periods. The Company has supplied data for nine months of EIM operation (Jan – Sep 2015) that show which generators were contributing energy to the EIM transfers. This data is summarized in Staff Exhibit/105. From this data, it appears that [redacted] Using these percentages and the plant production cost values discussed previously, Staff estimates the average aggregated production cost to be [redacted] (See Exhibit Staff/105).

Q. Does Staff have a recommendation regarding the benefit calculation?

A. Yes. The benefits should be calculated using the difference between the CAISO market price and the actual production cost incurred by the Company, and should not be calculated as the difference between the CAISO market price and the PACW market price. This change in calculation will correctly capture the inter-regional benefits.

Q. Please describe how the Company estimates flexibility reserve benefits.

A. The Company compares the flexible ramping reserves needed for reliability without access to EIM to those needed when EIM is available. The difference in reserve level is priced at the marginal cost determined by the EIM modeling.

Q. Does Staff have concerns regarding this calculation?

A. No. The Company's calculation appears straightforward and reasonable, and provides results that are in alignment with CAISO estimates.

Q. Please summarize Staff's issues with the EIM benefits calculation.

A. Benefits accrue to the Company in three functional areas – inter-regional benefits from direct exchange of energy with CAISO, intra-regional benefits from more economical dispatch within and between PACE and PACW, and benefits realized through the sharing of reserves (flexibility reserve benefit). Staff believes the Company has underestimated the inter-regional benefits by improperly developing costs based on bid price instead of actual production cost. Staff believes the Company has incorrectly characterized the CAISO "counterfactual" analysis and fails to account for any intra-regional benefits. Finally, Staff is satisfied that the Company's approach to estimating flexible reserve benefits is reasonable.

Q. Does Staff have a general recommendation?

A. Yes. In the course of discovery, Staff became aware of the complexity of the CAISO invoicing system and the PacifiCorp EIM-related tracking systems. The amounts of revenue involved in the EIM transactions – in the tens and possibly hundreds of millions of dollars – deserve the same level of analysis and scrutiny as given to large capital projects. Staff believes that limiting the EIM discussion to the compressed timeframe of the TAM, where this issue is only one of several others under consideration, could result in incomplete capture of benefits for customers. Further, Portland General Electric will be joining the EIM in 2017, and Idaho Power may follow suit in the near future. Staff believes that it may be in the best interest of customers to open a general investigation into developing a methodology for determining benefits and costs of participating in the EIM. The goal of such an investigation would be to specifically identify which cost elements are to be included in the calculation, which are to be excluded, and to have a stakeholder-approved method of calculation which is transparent and to be used by all regulated utilities participating in the EIM.

Q. What is Staff's recommendation in this filing?

A. Staff recommends two adjustments to the Company's EIM benefits calculation. First, the actual production cost should replace the EIM bid price when determining benefits to customers. The Company should recalculate the inter-regional benefits using these values. Second, the Company should provide an estimate of the intra-regional benefit not captured by GRID. If the Company is unable to estimate this benefit, Staff proposes a net power cost reduction equal to the difference between CAISO's estimate of the transfer benefit and the Company's estimate of the transfer benefit. Since the CAISO method captures both inter- and intra-regional benefits, conceptually this difference should represent the uncaptured intra-regional benefit as estimated by CAISO. Staff proposes an adjustment using the CAISO calculated CY2015 benefits of $26.2

million minus $13.9 identified by the Company, or reduction to net power cost of ($26.2 – $13.9) = $12.3 million.

ISSUE 2, TREATMENT OF WIND PRODUCTION TAX CREDITS

Q. What are Wind Production Tax Credits?

A. Wind Production Tax Credits (PTCs) are credit allowances against federal tax liability issued by the federal government. According to the Department of Energy website **energy.gov**, the PTC is:

> *"…an inflation-adjusted per-kilowatt-hour (kWh) tax credit for electricity generated by qualified energy resources and sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the taxable year. The duration of the credit is 10 years after the date the facility is placed in service for all facilities placed in service after August 8, 2005."*

Q. Does Oregon have a statute-based treatment for PTCs?

A. Yes. Senate Bill 1547, Section 18(b), signed into law in the most recent legislative session, mandates that each electric utility forecast the projected level of PTCs into rates through any variable power cost forecast process established by the Commission.

Q. How has Company treated PTCs in the past?

A. Ratemaking treatment of PTCs has traditionally been addressed in general rate case proceedings. At the conclusion of the Company's 2014 general rate case, approximately $17.2 million worth of PTCs were applied to Oregon rates. Due to the expiration of PTCs at some Company plants, the forecast of PTCs for 2017 is $13.7 million. This means that approximately $3.5 million of credit surplus is included in base rates for 2017, compared to the Company's forecast for 2017.

Q. How does the Company propose to treat PTCs?

A. In accordance with the statutory change due to SB 1547, the Company proposes to include in the net power cost calculation the variance between the PTCs currently in base rates, and the projected 2017 PTCs. This amount is about $3.5 million, or $5.0 million when adjusted for load changes and application of the tax gross-up factor. In future years, the Company proposes to track both the variance between PTCs in base rates and the projection, and also true-up any differences between the projected PTCs in power cost and the actual PTCs earned. The Company's proposal does not address future treatment of PTCs in general rate cases.

Q. Does Staff have a concern with this approach?

A. Yes. Although Staff agrees that mathematically, this treatment will capture the correct amount of PTCs, Staff is concerned that this method introduces unnecessary complexity. The Company's approach will necessitate the tracking of two variances each year: (1) the difference between the next (test) year projection of PTCs and the amount currently collected in base rates, and (2) the difference between the amount of PTCs collected through power costs in the TAM and those realized in the corresponding PCAM. Staff also notes that in the same calendar year that the Company files the TAM for the next test year, it also files a PCAM for the previous year. This means that there will always be two dockets adjusting rates for PTC variances in each year, one looking ahead to next year and one truing up last year's projection. Each would have to track the amount of PTCs in base rates.

Q. Does Staff have an alternate solution?

A. Yes. Staff proposes to apply the same treatment proposed by Portland General Electric (PGE) in UE 308, PGE's annual power cost projection. PGE has simply applied the full projection of PTCs to the annual power cost forecast and included these in rates through the power cost tariffs. PTCs currently in rates would be removed during PGE's next rate case, and PTCs will be forecasted and trued-up solely through the power cost recovery mechanisms currently in place. This eliminates the need to track a second variance and removes the confusion of having part of the PTCs included in base rates and another portion recovered in power costs.

Q. Please summarize Staff's recommendation regarding PTCs.

A. Staff recommends that:

(1) the full value of the PTC projection be included in rates in the 2017 TAM;

(2) the Company remove the $17.2 million currently in base rates during the Company's next general rate case; and

(3) annual variance between the forecasted PTCs and realized PTCs be reconciled in the PCAM each year.

Q. Please summarize your recommendations on the two issues discussed in this testimony.

A. On the issue of EIM Benefits and Costs, Staff recommends two adjustments to the Company's EIM benefits calculation:

(1) The Company should replace the EIM bid price with actual unit production cost in order to determine the cost of energy in the benefits calculation;

(2) The Company should provide an estimate of the intra-regional benefit not captured by GRID. If the Company is unable to estimate this benefit, Staff proposes a net power cost reduction equal to the difference between CAISO's estimate of the transfer benefit and the Company's estimate of the transfer benefit, or about $12.3 million.

Staff further recommends that the Commission consider opening a general investigation into developing a common construct for determining the calculation of costs and benefits of participating in the EIM for ratemaking purposes.

On the issue of treatment of PTCs, Staff recommends that:

(1) the Commission order that PTCs currently in base rates be removed in the next general rate case;

(2) the full amount of PTC's be included in this year's TAM without consideration of a variance; and

(3) future PTCs flow only through the TAM (projections) and PCAM (true-up).

Q. Does this conclude your Opening Testimony?

A. Yes.

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STAFF EXHIBIT 101

Witness Qualifications Statement

July 8, 2016

WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT

NAME:	John Crider
EMPLOYER:	Public Utility Commission of Oregon
TITLE:	Senior Utility Analyst Energy Resources and Planning Division
ADDRESS:	201 High Street, SE., Suite 100 Salem OR 97301-3612
EDUCATION:	Bachelor of Science, Engineering, University of Maryland
EXPERIENCE:	I have been employed at the Oregon Public Utility Commission (OPUC) since August of 2012. My current responsibilities include analysis and technical support for electric power cost recovery proceedings, with an emphasis on variable power costs and purchases from qualifying facilities. Prior to working for the OPUC I was an engineer in the Strategic Planning division for Gainesville Regional Utilities (GRU) in Gainesville, Florida. My responsibilities at GRU included analysis, design and support for generation economic dispatch modeling, wholesale power transactions, net metering, integrated resource planning, distributed solar generation and fuel (coal and natural gas) planning. Previous to working for GRU, I was a staff design engineer for Eugene Water & Electric Board (EWEB) where my responsibilities included design of control and communications system in support of water and hydro operations. I am a registered professional engineer in both Oregon and Florida.

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STAFF EXHIBIT 102

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

California ISO — 2015 Q1 Report
Quantifying EIM Benefits, 04/30/2015

BAA	January	February	March	Total
ISO	$0.48	$0.49	$0.48	$1.44
PACE	$0.88	$0.83	$0.91	$2.63
PACW	$0.42	$0.49	$0.28	$1.19
Total	$1.78	$1.81	$1.67	$5.26

Table 1: Estimated benefits shown are in millions and accrued in the first quarter of 2015.

California ISO — 2015 Q2 Report
Quantifying EIM Benefits, 07/30/2015

BAA	April	May	June	Total
ISO	$0.62	$1.00	$0.84	$2.46
PACE	$0.62	$0.97	$1.67	$3.26
PACW	$0.66	$1.21	$2.59	$4.46
Total	**$1.90**	**$3.18**	**$5.10**	**$10.18**

Table 1: Estimated benefits shown are in millions and accrued in the second quarter of 2015

California ISO — 2015 Q3 Report
Quantifying EIM Benefits, 10/27/2015

BAA	July	August	September	Total
ISO	$1.67	$0.93	$0.88	$3.48
PACE	$1.85	$1.42	$1.23	$4.51
PACW	$2.16	$0.97	$0.87	$4.01
Total	**$5.69**	**$3.32**	**$2.99**	**$12.00**

Table 1: Estimated benefits shown are in millions and accrued in the third quarter of 2015

California ISO — 2015 Q4 Report
Quantifying EIM Benefits, 02/01/2016

Region	October	November	December	Total
CAISO	1.27	1.30	2.70	**5.28**
NV Energy	n/a	n/a	0.84	**0.84**
PacifiCorp	1.24	2.19	2.75	**6.17**
Total	**2.51**	**3.49**	**6.29**	**12.29**

Total PacifiCorp = $26.23 million

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STAFF EXHIBIT 103

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 103 is confidential and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128

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STAFF EXHIBIT 104

Exhibits in Support
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Staff/104
Crider/1

Exhibit 104 is confidential and is subject to

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STAFF EXHIBIT 105

Exhibits in Support
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STAFF EXHIBIT 106

Exhibits in Support
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PacifiCorp-ISO Energy Imbalance Market Benefits

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Energy+Environmental Economics

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Executive Summary

This report examines the benefits of an energy imbalance market (EIM) between PacifiCorp and the California Independent System Operator (ISO). This report focuses on estimated potential EIM benefits with the low range reflecting a scenario in which assumptions were chosen to be conservative. The full range of estimated EIM benefits in this report for the year 2017 is $21 million to $129 million (2012$). Preliminary cost estimates (based on previous studies) of setting up the EIM range from $3 million to $6 million, with an estimated annual cost of $2 million to $5 million.

The report supports the conclusion that the two-party EIM provides a low-cost, low-risk means of achieving operational savings for both PacifiCorp and ISO and enabling greater penetration of variable energy resources. The report further supports that the benefits of the EIM would increase to the extent that: (1) operational changes can be made to support the EIM, such as increased transmission transfer capabilities between PacifiCorp and ISO; and (2) additional entities join the EIM, thus bringing incremental load and resource diversity, transfer capability, and flexible generation resources that would further reduce costs for customers.

Changes in the electricity industry in the Western U.S. are making the need for greater coordination among balancing authorities (BAs),[1] such as through an EIM, increasingly apparent. Renewable portfolio standards already enacted in Western states are expected to result in some 60,000 MW of wind, solar, geothermal, and other renewable generation in the Western Interconnection by 2022, comprising approximately 15% of total electric energy.[2]

Recent studies have suggested that it will be possible to reliably operate the current western electric grid with high levels of variable generation, but doing so may require supplementing the hourly bilateral markets used in the West toward shorter scheduling timescales and greater coordination among western BAs. Greater coordination would allow BAs to pool load, wind, and solar variability and reduce flexibility reserve requirements, and would increase flexibility and reduce renewable curtailment.

In response, several regional initiatives, studies, and groups have emerged to explore innovations for scheduling and coordination. These include reforms being assessed as part of the Western Electric Coordinating Council's Efficient Dispatch Toolkit (EDT) initiative, an effort by a group of public utility commissions to explore an EIM for the West, and an ongoing Northwest Power Pool initiative to analyze the benefits of an EIM or other forms of regional coordination for the Pacific Northwest region.

As an extension of these efforts, in February 2013 PacifiCorp and ISO signed a memorandum of understanding to pursue an EIM. Energy and Environmental Economics,

[1] A balancing authority (BA) is a responsible entity that integrates resource plans ahead of time, maintains load-interchange-generation balance within a balancing authority area, and supports Interconnection frequency in real time. A balancing authority area (BAA) is the collection of generation, transmission, and loads within the metered boundaries of a balancing authority, which maintains load-resource balance within this area.

[2] These renewable capacity and energy projections are from the Western Electricity Coordinating Council's Transmission Expansion Planning Policy Committee (TEPPC) 2022 Common Case; see http://www.wecc.biz/Lists/Calendar/Attachments/4057/2022 20Common%20Case%20-%20Webinar%205.pdf.

Inc. (E3), a consulting firm, was retained by ISO to assess the EIM's potential benefits. This report documents E3's findings.

The EIM under consideration is a balancing market that optimizes generator dispatch within and between balance authority areas (BAA)[3] every five minutes by leveraging the existing ISO real-time dispatch market functionality. It does not replace the day-ahead or hourly markets and scheduling procedures that exist today. The ISO outlined the structure of such an EIM in a recent proposal to the Western Governors Association and the Public Utilities Commissions Energy Imbalance Market (PUC-EIM) Task Force.[4]

An EIM covering PacifiCorp and ISO would allow both parties to improve dispatch efficiency and take advantage of the diversity in loads and generation resources between the two systems, reducing production costs, operating reserve requirements, and renewable generation curtailment. Specifically, the creation of a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM would yield the following four principal benefits:

+ *Interregional dispatch savings*, by realizing the efficiency of combined 5-minute dispatch, which would reduce "transactional friction" (e.g., transmission charges) and alleviate structural impediments currently preventing trade between the two systems;
+ *Intraregional dispatch savings*, by enabling PacifiCorp generators to be dispatched more efficiently through the ISO's automated system (nodal dispatch software), including benefits from more efficient transmission utilization;

[3] See footnote #1
[4] See CAISO, "CAISO Response to Request from PUC-EIM Task Force," March 29, 2012, http://www.westgov.org/PUCeim/documents/CAISOcewa.pdf; CAISO, "Energy Imbalance Protocols (Revised to Support CAISO Cost Estimate for PUC-EIM)", January 24, 2013, http://www.westgov.org/PUCeim/documents/CAISOrcp.pdf.

+ *Reduced flexibility reserves*, by aggregating the two systems' load, wind, and solar variability and forecast errors; and
+ *Reduced renewable energy curtailment*, by allowing BAs to export or reduce imports of renewable generation when it would otherwise need to be curtailed.

These benefits are indicative but not exhaustive. A recent report by staff to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission identifies non-quantified reliability benefits that will also arise. These include enhanced situational awareness, security constrained dispatch, faster delivery of replacement generation after the end of contingency reserve sharing assistance, and enhanced integration of renewable resources.[5]

E3 estimated benefits from a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM using the GridView[6] production simulation software to simulate operations of the Western Interconnection with and without the EIM in the year 2017. This year was selected to represent likely system conditions within the first several years after the EIM becomes operational. E3's analysis incorporated California's greenhouse gas regulations, and the associated dispatch costs.

The GridView results are sensitive to several key assumptions and modeling parameters. These include: limits on the transmission transfer capabilities between PacifiCorp and ISO, and the extent to which unloaded hydroelectric capacity is allowed to contribute toward contingency and flexibility reserve requirements. E3's analysis of EIM benefits is also sensitive to the assumed level of savings from moving to nodal dispatch in PacifiCorp and the amount of renewable energy curtailment that could be reduced through the EIM.

[5] Staff of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2013, "Qualitative Assessment of Potential Reliability Benefits from a Western Energy Imbalance Market," February 26.
[6] GridView is ABB's production simulation software.

E3 developed several scenarios to address key uncertainties in the modeling of EIM benefits. These scenarios explore a wide range of potential benefit levels to reflect both the limitations of existing tools to characterize all of the changes to system operations that would occur under an EIM, particularly in the modeling of hydropower, reserves, and renewable curtailment, greenhouse gas regulation, and uncertainties about the extent to which future industry developments would allow cost savings to occur both with and without an EIM. The scenarios were developed around three assumptions of transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO: low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW). Within each scenario, E3 modeled a low and high range of benefits. The assumptions for the low and high range estimates are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Low and high range assumptions under low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW) PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability scenarios

Assumption	Low transfer capability		Medium transfer capability		High transfer capability	
	Low range	High range	Low range	High range	Low range	High range
Maximum hydropower contribution to contingency and flexibility reserves*	25%	12%	25%	12%	25%	12%
Share of intraregional dispatch savings achieved	10%	100%	10%	100%	10%	100%
Share of identified renewable energy curtailment avoided	10%	100%	10%	100%	10%	100%

** Percent of nameplate capacity for each project*

Across these scenarios, E3 estimated that a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM would generate total annual cost savings (in 2012 $) of $21-129 million in 2017, with PacifiCorp and ISO both benefitting. Table 2 shows the range of benefits by category for each scenario.

Table 2. Low and high range annual benefits under low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW) PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability scenarios (million 2012$)

Benefit Category	Low transfer capability		Medium transfer capability		High transfer capability	
	Low range	High range	Low range	High range	Low range	High range
Interregional dispatch	$14.1	$11.0	$22.3	$17.7	$22.4	$17.8
Intraregional dispatch	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0
Flexibility reserves	$4.0	$20.8	$11.0	$51.3	$13.4	$77.1
Renewable curtailment	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8
Total benefits	**$21.4**	**$65.6**	**$36.7**	**$102.8**	**$39.2**	**$128.7**

Notes: Individual estimates may not sum to total benefits due to rounding. Section 2.4 describes why interregional dispatch savings are lower in the high range than the low range.

The benefit estimates described in this report are gross benefits and are not net of estimated costs. Because the EIM would make use of ISO's existing dispatch software, the initial cost is expected to be low when compared to these benefits. E3 did not conduct an independent analysis of the cost of establishing and operating an EIM. Based on ISO's estimates of market operator costs, PacifiCorp would incur a one-time fixed charge of approximately $2.1 million.[7] A separate study of a WECC-wide EIM estimated that each EIM market participant would also incur one-time capital costs of $1-4 million for software, hardware, and other related investments.[8] Annual costs to operate the PacifiCorp-ISO EIM are estimated to be on the order of $2-5 million.[9]

[7] Based on estimates from CAISO staff.

[8] WECC, 2011, "WECC Efficient Dispatch Toolkit Cost-Benefit Analysis (Revised)," WECC White Paper, p. 62, http://www.wecc.biz/committees/EDT/EDT%20Results/EDT%20Cost%20Benefit%20Analysis%20Report%20-%20REVISED.pdf.

[9] This estimate is comprised of CAISO estimate of $1.35 million per year in administrative charges to PacifiCorp plus additional PacifiCorp costs of $1-4 million per year in staffing and other operating costs for an EIM market participant.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and Goals

PacifiCorp and ISO have been active participants in an ongoing regional effort to enhance bulk power operations to achieve cost savings for customers and facilitate the integration of higher levels of renewable generation. In response, PacifiCorp and ISO have been funding, participating in, and observing a number of regional and national initiatives, studies, and groups aimed at enhancing access to needed flexible resources, application of automated tools to manage resources and products that balance variable generation, and more effective utilization of existing and new transmission facilities. These efforts include:

+ The 2008 Western Executive Industry Leaders (WEIL) study, which identified economic opportunities to lower renewable procurement costs across the Western Interconnection;[10]
+ Two recent (2011 and 2012) studies of an EIM covering all of the Western Interconnection except for ISO and the Alberta Electric System Operator, one coordinated by WECC and another by the PUC-EIM Group (see Section 3.2);
+ Two studies examining intra-hour scheduling in the Western Interconnection, one for the WECC's Variable Generation Subcommittee and another for the Northwest Power Pool (see Section 3.2);

[10] See http://www.weilgroup.org/E3_WEIL_Complete_Study_2008_082508.pdf for the full report.

+ A Joint Initiative among Columbia Grid, Northern Tier Transmission Group, and WestConnect on a dynamic scheduling system, an intra-hour transaction accelerator platform, and intra-hour transmission scheduling;[11] and
+ The North American Electric Reliability Corporation's (NERC's) ongoing Integration of Variable Generation Task Force (IVGTF).[12]

Building on their involvement in these efforts, PacifiCorp and ISO undertook a joint study to evaluate the potential benefits of an EIM covering their service areas. E3 was retained to identify and quantify the benefits of this potential EIM, and to examine the allocation of benefits between PacifiCorp and ISO.

This report describes E3's methods and findings. Throughout the study process, E3 worked closely with both PacifiCorp and ISO to develop scenario assumptions, validate the approach, and estimate benefits consistent with how each party believes its system operates today and would operate in the future under each of the defined scenarios.

1.2 Structure of this Report

The remainder of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies key assumptions (2.1), specifies methods (2.2) and scenarios (2.3), and presents benefits (2.4) and benefit attribution (2.5) for the analysis. Section 3 provides context for interpreting the results, describing where the assumptions lie along a conservative-moderate-aggressive spectrum (3.1) and how the results compare against other EIM studies (3.2). The report also contains a technical appendix that describes modeling assumptions and methods in more detail.

[11] For documents related to this process, see http://www.columbiagrid.org/ji-nttg-wc-documents.cfm.
[12] For task force materials, see http://www.nerc.com/filez/ivgtf.html.

2 EIM Analysis

2.1 Key Assumptions

2.1.1 WHAT IS AN EIM AND WHAT WOULD IT DO?

The EIM considered in this study would consist of a voluntary, sub-hourly market covering the PacifiCorp West, PacifiCorp East, and ISO BAAs. EIM software would automatically dispatch imbalance energy from generators voluntarily offering their resource for dispatch across these BAAs every five minutes using a security-constrained least-cost dispatch algorithm. By providing an interregional market for intra-hour imbalance energy, the EIM would complement PacifiCorp's existing procedures for transacting in the ISO's hour-ahead and day-ahead markets. This study assumes that the ISO hour-ahead and day-ahead markets will remain unchanged and that PacifiCorp will continue its existing operational plans to serve its load, arrangements for unit commitment, contingency reserves, regulation, regional reserve sharing agreements, and other BA responsibilities.

The EIM is expected to lead to four principal changes in system operations for PacifiCorp and ISO:

+ **More efficient interregional dispatch.** The EIM would allow more efficient use of generators and the transmission systems in PacifiCorp and ISO by removing transmission rate and structural impediments between BAAs, eliminating within-hour limitations, and enabling more efficient dispatch between the two systems relative to hourly scheduling.

+ **More efficient intraregional dispatch in PacifiCorp.** The EIM's nodal dispatch software would improve the efficiency of PacifiCorp's system dispatch by better reflecting transmission constraints and congestion within PacifiCorp.

+ **Reduced flexibility reserve requirements in PacifiCorp and ISO.** By pooling variability in load and wind and solar output, PacifiCorp and ISO would each reduce the quantity of reserves required to meet flexibility needs.

+ **Reduced renewable energy curtailment in ISO.** By allowing generators in PacifiCorp's BAAs to reduce output when ISO faces an "over-generation" situation, an EIM would reduce the amount of renewable energy ISO would otherwise need to curtail.

This study calculates the benefits associated with these changes by comparing the total cost of operating the combined ISO and PacifiCorp systems under two cases: (1) a Benchmark Case, representing continuation of current scheduling and operating practices under "business-as-usual," and (2) an EIM Case, in which an EIM is established encompassing the PacifiCorp and ISO BAAs. The cost difference between the Benchmark Case and the EIM Case represents the total benefits of an EIM. The study also provides a high-level estimate of how these benefits might be apportioned among the ISO and PacifiCorp systems.

2.1.2 EIM COSTS

The costs of an EIM include those borne by the market operator to set up and operate the EIM, and those borne by market participants to participate in the EIM. The EIM requires some expansion of ISO's modeling and software capabilities, but by using ISO's existing software, initial costs are significantly reduced relative to what they would be if new software development were needed.

Additional hardware and organizational costs may also be required. For instance, PacifiCorp may need to purchase some new metering or communications hardware to enable effective communication between parties. PacifiCorp may also seek some amount of staff training and organizational development to more fully take advantage of the market opportunities offered by the EIM.

ISO has estimated the costs of setting up and operating an EIM, as part of its engagement with ongoing regional EIM initiatives. ISO's proposed operator charges for the EIM use a "pay-as-you-go" approach, which allows the EIM to expand as new market participants join. The one-time upfront charge covers the cost of making the modeling, systems, and other preparations to include an entity in the EIM, and depends on the size of the BAA. Ongoing administrative charges cover costs to operate the EIM, and are based on the same cost structure as ISO's existing grid management charge and the EIM participant's level of usage. For a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM, ISO estimates that PacifiCorp would incur a one-time fixed charge of approximately $2.1 million and $1.35 million per year in administrative charges.[13]

Independent estimates of market participant costs were not developed for this study. A WECC-sponsored study of EIM costs estimated that each market participant would incur total capital startup costs of $1-4 million and operating costs of $1-4 million per year.[14]

[13] Based on estimates from CAISO staff. Administrative charges per participant will likely fall as the number of participants grows. Other cost and risk allocation issues associated with the EIM, and the rules to address these issues, will be considered in a 2013 stakeholder process.
[14] WECC, 2011, "WECC Efficient Dispatch Toolkit Cost-Benefit Analysis (Revised)," WECC White Paper, p. 62, http://www.wecc.biz/committees/EDT/EDT%20Results/EDT%20Cost%20Benefit%20Analysis%20Report%20-%20REVISED.pdf.

In this case, PacifiCorp is assumed to be the only incremental market participant and no incremental costs would be required for existing ISO market participants.

Using these preliminary estimates of market operator and market participant costs, total fixed and operating costs for the PacifiCorp-ISO EIM would be on the order of $3-6 million (one-time startup costs) and $2-5 million per year (annual operating costs), respectively. PacifiCorp and ISO are actively working to develop specific start up and operating costs as part of initial efforts under the memorandum of understanding.

2.1.3 KEY MODELING ASSUMPTIONS

Five key modeling assumptions are important for understanding the results in this study: 1) the use of hurdle rates, (2) hourly dispatch, (3) the treatment of flexibility reserves, (4) transfer capability limits between PacifiCorp and ISO, and (5) limits on hydropower contributions to reserves. This section provides a brief overview of the rationale for these assumptions.

2.1.3.1 Hurdle rates

Within the Western Interconnection's bilateral markets, there are a number of impediments to efficient trade of energy across BAA boundaries. These include:

+ The need, in some cases, for market participants to acquire point-to-point transmission service in order to schedule transactions from one BAA to another;
+ The current practice of some transmission providers requiring short-term transactions to provide real power losses for each transmission provider system that is utilized, resulting, in some cases, in multiple or "pancaked" losses requirements; and

+ Inefficiencies due to illiquid markets and imperfect information, such as the standard 16-hour "Heavy-Load Hour" and 8-hour "Light-Load Hour" day-ahead trading products defined by the Western Systems Power Pool, minimum transaction quantities of 25 MW, and the bilateral nature of transaction origination and clearing, among others.

In production simulation modeling, these impediments to trade are typically represented by "hurdle rates," $/MWh price adders that inhibit power flow over transmission paths that cross BAA boundaries. In this analysis, E3 used hurdle rates that were benchmarked to historical data, so that hourly power flows on major WECC paths in the simulation approximate the historical flow levels on those paths during a historical test year.[15]

An EIM would perform a security-constrained, least-cost dispatch across the entire EIM footprint for each 5-minute settlement period, eliminating the barriers listed above at the 5-minute timestep. This is represented in production simulation modeling by the removal of hurdle rates, which allows for more efficient (i.e., lower cost) dispatch.

2.1.3.2 Hourly dispatch

While a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM would likely operate on a 5-minute timestep, E3 used GridView simulation runs with an hourly timestep to estimate the change in operating costs associated with an EIM. This was done in order to simplify the computational process and reduce model runtime, and because of the limited quantity of high-temporal resolution data available for the Western Interconnection.

[15] This analysis used benchmarked hurdle rates from the WECC EIM study. See http://www.wecc.biz/ committees/ EDT/ Documents/E3_EIM_Benefits_Study-Phase_2_Report_RevisedOct2011_CLEAN2[1].pdf, pp 41-43.

This assumption introduces two potentially offsetting modeling inaccuracies. On the one hand, since hourly operations would continue to be performed using today's operating practices, the use of an hourly timestep might overestimate the potential benefits of an EIM, because changes in dispatch that are feasible on an hourly timestep might not be feasible on a 5-minute timestep due to ramping limitations. On the other hand, this method excludes: (1) savings due to more efficient dispatch of resources to meet net load variations inside the operating hour; and (2) savings from reductions in costs to meet potential intra-hour ramping shortages. Other studies have indicated that sub-hourly dispatch benefits may be substantial. Those benefits would be additive to the benefits reported here.

2.1.3.3 Flexibility reserves

BAs hold reserves to balance discrepancies between forecasted and actual load within the operating hour. These "flexibility" reserves are in addition to the spinning and supplemental reserves carried against generation or transmission system contingencies.[16] Flexibility reserves generally fall into two categories: *regulation* reserves automatically respond to control signals or changes in system frequency on a time scale of a few cycles up to five minutes, while *load following* reserves provide ramping capability to meet changes in net loads between a 5-minute and hourly timescale.

Higher penetration of wind and solar energy increases the amount of both regulation and load following reserves needed to accommodate the uncertainty and variability inherent in these resources while maintaining acceptable balancing area control

[16] This study assumes that contingency reserves would be unaffected by an EIM and that PacifiCorp would continue to participate in its existing regional reserve sharing agreement for contingency reserves in all scenarios.

performance. By pooling load and resource variability across space and time, total variability can be reduced, decreasing the amount of flexibility reserves required to ensure reliable operations. This reduces operating costs by requiring fewer thermal generators to be committed and operated at less efficient set points.

For this study, E3 performed statistical calculations of the quantity of flexibility reserves that would be required in both the Benchmark Case and the EIM Case. The reserve quantities are a function of the variability and uncertainty of the within-hour net load signal. These requirements decline when the calculations are performed for a larger geographic area and a more diverse portfolio of wind and solar resources. In keeping with the 5-minute operational timestep of a potential EIM, E3 assumed that the diversity benefit from an EIM results in savings from reduced load following reserves, but not regulation reserves. Other contingency reserves (spin and non-spinning reserves) were assumed not to change under the EIM operation.

There are two implicit assumptions embedded in this approach: (1) that PacifiCorp and ISO would carry the calculated levels of flexibility reserves in the Benchmark Case, and (2) the EIM would include a mechanism to take advantage of increased net load diversity by reducing the quantities of flexibility reserves that would need to be carried. With regard to the first assumption, while there is currently no defined requirement for BAs to carry load following reserves, all BAs must carry load following reserves in order to maintain control performance standards within acceptable bounds, and reserve requirements will grow under higher renewable penetration scenarios. ISO is in the process of introducing a "flexi-ramp" product for this purpose.

With regard to the second assumption, while the specific design of a potential PacifiCorp-ISO EIM has not been finalized, it is logical to assume that ISO's flexi-ramp requirements would be calculated in such a way as to maximize diversity benefits across the entire EIM footprint, within the context of its 5-minute operational timestep. However, it should be noted that this mechanism may not be in place at the time EIM becomes operational, and the ISO and PacifiCorp may require a period of operational experience before the full benefits of flexibility reserve savings can be achieved.

2.1.3.4 Transmission transfer capability

PacifiCorp has several interconnections and contract transmission rights between the ISO and both the PacifiCorp East and PacifiCorp West BAAs that can potentially be utilized for EIM activity. Each interconnection has unique capabilities to facilitate beneficial interchange based upon existing facilities, path operators, legacy agreements, and incremental costs. Initiatives are underway to maximize the potential at each interconnection for the EIM.

Transmission transfer capability limits between PacifiCorp and ISO will constrain EIM benefits. These limits can be physical or contractual. If the transmission paths connecting PacifiCorp and ISO are congested, generators in PacifiCorp will not be able to provide additional imbalance energy to ISO, and vice versa. PacifiCorp and ISO anticipate initially relying on PacifiCorp transmission contract rights to the ISO to facilitate EIM transactions, as opposed to a "flow-based" transmission optimization, similar to those in use in the ISO and other organized markets, that would be unconstrained by contract limitations.

While reliance on existing contract path scheduling mechanisms will prevent achievement of full benefits at EIM startup, transmission transfer capability and associated EIM benefits would increase through potential contractual changes, new transmission construction, operational changes such as WECC-wide 15-minute scheduling, and the addition of other EIM participants. In particular, as additional market participants join the EIM and a larger contiguous EIM area is formed, flow-based transmission usage will be explored, along with methods to limit impact to non-participating transmission systems. Flow-based transmission usage is expected to increase benefits to EIM market participants. In addition, a mechanism to increase the flexibility of existing transmission for intra-hour use could be pursued to increase the transfer capabilities and increase the value of EIM.

This report provides a range of benefits based, in part, on three different potential interchange capabilities between PacifiCorp and ISO, specifically 100, 400, and 800 MW.[17] The two parties have agreed in the memorandum of understanding to conduct an initial review of contracts. The findings from the ongoing review, collaboration with neighboring transmission path operators, and additional certainty on market design will inform total interconnection capabilities in the short-term as well as specific opportunities to add to those capabilities over time. The model also incorporates a 200 MW limit on east to west transfers between the PacifiCorp East and PacifiCorp West BAAs. For reduced renewable curtailment, E3 assumed that this transfer capability would not pose a constraint, given the relatively small quantity of curtailed energy in question.

[17] For simplicity of modeling, transmission transfer capabilities are modeled at the California-Oregon Intertie (COI). This is a proxy used to demonstrate a general level of increased benefit with increasing interconnection capabilities, which may occur on other paths.

2.1.3.5 Limits on hydropower contributions to flexibility reserves

Cost savings from reduced flexibility reserves are sensitive to assumptions about the availability of hydropower to provide reserves. Dispatchable hydroelectric resources only rarely generate at levels that approach maximum nameplate capacity due to limitations on water available for power generation. On many facilities, a portion of the "unloaded" capacity — the difference between the nameplate capacity and the actual generation — can be used to provide contingency and flexibility reserves. However, this unloaded capacity varies by facility and with continually-fluctuating river conditions, making it challenging to generalize for modeling purposes. This leads to uncertainty in the calculation of operating costs using production simulation models.

In order to address this uncertainty, E3 developed a range regarding the ability of hydro to provide flexibility reserves, which affect a significant component of potential EIM savings. In the high range, E3 assumed that up to 12% of the total nameplate capacity of hydropower generation is available to provide flexibility reserves, while in the low range, E3 assumed that up to 25% of hydropower nameplate capacity is available to provide flexibility reserves.[18] EIM benefits are higher in the case where hydro's ability to provide flexibility reserves is restricted, because a higher proportion of reserves are being provided by thermal resources that can be optimized using the EIM dispatch software. Conversely, there are fewer cost savings available in the case where hydro provides a larger quantity of flexibility reserves with little, if any, variable cost.

[18] The two scenarios used here reflect the low and high ends of a plausible range of values based on CAISO and PacifiCorp experience.

2.2 Methods

2.2.1 INTERREGIONAL DISPATCH SAVINGS

An EIM would reduce transactional friction between PacifiCorp and ISO and thus enable improved resource dispatch efficiency and reduced cost to serve load in both systems. E3 estimated these interregional dispatch savings by running parallel production cost simulations using GridView: one with a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM (EIM Dispatch Case) and one without the EIM (Benchmark Case).

The Benchmark Case simulates status quo operational arrangements, and includes hurdle rates to represent economic and non-economic barriers to trade, such as transmission tariff rates, losses, and lack of market liquidity. The EIM Dispatch Case simulates operations with an EIM in place by eliminating these hurdle rates between PacifiCorp and ISO, resulting in more efficient energy dispatch and lower production costs.[19] Interregional dispatch savings from an EIM are measured as the difference in production costs between the Benchmark and EIM Dispatch Cases. In eliminating hurdle rates, E3 implicitly assumed that no variable transmission costs are incurred for EIM transactions.

To calculate the interregional dispatch savings, E3 developed GridView production cost estimates for two cases. The first, a Benchmark Case, assumes hurdle rates are in place. The second, an EIM Dispatch Case, assumes alternately that there is 100, 400, and 800 MW of transmission transfer capability between the PacifiCorp and ISO systems, and that EIM transactions using this capability pay no hurdle rates. E3 scaled the

[19] Only hurdle rates between PacifiCorp –West and ISO have been adjusted from the benchmark case. Hurdle rates were also used to simulate the need for market participants to acquire CO_2 allowances when delivering “unspecified” electric energy into California. These CO_2-related hurdle rates were kept in place for both the Benchmark and the EIM Dispatch Cases.

interregional dispatch savings for lower levels of transmission transfer capability (100 MW and 400 MW) by assuming that the benefits are proportional to the change in intertie flows resulting from the EIM at each level of transfer capability.[20]

2.2.2 INTRAREGIONAL DISPATCH SAVINGS

In bilateral markets, load serving entities (LSEs) like PacifiCorp seek to minimize the cost of serving their loads through a combination of dispatching their own resources and trading energy subject to the physical limitations of the transmission system. This can result in significant additional dispatch costs to manage transmission congestion within the LSE's own service territories. In a nodal market, all transmission constraints are considered when determining optimal commitment[21] and dispatch of generators, and the efficient use of the transmission system.

While ISO currently uses nodal dispatch, PacifiCorp's unit commitment and dispatch do not take full advantage of all sub-hourly cost saving opportunities. A PacifiCorp-ISO EIM would provide 5-minute nodal price signals to generation resources throughout the EIM area, thus enabling more optimal generation and transmission dispatch in the PacifiCorp area. These efficiency improvements cannot be captured using the GridView software, which assumes perfectly efficient operations within each area.

To quantify the cost savings from using ISO's nodal dispatch software within PacifiCorp's BAAs, E3 assumed these savings would be proportional to the estimated savings from

[20] Scaling factors of 0.617 (12% hydropower reserve cap) and 0.628 (25% hydropower reserve cap), applied to the 800 MW results, were used for the 100 MW transfer capability scenario, based on estimated changes in intertie flows. A 0.997 scaling factor, applied to the 800 MW results, was used in the 400 MW case for both hydropower assumptions.
[21] Under an EIM, commitment would remain the responsibility of the BA. An EIM would provide optimal real-time dispatch, but would not address commitment.

ISO's own transition to nodal pricing that occurred in 2009.[22] By assuming estimated cost savings scale with peak load, the benefits from nodal dispatch in PacifiCorp for 2017 would be:

$$PacifiCorp\ 2017\ savings = CAISO\ 2009\ savings * \frac{PAC\ 2017\ peak\ load}{CAISO\ 2009\ peak\ load}$$

or

$$PacifiCorp\ 2017\ savings = \frac{\$105\ MM}{yr} * \frac{10{,}079\ MW}{45{,}486\ MW} = \frac{\$23\ MM}{yr}$$

Because there is some uncertainty about the extent to which ISO's nodal dispatch software will produce dispatch cost savings from PacifiCorp's generation, this study examines alternative low and high scenarios. In the low range scenario, the EIM is assumed to achieve 10% of the total $23 million of available cost savings, which were calculated based on an hourly analysis. This assumption stems from the ISO's experience that its balancing market clears transactions totaling approximately 10% of total load. In the high range scenario, the EIM is assumed to achieve 100% of the total $23 million of available cost savings. This scenario implicitly assumes that 5-minute EIM prices will inform market transactions that occur on an hourly basis, allowing more savings than would occur based only on the amount of imbalance energy clearing in the 5-minute market. As the non-EIM forward market becomes better informed by the EIM market, E3 would expect that the real-time nodal market applied to PacifiCorp would result in more than 10% savings.

[22] See Frank A. Wolak, 2011, "Measuring the Benefits of Greater Spatial Granularity in Short-Term Pricing in Wholesale Electricity Markets, *American Economic Review* 101: 247-252. The estimates in this study are estimated annual cost reductions that resulted from the introduction of nodal pricing in California.

2.2.3 REDUCED FLEXIBILITY RESERVES

Currently, PacifiCorp and ISO meet their operating reserve requirements by procuring and utilizing existing generating capacity within their respective BAAs. An EIM would lower the total cost of procuring and utilizing flexibility reserves for both entities in two ways: (1) reducing flexibility reserve requirement quantities by combining PacifiCorp and ISO's forecast error for load and variable generation; and (2) enabling flexibility reserves to be procured from thermal or hydro resources anywhere in the EIM footprint, subject to transmission constraints. The result is that the combined cost of procuring flexibility reserves with an EIM is less than it would be if each entity procured them independently.

E3 estimated the cost savings from reduced flexibility reserves using the following three steps. First, flexibility reserve requirements were calculated for PacifiCorp and ISO as separate areas (Benchmark Case) and then again as a combined area (EIM Flexibility Reserve Case).[23] Flexibility reserve requirements were calculated separately for each hour using three years of 10-minute load, wind, and solar data for PacifiCorp and ISO. Calculations in the EIM Flexibility Reserve Case were constrained so that reductions in flexibility reserve requirements were less than or equal to the assumed transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO.

Next, E3 applied the flexibility reserve requirement calculations from above to production cost simulation runs for each case, using GridView. In the Benchmark Case and EIM Dispatch Cases, PacifiCorp and ISO must procure flexibility reserves from capacity located in their respective BAs to meet the requirements calculated for each

[23] These results, when scaled back from 2017, are similar in size to the levels of reserves procured in each jurisdiction today for regulation and load following.

entity. In the EIM Flexibility Reserve Case, all PacifiCorp and ISO generation is eligible to meet the single flexibility reserve requirement for the EIM footprint, subject to transfer constraints.

Table 3 shows E3's estimates of the combined minimum reserve requirements for PacifiCorp and ISO under the EIM. The standalone case represents no transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO, and is comprised of 608 MW of required reserves in PacifiCorp and 1,403 MW in ISO. As the Table shows, increasing transfer capability allows for greater diversity benefits, reducing minimum reserve holdings.

Table 3. Estimated Total Minimum Reserve Holdings under the EIM in 2017

PacifiCorp-ISO Transfer Capability	Minimum Reserve Holdings (MW)
Standalone (no EIM)	2,011
100 MW	1,932
400 MW	1,687
800 MW	1,583

As a final step, E3 calculated the difference in production costs between the EIM Dispatch Case and EIM Flexibility Reserve Case to estimate the annual benefit of reduced flexibility reserves, over and above the dispatch benefits. This yields the incremental savings associated with flexibility reserve reductions between the two cases. E3 benchmarked the cost savings using market prices for ancillary services in ISO, to ensure that these estimates were reasonable (See Technical Appendix).

Since the PacifiCorp-ISO EIM would be a 5-minute energy market, only the portion of savings associated with reductions in load following reserves (5-minute to hourly timescale) would accrue under an EIM. Each area would continue to procure and deploy regulation reserves independently. Since load following accounts for approximately 80%

of total flexibility reserve needs (load following plus regulation) in E3's calculations, E3 assumed that a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM could achieve 80% of total savings from reduced flexibility reserve requirements.

2.2.4 REDUCED RENEWABLE ENERGY CURTAILMENT

High penetrations of variable generation increase the likelihood of over-generation conditions. In these situations, curtailment of variable generation may be necessary since the system is not flexible enough to reduce the output from other resources located exclusively within the same BAA. Based on discussions with ISO, over-generation conditions and the curtailment of renewable generation are likely to be a long-term issue as additional wind and solar resources come online.

As a standalone BA, ISO schedules imports on an hour-ahead basis and may find it difficult to back down imports on shorter timescales if local renewable generation is higher or if load is lower than expected. An EIM could potentially avoid over-generation situations since it could enable ISO to reduce imports in real time from PacifiCorp rather than curtail renewables during minimum generation or ramp-constrained intervals.

E3 calculated the benefits of reduced energy curtailment in ISO by multiplying estimates of: (1) the annual amount of renewable energy curtailed when simulating ISO operations as a standalone entity without an EIM, and (2) the value of curtailed renewable energy (in $/MWh). The result represents the cost of renewable energy curtailment that an EIM could help to avoid, assuming that PacifiCorp has generation available to back down during these situations.

To estimate the level of renewable energy curtailment in ISO, E3 developed a methodology that uses outputs from two sequential GridView model runs. In the first run (representing unit commitment based on forecasted needs), projected solar, wind, and load profiles were used to estimate economic imports into ISO. In the second run (representing real-time dispatch), actual solar, wind, and load profiles were used along with minimum import limits set to the level of economic imports from the first simulation. This limit prevented the model from lowering the interchange below the level determined by the unit commitment process. This reduction in system flexibility resulted in approximately 120 GWh of renewable energy curtailed by ISO in 2022.

This is likely a conservative estimate of the level of renewable energy curtailment. Production simulation models are designed to utilize normative assumptions regarding load, hydro conditions, thermal resource outages, and other variables in order to produce reasonable, mid-range estimates of resource dispatch and prevailing power flows. However, renewable curtailment occurs during extreme events such as very high output of wind, solar and hydro resources combined with very low load conditions. These conditions are not well-represented in production simulation modeling inputs. Hence, renewable curtailment is likely to be understated in production simulation model outputs.

E3 used a $90/MWh value of avoided renewable energy curtailment as the sum of three components: (1) renewable energy certificate (REC) value, assumed to be $50/MWh; (2) production tax credit (PTC) value of $20/MWh; and (3) the avoided production cost of the thermal unit that an EIM enables to dispatch down, estimated to be $20/MWh.

E3 used the simulated renewable curtailment results to develop two scenarios for renewable energy curtailment in 2017. As a lower end estimate, E3 assumed that ISO renewable energy curtailment is 10% of the simulated value, or 12 GWh. As a higher end estimate, E3 assumed that renewable curtailment is 100% of the simulated value, or 120

GWh. This range of curtailment estimates was then multiplied by the value of avoided renewable energy curtailment to calculate lower end and higher end estimates of $1.1 million (= 12 GWh * 90/MWh) to $10.8 million (= 120 GWh * $90/MWh) in benefits for reduced renewable energy curtailment in 2017.

2.3 EIM Scenarios

E3 estimated EIM benefits based on study year 2017. E3 chose this year, in consultation with ISO and PacifiCorp, to represent a period after the EIM was already operational but prior to any significant changes in load, generation, and transmission. In particular, E3's modeling analysis excludes: (1) a portion of the full build out of renewable resources necessary to meet California's 33% RPS; (2) expected retirements and replacements of ISO thermal generating capacity due to once-through-cooling (OTC) regulations; and (3) a number of planned and proposed transmission projects, such as Gateway West that have the potential to provide a substantial expansion of the quantity of flexible resources that would be able to participate in a 5-minute market.

E3 used scenario assumptions to inform how sensitive benefits are to: (1) the transmission transfer capability between ISO and PacifiCorp, which limits savings both from interregional dispatch and reduced flexibility reserves; (2) the amount of hydropower capacity that can provide flexibility reserves; (3) the extent to which nodal prices from an EIM would change PacifiCorp's dispatch and produce associated efficiency improvements; and (4) the extent of renewable energy curtailment that can be avoided through an EIM. These scenarios are designed to explore a wide range of potential benefit levels to reflect the limitations of existing tools to characterize all of the changes to system operations that would occur under an EIM, particularly the modeling of hydropower, reserves, and renewable curtailment. In addition, the scenarios capture a range of uncertainties about the extent to which future industry developments would allow cost savings to occur both with and without an EIM.

Table 4. Low and high range assumptions under low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW) PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability scenarios

Assumption	Low transfer capability		Medium transfer capability		High transfer capability	
	Low range	High range	Low range	High range	Low range	High range
Maximum hydropower contribution to contingency and flexibility reserves*	25%	12%	25%	12%	25%	12%
Share of intraregional dispatch savings achieved	10%	100%	10%	100%	10%	100%
Share of identified renewable energy curtailment avoided	10%	100%	10%	100%	10%	100%

** Percent of nameplate capacity for each project*

The scenarios are organized around low, medium, and high scenarios for transmission transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO, with 100, 400, and 800 MW, respectively, in each case. Within each scenario, E3 calculated a low and high range of benefits (Table 4). The low range assumes: hydropower can contribute up to 25% of nameplate capacity toward flexibility reserves; PacifiCorp achieves 10% of estimated nodal dispatch savings; and the value of renewable energy curtailment is 10% of the full estimated value. The high range assumes: hydropower can contribute up to 12% of nameplate capacity toward contingency and flexibility reserves; PacifiCorp achieves 100% of estimated nodal dispatch savings; and the value of renewable energy curtailment is 100% of the full estimated value.

2.4 EIM Benefits

Figure 1 and Table 5 show the low and high range of EIM benefits for the low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW) transfer scenarios, and the amount attributed to each component. Total annual benefits in 2017 range from $21 million in the low range of the 100 MW transfer capability scenario, to $129 million in the high range of the 800 MW transfer capability scenario (2012$).

Figure 1. Low and high range benefits under low (100 MW), medium (400 MW), and high (800 MW) PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability scenarios (2012$)



Table 5. Low and high range annual benefits in 2017 under low, medium, and high PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability scenarios (million 2012$)

Benefit Category	Low transfer capability		Medium transfer capability		High transfer capability	
	Low range	High range	Low range	High range	Low range	High range
Interregional dispatch	$14.1	$11.0	$22.3	$17.7	$22.4	$17.8
Intraregional dispatch	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0
Flexibility reserves	$4.0	$20.8	$11.0	$51.3	$13.4	$77.1
Renewable curtailment	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8
Total benefits	**$21.4**	**$65.6**	**$36.7**	**$102.8**	**$39.2**	**$128.7**

Notes: Individual estimates may not sum to total benefits due to rounding.

Differences in individual benefit categories provide important insights into the impact of scenario assumptions on the results.

- Interregional dispatch savings range from $14 million to $22 million per year. Increasing PacifiCorp-ISO transfer capability from 100 MW in to 400 MW drives significant additional cost savings. However, the marginal benefit of additional transfer capability beyond 400 MW appears to be small.
- Interregional dispatch savings are somewhat lower under the high range scenarios than under the low range scenarios because of interactions that occur between the hurdle rate and operating reserve aspects of the modeling. When the ability of hydropower to provide reserves is restricted, total production costs increase because more thermal generators are committed to provide reserves. These additional thermal generators tend to be higher-cost units, which may be operated at or near their minimum operating levels. This restricts the dispatch efficiency gains that are available due to the elimination of hurdle rates, because these higher-cost generators are less able to reduce their output when a lower-cost unit is available in a neighboring system.
- Annual cost savings from reduced flexibility reserves range from $4 million to $77 million. These are driven largely by constraints on the ability of hydropower to provide contingency and flexibility reserves. This is a source of considerable

uncertainty, and more research is needed to understand hydro's ability to contribute toward flexibility reserve requirements under high penetrations of wind and solar. Transfer capability is also an important constraint, as benefits increase from $4 million per year with 100 MW to $13 million per year with 800 MW of transfer capability in the scenario where hydropower can contribute to up to 25% of flexibility reserves.

+ Annual cost savings from intraregional dispatch savings and reduced renewable energy curtailment range from $3 million to $34 million, suggesting that, although they are uncertain, both categories could be important contributors to EIM benefits. Because an EIM would provide an automated mechanism for facilitating wind curtailment solutions, as well as clearing any payment required in the event of curtailment, this is likely to be an important and growing EIM benefit going forward.

The results described here confirm that, even under conservative assumptions regarding the use of hydro for imbalance energy and the availability of transmission transfer capability, the incremental benefits of an EIM between PacifiCorp and ISO are likely to be larger than the preliminary estimates of the costs to implement and operate this market. The results also confirm that the benefits of an EIM can be quite substantial as participation grows, allowing more resources to participate and lowering the costs of both imbalance energy and the costs of providing adequate dynamic reserves.

2.5 Attribution of EIM Benefits

E3 assumed that the benefits of an EIM would be attributed to PacifiCorp and ISO as follows:

- **Interregional dispatch savings.** Savings were split evenly between PacifiCorp and ISO to reflect: (1) the reduced cost to serve ISO load, since expensive internal generation is displaced by low-cost imports from PacifiCorp; and (2) additional revenues for PacifiCorp, since it exports additional power to ISO.
- **Intraregional dispatch savings.** The savings were scaled to the PacifiCorp service area from a study of the ISO's nodal market, thus all benefits were attributed to PacifiCorp.
- **Reduced flexibility reserves.** Benefits were allocated to PacifiCorp and ISO in proportion to their standalone need, resulting in a roughly 30/70 split, respectively.
- **Reduced renewable energy curtailment.** All benefits of reduced curtailment were attributed to ISO, because the reduced curtailment would take place within the ISO footprint.

This simple approach allocates the total cost savings between the two parties and does not attempt to account for changes in market revenues relative to today's bilateral system. It is not intended to be a methodology for allocating costs and benefits. The actual net costs and benefits that would flow to the PacifiCorp and ISO systems might be different from the assumptions used here.

The attribution of benefits from a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM in 2017 is summarized in Tables 6 and 7. PacifiCorp achieves annual cost savings of $10-54 million, with the range dependent on the extent to which PacifiCorp generators participate in the EIM and its nodal market, transfer limits, and the extent to which hydropower can provide flexibility reserves. Annual cost savings to ISO are $11-74 million by 2017, with the range dependent on transfer limits, the extent to which hydropower can provide flexibility reserves, and the extent of renewable curtailment.

Table 6. Attribution of EIM benefits to PacifiCorp in 2017 (million 2012$)

Benefit Category	Low transfer capability		Medium transfer capability		High transfer capability	
	Low Range	High Range	Low Range	High Range	Low Range	High Range
Interregional dispatch	$7.0	$5.5	$11.2	$8.9	$11.2	$8.9
Intraregional dispatch	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0	$2.3	$23.0
Flexibility reserves	$1.2	$6.1	$3.2	$14.9	$3.9	$22.5
Renewable curtailment	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0
Total benefits	**$10.5**	**$34.6**	**$16.7**	**$46.8**	**$17.4**	**$54.4**

Note: Attributed values may not match totals due to independent rounding.

Table 7. Attribution of EIM benefits to ISO in 2017 (million 2012$)

Benefit Category	Low transfer capability		Medium transfer capability		High transfer capability	
	Low Range	High Range	Low Range	High Range	Low Range	High Range
Interregional dispatch	$7.0	$5.5	$11.2	$8.9	$11.2	$8.9
Intraregional dispatch	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0	$0.0
Flexibility reserves	$2.8	$14.7	$7.8	$36.4	$9.5	$54.6
Renewable curtailment	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8	$1.1	$10.8
Total benefits	**$10.9**	**$31.0**	**$20.0**	**$56.0**	**$21.8**	**$74.3**

Note: Attributed values may not match totals due to independent rounding.

3 Interpreting the Results

3.1 Conservative Nature of the Results

Because of the difficulties in modeling the operational complexities of an EIM, E3's approach was intended to use conservative to moderate assumptions to generate credible results, both as a standalone analysis and relative to other studies. Table 8 provides a high-level overview of the nature of assumptions (conservative, moderate, aggressive) used for each of the five identified categories of benefits, and an explanation of why the assumptions were considered to be conservative or moderate.

Table 8. Categorization of assumptions used in this study

Benefit Category	Assumptions (conservative, moderate, aggressive)	Rationale
Interregional dispatch	Conservative-Moderate	• E3 limited PacifiCorp-ISO transmission transfer capability in the low transfer capability scenario to 100 MW, which limited EIM benefits • E3 used hurdle rates to inhibit interregional trade in Benchmark Case (moderate assumption) • Hourly cost differences between natural gas-fired generators are understated in production simulation models due to the use of uniform heat rates assumptions and normalized system conditions; these models understated EIM benefits
Intraregional dispatch	Conservative-Moderate	• E3 calculated nodal dispatch savings by scaling estimated ISO peak load-normalized savings by PacifiCorp peak load (moderate assumption); E3 assumed only 10% of these savings materialize for low range (conservative assumption)
Flexibility reserves	Conservative	• E3 limited PacifiCorp-ISO transmission transfer capability in the low transfer capability scenario to 100 MW, which limited EIM benefits • E3 included operating cost only; no capacity cost savings are included, which limited EIM benefits • E3 allowed 25% of total hydropower capacity to contribute to flexibility reserves in the low range estimates, which limited EIM benefits • E3 did not require lock-down of dispatch 45 minutes prior to the operating hour, as done in other studies, which would have raised the quantity of reserves required and increased EIM benefits
Renewable curtailment	Conservative	• E3 did not evaluate renewable curtailment for PacifiCorp, which limited EIM benefits • In low range estimate, E3 assumed wind and solar not producing significant over-generation (conservative assumption) • Production simulation models understate the frequency with which low net load/high generation events occur due to their use of idealized operating assumptions; these models limit EIM benefits
Within-hour dispatch	Conservative	• Production simulation analysis modeled at hourly level, omitting potential benefits of sub-hourly dispatch (other studies indicate that these benefits could be substantial)

3.2 Comparison to other Studies

Several recent studies have examined the potential benefits of greater balancing area coordination in the Western Interconnection. These include:

- **WECC EIM Analysis (completed in 2011)** — examined the benefits of an hourly EIM in parts of the WI region; undertaken by E3 for WECC;[24]
- **PUC EIM Group Analysis (completed in 2012)** — examined the benefits of a 10-minute EIM in parts of the WI region; undertaken by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) for the PUC-EIM Group;[25]
- **WECC VGS (draft completed in 2012)** — examined the benefits of 10-minute bilateral scheduling for the entire WECC region; undertaken by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for WECC as part of the WECC Variable Generation Subcommittee (VGS);[26]
- **NWPP EIM (ongoing)** — examining the benefits of 5-minute security constrained economic dispatch for the Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) footprint, undertaken by PNNL for the NWPP Market Assessment and Coordination (MC) Initiative using a 10-minute dispatch model.

The above studies can be broadly categorized into two different approaches. The first two studies, the WECC EIM and PUC Group EIM analyses, use hurdle rates to capture transactional friction between BAAs in the base case, which are removed in the EIM case. They also assume that an EIM will enable BAs to reduce the quantity of flexibility reserves that they would need to carry for wind and solar integration. The last two

[24] See http://www.wecc.biz/committees/EDT/EDT%20Results/E3_EIM_Benefits_Study-Phase_2_Report_RevisedOct2011_CLEAN2%5B1%5D.pdf for the final report.
[25] See http://www.westgov.org/PUCeim/ for the PUC EIM website and link to the NREL final report.
[26] The draft final report, "Balancing Authority Cooperation Concepts to Reduce Variable Generation Integration Costs in the Western Interconnection," is not yet publicly available.

studies assume transactional friction between balancing areas is not alleviated by an EIM on an hourly timestep, and that an EIM will not reduce the quantity of regulation and flexibility reserves required for wind and solar integration. Instead, they conduct detailed analysis of dispatch changes that would occur on a 10-minute timestep compared to a fixed hourly interchange schedule between BAAs.

The approach used in this study is consistent with the WECC EIM and PUC Group EIM analyses. It does benefit, however, from the NWPP EIM study assumption used to limit the amount of hydropower that would qualify and be available to provide contingency and flexible reserves. Table 9 (next page) provides a high-level comparison between the benefit estimates in this study and the four aforementioned studies, describing key drivers of differences.

The estimated annual benefits in this study are smaller than in other studies because of:

+ The smaller geographic footprint of this study, which covered only the PacifiCorp and ISO areas and not the larger Western Interconnection region;
+ The modeling scope in this study, which did not include sub-hourly dispatch; and
+ The modeling assumptions used in this study, which resulted in a smaller base case operating reserve requirement, and hence a smaller change in reserves in the EIM case, than the PUC EIM Group analysis.

The results in this study should thus be viewed as conservative relative to other studies.

Table 9. Comparison of annual benefits and geographic scope between this study and other EIM studies

Study (Organization)	Annual Benefits ($MM)	Geographic Scope	Key Drivers of Differences with this Study
PacifiCorp-ISO EIM study	$21-$129 in 2017	PacifiCorp and ISO	
WECC EIM (E3)	$141 in 2020	WECC excluding ISO and AESO	• WECC EIM study had similar approach to this study • WECC EIM study had larger EIM footprint than this study • WECC study excluded intraregional dispatch savings; this study includes intraregional dispatch savings • No assessment of renewable curtailment reduction in WECC study; this study includes benefits of renewable curtailment reduction
PUC EIM Group (NREL)	$349 in 2020	WECC excluding ISO and AESO	• PUC EIM study had larger EIM footprint than this study • PUC EIM study modeled 10-minute dispatch; this study models hourly dispatch • PUC EIM study required more reserve in base case due to earlier schedule lockdown, increasing EIM benefits; this study assumed later lockdown • PUC EIM study included regulation reserve savings for EIM; this study assumes no regulation reserve savings
WECC VGS (PNNL)	Pending	Entire WECC	• WECC VGS study had larger EIM footprint than this study • VGS study modeled 10-minute bilateral scheduling, not EIM • In VGS study, no savings due to reduced reserves or reduced transactional friction, which means all savings due to within-hour efficiency gains; this study includes savings from reduced reserves or transactional friction
NWPP EIM (PNNL)	Pending	NWPP	• Similar approach to WECC VGS study • Detailed results pending

Technical Appendix

Technical Appendix

Overview

This technical appendix provides a detailed description of the methods and assumptions used in calculating the benefits of more efficient interregional dispatch and reduced flexibility reserves from a PacifiCorp-ISO EIM. Following this overview, this appendix includes three sections. The first describes methods for calculating inputs to the Benchmark Case, including hurdle rates and statistical calculations used to estimate flexibility reserve requirements in the Benchmark Case. The second section describes the change in hurdle rates used in an EIM Dispatch Case. The third section describes the statistical calculations used to estimate a comparative benchmark for reserves in an EIM Flexibility Reserves Case and how transmission constraints were addressed in these calculations.

E3 estimated the benefits of more efficient interregional dispatch and reduced flexibility reserves using a combination of statistical analysis and production simulation modeling. All production simulation modeling was conducted using ABB's GridView model.[1]

E3 modeled three cases:

- **Benchmark Case**, reflecting a business as usual scenario that includes continued obstacles to interregional dispatch between PacifiCorp and ISO and separate procurement of flexibility reserves;
- **EIM Dispatch Case**, in which obstacles to more efficient interregional dispatch are removed but flexibility reserves are still procured separately; and
- **EIM Flexibility Reserve Case**, in which obstacles to more efficient interregional dispatch are removed and PacifiCorp and ISO pool flexibility reserves.

The Benchmark Case was developed using the Western Electricity Coordinating Council's (WECC's) Transmission Expansion Planning Policy Committee (TEPPC) 2022 Common Case as a starting point, with updates developed for ISO's Transmission Planning Process (TPP) GridView simulation to improve accuracy inside of California. Load forecasts, fuel price forecasts, generators, and transmission were also adjusted to reflect anticipated values and availability in 2017. The EIM Dispatch Case and EIM Flexibility Reserve Case were used to isolate the benefits of more efficient interregional dispatch and reduced flexibility reserves, respectively, relative to the Benchmark Case.

In the EIM Dispatch Case, E3 modeled the incremental benefits of more efficient interregional dispatch by eliminating the hurdle rates between PacifiCorp and ISO that are used to reflect impediments to regional electricity trades in the Benchmark Case.[2] In the EIM Flexibility Reserve Case, E3 modeled the

[1] For more on GridView, see http://www.abb.com/industries/db0003db004333/c12573e7003305cbc12570060069fe77.aspx.

[2] A component of hurdle rates that reflects to need to acquire CO_2 allowances when delivering electricity from neighboring states into California, as required by California's greenhouse gas "cap-and-trade" program developed in compliance with AB32, was retained in all cases.

incremental benefits of reduced flexibility reserves by calculating the reduction in flexibility reserves that results from pooling load, wind, and solar variability between PacifiCorp and ISO, and then by reducing the amount of required reserves in GridView runs.

As described in the main report, within the EIM Dispatch Case and EIM Flexibility Reserve Case, E3 modeled the year 2017, to provide an estimate of near-term benefits from an EIM. Figure 1A illustrates E3's modeling approach.

Figure 1A. Modeling approach for calculating interregional dispatch and reduced flexibility reserve benefits



The modeling was organized around three scenarios of interchange transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO: 100, 400, and 800 MW. Within each transfer capability scenario, E3 modeled low and high benefit ranges. In the low range scenario, E3 limited hydropower's ability to contribute to contingency and flexibility reserves to 25% of nameplate capacity. In the high range scenario, E3 assumed that 12% of hydropower nameplate capacity can contribute to contingency and flexibility reserves. Production cost results for the interaction of all of these scenarios are described in this Appendix.

Benchmark Case

The Benchmark Case used WECC's TEPPC 2022 Common Case as a starting database. Inputs to the TEPPC database are developed from a collaborative stakeholder process, and are used in studies to assess regional economic transmission in the Western Interconnection. In addition, the TEPPC database has been used in ISO's TPP, and in other studies of the benefits of an EIM throughout the Western Interconnection.[3]

Adjustments to the TEPPC Common Case

In developing its 2017 TPP Case, ISO staff made adjustments to the TEPPC 2022 Common Case to improve transmission and generation modeling accuracy within California. E3 incorporated those adjustments and made further modifications to the TEPPC 2022 Common Case in three primary areas: (1) fuel price forecast, (2) load forecast, and (3) generation and transmission.

Fuel price forecast

Natural gas prices were based on the ISO's long-term procurement plan (LTPP), adjusted to match annual average Henry Hub fuel prices from NYMEX.[4] Table 1A shows fuel prices by region, for the TEPPC regions within the ISO and PacifiCorp BAAs.

Table 1A. Average annual burnertip gas price (2012$/MMBtu)

Area	2017
PACE_ID	$ 3.99
PACE_UT	$ 3.81
PACE_WY	$ 3.95
PACW	$ 3.91
PG&E_BAY	$ 4.09
PG&E_VLY	$ 4.09
SCE	$ 4.18
SDGE	$ 3.86

Load forecast

A load forecast for 2017 was provided directly by PacifiCorp for the PacifiCorp East and PacifiCorp West BAAs. For all other load areas, monthly peak and energy values were interpolated between 2006 historical data (provided by TEPPC by BA) and the 2022 forecasted value from TEPPC's Data Working Group (DWG) based on the most recently available WECC Load-Resource Subcommittee (LRS) data submittals.

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[3] ISO, 2013, *Draft 2012-2013 Transmission Plan*, http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Draft2012-2013TransmissionPlan.pdf; E3, 2011, WECC EDT Phase 2 EIM Benefits Analysis & Results (October 2011 Revision), http://www.wecc.biz/committees/EDT/EDT%20Results/E3_EIM_Benefits_Study-Phase_2_Report_RevisedOct2011_CLEAN2%5B1%5D.pdf.
[4] A small adjustment was also implemented to use the same fuel prices for PG&E Bay and PG&E Valley load areas.

Generation and transmission

Some generation and transmission projects were removed from the TEPPC 2022 Common Case, because they were not expected to be online by 2017, based on input from ISO and PacifiCorp. For modeling purposes, generation in 2017 was assumed to precede the majority of expected OTC-related retirements and replacements in California.

Hurdle rates

The Benchmark Case utilized hurdle rates from the WECC EDT Phase 2 EIM Benefits Analysis, which were developed by calibrating simulation output to historical flow levels on WECC paths.[5] These historically-calibrated hurdle rates are adjusted to reflect the impact of anticipated CO_2 allowance cost on unspecified power imports into California in 2017. For power flows from PacifiCorp-West (PACW) to ISO, E3 used a value of $21.07/MWh, which included a $10.76/MWh cost for CO_2 allowances on PacifiCorp exports to ISO (Table 2A). This $10.76/MWh adder was based on a default CO_2 emissions factor for a CCGT from the California Air Resources Board and a CO_2 price of $24.66 (2012$) per short ton of CO_2. For power flows from ISO to PACW, E3 used a hurdle rate of $3.97/MWh. E3 assumed no direct interties between ISO and PACE.

Table 2A. Hurdle rates used in the Benchmark Case

Case	Hurdle Rate ($/MWh)			
	PACW → ISO			ISO → PACW
	CO_2-related	Non-CO_2 related	Total	
Benchmark Case	$10.76	$10.31	$21.07	$3.97*

**No CO_2-related hurdle rate is applied to ISO exports to PACW because CO_2 permit cost under AB32 is directly modeled in the dispatch for generators located inside California.*

Flexibility reserves

To determine the production costs associated with flexibility reserve levels in the Benchmark Case, E3 calculated load following and regulation reserve requirements, summed the two, and then set the total as a constraint in GridView. Load following here is defined as the capacity needed to manage the difference between the hourly unit commitment schedule and 10-minute forecasted net load. Regulation is defined as the capacity needed to manage the difference between 10-minute forecasted net load and 10-minute actual net load.

Load following and regulation reserves were calculated using a common methodology based on the North American Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC) Control Performance Standard 2 (CPS2).[6] CPS2 is designed to ensure that a BA maintains its area control error (ACE) – the difference between actual and scheduled power flows across interties to neighboring BAs – within reasonable bounds. Spinning

[5] See http://www.wecc.biz/committees/EDT/EDT%20Results/E3_EIM_Benefits_Study-Phase_2_Report_RevisedOct2011_CLEAN2%5B1%5D.pdf. The WECC Analysis reported hurdle rates in 2010$, and those rates were adjusted to 2012$ for this analysis.
[6] For more on NERC CPS, see http://www.nerc.com/docs/oc/ps/tutorcps.pdf.

reserve requirements) were set to equal 3% of load, which represents one-half of total operating reserves requirements (spinning plus non-spinning). Non-spinning reserve needs were not explicitly modeled because the simulation addresses reserve needs by increasing the level of generator commitment required, but is assumed for modeling that non-spinning reserve needs would typically be met with resources that do not require day-ahead unit commitment.

By benchmarking against ISO's current regulation procurement, wind integration studies performed by PacifiCorp, and in consultation with ISO and PacifiCorp, E3 chose to model a CPS2 compliance target which requires BAAs to secure load following reserves to meet 97% of forecasted load following demand, equivalent to 1.5% of the left-hand and right-hand tails of a distribution of load following needs (i.e., 10-minute forecasted net load minus hourly unit commitment). For regulation under this target, BAAs also secure regulation reserves to meet 94% of forecasted regulation demand, equivalent to 3% of the left-hand and right-hand tails of a distribution of regulation needs (i.e., 10-minute actual load minus 10-minute forecasted net load). This approach allows regulation reserves to meet load following needs, but not vice versa.

The regulation requirement percentage is lower than load following because regulation can be used to meet load following requirements. In the 3% of time periods with an unmet load following requirement, the residual load following error is added to the time-series regulation requirement. During these hours, if the system had unutilized regulation capacity or if regulation needs were in the opposite direction of the load following residual error, generator flexibility procured for regulation may be able to still satisfy the CPS2 requirement for that time period even though the system were short on load following resources.

Key steps in this analysis are shown graphically in Figure 2A.

- Step 1: Calculate a distribution of load following requirements. E3 used historical 10-minute wind, solar, and load data to forecast 10-minute net load and hourly unit commitment based on hourly net load. Forecasted hourly net load was then calculated for each 10-minute time period, using a linear 20-minute ramp across the top of the hour (see upper rightmost part of Figure 2A). A distribution of load following requirements was calculated as the difference between the 10-minute and hourly net load forecasts in each 10-minute period.
- Step 2: Calculate load following up and down needs. These were calculated using the 1.5 and 98.5 percentiles of these distributions, respectively, consistent with the chosen CPS2 compliance target. Figure 3A shows an example of the distribution for load following requirements and the points associated with the 1.5 and 98.5 percentiles.
- Step 3: Calculate a distribution of regulation requirements. A distribution of regulation requirements was calculated as the difference between the 10-minute net load forecast and 10-minute actual net load values. Residual load following errors were added to the regulation distributions to allow for the fact that regulation reserves can also be used for load following.
- Step 4: Calculate final regulation requirements as the 3rd and 97th percentiles of this distribution, representing regulation down and up needs, respectively.

Figure 2A. Flexibility reserve calculation steps



Figure 3A. Load following needs associated with the 1.5 and 98.5 percentiles



To calculate net load, E3 used three years of 10-minute load and modeled renewable production data. Years 2004 to 2006 were used in the analysis because of data availability in the Western Wind Integration Dataset. Solar PV was modeled using data from Solar Anywhere and 10-minute load data was provided by PacifiCorp and ISO. The load data provided was scaled to 2017 by both annual energy and peak load to account for load growth. Forecasts for 10-minute wind, solar, and load were created using linear regression and were extensively benchmarked. The following table shows renewable assumptions used for 2017.

Table 3A. Renewable assumptions for 2017 reserve calculations[7]

Area	Wind Installed (MW)	Solar Installed (MW)
PacifiCorp East	1,638	-
PacifiCorp West	635	-
PacifiCorp Combined	2,272	-
ISO	6,228	5,483
PacifiCorp and ISO (pooled)	8,501	5,483

In the Benchmark Case, regulation and load following were calculated separately for PacifiCorp East, PacifiCorp West, and ISO, and were implemented in GridView as separate constraints for each BAA. Table 4A shows the resulting load following up and regulation up reserve requirements for PacifiCorp East, PacifiCorp West, and ISO. The GridView modeling configuration used does not have the ability to model load following down and regulation down.

Table 4A. Estimated load following up and regulation up reserve requirements for PacifiCorp East, PacifiCorp West, and ISO in 2017

Area	Average Regulation Up (MW)	Average Load Following Up (MW)
PacifiCorp East	103	313
PacifiCorp West[8]	45	146
PacifiCorp Combined	115	357
ISO[9]	276	1,128

[7] The study did not incorporate the most current renewable resource capacity in PacifiCorp, which results in understating total installed wind capacity in PacifiCorp's BAAs by 280 MW. As of 2013 PacifiCorp will have 1,758 MW of installed wind capacity in PacifiCorp East and 795 MW of installed wind capacity in PacifiCorp West.

[8] In the Benchmark and EIM Cases, E3 assumed that PacifiCorp East is able to transfer 200 MW to PacifiCorp West within the hour but with no transfer capability in the reverse direction for EIM transactions. The hourly load following requirement applied to PacifiCorp West is reduced for this transfer capability, and a separate reserve requirement is applied to the Combined PacifiCorp area which reflects diversity of wind and load variability across the two PacifiCorp BAs.

[9] The applied common methodology for determining regulation and load following results in conservative lower amount of regulation requirements used in ISO production and lower regulation and load following 20 minute requirements then has been calculated using other methodologies.

EIM Dispatch Case

In the EIM Dispatch Case, E3 modeled reduced transactional friction between PacifiCorp and ISO from the EIM by removing the non-CO_2 hurdle rates in the Benchmark Case. In this case, the PACW → ISO hurdle rate still includes the $10.76/MWh cost for CO_2 allowances on PacifiCorp flows to ISO (Table 5A).

Table 5A. Hurdle rates for the Benchmark and EIM Dispatch Cases

Case	Hurdle Rate ($/MWh)			
	PACW → ISO			ISO → PACW
	CO_2-related	Non-CO_2 related	Total	
Benchmark Case	$10.76	$10.31	$21.07	$3.97
EIM Dispatch Case	$10.76	$0.00	$10.76	$0.00*

**No CO_2-related hurdle rate is applied to ISO exports to PACW because CO_2 permit cost under AB32 is directly modeled in the dispatch for generators located inside California.*

Eliminating hurdle rates enables GridView to dispatch more generation in the PacifiCorp BAAs to serve needs in the ISO BAA when more efficient units are available, and vice-versa. Reduced transactional friction lowers total production costs. As described in the main text, for the EIM Dispatch Case E3 used an 800 MW static transfer limit on the California-Oregon Intertie (COI) as a proxy for transfer capability between the PacifiCorp and ISO systems.

Table 6A shows production costs in the Benchmark Case, the EIM Dispatch Case, and cost savings (Benchmark Case – EIM Dispatch Case production costs), for the 100, 400, and 800 MW transfer capability scenarios under both hydro assumptions. As described in the main body, production cost savings from the 800 MW scenario were scaled to 100 and 400 MW based on relative changes in intertie flows. Most of the savings stemming from increased flows between the Benchmark Case and the EIM Dispatch Case were captured with 400 MW of transfer capability.

Table 6A. Production cost savings in the EIM Dispatch Case for different hydropower flexibility scenarios and assumptions about transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO (Million 2012$)

	25% Hydro Reserve Cap			12% Hydro Reserve Cap		
Transfer Capability (MW)	100	400	800	100	400	800
EIM Dispatch Case	$14.1	$22.3	$22.4	$11.0	$17.7	$17.8

As described in this report, GridView assumes perfect, security-constrained, least-cost dispatch within both the ISO and PacifiCorp footprints. The EIM Dispatch Case thus captures the incremental benefits from more efficient dispatch between PacifiCorp and ISO assuming that PacifiCorp already uses nodal dispatch. The savings from moving to nodal dispatch in PacifiCorp are estimated separately under “intraregional dispatch savings” and described in Section 2.2.2 of this report.

EIM Flexibility Reserves Case

E3 calculated within-hour regulation and load following reserves for the EIM Flexibility Reserves Case using the same approach as in the Benchmark and EIM Dispatch Cases, except that net load profiles for each BA were summed before the calculation and transmission constraints were enforced to ensure realistic reserve sharing. By summing the net load profiles for PacifiCorp and ISO, diversity in forecast errors and net load ramps reduces the reserves that each BAA is required to hold, relative to the Benchmark Case.

Table 7A shows the pooled load following up and regulation up reserve requirements for PacifiCorp and ISO in 2017, prior to enforcing transmission constraints between BAs.

Table 7A. Pooled load following and regulation up reserve requirements for PacifiCorp and ISO in 2017

Area	Average Regulation Up (MW)[10]	Average Load Following Up (MW)
PacifiCorp and ISO (pooled)	310	1,255

Transmission limits were enforced on the results in the above table as a set of five separate constraints in the GridView cases, shown below for the scenario where 100 MW of transfer capability exists between PacifiCorp and ISO. These five constraints ensure that each BA holds the necessary reserves given transfer limits. The constraints also reflect the assumption that PacifiCorp East is able to transfer 200 MW to PacifiCorp West within the hour but with no transfer capability in the reverse direction.

1. $PACW_{pooled\ reserves} \geq max(PACW_{benchmark\ case} - 200\ MW, 0)$
2. $PACE_{pooled\ reserves} \geq PACE_{benchmark\ case}$
3. $CAISO_{pooled\ reserves} \geq max(CAISO_{benchmark\ case} - 100\ MW, 0)$
4. $PacifiCorp_{pooled\ reserves} \geq max(x - 100\ MW, 0)$
5. $PAC\&CAISO_{pooled\ reserves} \geq max\left(x + CAISO_{benchmark\ case} - 100\ MW,\ PAC\&CAISO_{no\ transfer\ limit}\right)$

where: $x = max(PACW_{benchmark\ case} + PACE_{benchmark\ case},\ PacifiCorp_{benchmark\ case})$

[10] Reductions to both regulation and load following requirements were modeled in the EIM Flexibility Reserves Case, but resulting cost savings were multiplied by the share that load following reserves (80%) represent relative to total flexibility reserves (load following plus regulation), to account for the fact that the EIM will only affect reserves above a 5-minute timestep.

Table 8A shows production cost savings for the four transfer capability scenarios and two hydropower flexibility scenarios. As described in the main text, cost savings were multiplied by the share that load following reserves (80%) represent relative to total flexibility reserves (load following plus regulation), to account for the fact that the EIM will only affect reserves above a 5-minute timestep.

Table 8A. Production cost savings in the EIM Dispatch and EIM Flexibility Reserve Cases for different hydropower flexibility scenarios and assumptions about transfer capability between PacifiCorp and ISO (Million 2012$)

	25% Hydro Reserve Cap			12% Hydro Reserve Cap		
Transfer Capability (MW)	**100**	**400**	**800**	**100**	**400**	**800**
EIM Dispatch Case	$14.1	$22.3	$22.4	$11.0	$17.7	$17.8
EIM Flexibility Reserve Case	$4.0	$11.0	$13.4	$20.8	$51.3	$77.1
Total Both Cases	$18.1	$33.3	$35.8	$31.8	$69.0	$94.9

E3 benchmarked the results from the EIM Flexibility Reserve Case by multiplying reductions in hourly load following component of flexibility reserve quantities by ISO regulation prices. Annual savings from reduced flexibility reserves were calculated as the difference between reserve costs with no transfer capability (i.e., 0 MW) and reserve costs with transfer capability (i.e., 100, 400, or 800 MW) between PacifiCorp and ISO. Consistent with the approach taken for the GridView modeling, only savings in load following up reserve costs were assumed to be achievable through an EIM.

The results of this benchmarking exercise (AS price-based results) are shown in Table 9A, using ISO AS market prices from 2010, 2011, and an average of the two years. Given that PacifiCorp is more dependent than ISO on thermal resources to provide flexibility reserves, the benchmarking results in the below table are conservatively low (i.e., ISO AS prices are likely to be lower than implied AS prices in PacifiCorp because hydropower provides a significant amount of AS in ISO). With this in mind, the EIM Flexibility Reserve Case results (Table 8A) appear reasonable compared to the benchmarking results below.

Table 9A. Results from flexibility reserve benefits benchmarking analysis (Million 2012$)

Transfer Capability	2010 AS Prices	2011 AS Prices	Average 2010/2011 AS Prices	EIM Flex. Reserve Case (25% Hydro Reserve Cap)	EIM Flex. Reserve Case (12% Hydro Reserve Cap)
100 MW	$7.3	$4.5	$5.7	$4.0	$20.8
400 MW	$24.3	$14.8	$18.8	$11.0	$51.3
800 MW	$29.6	$17.6	$22.7	$13.4	$77.1

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CUB Data Request 45

Please reconcile Dickman/Table 2:

PAC/100
Dickman/26

Table 2
Total-Company EIM-Related Benefits and Costs

$ millions	2016 TAM	2017 TAM
Inter-regional dispatch	$8.4	$11.3
Flexibility Reserves	$1.7	$2.6
Test-period EIM benefits	**$10.1**	**$13.9**
Test-period EIM costs	**$5.1**	**$6.4**

with the California ISO reports on Quantifying EIM Benefits[1], which estimate PacifiCorp specific benefits to be $33.26 million for the four most recent quarters:

Period	**$ Benefit to PAC in millions**
Q2 2015	$7.72
Q3 2015	$8.52
Q4 2015	$6.17
Q1 2016	$10.85
total	$33.26

Response to CUB Data Request 45

The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) reports include three energy imbalance market (EIM) related benefits:

- Inter-regional dispatch,
- Intra-regional dispatch, and
- Flexibility Reserves.

Table 2 only includes two EIM-related benefits: (1) inter-regional dispatch, and (2) flexibility reserves. Intra-regional dispatch benefits result from more optimal dispatch of the Company's resources to meet its own requirements within each hour. The intra-regional benefit is relative to the Company's more manual dispatch process used in actual operations prior to participation in the EIM. However, the Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision Tool (GRID) employs a linear program optimization—i.e., optimal dispatch—constrained by: transmission capacity, thermal discretionary availability, purchases and sales market caps, and net load requirements. As a result, GRID has

[1] http://www.caiso.com/Documents/PacifiCorp_ISO_EIMBenefitsReportQ2_2015.pdf
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/PacifiCorp_ISO_EIMBenefitsReportQ3_2015.pdf
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/ISO_EIMBenefitsReportQ4_2015.pdf
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/ISO_EIM_BenefitsReportQ1_2016.pdf

always assumed perfectly optimized hourly dispatch of PacifiCorp's generating units. EIM does not relieve constraints in the GRID linear program optimization (i.e., transmission capacity, thermal discretionary availability, purchases and sales market caps, and net load requirements). Consequently, the EIM does not create additional intra-regional dispatch benefits relative to GRID. Please also refer to page 12 and 13 of the Direct Testimony of Company witness, Brian S. Dickman in Docket UE-296.

The Company does not have a specific breakout of the intra-regional benefits reflected in in the total benefits reported by the CAISO.

For more details on the historical results supporting the values in Dickman Table 2, please refer to TAM Support Set 2, specifically the confidential file entitled "ORTAM17w_EIM Benefits ORTAM17 (Jan15-Jan16) CONF.xlsx".

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EIM Quarterly Benefit Report Methodology

Effective with Q1, 2016 EIM benefits report

Revision History

Date	Version	Description	Author
02/01/2016	1.0		Lin Xu
04/30/2016	2.0	Allow the ISO's units to be committed in the counter factual dispatch	Lin Xu

This document illustrates how the EIM benefit is calculated with an example. In the past, the ISO had discussed the method in Technical Bulletins and in the benefit reports. This document consolidates these prior materials into a concise paper for easier understanding.

The total EIM benefit is the cost saving of the EIM dispatch compared with a counterfactual (CF) without EIM dispatch. The counter factual dispatch meets the same amount of real-time load imbalance in each BAA without EIM transfers with neighboring EIM BAAs. For an EIM BAA, the benefit can take the form of cost savings or profit or their combination. A BAA will be likely to have energy cost savings when the BAA is importing energy economically, or its base schedules are being optimized by the EIM. A BAA will be likely to have an energy profit when the BAA is exporting energy economically to other BAAs, and being paid a price higher than the bid cost. A BAA, other than the ISO, may also have a GHG profit when the resource is allocated GHG MWs, and is receiving GHG revenue based on marginal GHG cost that is likely higher than its own GHG bid cost.

For each 5-minute interval, **EIM benefit for a BAA = counterfactual dispatch cost – (EIM dispatch cost + transfer cost) + GHG revenue – GHG cost.** Then the 5-minute level EIM benefit are aggregated every month with a multiplier 1/12 to convert ($/5 min) to a dollar amount.

EIM benefit calculation components

EIM dispatch cost

The total dispatch cost for a BAA for an interval is the sum of all the unit level EIM dispatch cost for that BAA and for that interval.

For all other BAA's other than CAISO, the dispatch cost only includes variable dispatch cost, i.e. the bids submitted by the corresponding Scheduling Coordinator.

For the ISO's long start units, we only consider variable dispatch cost. For the ISO's short start units, we use a generic cost formula, which includes variable dispatch cost, startup cost, and no load cost. Specifically, the three-part cost include

- the variable dispatch cost of RTD, which is equal to the bid cost associated with the delta instruction above or below the base schedule for each interval,
- the no load cost associated with the incremental dispatch, which is equal to the no load cost divided by Pmax and then multiply it with the delta instruction from base schedule,
- the startup cost associated with the incremental dispatch, which is equal to the startup cost divided by the minimum online hours, and then multiply it with the delta instruction from base schedule divided by the Pmax.

The purpose for this generic cost formula is to evaluate cost differences between EIM dispatches and counter factual dispatches without performing sophisticated unit commitment simulations. Prior to Q1 2016, only variable dispatch cost was considered in the EIM benefit calculation. With NV Energy joining EIM and improving the transfer capabilities from and to the ISO, we observed significantly increased transfer volume in EIM. The higher transfer volume cannot be sufficiently replaced by resources online in EIM without committing or decomitting resources. That is why we adopted the three-part cost formula starting from Q1 2016 to allow for unit commitment decisions to better evaluate the production difference between EIM and the counter factual dispatch of the ISO. The unit commitments decisions were made only for short start units that are not combined cycle units. The combined cycle units had complicated models in EIM, so their counter factual commitment status are fixed at the EIM commitment status to avoid oversimplification.

We approximate the ISO's commitment costs by converting the startup cost and no load cost into variable dispatch cost, assuming a committed short start resource will be fully loaded for minimum online hours. For each supply segment, the corresponding three-part variable cost is equal to

bid_price + no_load_cost/Pmax + startup_cost/min_up_hour/Pmax

Note the formula above converts startup cost (in unit $) and no load cost (in unit $/h) into variable dispatch cost (in unit $/MWh). By doing this, the commitment for the ISO's units can be determined based on the economic metric order of the three-part variable cost.

Transfer cost

As a convention, select the importing direction as the default direction for a transfer, so importing transfer is positive and exporting transfer is negative. The transfer cost is equal to the transfer MW times the transfer price. For an importing BAA, the transfer price is the LMP of the BAA minus half of the absolute value of the transfer shadow price. For an exporting BAA, the transfer price is the LMP of the BAA plus half of the absolute value of the transfer shadow price. Transfer could occur in both the 15-minute market and the 5-minute market. In this case, the transfer cost is 15-minute transfer * 15-minute transfer price + (5-minute transfer – 15-minute transfer) * 5-minute transfer price for each 5-minute interval.

Counterfactual dispatch cost

The counterfactual dispatch for an EIM BAA mimics the market operations without importing or exporting through the EIM transfers. The counterfactual dispatch moves units inside the BAA to meet the same real-time load imbalance as the EIM dispatch without considering transmission constraints. However, for PacifiCorp, the transfer limit between PACE and PACW is enforced in the counter factual dispatch. Relaxing transmission constraints tends to under estimate the counterfactual dispatch cost and the EIM benefit. However, because few transmission constraints were observed binding in EIM, it is unlikely the EIM benefit will be significantly under estimated.

The counterfactual dispatch makes unit commitment decisions only for the ISO's short start units. The unit commitment decisions are based on the generic three-part variable cost formula, which has converted startup cost and no load cost into variable dispatch cost. So unit commitment can be determined by the economic metric order of the three-part cost.

In cases where a counterfactual dispatch could not be produced for a BAA using available bids, the highest bid dispatched will be extended as the marginal cost for procuring more supply. An EIM BAA may restrict the pool of dispatchable units in the counterfactual dispatch if that the BAA's practice prior to joining EIM was to balance real-time load from a limited pool.

ISO counterfactual dispatch

The ISO would need to meet load without EIM transfers in the counterfactual dispatch. The counterfactual dispatch is constructed in the following way.

1. Calculate the ISO's net EIM transfer;
2. Economically dispatch resources from the ISO to replace the transfer
   A. If the ISO is importing from the EIM,
      a. Find the ISO's undispatched supply with the variable cost (bid and three-part converted) greater than or equal to the transfer price;
      b. Sort and stack the supply by the variable cost from low cost to high cost; and
      c. Clear the supply stack from low cost to high cost up to the transfer megawatts
   B. If the ISO is exporting to the EIM,
      a. Find the ISO's dispatched supply with the variable cost (bid and three-part converted) less than or equal to the transfer point price;
      b. Sort and stack them by the variable cost from high cost to low cost; and
      c. Clear the supply stack from high cost to low cost up to the transfer megawatts

NV Energy counterfactual dispatch

NV Energy's counter factual dispatch is constructed in the following way.

1. Calculate the real-time net load imbalance for NVE;
2. Economically dispatch resources from NVE on top of the base schedules to meet NVE's net load imbalance
   A. If the net load imbalance is positive,

  a. Find NV Energy's bid-in supply above base schedules;
  b. Sort and stack them by the variable cost from low cost to high cost; and
  c. Clear the supply stack from low cost to high cost up to the net load imbalance.

B. If the net load imbalance is negative,
  a. Find NV Energy's bid-in supply below base schedules;
  b. Sort and stack them by the variable cost from high cost to low cost; and
  c. Clear the supply stack from high cost to low cost up to the net load imbalance.

PacifiCorp counterfactual dispatch

PacifiCorp East BAA and PacifiCorp West BAA would need to meet demand without intra-hour transfers between PacifiCorp and the ISO, but transfers could occur between PACE and PACW in the counterfactual dispatch. The PacifiCorp counter factual dispatch will be constructed in the following way:

1. Calculate the real-time net load imbalance for each BAA;
2. Economically dispatch resources from the limited pool on top of the base schedules to meet net PacifiCorp load imbalance without violating the transfer limitations between PACE and PACW.
   A. If the net load imbalance is positive,
      a. Find PacifiCorp's bid-in supply above base schedules;
      b. Sort and stack them by the variable cost from low cost to high cost; and
      c. Clear the supply stack from low cost to high cost up to the net load imbalance subject to the transfer limit between PACE and PACW
   B. If the net load imbalance is negative,
      a. Find PacifiCorp's bid-in supply below base schedules;
      b. Sort and stack them by the variable cost from high cost to low cost; and
      c. Clear the supply stack from high cost to low cost up to the net load imbalance subject to the transfer limit between PACE and PACW

GHG revenue

Greenhouse gas (GHG) revenue for a resource is equal to its GHG allocation MW times the GHG price.

GHG cost

GHG cost for a resource is equal to its GHG allocation MW times its GHG bid.

Example

This example illustrates how the EIM benefit is calculated.

The transfers out of the EIM optimization are listed below. Base scheduled transfers have been excluded in the FMM transfers and RTD transfers.

from BAA	to BAA	FMM transfer	FMM transfer price	RTD incremental transfer	RTD transfer price	transfer cost
PACE	NEVP	140	$26	10	$25	$3,890
NEVP	CISO	160	$26	20	$30	$4,760
PACE	PACW	190	$26	10	$25	$5,190
PACW	CISO	110	$26	-10	$30	$2,560

BAA to BAA transfers and prices

Assume the EIM energy imbalance and prices are as follows. Every BAA is balanced with Gen + Transfer – Load = 0. Assume the EIM optimization results in $1 GHG price, which means the ISO's LMP is $1 higher than the neighboring BAA (NEVP and PACW), because there is no congestion going into the ISO in the example. In the table below, positive transfer MW means the BAA is importing and negative transfer MW means it is exporting. Also, transfers in the table are sum of the transfers occur in both the FMM and the RTD with base scheduled transfer being excluded.

BAA	Gen	Load	Net transfer in MW	LMP	GHG price
CISO	0	280	280	$31	$0
NEVP	50	20	-30	$30	$1
PACE	150	-200	-350	$20	$1
PACW	100	200	100	$30	$1

EIM energy imbalance and prices by BAA for one 5-minute interval

Transfer cost

The transfers occur in both FMM and RTD, and their volume and prices are listed below. They are calculated from applying the convention that importing is positive and exporting is negative the BAA to BAA transfers, and summing them over all the neighboring BAAs.

BAA	transfer cost
CISO	$7,320 = $4,760+$2,560
NEVP	($870) = $3,890-$4,760

PACE	($9,080) = -$3,890-$5,190
PACW	$2,630 = $5,190-$2,560

EIM transfer cost by BAA

EIM dispatch cost

Now calculate the total bid cost associated with the EIM dispatches (delta from base schedules). The EIM dispatch costs are listed below.

BAA	Gen_EIM	EIM dispatch cost
CISO	0	$0
NEVP	50	$1,450
PACE	150	$2,700
PACW	100	$2,800

EIM dispatch cost by BAA

Counterfactual dispatch cost

Then construct the counter factual dispatches as described in the previous section, and sum up the counter factual dispatch cost for each BAA.

BAA	Gen_CF	Counterfactual dispatch cost
CISO	280	$9,240
NEVP	20	$640
PACE	-200	($3,800)
PACW	200	$6,200

Counterfactual dispatch cost by BAA

GHG cost and revenue

The GHG costs associated with the 280 MW of importing transfer into CISO, and the revenues received by the GHG allocated MWs in both FMM and RTD are listed below.

BAA	GHG FMM MW	GHG RTD MW	GHG cost	GHG revenue
CISO	0	0	$0	$0
NEVP	0	0	$0	$0
PACE	200	200	$20	$200
PACW	70	80	$75	$80

GHG cost and revenue by BAA

EIM benefit

With all the cost and revenue for each BAA available, we can use the formula EIM benefit for a BAA = counterfactual dispatch cost – (EIM dispatch cost + transfer cost) + GHG revenue – GHG cost to calculate EIM benefit for each BAA.

BAA	CF dispatch cost	EIM dispatch cost	Transfer cost	GHG cost	GHG revenue	EIM benefit
CISO	$9,240	$0	$7,320	$0	$0	**$1,920**
NEVP	$640	$1,450	($870)	$0	$0	**$60**
PACE	($3,800)	$2,700	($9,080)	$20	$200	**$2,760**
PACW	$6,200	$2,800	$2,630	$75	$80	**$775**

EIM benefit for one 5-minute interval

This calculation is performed for each 5-minute interval with unit $/hr. We convert the $/hr benefit into the dollar benefit by multiplying 1/12. Then the 5-minute interval benefits in dollar amount can be aggregated into the monthly benefit by summing all the 5-minute intervals in the month.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: JOHN CRIDER

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 109

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

[10] PacifiCorp: No 'Material Impact' From Loss of Market-Based Rate Authority • *from [1]*

FERC revoked the market-based rate authority of PacifiCorp, Nevada Power, Sierra Pacific Resources and 20 other marketing affiliates of Berkshire Hathaway Energy June 9 because of concerns over excessive market power.

The commission required each marketer to refund the difference between market- and cost-based rates for transactions from Jan. 9, 2015, to April 9, 2016 *[ER10-2475 et al.]*.

The revocation—culminating an 18-month Federal Power Act Section 206 proceeding undertaken in connection with Berkshire's 2013 acquisition of NV Energy—applies to sales in four Northwest balancing authorities: PacifiCorp East, PacifiCorp West, Northwestern Energy and Idaho Power.

The order allows the affected entities—known as the Berkshire Sellers—to trade at market-based rates in BAs

The Berkshire Sellers were also required to file new cost-based rate tariffs for the four BAs at issue, although the order does not prohibit them from refiling for market-based rates as circumstances warrant.

PacifiCorp spokesman Bob Gravely said the utility was still reviewing the ruling, but that the impact would be "limited due to the small number of wholesale transactions that are affected."

Most of the marketing affiliates (including Pinyon Pines Wind II, Solar Star California XX, Fish Lake Power and others) were part of BHE before the acquisition of NV Energy. Many are tied to specific Berkshire generation companies in Southern California and elsewhere in the Southwest whose output is delivered primarily under long-term contracts that are not subject to the revocations.

"The ruling only applies to bilateral wholesale market transactions that sink at the four listed BAs, which is a relatively small universe," Gravely said. "The bulk of PacifiCorp's wholesale sales occur at trading hubs that are outside of the areas covered by the order." As for the

run by BPA, California ISO, Arizona Public Service, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and Western Area Power Administration's Lower Colorado and Colorado-Missouri regions.

refunds, he said the delta between market- and cost-based rates "is nominal and has been for a while," but he did not disclose their cash value.

"Importantly," Gravely emphasized, "this does not apply to the [CAISO] Energy Imbalance Market, which is

subject to another FERC requirement. In fact, the FERC order specifically states that it does not apply to the EIM."

However, the revocation comes just three weeks after FERC affirmed its decision in a separate proceeding *[ER15-2281 et al.]* requiring mitigation for PacifiCorp, Nevada Power and Sierra Pacific Power's failure to demonstrate a lack of market power in the EIM. Although FERC did not revoke market-based rate authority in that proceeding, it required the utilities to offer their generating units into the EIM at the default energy bid.

Gravely said PacifiCorp and NV Energy would nevertheless continue to participate in the EIM subject to that requirement and would still generate savings for customers. For example, he said, PacifiCorp's customers "realized almost $16 million in benefits from the EIM during the first three months of 2016, an amount that increased from previous quarters" despite imposition of the default energy bid requirement last November.

He also said the orders do not portend a growing

so in this case, as most re
to meet quarterly reportin
market analyses—but a re
presumption of market pc

FERC doesn't track or
its market-based rate auth
but there are currently thr
ings underway at FERC ir
ordered to show cause wh
market-based rate authorit

Five Fortis sellers wer
after failing an indicative
Power BA *[EL15-42]*; 11
ates failed market power
and Arizona Public Servi
Tucson BA *[EL16-36]*.

However, not all mark
proceedings result in revc
successfully avoided that

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 200

Opening Testimony

<u>REDACTED</u>
July 8, 2016

Q. Please state your name, occupation, and business address.

A. My name is Lance Kaufman. I am a Senior Economist for the Public Utility Commission of Oregon (Commission or OPUC). My business address is 201 High Street SE, Suite 100, Salem, Oregon 97301.

Q. Please describe your educational background and work experience.

A. My witness qualification statement is found in Exhibit Staff/201.

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to provide analysis of and recommendations on four model changes in the 2017 TAM. Three of these model changes were instituted in the 2016 TAM and one is new to the 2017 TAM. I also provide an analysis of Bridger Coal Company costs.

Q. How is your testimony organized?

A. My testimony is organized as follows:

ISSUE 1, DAY AHEAD REAL TIME TRANSACTIONS

Q. Please summarize the Day Ahead Real Time (DA-RT) transactions issue.

A. PacifiCorp, dba Pacific Power (PacifiCorp or Company) introduced two energy market model changes in its 2016 Transition Adjustment Mechanism (TAM). First, PacifiCorp modified the market energy prices used in GRID. In this testimony Staff refers to this change as the Price Adder. Second, PacifiCorp made an outboard increase in net power costs based on historical purchase patterns. In this testimony Staff refers to this change as the Outboard Cost Increase.

PacifiCorp justifies these changes because historic market purchases are generally more expensive than the average monthly price, and because PacifiCorp makes purchases on a monthly, daily, and real time basis. PacifiCorp claims that the Company's purchasing behavior is not completely reflected in the original GRID model.

Q. What is the dollar impact of these model changes?

A. The combined impact of these two changes is an increase to system wide power costs of [redacted] It is not possible to fully separate this value into the two separate model changes because the magnitude of the Outboard Cost Increase is dependent upon the Price Adder. When the model changes are implemented simultaneously, the Price Adder is responsible for a [redacted] increase to power cost and the outboard increase is responsible for a [redacted] increase to power cost.

Q. What is the purpose of the Price Adder?

A. The Company claims that analysis of their historical purchases and sales reveals a pattern wherein the Company makes purchases when the market price is above average, and makes sales when the market is below average. The Company has proposed the Price Adder to capture the difference between the high purchase price and the average market price, and to also capture the difference between the low sales price and the average market price. However, GRID already differentiates market price into periods of higher and lower prices.

Q. Please further explain the Company's Price Adder model change.

A. PacifiCorp calculates the difference between average historic *price* and its historic *cost* per megawatt hour for transactions. The daily average price represents the simple average of bilateral market daily prices in a month – that is, the sum of hourly prices within the period divided by number of hours in the period. The historic cost represents the actual amount paid by the Company to buy or sell energy on a per MWh basis. These values differ for two reasons. First and foremost actual market transactions are not evenly spread across the month and are highly correlated with demand. The Company will tend to purchase more energy when the demand is high, and be forced to sell when demand is low. Naturally, normal market pressures would indicate that purchase price would be greater than selling price based simply on demand. Second, the historic market price is not a figure that is available to traders on a real time basis; rather, it is an index generated after trades in the period have been completed. Because of this, PacifiCorp may engage in transactions that are priced above market due to lack of information.

A separate Price Adder is calculated for every day and every market for both purchases and sales. The Price Adder is calculated separately for purchases, sales, high load hour and low load hour. The largest Price Adder for purchases is [redacted] and the largest price reduction for sales is [redacted] The same Price Adder is applied to all GRID market prices within the same month and high/low load hour designation for GRID market purchases.

Q. What does the Price Adder represent?

A. According to the Company, the Price Adder is an attempt to capture the effects of being forced to purchase energy when prices are high, and to sell energy when prices are low.

Q. What is the impact of the Price Adder on GRID market transactions?

A. The Price Adder decreases GRID sales by [redacted] MWh, or [redacted] percent. The Price Adder decreases GRID Purchases [redacted] MWh or [redacted] percent.[1]

Q. Are these Price Adders arbitrary and do they present an unrealistic representation of reality?

A. Yes. The Price Adders are arbitrary to the extent that the "average pricing period" is arbitrary. PacifiCorp calculates average price by month and high-load hour-light load hour designation. If PacifiCorp chose a smaller period to average prices over, such as daily averages or yearly averages the Price

[1] *See* Staff/219 DA-RT Transactions.

Adder would be smaller. If PacifiCorp chose a larger period to average prices over the Price Adders would be larger.

The Price Adders are unrealistic because they do not address the fundamental modeling flaw in GRID, the correlation between market price and demand. As a result, they serve to decrease both market purchases and sales in a manner that is not consistent with reality. This is because the modeling change does not reflect how prices actually work. PacifiCorp's methodology results in two simultaneous "market" prices, a purchasing price and a selling price, with purchasing always higher than selling. This is not the how the market actually works. At any one time, for any single trading hub, there is a single market clearing price. At times, this single market price will be lower than the monthly average, and at times this price will be higher than monthly average.

The DA-RT result of fewer market transactions is contrary to both PacifiCorp's argument and a previous Commission finding[2] that GRID underestimates the volume of market transactions.

Rather than enhance the model to represent reality, PacifiCorp has directed the model in an unrealistic manner in order to achieve a desired result. Because the adjustments are arbitrary and unrealistic, it is difficult to verify that PacifiCorp is not double-counting costs or failing to capture benefits related to system generation and market transactions.

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[2] *See Re. PacifiCorp 2008 Transition Adjustment Mechanism* Docket UE 191 Order 07-446 page 10.

The overall impact of the Price Adders is a substantial decrease in purchases and sales. PacifiCorp provides no evidence to support its claim that the base GRID model over-estimates sales and purchases. In fact, PacifiCorp argues that GRID *does not* model enough sales and purchases but then makes a second outboard adjustment to increase system balancing transactions by 2.5 million MWh.[3]

Q. Does PacifiCorp's testimony accurately describe the Price Adder methodology actually used in the TAM?

A. No. The actual methodology used by PacifiCorp in the TAM differs from that described in the text. For some periods, PacifiCorp applies a different Price Adder than that suggested by the four-year history.

Actual historic data indicates that in some months, purchases are on average *less* expensive than sales.[4] This would result in a GRID purchase price below the GRID sale price within a single trading hub. At these prices, GRID would optimize by arbitraging within the same trading hub, maximizing both sales and purchases within the hub. PacifiCorp prevents GRID from performing this arbitrage by overriding the Price Adder calculation formula for these specific occurrences.[5]

The need for PacifiCorp to make a second arbitrary adjustment to prices in order to remedy illogical results of the first arbitrary adjustment highlights the

[3] *See* PAC/100, Dickman/20:13-21:6.
[4] For example, the April HLH adder for COB is [redacted] for purchases than sales. *See* Staff/220 Confidential Price Adders. If the related price adders were used in the model, GRID would purchase and sell at COB, reducing net power cost by [redacted] for every one MWh transaction.
[5] *See* Staff/202 PacifiCorp response to Staff DR 16.

fact that PacifiCorp's Price Adder method is not appropriate. PacifiCorp's methodology of driving a fixed wedge between purchase price and sales price artificially decreases market transactions and does not accurately represent the process that GRID is intended to model.

Q. What would be a preferable method of reconciling PacifiCorp's actual purchasing behavior with the base GRID model results?

A. A more accurate modeling choice would be to create variation in forecasted price that more accurately represents normal power price variation, and to accurately correlate PacifiCorp's load with this variation. This method is more appropriate because it is modeling the factors that underlie PacifiCorp's observations about historic sale and purchase transactions.

Q. Is it your position that the GRID price does not represent a normal price pattern?

A. Yes. As can be seen in Figure 1 GRID uses the same weekly price pattern throughout the month.[6] There is almost no day-to-day variation in market price. In reality prices will vary with demand. The effort to normalize power prices smooths out daily and hourly variation in market price. It is likely that the actual hourly market prices for 2017 will be more volatile than the GRID market price, and that it will have a greater high to low price range. This figure shows that

[6] Source: Ralston Confidential Workpaper "ORTAM17w_DA-RT Price Adder CONF.xlsx"

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q. What is the significance of this market curve?

A. As can be seen in the figure, use of a repeated weekly average market price removes volatility. However, that smoothing also eliminates the normal daily and hourly fluctuations of price which represent the essence of the issue for the company.

Q. Please explain why the market price volatility is important.

A. Volatility is important because market price is correlated with demand. When demand is high, the Company may not be able to meet the load with its own resources and is forced to go to the market for purchase. As demand increases, market price will also increase. These two factors conjoin to help explain why the Company tends to purchase when the market price is higher than average. Similarly, the correlation between demand and market price helps explain why the Company must sell when price is lower than average.

Outboard Cost Increase

Q. Please explain the Outboard Cost Increase model change.

A. The Outboard Cost Increase is an adjustment that PacifiCorp makes to system costs after the optimal system dispatch has occurred in GRID. PacifiCorp describes this adjustment as "incremental balancing volumes associated with using standard products to cover the open position determined by GRID."[7] However, the dollar value of this adjustment is unrelated to any forecast of "incremental balancing volumes." The reason for this is that the per-unit cost of the balancing volumes is adjusted such that the total cost equals a target number. Algebraically, Cost = Price * Quantity. PacifiCorp calculates the Cost component externally with historical data, then obtains a Quantity value from GRID, and sets Price so that the formula balances.

Q. How is the Outboard Cost Increase adjustment calculated?

A. The Outboard Cost Increase is calculated as follows. First, PacifiCorp calculates the difference between the total historic purchase costs and historic purchase volumes made at the monthly average price. A similar calculation is made for historic sales. In this proceeding, PacifiCorp calculates the average annual difference as [redacted].[8]

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[7] *See* PAC/100, Dickman/21:2-21:4.
[8] *See* Staff/221 Confidential Outboard Cost Increase Calculations.

The second step is to perform the same calculation using GRID purchases and sales rather than historic purchases and sales. PacifiCorp calculates the "above average cost of transactions" in GRID as [redacted].[9] The Outboard Cost Increase is the difference in these two numbers, or [redacted], which represents the Cost portion of the formula above. This amount is added to power costs and is independent of any estimate of balancing volumes.

Q. What is the Company trying to achieve with this adjustment?

A. The Company claims that it purchases energy in the forward market in large blocks. The large blocks will not necessarily correlate with demand in real time and so excess energy must be sold to balance the Company's position. The Company claims that these additional balancing transactions are not accounted for and represent an additional power cost not recovered through GRID modeling. The Outboard Cost Increase is the Company's attempt to estimate this cost.

Q. What is the Company actually achieving?

A. The Company is actually achieving an arbitrary cost increase with no rational relationship to the GRID forecast.

Q. Does this Outboard Cost Increase make sense?

A. No. PacifiCorp rationalizes its outboard adjustment with its need to make monthly and daily system balancing transactions.[10] However, there is not a

[9] *See* Staff/221 Confidential Outboard Cost Increase Calculations.
[10] *See* PAC/100 Dickman/16 at lines 2 through 6.

rational link between expected balancing transactions and the Outboard Cost Increase. This becomes clear when looking at extreme outcomes.

The additional monthly and daily transactions needed should be a decreasing function of real-time transactions. That is, as less real-time transactions are needed, there is less of a need for additional balancing transactions to manage them. However, the Company's Outboard Cost operates opposite to this: as real-time transactions decrease the additional balancing transactions increase. In the extreme example of no real-time transactions, there is no need for "additional transactions." The "above average cost of transactions" in GRID would be zero dollars. However, the historic value would not change. As a result, the total Outboard Cost Increase in this case would be exactly equal to the historic value of the "above average cost of transactions," or [redacted].[11]

PacifiCorp's argument is that the Outboard Cost Increase accounts for the cost of additional balancing transactions. However, the Outboard Cost Increase grows as balancing transactions decrease. The fact that PacifiCorp's methodology increases system balancing costs as real time purchases decrease is a sign that the methodology is fundamentally flawed.

Q. Please summarize the function of the Outboard Cost Increase.

A. In essence, the Company believes that balancing transactions exist that are not captured by GRID modeling and that these transactions have a cost to the Company. The Company has shown that historically it has engaged in

[11] As Staff notes in discussion of the Price Adder, this number is arbitrary to the extent that the "average pricing period" is arbitrary.

such balancing transactions and has estimated the cost of these. The Company proposes to collect this historical amount of transaction cost as an adder which collects the difference between the historical cost and the GRID result.

Q. Do you have additional concerns regarding the DA-RT model changes?

A. Yes. Staff is concerned that the DA-RT model changes do not account for the other moving parts with actual power costs because both adjustments are unrealistic and arbitrary. For example, actual sales and purchases tend to be higher than GRID results. However, if sales and purchases in reality are different than GRID results, then fuel use is also likely different. PacifiCorp's model embeds costs associated with a fixed volume of historic sales at historic prices. It fails to make any compensating adjustments in actual fuel cost or renewable generation.

Q. Please continue.

A. Staff has also observed that a substantial volume of transactions are more appropriately categorized as either hedging transactions, where daily power is purchased several days to months ahead, or arbitrage transactions, where purchases and sales occur simultaneously at equal volumes of energy for identical delivery times.

Q. What is Staff's recommendation concerning the use of the Price Adder?

A. Staff recommends that the Commission reject the Company's modeling change as implemented. Staff agrees in concept that the Company does in fact purchase energy at prices above the average market price, and does in fact sell at prices below the average market price. Due to this fact, it is reasonable that a difference exists between the Company's actual transaction cost/revenue and that modeled with the average market curve. However, the Company's use of two separate market prices is flawed, does not reflect reality, and produces unreasonable results. Instead, Staff recommends that the Company model in GRID a more realistic market price curve that would naturally correlate with demand and would address this issue within the modeling.

Q. What is Staff's recommendation concerning the use of the Outboard Cost Increase?

A. Staff recommends that the Commission reject the Company's use of the Outboard Cost Increase. It appears to be little more than an arbitrary (albeit historically-based) cost adder whose purpose is to collect transaction costs that the Company claims to incur but are not modeled in GRID. Staff is concerned that the cost increase may include the cost of arbitrage and hedging transactions and other potentially revenue producing events whose benefits may not be accounted for.

Q. Does this conclude your testimony concerning DA-RT transactions?

A. Yes.

ISSUE 2, FORCED OUTAGE MODELING

Q. Please describe the changes PacifiCorp made in modeling forced outages.

A. In both the 2016 and 2017 TAM, PacifiCorp uses a new method of modeling forced outages. Prior to the 2016 TAM, PacifiCorp calculated a forced outage rate for each plant and reduced the capacity of each plant by its respective forced outage rate in every hour of the year. This method, termed the "deration method" or "haircut method" is not consistent with normal forced outage patterns. In reality, forced outages have a limited duration. Some actual forced outages result in a 100 percent reduction in available capacity while others result in a partial reduction in available capacity.

In Order No. 10-414, the Commission noted "the lack of sophistication and realism associated with the deration approach," and stated that "[w]e are concerned that adjustment to the heat rate curve based on forced outage rates may skew the reserve carrying logic in a production cost model and result in an unrealistic and suboptimal carrying of spinning reserves across generating units. We understand that Pacific Power is currently developing a new production cost model that may replace GRID in future regulatory proceedings. We encourage Pacific Power to work with ICNU, CUB and Staff to explore alternatives to this approach."[12]

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[12] *In re Investigation into Forecasting Forced Outage Rates for Electric Generating Units*, OPUC Docket No. UM 1355, Order No. 10-414 at 8 (Oct. 22, 2010)..

In the 2016 TAM, PacifiCorp modified the forced outage mechanics to recognize that forced outages occasionally result in 100 percent capacity reductions. PacifiCorp's modification is to use four years of actual forced outage events to model the timing and size of capacity reductions. All forced outage events in the four year period are included in the GRID model. This results in four times the actual number of forced outage events. However, the duration of each event is reduced to one quarter of the actual duration. By reducing the duration of each event, PacifiCorp achieves the "average" annual forced outage rate, while maintaining a more realistic capacity reduction.

Q. Does Staff have concerns with regards to this model change?

A. Yes, Staff is concerned that the model change abnormally inflates power costs associated with re-starting generation. There are two costs associated with starting a plant. The first cost is additional oil used to warm the plant. The second cost is the lower heat rate of plants operating at low capacity factors. PacifiCorp's new method results in four times the expected annual number of outages.

Q. What is Staff's proposed treatment of forced outages?

A. Staff agrees with the Commission's observation that the "haircut" capacity reduction is not an accurate method of modeling forced outages. However, PacifiCorp's solution results in start-up costs above the expected value. In the current TAM, Staff proposes calculating four distinct Net Power Cost (NPC) values, one corresponding to each actual annual period of forced outages. Staff proposes maintaining the collars and caps used in previous dockets.

Staff proposes using the average of the four annual NPC. A permanent solution may require a stochastic power cost model.

Q. Does Staff have an estimate for this adjustment?

A. Staff has requested the data necessary to perform this adjustment but PacifiCorp has only provided the power cost results for a single year. This results in a system wide reduction of [redacted].[13]

Q. Other than the modeling change, does Staff have any other concerns about the forced outage calculations?

A. Yes. Staff observed that PacifiCorp may not be calculating forced outage rates in a manner consistent with Order No. 10-414.[14] Order No. 10-414 describes a mechanism for treating forced outage outliers. PacifiCorp's opening testimony describing its cap and collar mechanism is not clearly consistent with the Order.[15] PacifiCorp's response to OPUC DR 70[16] also appears inconsistent with the Order because it indicates that outlier status is calculated after taking the four year average. The Commission's Order indicates that each individual year used to calculate the four year average should be tested as an outlier.

However, the issue does not appear to introduce a systematic bias in the forced outage rate and Staff has no related adjustment.

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[13] *See* Staff/203 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 71
[14] *See Investigation into Forecasting Forced Outage Rates for Electric Generating Units* Docket UM 1355 Order 10-414 page 5.
[15] *See* PAC/100 Dickman/24:6-10.
[16] *See* Staff/204 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 70

ISSUE 3, AVIAN PROTECTION COMPLIANCE

Q. What is the background of this issue?

A. On December 19, 2014, PacifiCorp pled guilty to violating the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).[17] As part of the plea agreement, PacifiCorp was required to implement measures to minimize the hazard to birds in the area. Part of these measures resulted in curtailment of the Glenrock and Seven Mile Hill (Wind Farms) wind sites. In the 2016 TAM, PacifiCorp adjusted GRID to account for the reduction in output and continues to use the adjusted amounts in their current filing.[18]

Q. Has the Commission previously ruled on this issue?

A. Yes. ICNU raised the avian model change as an issue in UE 296. In Order No. 15-394, the Commission rejected ICNU's argument. However, the Commission also requested that Parties continue to review previous GRID model changes. Staff reviewed the previous testimony on this issue and found that a number of relevant facts were not included in the record. Based on its review, Staff concludes that these costs that arise from the GRID avian adjustment are not appropriately included in customers' rates and recommends the Commission reject the model change.

Q. Why does Staff recommend the Commission reject the model change?

A. Staff concludes that PacifiCorp's decisions involving the planning and construction of its wind plants, which violated federal law and ignored the

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[17] *See* Staff/205 PacifiCorp Plea Agreement.
[18] *See* UE 296 PAC/100 Dickman/39

advice of federal agencies, were not prudent. The court order requiring the wind plant curtailment is a direct result of these imprudent decisions. The U.S. District Court in Wyoming found that: "consultants advised Defendant that, in addition to big game and other wildlife protected by state law, golden eagles and other species of raptors and migratory birds protected under federal law were observed in the project area and some were likely to be killed by collision with the wind turbines".[19] Further, "as part of its Wyoming Industrial Siting Council permit application, Defendant evaluated raptor usage in the project area, and the company developed raptor mortality estimates. The USFWS did not have the opportunity to review the avian use studies, mortality estimates, or turbine siting plan for (the Wind Farms) prior to the date when it became operational, and did not authorize any take of federally-protected avian species at the facility."[20] The government found that the Wind Farms had been "constructed contrary to relevant agency guidance regarding avoiding and minimizing avian take by wind facilities in effect during the period."[21] In light of the findings that PacifiCorp knowingly sited the wind farms in an identified avian-sensitive location contrary to agency guidance, Staff believes ratepayers should be held harmless from the resulting penalties and curtailment/mitigation measures.

Q. What costs has PacifiCorp incurred as a result of its violation of the MBTA?

[19] Staff/205 Kaufman/15 Plea Agreement
[20] Staff/205 Kaufman/15 Plea Agreement
[21] Staff/205 Kaufman/18 Plea Agreement

A. The Court issued a judgment in this case on December 22, 2014.[22] The judgment includes financial penalties of $2,500,100 and requires the implementation of a Migratory Bird Compliance Plan ("MBCP"). The implementation of the MBCP requires:

1. Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies;
2. Mortality Monitoring/Reporting/Disposition, Nest Monitoring;
3. Experimental Advanced Conservation Practices, Best Management Practices;
4. Programmatic Take Permits; and
5. Compensatory Mitigation.[23]

At a minimum, Staff has determined that the MBCP has increased PacifiCorp's 2017 TAM NPC by [redacted] on a system basis.[24]

Q. What is Staff's proposed adjustment?

A. Staff proposes that the MBCP-related modeling changes be reversed and all direct and indirect costs associated with the Court's order be removed from NPC, including both the TAM and the Power Cost Adjustment Mechanism (PCAM).

[22] *See* Staff/206 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 21.
[23] *See* Staff/205 Kaufman/22-Kaufman/28.
[24] *See* Staff/222 PacifiCorp Confidential Response to OPUC DR 22.

ISSUE 4, MINIMUM COAL CONTRACTS

Q. What is the background of this issue?

A. Due mainly to the low cost of natural gas, many coal plants are dispatching well below their historical average. This has raised a new modeling issue in that many coal plants have rail contracts that require the shipment of a minimum amount annually. These minimums are assurances for the transporter, which generally helps the Company to negotiate a lower transportation contract price. In the current TAM, GRID's economic dispatch results in many coal plants[25] being below their minimum coal requirements. In order to account for the minimums, PAC changed the manner in which it modeled the coal plants.

Q. Please describe how PacifiCorp treats contract minimum constraints in this case.

A. PacifiCorp's fuel cost input for each plant has two components, a dispatch component and a cost calculation component.[26] The dispatch component is intended to represent the marginal fuel cost and is used to economically dispatch. The cost calculation component represents the average fuel cost and is used to calculate net variable power costs.

This appears to be a modeling aspect of GRID that has been implemented in the past. However, in this filing PacifiCorp is proposing a new method of

[25] Specifically, [redacted] are dispatched using a constrained coal cost. *See* Staff/223 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to ICNU DR 8.

[26] *See* Staff/207 PacifiCorp Response to CUB DR 13 and Staff/208 PacifiCorp Response to CUB DR 35.

calculating dispatch component. In the current filing, several of PacifiCorp's coal plants are expected to be dispatched at or below the level that invokes take or pay requirements and liquidated damage requirements.

PacifiCorp prevents dispatch from dropping below contract minimums by artificially adjusting the dispatch fuel cost (Artificial Dispatch Fuel Cost adjustment or ADFC). This appears to be an iterative process in which PacifiCorp makes adjustments to prices, runs GRID, reviews fuel consumption, and adjusts prices again.

This is a manual process that results in an approximate solution. Figure 2 below identifies the contract marginal cost for Cholla 4 fuel. The square dot identifies the GRID output and price. In an optimal solution the square would lie on the incremental cost curve.

[redacted]

Q. Has PacifiCorp presented this ADFC modeling technique in previous cases?

A. Staff is not aware of this technique being used in previous cases. Staff has reviewed previous cases and Staff can find no mention of contract minimums or this type of iterative price adjustment.

Q. What is Staff's concern with this modeling adjustment?

A. Staff has three concerns with this adjustment:

1. Staff views this as a prohibited modeling change.
2. The contracts themselves may be imprudent.
3. The modeling change may not be implemented optimally.

Q. Why does Staff consider this to be a prohibited modeling change?

A. In Commission Order No. 15-394, PacifiCorp was directed to “make no changes to its GRID modeling for its 2017 TAM.” This was done so that Staff, the parties and ultimately the Commission would have more time to evaluate and verify the modeling changes presented by the Company in its 2016 TAM.

Q. Is PacifiCorp subject to any other model change requirements in addition to Order No. 15-394’s prohibition on 2017 TAM model changes?

A. Yes. As part of Docket No. UE 191, PacifiCorp agreed to formal pre-filing reviews of GRID model changes. This agreement was made in recognition that TAM filings are limited proceedings and that reviewing model changes within the time frame of a TAM proceeding is extremely challenging for the Commission. The details of the pre-filing model change review are formalized by the stipulation adopted in Order No. 09-274.[27] A stipulation adopted in Order No 09-432 further clarifies the limitations on modeling changes and changes to input calculations. Such changes require notification by March 1 and detailed explanation of the changes in the April 1 filing, including side by side model comparisons. However, there was no March 1 notification, and PacifiCorp’s April 1 filing does discuss the minimum take modeling changes and provides no side by side comparison.

Q. These Orders specifically reference changes to the GRID model. If PacifiCorp is only changing inputs to the GRID model, why do you consider the AFDC adjustment is to be a model change?

[27] *See* Order No 09-274 page 3 item 1.

A. This is a model change because PacifiCorp is modifying the functionality of the dispatch price. In addition, PacifiCorp's method of selecting the input price constitutes GRID modeling. It is an iterative process involving multiple GRID runs. PacifiCorp's intent in manipulating the GRID inputs is to achieve a specific output result.

Q. You state that the contracts themselves may be imprudent. Can you elaborate?

A. Yes. Four coal supply contracts and two transport contracts have a contract term starting in 2015 or later.[28] Parties have previously expressed concern about PacifiCorp engaging in long term coal supply contracts given the current regulatory and economic uncertainty regarding coal generation.[29] Staff's proposal for the Coal Contract issue in this docket does not require a final prudence evaluation of these contracts until the 2017 PCAM.

Q. What is Staff's concern with the AFDC modeling change itself?

A. Staff is not convinced that the current modeling change is the best way to implement minimum take requirements. The current manual and iterative process is inexact and ad-hoc. It leads to economic dispatching, which approximates optimal solutions but does not account for the optionality provided by plant storage capacity.[30] Ideally, the model would result in

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[28] *See* Staff/209 Highly Confidential PacifiCorp response to OPUC DR 67 and Staff/210 Highly Confidential PacifiCorp response to OPUC DR 68

[29] PacifiCorp has declined to provide its coal hedging policy in this docket. S*ee* Staff/211 Response to OPUC DR 177.

[30] PacifiCorp's Coal Inventory Policies and Procedures indicates that coal inventory provides a buffer between coal deliveries and coal burn. S*ee* Staff/212 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 18.

dispatching, which would minimize the costs of meeting the coal requirements exactly.

Staff agrees that minimum-take requirements and shortfall-related damages have potential impacts on power costs. These impacts would be appropriate to consider if PacifiCorp was prudent in subjecting customers to these requirements. Should the contracts, contract extensions, and hedging policy be found to be prudent, Staff supports modifying the GRID model to optimally incorporate the contract requirements.

Q. What is Staff's proposal?

A. The Commission should reject the AFDC model change proposed by PacifiCorp. In place of the AFDC dispatch component of fuel cost could be calculated at the marginal contract or spot price.

It is important that the Company comply with the Commission's Order prohibiting new changes to the GRID model. The current modeling change should be postponed for a year to allow Staff to fully analyze the 2016 TAM changes. The Commission Order in the 2016 TAM, the limited time to review the contracts, and the in-exact and incomplete nature of the model adjustment leads Staff to this recommendation. Staff further recommends that if PacifiCorp incorporates contract minimum requirements in future TAM filings, PacifiCorp should also incorporate contract flexibility and coal stockpile flexibility.

Staff agrees that contract minimums have a real impact on power costs. Should the contracts and policies be found to be prudent in a future TAM proceeding, Staff believes any added costs associated with the contracts should be subject to the Company's PCAM. This will limit any potential harm to the Company related to the Commission's moratorium on model changes.

ISSUE 5, BRIDGER COAL COSTS

Q. What does your testimony on this issue demonstrate?

A. Based on the items below, Staff finds that PacifiCorp has not adequately evaluated market opportunities. Staff proposes a prudence disallowance of a portion of BCC coal costs. Specifically, my testimony will demonstrate the following items:

1) Bridger Coal Company (BCC) coal costs are rapidly rising and will likely remain high;
2) PacifiCorp's current theory of rate treatment for BCC is unfounded and detrimental to customers;
3) A valid coal market exists, transportation is available, and the plant can burn market coal;
4) Market options are less expensive than continued participation in the BCC coal supply agreements;
5) PacifiCorp has not prudently evaluated market alternatives to BCC coal; and
6) Using market today and in the future is substantially cheaper, even after accounting for capital costs.

Bridger Coal Company coal costs are rapidly rising and will likely remain high

Q. Please summarize your argument for why BCC coal costs are rapidly rising and will likely remain high.

A. PacifiCorp proposes a [redacted] percent price increase for Bridger Coal Company coal price in the 2017 TAM. PacifiCorp claims that this increase is primarily related to a reduction in annual coal production. This reduction is related to depressed power prices and an associated decrease in Bridger Plant dispatch rates.

The market conditions that have caused Bridger to dispatch infrequently are likely to continue. Market prices for electricity are driven by the marginal cost of generation. Low demand growth and high growth of renewable generation will continue to put downward pressure on market prices. If power prices remain low, the Bridger Plant will continue to dispatch at a low rate. Consequently, BCC will continue to have a low production quantity.

As such, low coal production and no competitive pressure will likely continue in the future, meaning that BCC coal prices will likely remain high in the future.

Q. How have actual BCC coal production and prices changed in recent years?

A. Staff has acquired two estimates of BCC coal costs. Figure 3 below provides a summary of EIA data on BCC coal cost. This figure identifies the 12 month rolling average cost for BCC coal. Costs appear to increase gradually prior to 2005, and more rapidly after 2005. BCC coal costs in 2015 were three times BCC coal costs in 2000.

Figure 3 Twelve Month Rolling Average Cost of BCC Coal



Figure 4 below shows the actual monthly BCC coal cost per ton according to PacifiCorp.[31] PacifiCorp data indicate BCC coal prices have displayed month to month volatility, with an upward trend.

[31] *See* Staff/213 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 60

[redacted]

Q. There appears to be a sharp and persistent price increase in the Spring of 2016. Can you explain this?

A. Yes. PacifiCorp notes in its testimony that Jim Bridger dispatch has decreased due to low power prices.[32] PacifiCorp anticipates that coal costs will remain elevated in 2016 and 2017.[33]

Q. PacifiCorp has an approved affiliated interest contract on file for BCC. Is it normal for coal prices to have such high month to month variation?

A. No, the variation displayed in Figure 4 above is not consistent with normal coal prices. It is also not consistent with the Affiliated Interest contract approved by the Commission for BCC. Most coal contracts identify either a fixed price per ton or an escalating price per ton tied to specific cost indices. The Third

[32] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/13.
[33] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/13.

Restated and Amended Coal Supply Agreement (Coal Contract) that is currently applicable to BCC was filed by PacifiCorp in UE 189 and was approved by the Commission in 2001. This contract has a coal price that escalates with specific cost indices and appears to continue to 2024 without an option for a cost reopener.

Despite Staff's data request to PacifiCorp to provide the monthly contract price for BCC, to date PacifiCorp has refused to provide such data because it does not deem the information relevant to this proceeding.[34] Staff explores PacifiCorp's position regarding the BCC Coal Contract and its obligations to BCC in the following subsection of this testimony.

Q. How has BCC's forecast for 2017 coal production and price changed in recent years?

A. The 2013 mine plan forecasted a 2017 production of [redacted] million tons at a cost of [redacted] per ton. The 2016 mine plan forecasted 2017 production of [redacted] million tons at a cost of [redacted] per ton. The 2017 TAM forecasts 2017 production of [redacted] million tons at a cost of [redacted] per ton.[35]

Q. How has PacifiCorp proposed to treat the BCC coal cost issue in its 2017 TAM?

A. PacifiCorp has responded to higher BCC coal costs by proposing to increase its capital investment in BCC. This increased capital investment does not

[34] *See* Staff/224 and Staff/225 PacifiCorp response to OPUC DR 61, and 62.
[35] These numbers include both PacifiCorp and Idaho Power share of BCC coal deliveries.

appear to have been subjected to any due diligence analysis.[36] PacifiCorp maintains a position that in the event it ceases purchasing coal from BCC, PacifiCorp customers are responsible for any unrecovered capital investment in the mine.[37]

Under PacifiCorp's theory of rate treatment for BCC, increased capital investment at BCC will increase customer liability for fixed mine costs and will reduce the future viability of market alternatives. PacifiCorp's decision to continue to invest in BCC without performing due diligence studies, and its decision to reduce transparency regarding market alternatives and BCC costs, indicate that it may not be operating in customers' interests.

Q. How does PacifiCorp investment in BCC relate to BCC investment in new plant, property, and equipment?

A. PacifiCorp, through its subsidiary Pacific Minerals Inc., owns a two thirds interest in BCC. To the extent that BCC needs additional capital, two thirds of this capital is raised from PacifiCorp.

Q. How much capital has BCC invested in new plant, property, and equipment?

[36] Staff requested cost benefit analysis of major BCC capital projects not yet subjected to a prudence review. PacifiCorp declined to respond. *See* Staff/214 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 57. Staff also requested due diligence studies used to support investing in BCC surface operations. PacifiCorp provided the Long Term Fuel Supply Plan. However, this document was generated in response to a Commission Order and evaluates investment in 2024, not recent and ongoing investment. *See* Staff/215 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 59.

[37] *See* Staff/226 PacifiCorp Response to Staff DR 36.

A. BCC has invested $501 million in assets since 1974.[38] These assets have a net book value of $192 million.[39] Figure 5 below provides the annual plant, property, and equipment investment of BCC.[40] BCC appears to have instituted a capital investment program in 2005, the same year that Berkshire Hathaway (Berkshire) purchased both PacifiCorp and BCC. In the first eleven years since Berkshire purchased PacifiCorp, BCC invested $352 million in new plant, property and equipment. This is 235 percent more than BCC invested in the first 31 years of operations.[41] This is a 663 percent increase in annual investment, from $4.8 million per year before 2005 to $31.9 million per year after 2005. Figure 3 shows that 2005 is also the same year BCC coal costs began rapid growth.

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[38] *See* Staff/216 PacifiCorp Response to Staff DR 35.
[39] *See* Staff/216 PacifiCorp Response to Staff DR 35.
[40] *See* Staff/216 PacifiCorp Response to Staff DR 35.
[41] These calculations are based on Staff/216 PacifiCorp's response to Staff DR 35. The data in this request should include all assets BCC has purchased, including those that have been retired. In a supplemental response PacifiCorp indicates that the data provided do not meet FERC accounting standards and may not be complete. *See* Staff/216 Kaufman/2.

Figure 5 BCC PP&E investment



Q. How much additional capital does Bridger Coal Company intend to invest over the life of the Bridger coal plant?

A. According to its 2016 10 year business plan,[42] Bridger Coal Company intends to invest [redacted] between 2017 and 2035.[43] In real 2016 terms, this is equivalent to [redacted].[44]

Q. How has BCC depreciation expense changed since 2015?

A. The table below identifies plant additions and annual depreciation at BCC. Due to substantial capital additions, BCC depreciation has increased every year.

[42] *See* Staff/231 Confidential Ralston Workpaper "14 Depr Exp 10YP.xlsx"
[43] *See* Staff/217 Confidential Bridger Coal Company Projected Capital Additions
[44] *See* Staff/217 Confidential Bridger Coal Company Projected Capital Additions

[redacted][45]

Q. How have BCC coal costs changed since the affiliated interest agreement was approved in UI 189?

A. In the initial filing for UI 189, PacifiCorp identifies the 1999 BCC coal cost as $15.35 per ton and an average heat value of 9400 Btu per pound.[46] The 2008 price was $29.37 per ton.[47] The 2010 price was $33.58 per ton.[48] Figure 4 above follows the monthly price from 2010 to present. The most current available price is [redacted] per ton from May of 2016.[49]

Q. What does PacifiCorp identify as the primary cause of increasing coal prices in 2017?

A. PacifiCorp states that the primary cause of increased costs per ton of coal is reduced dispatch of the Jim Bridger coal plant.[50]

Q. Does Staff have any evidence to support the claim that high fixed costs are driving the 2017 increase?

A. Yes. As volume increases, fixed costs are spread over fewer units, decreasing the average cost per unit. I evaluated the correlation between BCC monthly cost per ton and quantity delivered between January 2011 and December

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[45] *See* Staff/231 Confidential Ralston Workpaper "14 Depr Exp 10YP.xlsx"
[46] *See* Staff/228 Kaufman/97 UI 189 Initial Filing. Staff notes that the Third Restated and Amended Coal Supply Agreement was provided in this docket on a highly confidential basis. Staff's counsel contacted counsel for PacifiCorp and verified the Initial Filing is non-confidential.
[47] *See* UE 207 PPL/200 Lasich/4 line 9.
[48] *See* UE 207 PPL/200 Lasich/4 line10.
[49] This value does not include approximately [redacted] per ton in capital costs included in base rates. *See* Staff/213 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 60.
[50] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/13 at lines 5 to 6 and lines 12 to 13.

2015. Staff found a highly statistically significant correlation between BCC cost per ton and tons delivered. The correlation of -0.5721 was significant at the 0.001 significance level.[51]

Staff/218 itemizes the major cost categories for BCC and explains which items vary with tonnage, which remain fixed, and which are quasi-variable.[52] The nature of these relationships is embedded within the BCC production cost model. The results of the BCC production cost model also displays evidence that there is a negative relationship between cost per ton and total tons produced.

This relationship can be seen by comparing the BCC 10-year coal plan generated in 2013 with the 10-year plan generated in 2015. The 2015 plan projects almost double the quantity of production from 2024 to 2036 relative to the 2013 plan. The 2015 plan also projects an average annual cost per ton about 30 percent lower than the average cost projected in 2013 for the production period 2024 to 2036.

Q. Is there evidence that other factors besides reduced production volumes are increasing costs?

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[51] The Pearson's correlation coefficient can be tested for statistical significance using the Student's t-test. This test requires continuously distributed variables, a liner relationship between the two variables, an absence of outliers, and normally distributed variables. All four assumptions are valid. Staff performed a linear regression on the data and found the linear relationship to be highly statistically significant. Three observations were found to have residuals more than 2 standard deviations from the mean. These observations were removed as outliers. The remaining data were tested for normality using the Shapiro–Wilk test. The null hypothesis of normally distributed data was not rejected.

[52] *See* Staff/218 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 6.

A. Yes. Annual depreciation costs have increased by [redacted] million or [redacted] percent from 2015 to 2017.[53] The 2014 TAM identified $460,000 in management overtime and bonuses.[54] The 2017 TAM identifies [redacted] in management overtime and bonuses.[55] This is an increase of [redacted] percent.[56]

Further, in 2011, BCC produced [redacted] million tons[57] at a cost of [redacted] per ton.[58] The 2011 coal production volumes are equivalent to the 2016 production volumes, however the cost per ton has increased substantially.

Q. Does PacifiCorp expect BCC coal prices to remain high?

A. Not in the near term. The most recent (2016) BCC 10-year business plan indicates that coal will average [redacted] per ton from 2018 to 2023. After that, PacifiCorp projects that the underground operations will be depleted and BCC price per ton will average [redacted] per ton. Staff/227 Kaufman/20 and Kaufman/24 identifies the 2016 10 year plan price forecast for BCC coal. The BCC coal cost forecast is also summarized in Figure 7 below.

In this testimony, Staff presents evidence that the 2016 10-year plan is incorrect and that BCC coal costs will remain at or above [redacted] per ton. Staff also presents evidence that PacifiCorp has not prudently evaluated market alternatives to BCC because in both the short-run and the long-run market sourced coal has a lower "present value revenue requirement" (PVRR) than

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[53] *See* Staff/231 Confidential Ralston Workpaper "14 Depr Exp 10YP.xlsx".
[54] *See* Order 13-387 page 7.
[55] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/12 line 21.
[56] The increase is evidence that total BCC costs are increasing, not just per ton costs. However, PacifiCorp removes management overtime and 50 percent of incentive bonuses from the final 2017 TAM power costs. This removal is made in compliance with Order 13-387.
[57] *See* Staff/229 PacifiCorp Response to ICNU DR 12.
[58] *See* Staff/230 Confidential Cost Per Ton 2011.

BCC coal. Staff's finding that market alternatives have a lower PVRR is independent of Staff's finding that BCC future coal costs are underestimated. Even at PacifiCorp's forecasted BCC coal cost, continued purchase of BCC coal is not economic.

Q. How does the 2016 BCC 10 year business plan compare to the 2013 plan?

A. Figure 6 and Figure 7 below compare the annual production and cost per ton for the 2013 and 2016 10 year business plan. The 2013 plan has lower production volumes and higher costs per ton than the 2016 plan. The 2013 plan predicts cost per ton averages [redacted] from 2024 to 2034 while the 2016 plan predicts coal costs an average of [redacted] per ton over the same period.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q. Does the 2016 BCC 10-year business plan reflect low dispatch at Bridger Plant?

A. No. The plan has an average annual production volume of [redacted] tons between 2016 and 2023.[59] However, this is much more coal than Bridger is expected to consume each year in 2016 and 2017.[60] Bridger Plant must dispatch at a higher rate in 2018 through 2023 to use [redacted] tons of coal per year. For Bridger to dispatch at a higher rate, electricity market prices after 2018 must be substantially higher than they are today.

Q. Bridger Plant has historically been a low-cost energy source for PacifiCorp. Is it reasonable to assume that Bridger will continue to be a low-cost energy source?

A. Not necessarily. It is a natural part of the lifecycle of thermal resources to slowly become uneconomic. The Jim Bridger units were completed between

[59] *See* Staff/227 Kaufman/20.
[60] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/14 at lines 13 to 15.

1974 and 1979. These units will have operated - predominately as baseload generation - for 38 to 43 years. Newer generating facilities tend to have higher efficiency ratings, lower operating costs, and push older units up the generation stack. In recent years the Bridger Plant has moved from being a baseload plant with high capacity factor to a cycling plant, one that operates only during periods of higher energy demand.

Q. Is the Jim Bridger Plant the only coal plant that is no longer dispatching as a baseload plant?

A. No. Many of PacifiCorp's coal plants have experienced reduced dispatch rates. PacifiCorp coal dispatch has decreased so much that plants are being dispatched uneconomically simply to satisfy contractual minimum take requirements. PacifiCorp is not the only utility experiencing this phenomenon.

PGE's Boardman plant is currently dispatching uneconomically to avoid liquidated damages associated with contract minimums. The US Energy Information Administration observed as early as 2012 that newer, highly efficient natural gas plants are displacing coal plants on the generation stack.[61]

Low dispatch rates reduce the long term economic viability of coal plants. This has contributed to a wave of coal plant retirements. PacifiCorp's 2013 and 2015 Integrated Resource Plan have identified numerous scenarios in which all four Bridger units are either retired early or converted to gas

[61] *See* Staff/232 "Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost of Operation."

generation.[62] The OPUC has chosen not to acknowledge Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) action items related to Jim Bridger capital investments precisely because of the marginal economic viability of the Jim Bridger units.[63]

Q. Other than age and relative decline in efficiency, are there other factors causing coal plants to dispatch less often?

A. Yes, there are two market factors and two coal plant characteristics contributing to the decreasing dispatch:

- Low market power prices;
- Low ramping rates for coal generators;
- High startup costs for coal generators; and
- Increased volatility of energy prices.

The market characteristics are a direct result of new technologies. Because it is technological innovation that is driving these market characteristics, they should be considered the new status quo. The low ramp rates and high startup costs make coal plants poor competitors in low price high volatility energy markets.

Q. Do you agree with PacifiCorp's claim that low power prices will cause Jim Bridger to dispatch less often?

A. Yes, Staff agrees that low power prices will cause Bridger to dispatch less often. PacifiCorp witness Dickman states "[i]n the 2016 TAM, low market prices for natural gas caused generation from the Company's gas-fired units to

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[62] Many of the recent coal retirements are triggered by required capital investments. However, it is the marginal ongoing economic viability of these plants that cause the capital investments to close the plants.
[63] *See* Order 14-252 pages 8 and 9.

displace generation at coal-fired units. Low market prices projected for 2017 are again resulting in reductions in generation at certain coal-fired units."[64] PacifiCorp witness Ralston also states "[i]n the final update in November 2015, the consumption level at the Jim Bridger Plant fell by [redacted] MMBtu to [redacted] MMBtu, primarily due to lower natural gas and power market prices in the Company's official forward price curve."[65]

Q. What are some key factors driving low market prices?

A. The market price for electricity depends on the operating cost of the marginal generating units. This is a basic result of competitive markets. Two key factors are reducing the operating cost of the marginal generating unit. The first factor is strong growth of renewable generation. The regions PacifiCorp operates in have experienced substantial growth of renewable generation. Renewable generation tends to have low marginal operating costs. These resources reside at the bottom of the generation stack and push all other resources up the stack in terms of dispatch. At times of high renewable generation, renewables actually become the marginal unit. When this happens, the market can be zero or even negative.

The second factor driving low market prices is low natural gas prices. Recent innovations in natural gas production technology have greatly reduced the cost of drilling natural gas wells. This resulted in a structural shift in the natural gas market and a substantial decrease in both the present natural gas price and

[64] PAC/100 Dickman/10:19-11:1.
[65] PAC/200 Ralston/13:16-13:19.

the expectations for future natural gas prices. Low natural gas prices and high coal prices have caused newer, highly efficient natural gas plants to displace coal on the generation stack. This means that the cost per megawatt hour for some natural gas generators is less than the cost per megawatt hour for some coal generators. When natural gas fired plants are the marginal generating resource, the price of natural gas is a direct factor in the cost of the marginal generating resource and consequently on the market price.

Q. How does price volatility affect coal generation?

A. During periods of high average prices, electricity price volatility has little impact on coal generation. However, during periods of low average prices, price volatility affects coal generation because coal plants generally have low ramp rates and high starting costs. This means that a coal plant that is not generating will only be able to take advantage of increased market prices if the increase is sustained for an extended period of time.

Q. Please explain what a ramp rate is.

A. The ramp rate refers to how quickly a plant can increase or decrease generation. Some types of plants are relatively nimble and can increase or decrease generation quickly. These plants have high ramp rates. Coal plants take a relatively long time to increase or decrease generation. Coal plants can require over 10 hours to generate at capacity from a cold start.[66]

Q. Please explain why coal plants have high startup costs.

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[66] *See* Staff/233 Kaufman/21. A cold start refers to starting a plant after several days of no generation.

A. Coal plants require a substantial amount of energy to start. This energy includes secondary fuel sources to heat the furnace, increase boiler pressure and provide circulation.

Q. What are your expectations regarding energy prices and energy price volatility in the future?

A. The current market situation is a result of low gas prices and high renewable generation. The cost of renewable generation is expected to continue to decline. Natural gas price is forecasted to increase slowly. However, recent gas forecasts have been incorrectly high. There appears to be a persistent bias in natural gas forecasts. Even if natural gas prices increase slightly, as renewables grow, the share of time that renewable generation is the marginal resource will increase. This will counteract the upward pressure on prices and maintain the high volatility of market prices.

Q. Do other sources verify your expectations regarding market price?

A. Yes. The link between renewable generation and both electricity market price and price volatility is well established.[67] Both Oregon and California have enacted legislation requiring substantial growth in renewable generation.[68] The Obama administration has set a national target of 50 percent clean energy generation by 2025. Industry experts forecast low power prices will continue into the future.[69]

[67] Staff/234 Kaufman/2 and Kaufman/4.
[68] Oregon Senate Bill 1547 and California Senate Bill 350.
[69] *See* Staff/236 EIA Annual Energy Outlook Electricity Price Forecast

Q. If you assume that natural gas prices increase, would that mean that Jim Bridger would operate at a high capacity factor?

A. No. Coal price also plays an important role in whether gas plants dispatch before coal. While natural gas may become more expensive in the future, coal is also expected to become more expensive in the future. Because coal plants are generally less efficient than combined cycle combustion turbine plants, a one percent increase in coal prices increases the cost of coal generation by more than a one percent increase in gas prices.

Q. Given your expectations regarding future markets and technologies, do you expect Bridger to consume an increasing or decreasing amount of coal in the future?

A. Staff expects the Bridger Plant will dispatch at a low rate, and as a result it will consume a decreasing quantity of coal in the future.

Q. Given the high likelihood that Jim Bridger will continue to dispatch at low levels in the future, should the 2016 BCC ten-year business plan production volumes be changed?

A. The 2016 BCC ten-year plan forecasts an average annual production volume of [redacted] between 2016 and 2023. The forecasted 2016 and 2017 production is [redacted] tons. If 2016 and 2017 Bridger dispatch rates continue into the future, the 2016 BCC ten year plan overestimates production volumes by [redacted]. The 2016 business plan quantities need to be revised down by an average of [redacted] percent.

Q. Is the Bridger Plant economically dispatched in the 2017 GRID model?

A. No. The dispatch cost used in GRID for the Jim Bridger Plant is manually adjusted by PacifiCorp to achieve both the contract minimums for Black Butte mine and the BCC 2017 annual coal production target.[70]

Q. If the BCC mining plan were adjusted to reflect reduced production volumes consistent with 2016 and 2017 expectations, what would happen to BCC's forecasted coal cost?

A. BCC has substantial fixed costs. According to PacifiCorp, these fixed costs are responsible for the increase in the 2017 TAM BCC coal price increase. Ralston states that a [redacted] reduction in production volume[71] resulted in a [redacted] increase in BCC coal prices.[72] This indicates that a one percent decrease in production is associated with a [redacted] in price. If the 2016 10 year plan quantities are decreased by [redacted], and PacifiCorp is correct regarding the relationship between coal costs and volumes, the 10 year plan coal prices will increase by approximately 30 percent. The table below provides Staff's forecast of Bridger Coal Company prices for 2018 through 2023.

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

[70] *See* Staff/223 Kaufman/9.
[71] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/14 line 15.
[72] *See* PAC/200 Ralston/13 line 7.

[redacted]	[redacted]

Q. Do these prices include the capital cost associated with BCC?

A. No. The price forecast for BCC does not appear to include a return on capital. However, PacifiCorp's base rates do include a return on BCC investment.[73] PacifiCorp's last general rate case included a revenue requirement for a return on the BCC investment. This return was $15.35 million on a system basis.[74] This translates into [redacted] per ton. The full price paid by customers for BCC coal is the sum of the return imbedded in base rates and the price paid through the power cost mechanisms. The table below represents the forecasted Bridger Coal Cost inclusive of capital costs.

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

PacifiCorp's current theory of rate treatment for BCC is unfounded and detrimental to customers

Q. For ratemaking purposes, what pricing method is PacifiCorp using in place of the approved AI contract?

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[73] *See* Staff/237 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 55 and Staff/238 PacifiCorp Response to ICNU DR 13.

[74] *See* Staff/238 PacifiCorp Response to ICNU DR 13. Return was calculated from rate base addition using Staff's UE 263 revenue requirement model.

A. PacifiCorp is treating BCC costs as 100 percent pass through costs. [75] The price per ton charged by BCC to PacifiCorp consists of all BCC expenses within the month divided by tons of delivered coal.

Q. What is PacifiCorp's basis for this treatment?

A. PacifiCorp provides a partial description of its transfer pricing policy and proposes a basis for the transfer pricing policy in reply testimony of Docket No. UE 264.

> "**Q. Has the Commission set a cost-based transfer price as a part of approving coal supply arrangements from BCC to the Bridger Plant?**
> A. Yes. Since the 1970s, the Commission has allowed PacifiCorp to purchase coal from BCC at the actual, prudent costs of production, plus a return component on the investment in the Bridger mine limited to PacifiCorp's current authorized rate of return (ROR).[1] Under this approach, if BCC earns a margin over PacifiCorp's authorized ROR, it must credit this margin back to PacifiCorp through a reduced transfer price. In its most recent order on the supply agreement between BCC and Bridger, the Commission expressly approved the agreement as "fair, reasonable and not contrary to the public interest. " [2]
> [1] *In the Matter of Pacific Power*, Docket UF 3508, Order No. 79-754 (1979); *In the Matter of Pacific Power and Light Company*, Docket UF 3779, Order No. 82-606 (Aug 18, 1982).
> [2] *In re PacifiCorp*, Docket UI 189, Order No. 01-472 (June 12, 2001)."

PacifiCorp's response to OPUC DR 56(a) also provides support for its transfer pricing policy.[76] The response to this DR identifies a stipulation and Order accepting the stipulation in Docket No. UE 111 as supporting the transfer pricing policy. Staff has reviewed the referenced stipulation and Order No. 00-580 accepting the stipulation. There is no reference to a transfer pricing policy in this order or the attached stipulation. The stipulation does include a line item

[75] *See* Staff/224 and Staff/225 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 61 and 62.
[76] *See* Staff/239 Response to OPUC DR 56.

adjustment related to BCC but there is no discussion of the rationale for this adjustment or any ongoing rate treatment requirements related to this adjustment.

Q. In supporting its transfer pricing policy, PacifiCorp cites three Commission Orders. Do the referenced orders propose or imply a 100 percent cost pass through for BCC?

A. No. Order No. 79-754 demonstrates the Commission's understanding that the price for BCC coal is set pursuant to contract.[77] In that Order, the Commission presumed that the BCC contract price was set at a level that would allow BCC an opportunity to recover its costs and allow an opportunity to earn an adequate return on its investment.[78] For policy reasons, the Commission determined that it was not appropriate for BCC to earn a greater return on its investment than PP&L was otherwise authorized, and on that basis adjusted to price per ton to reflect a lower rate or return.[79] The Commission also considered the reasonable market price for BCC coal in relation to the contract price when determining the appropriate coal price for ratemaking purposes.[80]

Similarly, Order No. 82-606 stands for the same proposition as Order No. 79-754. In that Order, the Commission again recognized that the Jim Bridger

[77] *In re Pacific Power & Light Co.*, OPUC Docket No. UF 3508, Order No. 79-754 at 16 (Oct. 29, 1979) ("The price for coal purchases by PP&L from Bridger Coal are set subject to a February 1, 1974, coal sales agreement…Quarterly adjustments in the base coal prices are related to price changes in designated costs, as verified by various indices or observations, and are allowed by contract terms.").
[78] *Id.* at 19.
[79] *Id.* at 20 ("PP&L may finance Bridger operations as it chooses. However, for ratemaking purposes, the Commissioner will limit the return to PP&L on its Bridger investment to that level allowed on other PP&L operations.").
[80] *Id.* at 18-19.

Plant obtains coal from BCC pursuant to a coal contract, but that for ratemaking purposes, "no asset used in providing utility service may earn a rate of return greater than that authorized for Pacific, whether owned by the company or its affiliate."[81]

Finally, Order No. 01-472 approved PacifiCorp's affiliated interest relationship with BCC, subject to the conditions stated in Staff's Public Meeting Memo (Appendix A).[82] Appendix A makes clear that the relationship between BCC and PacifiCorp is governed by contract, and that base tonnages for coal purchases and pricing are established and adjusted pursuant to applicable contract provisions.[83] The Commission also continued the application of its policy to limit BCC's return, for ratemaking purposes, to PacifiCorp's authorized overall rate of return.[84] Notably, Staff's analysis and basis for recommending approval of the affiliated interest relationship and Third Restated and Amended Coal Supply Agreement focused on the contract price in relation to market prices.[85]

Q. How do you interpret the Commission's historic treatment of BCC contracts and prices?

A. As discussed above, the Commission has historically determined that the contract price allows for the recovery of BCC's costs. For policy reasons, the

[81] *In re Pacific Power & Light Co.*, OPUC Docket No. UF 3779, Order No. 82-606 at 8 (Aug. 18, 1982).
[82] *In re PacifiCorp*, OPUC Docket No. UI 189, Order No. 01-472 at 2 (Jun. 12, 2001).
[83] *Id.* at 3-4.
[84] *Id.* at 7.
[85] *Id.* at 4-6.

Commission has capped BCC's return on assets at PacifiCorp's authorized rate of return. Finally, the Commission has traditionally evaluated the reasonableness of BCC pricing in relation to market prices.

Valid market exists, transportation is available, and the plant can burn market coal

Q. Do valid market options exist for Jim Bridger Plant's coal supply?

A. Yes, there are several market options for Jim Bridger Plant's coal supply. These options include the Powder River Basin (PRB), Black Butte Mine, and the Uinta Basin.[86] Jim Bridger currently receives coal from the Black Butte Mine and has the option of purchasing additional coal from Black Butte Mine. PacifiCorp's long term coal plan identifies Powder River Basin as a viable source.[87] PacifiCorp has received market estimates for current and future Powder River Basin coal prices.[88] PacifiCorp does not appear to have evaluated Uinta Coal as a market source for Jim Bridger.

Q. Is transportation available to ship Powder River coal to the Jim Bridger Plant?

A. Yes. The workpapers provided by PacifiCorp witness Ralston include Union Pacific rail rates for shipping Powder River Basin coal to Jim Bridger Plant. PacifiCorp's response to OPUC DR 32 also indicates that "PacifiCorp does …

[86] *See* Staff/240 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 178.
[87] *See* Staff/215 Kaufman/7 Confidential Long Term Fuel Supply Plan.
[88] *See* Staff/241 Confidential Response to OPUC DR 1.

have a current rail agreement which allows for coal shipments from the Southern Powder River Basin mines."[89]

Q. What is the current cost to purchase and deliver coal to the Jim Bridger Plant?

A. The July 2016 spot price of coal was $8.70.[90] The workpapers provided by Ralston indicate transportation and handling of PRB coal in July 2016 would cost approximately [redacted], for a total cost of [redacted] per ton.

Q. How does the current cost of PRB coal compare to the current cost of BCC coal?

A. PRB coal has a lower heat content than BCC coal. An appropriate comparison requires converting to cost per MMBtu. BCC charged PacifiCorp [redacted] per ton for coal delivered in May 2016.[91] This translates into [redacted] per MMBtu. The current PRB delivered cost of [redacted] per ton translates into [redacted] MMBtu. The current cost of BCC coal is 179 percent more than the current delivered price of PRB coal.

Q. What is the expected cost of purchasing and transporting Powder River Basin coal to the Jim Bridger Plant in 2017?

A. Based on the workpapers by Ralston, the 2017 delivered cost of Powder River Basin coal is [redacted] This includes $11 per ton for PRB coal, [redacted] per ton for transportation and [redacted] per ton for dust suppression and handling.

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[89] *See* Staff/242 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 32.
[90] See Staff/243 EIA Coal Market Report.
[91] This is down from [redacted] per ton in April 2016 and [redacted] per ton in March.

PacifiCorp bases this estimate on a May 2014 forecast of coal prices. This translates into a cost of [redacted] per MMbtu.

Q. Is there evidence that PacifiCorp has recently purchased PRB coal?

A. In Docket No. UE 264, PacifiCorp witness Crain states "[t]he Company issued a solicitation for Powder River Basin coal supplies. As a result of the solicitation, the Company secured new coal supply arrangements with Western Fuels for Dry Fork mine coal for 2014 through 2016."[92] This indicates that PacifiCorp is currently purchasing and shipping coal. The PRB is considered by PacifiCorp to be a liquid market.[93]

Q. Is Jim Bridger Plant capable of burning PRB coal?

A. [redacted][94] PacifiCorp's current long term coal supply plan indicates that the Company is currently planning to switch to PRB coal in 2024 when the BCC underground reserves are depleted. This plan involves some capital additions to allow Jim Bridger to receive and burn PRB coal. By installing these facilities early, PacifiCorp would be able to spread the capital costs over a longer period and receive PRB coal at a time when PRB coal costs substantially less than BCC coal.

Q. Please summarize the evidence that there is a viable market source of coal is available to burn at the Bridger Plant.

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[92] *See* UE 264 PAC/600 Crane/3 lines 18 through 21.
[93] *See* Staff/240 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 178.
[94] *See* Staff/212 Kaufman/14 Confidential PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 18.

A. PacifiCorp is currently purchasing Powder River Basin coal. PacifiCorp work-papers for the 2017 TAM include PRB coal costs and transportation cost from PRB to the Jim Bridger Plant. PacifiCorp's long term coal plan demonstrates that PacifiCorp expects to burn PRB coal at Jim Bridger Plant in 2024.

Market options are less expensive than continued participation in the BCC coal supply agreements

Q. What factors should be considered when evaluating whether market options are less expensive than continued participation in the BCC coal supply agreements?

A. The following factors are relevant to evaluating market alternatives to the BCC contract:

- Incremental capital costs of modifying Bridger Plant;
- Expected MMBtu price differential;
- Expected MMBtu volumes;
- Incremental costs of breaking contracts with BCC; and
- System benefits associated with optimally dispatching Jim Bridger Plant.

Q. What additional capital is required for the Bridger Plant to receive and burn PRB coal?

A. Staff/241, Kaufman/5 itemizes the potential investments and the expected costs. While Jim Bridger can currently burn a limited amount of PRB coal, PacifiCorp has identified potential Bridger Plant additions that may be necessary to burn the plant's full requirements with PRB coal. The potential costs include enhanced rail facilities and minor Jim Bridger unit upgrades.

Staff notes that these are potential investments and may not be necessary. The total capital cost for these items in 2016 dollars is [redacted].

Q. What is the annual incremental cost of making the proposed investments?

A. These modifications are currently planned to be made in 2021 through 2024 and recovered over the life of the plant. Because PacifiCorp intends to recover the capital, Staff proposes that the incremental cost is limited to the revenue requirement associated with the return on the investment. Staff excludes depreciation from an incremental cost because PacifiCorp would recover the capital costs from customers in both scenarios.

The pretax return PacifiCorp uses to model these investments in its long term coal plan is [redacted] percent. The associated revenue requirement is [redacted]

Q. What is the expected MMBtu price differential?

A. The 2017 TAM BCC coal cost is [redacted] per MMBtu. Delivered PRB coal is expected to cost [redacted] per MMBTu in 2017. The 2017 cost of BCC coal is 41 percent more than the 2017 delivered price of PRB coal. The expected price differential is [redacted] per MMBtu.

Q. What are the expected MMBtu volumes?

A. At the current dispatch levels, Jim Bridger is expected to dispatch [redacted] MMBtu. Black Butte is expected to supply [redacted] MMBtus. The

[95] Calculated as [redacted] * [redacted]

remaining [redacted] MMBtus could be purchased from PRB for a total 2017 fuel savings of [redacted]

Q. What would be the incremental costs of stopping BCC coal purchases?

A. There do not appear to be incremental costs associated with stopping BCC coal purchases. The BCC contract has some language identifying monthly shortfall damages. These damages are limited to the labor component of coal costs and do not appear to be relevant to permanent cancelation of the contract.

Q. Would purchasing market coal affect the dispatch of Jim Bridger?

A. Yes. Jim Bridger Plant is not currently optimally dispatched. The coal dispatch price has been artificially modified to fully take both the BCC mine plan's production volumes and the Black Butte minimum take requirements. Optimal dispatch of Jim Bridger at market prices would result in an NPC savings. These savings are not factored into Staff/s calculations.

Q. What are the net 2017 system savings associated with switching to PRB coal?

A. The net 2017 system cost reduction associated with switching to PRB coal is at a minimum [redacted]. This value is a minimum because it does not include the potential NPC savings resulting from dispatching Jim Bridger at the marginal PRB coal cost. Figure 8 below summarizes the calculations for the net 2017 system cost reduction.

[redacted]

Q. What is PRB coal expected to escalate to over the life of Bridger Plant?

A. Coal is expected to escalate to [redacted] per ton in 2036.[96] Rail rates are expected to escalate at a rate of approximately one percent per year to [redacted] per ton by 2036.[97] At the end of Bridger Plant's life, the delivered price of PRB is forecast to be [redacted] per ton.[98] BCC coal in 2036 is expected to be [redacted] per ton.[99] The delivered price of PRB coal is forecasted to be lower than the BCC coal price in every year between now and Jim Bridger Plant's expected retirement date.

PacifiCorp has not prudently evaluated market alternatives to BCC coal

Q. Has the Commission ordered PacifiCorp to evaluate market alternatives to BCC?

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[96] *See* Staff/244 Confidential SNL Coal Forecast.
[97] Based on rail price growth since 2010. *See* Staff/245.
[98] *See* Staff/246 Confidential PRB JB Cost Forecast. Note that this exhibit is calculated using 2014 assumptions. The values are not comparable to the proposed adjustment calculations. The proposed adjustment is based on current data. The 2014 values are used in the long term analysis to reflect data available to the Company at the time that it should have evaluated PRB coal for Jim Bridger.
[99] *See* Staff/227 Kaufman/23.

A. Yes. In PacifiCorp's *2014 Transition Adjustment Mechanism* (Docket No. UE 264) ICNU provides testimony that BCC coal costs are higher than market alternatives. In Order No. 13-387, resolving Docket No. UE 264, the Commission "adopt[ed] the proposal, endorsed by Staff, CUB, and Pacific Power, for the company to prepare a periodic fuel supply plan that compares affiliate mine fuel supply to other alternative fuel supply options, including market alternatives, to facilitate implementing prudence and affiliate transaction standards in future rate proceedings."[100]

Q. Regardless of the Commission's Order, does PacifiCorp have an ongoing obligation to assess market options for BCC?

A. Yes. The Company is obligated to provide service to its customers in a least-cost/least-risk manner. In so doing, the Company should analyze and assess the pricing and flexibility of its coal supply agreements in order to ensure that its customers' rates are fair, just and reasonable.[101]

Q. Have Staff and other parties notified PacifiCorp that market alternatives are potentially less expensive than BCC?

A. Yes. In Docket No. UE 207, Staff proposed a Lower of Cost or Market adjustment for Jim Bridger fuel cost. This adjustment was based on analysis that demonstrated market coal was less expensive than BCC coal.[102] In Docket

[100] *See* Order 13-387 page 7.
[101] *See* ORS 756.040.
[102] *See* Docket UE 207 Staff/100 Brown/3 and Staff/200 Dougherty/4.

No. UE 264, ICNU provided a similar adjustment based on evidence that BCC coal was more expensive than market alternatives.[103]

Q. Has PacifiCorp provided any analysis to support its position that BCC coal is less expensive than PRB coal?

A. No. In Docket No. UE 264, PacifiCorp claimed that BCC has historically been a low cost coal source and that no coal was available to Jim Bridger Plant at a lower cost than BCC in 2014.[104] However, PacifiCorp's testimony does not support this claim with evidence on the cost of purchasing and transporting PRB coal. At the time of filing the UE 264 testimony, PacifiCorp was aware that PRB represented a fueling option for Jim Bridger. This is demonstrated by prior PacifiCorp testimony which evaluates PRB coal as an alternative to BCC coal. In Docket No. UE 216, PacifiCorp provides testimony comparing the cost of BCC coal to the cost of PRB coal and found that PRB coal was more expensive in 2011.

Q. Has PacifiCorp satisfied the Commission Order to periodically evaluate market alternatives to BCC?

A. PacifiCorp has filed a long term fuel supply plan. However this plan does not satisfy Order No. 13-387, which requires PacifiCorp "to prepare a periodic fuel supply plan that compares affiliate mine fuel supply to other alternative fuel supply options, including market alternatives, to facilitate implementing

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[103] *See* Docket UE 264 ICNU/100 Deen/8-10.
[104] *See* Docket UE 264 PAC/600 Crane/10 at lines 13 to 20.

prudence and affiliate transaction standards in future rate proceedings."[105] PacifiCorp submitted a compliance filing with a long term fuel supply plan for Jim Bridger on December 30, 2015. This plan is provided in Staff/215. The plan submitted by PacifiCorp does not adequately evaluate market options, nor does it provide parties with sufficient data to evaluate the prudence of PacifiCorp's ongoing purchase of coal from BCC.

Before PacifiCorp filed its actual long term fuel plan, PacifiCorp filed a compliance plan in Docket No. UE 287.[106] The compliance plan provides a very general framework for evaluating fuel cost. No parties objected to PacifiCorp's compliance plan. Staff has reviewed the compliance plan and attached it as Exhibit Staff/247. Staff continues to have no specific objections to the compliance plan, however a more detailed compliance plan may have helped parties identify many of the shortcomings that appear in PacifiCorp's actual long term fuel supply plan.

Q. Please summarize the long term fuel supply plan for the Jim Bridger Plant.

A. The supply plan focuses on the anticipated 2024 depletion of BCC's underground operations. PacifiCorp explores two alternative responses to the 2024 depletion. Both options purchase BCC coal until 2024. At that time, the underground operations are forecasted to be fully depleted and BCC annual production will drop from 6-8 million tons per year to 2-3 million tons per year.

[105] *In* Docket UE 264 Order 13-387.
[106] *In the Matter of PacifiCorp*, *dba Pacific Power, 2015 Transition Adjustment Mechanism*, Docket UE 287, Direct Testimony of Cindy Crane, Exhibit PAC/201 (April 2014).

The decreased production is assumed to be insufficient to meet Jim Bridger fueling requirements. In both production alternatives, PacifiCorp makes investments at the Jim Bridger Plant to make it capable of receiving and burning PRB coal. At this point, the two alternatives diverge. The base case continues purchasing coal from BCC surface operations until 2036. The base case meets the difference between BCC production and Jim Bridger consumption through PRB purchases. The market case closes BCC mine, incorporates all costs associated with the closure of BCC mine into Jim Bridger Plant fuel costs, and purchases all ongoing Jim Bridger coal requirements from PRB.

PacifiCorp finds the base case to have a lower PVRR than the Market case.

Q. Does the long term plan evaluate market alternatives to BCC?

A. The long term plan only evaluates one alternative coal market, PRB. The plan only evaluates a one point in time adoption of market coal, 2024.

Q. Does the long term plan accurately estimate BCC coal costs?

A. No. As Staff describes above, PacifiCorp is overestimating the rate at which the Jim Bridger Plant dispatches on an ongoing basis. Due to the relationship between BCC production volume and production cost, this means that BCC coal costs are over-estimated.

Q. Does the long term plan accurately estimate PRB coal costs?

A. No. The long term plan overestimates PRB coal. The forecast used in the long term plan is dated May 2014. The SNL coal forecast dated May 2014 has a substantially lower growth rate than the long term plan forecast.

Q. Does the long term plan accurately estimate PRB transportation costs?

A. No. Staff sees two issues with the long term plan's transportation costs. First, the base cost appears unreasonably high. The average cost of transporting PRB coal to market in 2010 was $17.50 per ton. After escalating for rail transportation cost index this is the equivalent of $19.15 per ton in 2015 dollars.[107] The work papers underlying PacifiCorp's long term fuel plan identifies 2015 PRB transportation cost as [redacted] per ton.[108] PacifiCorp estimates PRB coal transportation is [redacted] percent higher than average. However, Jim Bridger is located in Wyoming, the same state as the PRB. Most PRB coal travels outside of Wyoming and has a substantially longer rail route.[109] Because Jim Bridger is substantially closer to the PRB than most plants receiving PRB coal, the transportation cost should be substantially lower than average, not higher than average.

The second issue Staff has regarding the long term plan's estimate of transportation cost has to do with the annual escalation rate. PacifiCorp escalates its 2015 rail transport cost estimate (exclusive of fuel) at a [redacted] percent annual escalation rate. However, the Association of American Railroads "All Inclusive Index Less Fuel" shows a much lower historic trend.

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[107] Rates are escalated by the Association of American Railroads All Inclusive Index Less Fuel. *See* Staff/244. This index was used because the index inclusive of fuel was not publically available. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics provides a railroad diesel fuel index. *See* Staff/248. The BTS index indicates that railroad diesel cost the same in 2010 as in 2015. Because diesel indices are similar Staff finds that the All Inclusive Index Less Fuel is appropriately used to escalate railroad costs from 2010 to 2015. Escalations involving other periods in which fuel prices have changed may not be appropriate however.

[108] This is inclusive of railcar leasing.

[109] *See* Staff/249 Powder River Coal Destinations.

The current rail cost index is growing at a rate of 1.3 percent annually since 2010.[110]

Q. Does the long term plan evaluate the option of switching to market alternatives in the 2017 TAM?

A. No

Q. Does the long term plan evaluate any market alternatives prior to 2024?

A. No

Q. Does the long term plan evaluate Uinta coal?

A. No. Uinta coal is more expensive per MMBtu than PRB coal. However the Uinta basin is closer to Jim Bridger than the PRB and Uinta coal has a much higher heat content per pound, at 11,700 Btu. The higher heat content of Uinta coal means fewer tons shipped and substantial transportation savings relative to PRB. Staff was unable to establish a shipping cost per ton for Uinta coal and the Company has not provided an independent estimate of the delivered cost of Uinta coal to PRB.

Q. Does the long term plan include costs for which PacifiCorp customers are not responsible?

A. Yes. PacifiCorp assumes that BCC closes in 2024 under the market alternative scenario. PacifiCorp also assumes that PacifiCorp customers are responsible for all closure costs and all undepreciated assets. The Affiliated Interest agreement approved by the Commission includes no language

[110] *See* Staff/250 Rail Growth Rate Calculations.

obligating PacifiCorp customers to pay these costs. Further, PacifiCorp has not established that BCC would shut down in the event of transitioning to market. As an affiliate, BCC can independently choose to market its coal to other coal customers. In fact, the Affiliated Interest agreement approved by the Commission includes third party coal sales.

Q. Is the long term plan an adequate attempt to satisfy Order No. 13-387?

A. No. The ICNU testimony in UE 264 and Staff's LCM testimony in UE 207, UE 216, and UE 227 all test the prudence of not purchasing market coal in current TAM year.[111] Order No. 13-387 explicitly identifies that a primary purpose of the long term fuel supply plan is to help parties make such prudence decisions. PacifiCorp's long term fuel plan does not test any market alternatives until 2024, seven years after the relevant TAM year of 2017.

Q. Does the long term plan satisfy PacifiCorp's ongoing obligation to secure fuel in a least cost manner?

A. No. Notwithstanding Order No. 13-387, PacifiCorp has an ongoing obligation to secure fuel in a least cost manner. The long term plan filed by PacifiCorp is a very narrow test of one market alternative in one year. It does not represent the breadth of analysis required to identify the least cost solution to Jim Bridger's fuel requirements. In addition, the long term plan over-estimates the market price and transportation cost of coal while underestimating the cost of BCC coal.

[111] *See* Docket UE 264 ICNU/100 Deen/8-10, Docket UE 207 Staff/400 Dougherty/17, Docket UE 216 Staff/200 Dougherty/2-3, and Docket UE 227 Staff/200 Bahr/2.

Q. How do historic PRB coal costs compare to BCC coal costs?

A. Staff requested historic spot market prices for PRB from PacifiCorp. PacifiCorp declined to respond to this DR.[112] Most sources referred to by PacifiCorp were proprietary and unavailable. This data is available in graphic form from 1980 through 2011 and reproduced in the Figure 9 below.

Figure 9 Historic PRB Coal Costs



Source: Powder River Basin Coal Resource and Cost Study by John T. Boyd Company[113]

[112] *See* Staff/251 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 180 and Staff/242 PacifiCorp Response to OPUC DR 32.
[113] *See* Staff/252 Kaufman/74 Powder River Basin Coal Resource and Cost Study by John T. Boyd Company.

Figure 3 above shows that coal BCC coal costs have increased 200 percent since 2000 while PRB coal costs have increased approximately 100 percent since 2000.

Q. Has PacifiCorp acted in a prudent manner in continuing to receive BCC coal?

A. No. Based on my analysis, PacifiCorp could have saved [redacted] million in present value revenue requirement by switching from BCC coal to PRB coal. This calculation is based on information that was available to PacifiCorp in 2015.

Q. Is your result sensitive to your assumptions regarding Jim Bridger dispatch rates?

A. The finding of imprudence is not sensitive to Jim Bridger dispatch rates. Using the same dispatch and BCC coal cost rates assumed by PacifiCorp in the long term plan is still finding that switching to PRB coal saves [redacted] million in present value revenue requirement.

Q. Please summarize your analysis of Jim Bridger's coal costs.

A. Staff finds that BCC coal currently costs [redacted] percent more per MMBtu than delivered PRB coal and will continue to cost more until 2036 and beyond. PacifiCorp recently secured additional PRB coal and currently receives PRB coal for other facilities. PRB is a viable and available coal source for the Jim Bridger Plant.

PacifiCorp has been repeatedly notified that Jim Bridger coal costs are unacceptably higher than market over an extended time period. The

Commission has ordered PacifiCorp to evaluate market options for the Jim Bridger Plant. PacifiCorp has not complied with the Commission Order or its ongoing obligation to secure coal at least cost. Despite it's high production costs PacifiCorp continues to make investments in an uneconomic affiliate mine.

Neither the Commission nor Staff has ever proposed that BCC is fully regulated. The BCC is an affiliate mine, and as an affiliate it is free to continue operating and providing coal on the general coal market. Customers would experience immediate and ongoing cost savings by purchasing coal from the PRB.

Staff concludes that the Company has acted imprudently because PacifiCorp has not adequately evaluated market opportunities on a timely basis. Had PacifiCorp prudently evaluated market options for fueling the Jim Bridger Plant, PacifiCorp would likely have saved [redacted] million[114] in 2017 and a similar amount in 2016. These savings would continue on an ongoing basis.

Q. What is your proposal for the treatment of Jim Bridger Plant's coal costs?

A. Staff proposes a prudence disallowance of the Jim Bridger Plant coal costs equal to the expected 2017 net savings associated with purchasing PRB coal. Staff's current estimate of these savings is [redacted] million on a system basis.

Q. Is your proposal a lower of cost or market adjustment?

[114] TAM savings plus amount of BCC in base rates less carrying cost of upgrades.

A. No. Under OAR 860-027-0048, regulated utilities are required to reprice services and supplies received from affiliates at the lower of the affiliates cost or the market price. However, Staff is not proposing to reprice Bridger coal at market prices. Staff has proposed a prudence disallowance equal to the amount PacifiCorp would have saved in 2017 if it had prudently evaluated market opportunities, and made any required investments to ship and receive market coal in place of BCC coal.

Q. Is there any other information that may be relevant to the Commission's decision regarding Bridger Coal Company costs?

A. Yes. In the course of this investigation Staff discovered that PacifiCorp did not incorporate the costs associated with the potential depletion of BCC in its most recent two IRPs.[115] However, the 2013 through 2016 business plans all show BCC underground operations being depleted in 2024. Staff anticipates that in its next general rate case PacifiCorp will request that over $400 million be added to rate base related to four Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) investments at the Jim Bridger Plant. Failure to incorporate coal handling facilities, and the marginal economic viability of these investments in the last two IRPs will play a role in the prudence review of these investments.

Staff does not anticipate that any TAM disallowance related to BCC costs will affect the analysis of the Jim Bridger SCR investments in the next rate case. PacifiCorp has committed to the SCR investments, and Staff's analysis of the ongoing viability of BCC is not dependent on the prudence determination of the

[115] *See* Staff/241 Confidential Response to OPUC DR 1.

SCRs. However, the Commission should be aware that there may be a relationship between the two issues.

Q. Does this conclude your opening testimony?

A. Yes.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 201

Witness Qualifications Statement

July 8, 2016

WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT

NAME:	Lance Kaufman
EMPLOYER:	Public Utility Commission of Oregon
TITLE:	Senior Economist Energy Rates, Finance and Audit Division
ADDRESS:	201 High Street SE. Suite 100 Salem, OR. 9730
EDUCATION:	In 2013 I received a Doctorate degree in economics from the University of Oregon. In 2008 I received a Master of Science degree in Economics from the University of Oregon. In 2004 I received a Bachelor of Business Administration in Economics from the University of Alaska Anchorage.
EXPERIENCE:	From March of 2013 to September of 2014 and from September of 2015 to the present I have been employed by the Oregon Public Utility Commission (OPCU). My current responsibilities include analysis of power costs, cost allocations, decoupling mechanisms, and sales forecasts. I have worked on power costs in the following OPUC dockets: IPC UE 301, IPC UE 305, PAC UE 307, and PGE UE 308. From September 2014 to September 2015 I was employed by Regulatory Affairs Public Advocacy group of the Alaska Department of Law. From 2008 to 2012 I was employed by the University of Oregon as an instructor. I taught undergraduate level courses in Microeconomics, Urban Economics, and Public Economics.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 202

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

OPUC Data Request 16

Please refer to the work paper provided with the opening testimony of Brian Dickman titled "ORTAM17w_DA-RT Price Adder CONF.xlsx" sheet "Adders" cell C250. Please provide the rational for the weighting formula in this cell.

Response to OPUC Data Request 16

The purpose of the formula in the file entitled "ORTAM17w_DA-RT Price Adder CONF.xlsx," the work sheet entitled "Adders" cell C25 is to ensure that the buy price adder is always greater or equal to the sell price adder.

If the adders resulted in a buy price that was lower than the sell price in that same market at the same time, the Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision Tool (GRID) will enter an essentially unlimited loop of making purchases and sales at the same market to take advantage of the differential between the two prices. The historical results demonstrate that volume associated with such periods is limited, so the results would be unrealistic. Using a weighted average of the purchase volumes and sales volumes creates a single adder which is reflective of the historical day-ahead and real-time price impact of both purchases and sales and which does not result in unlimited volumes from GRID.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 203

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

OPUC Data Request 71

Please provide GRID model results comparable to "_ORTAM17 NPC Study_2016 03 18 CONF.xlsm" with all inputs and assumptions the same, but using only a single year of data to calculate forced outage rather than four years. Such calculations should include the caps and collars identified in PAC/100, Dickman/24:8-10. Such calculations should exclude the compression of outage events described in PAC/100, Dickman/24:11-16. Please provide four separate models using the following time periods for actual forced outage data:

(a) Actual forced outage rate from July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012;

(b) Actual forced outage rate from July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013;

(c) Actual forced outage rate from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014;

(d) Actual forced outage rate from July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2015;

Response to OPUC Data Request 71

The Company objects to this request as unduly burdensome, overly broad, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Company responds as follows:

(a) Please refer to Confidential Attachment OPUC 71 -1. Note: the Company has not recalculated coal costs to account for the volume changes in the results. The results also do not reflect the Company's "screening" process, which optimizes start-up and shut-down of gas-fired resources. For calculations of the revised Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision Tool (GRID) inputs, please refer to Confidential Attachment OPUC 71 -2 through Confidential Attachment OPUC 71 -4.

(b) The Company has not yet performed the requested analysis and will supplement this response when it is completed. Instructions concerning the steps necessary to complete the analysis are contained in the first tab of Confidential Attachment OPUC 71 -2.

(c) The Company has not yet performed the requested analysis and will supplement this response when it is completed. Instructions concerning the steps necessary to complete the analysis are contained in the first tab of Confidential Attachment OPUC 71 -2.

(d) The Company has not yet performed the requested analysis and will supplement this response when it is completed. Instructions concerning the steps necessary to complete the analysis are contained in the first tab of Confidential Attachment OPUC 71 -2.

The confidential attachments are designated as Protected Information under Order No. 16-128 and may only be disclosed to qualified persons as defined in that order.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 204

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

OPUC Data Request 70

Please refer to PAC/100, Dickman/24:8-16. Were the caps and collars applied before or after "each event in the four-year history was divided by four?"

Response to OPUC Data Request 70

The caps were applied before each event in the four-year history was divided by four. Please refer to TAM Support Set 2, specifically rows 3996, 4791, and 4834 of tab "Event Data" in the file entitled "ORTAM17w_Forced Outage Shaping CONF.xlsm".

The collars are applied after each event in the four-year history was divided by four. The 48-month average outage rate, after applying the collars, is an input to the shaping calculation (cell AG10 on each unit's calculation). The rounding of all event lengths is adjusted up or down so that the forecasted hourly outage shape (cell AG11 on each unit's calculation) produces an outage rate that matches 48-month average after applying the collars.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 205

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Staff/205
Kaufman/1

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FILED
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF WYOMING

DEC 19 2014

Stephan Harris, Clerk
Cheyenne

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. PACIFICORP ENERGY, a division of PACIFICORP Defendant.	CR 14- CR-301-R NON-PUBLIC DOCUMENT

Plea Agreement

Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States Department of Justice, by and through the United States Attorney for the District of Wyoming and the Environmental Crimes Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division (hereinafter "the Department" or "the government"), and the Defendant PACIFICORP ENERGY, a division of PacifiCorp (hereinafter "the Defendant"), by and through its undersigned representatives, and pursuant to the authority of Defendant's Board of Directors, enter into this Stipulated Plea Agreement ("Agreement"). The terms of the Agreement are as follows:

1. The Defendant is charged in the District of Wyoming by Information with two Class "B" Misdemeanor violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a).

2. The Defendant's representative and counsel have read the charges against the Defendant and understand the nature and elements of the crimes with which the Defendant has been charged.

3. The Defendant will enter voluntary pleas of guilty to the charges in the Information in this case.

4. *Nature of the Agreement*: The parties agree that this Plea Agreement shall be filed and become a part of the record in this case, and will be governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). The Defendant understands that if the Agreement is accepted by the Court, it will not have an automatic right to withdraw its plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(A). This Plea Agreement binds the Department and the Defendant. During the term of probation, the Defendant shall provide the court with notice of any corporate name change or any other change in corporate structure or governance that would materially affect this Plea

Agreement and/or the Migratory Bird Compliance Plan ("MBCP"), discussed herein, within thirty days of such change. No change in name, business reorganization, merger, change of legal status, or similar action or event shall alter the Defendant's responsibilities under this Plea Agreement. The Defendant agrees that it shall not knowingly engage in any action to seek to avoid the obligations and conditions set forth in this Plea Agreement.

5. *Effect of Withdrawal from the Agreement:* The parties stipulate and agree that if the Defendant moves to withdraw its guilty plea, entered pursuant to and receiving the benefits of this Agreement, and if it successfully withdraws its plea either in the district court or on appeal, that this Agreement will become null and void. Moreover, if the Defendant at any time after judgment is entered obtains dismissal, reversal, or remand of the count(s) of conviction for any reason, the government will be permitted to restore all charges not filed pursuant to this Plea Agreement. The Defendant, in that circumstance, expressly waives any claim of double jeopardy or right to have this Agreement enforced. In such event, the Defendant waives any objections, motions, or defenses based upon the Statute of Limitations, the Speedy Trial Act, or any other potential restriction on the re-institution of counts dismissed, or institution of counts surrendered, as part of the consideration given by the government in this Agreement.

6. *Admission of Guilt:* The Defendant will plead guilty to the Information because it is in fact guilty of the charges contained in the Information. In pleading guilty, Defendant agrees and stipulates to the facts set forth in the Statement of Facts (Attachment A). Defendant agrees that, if this matter were to proceed to trial, the government would prove beyond a reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts set forth in Attachment A and as set forth in the criminal Information filed in this case.

7. *Maximum Punishment Provided by Law:* The Defendant has been advised of and understands the maximum potential punishment provided by law:

Counts One and Two each allege a Class "B" Misdemeanor, in violation of the MBTA, carrying a maximum penalty for an organizational defendant of a fine of not more than $15,000 (per 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)), or twice the gross gain or loss resulting from the unlawful conduct pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d); five years of probation (per 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(2)); and a special assessment of $50 (per 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(1)(B)(ii)).

Additionally, the Court could impose additional conditions of probation to include the payment of community service or restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b), and a conviction could result in additional administrative sanctions such as suspension, debarment, and listing to restrict rights and opportunities of the defendant to contract with or receive benefits, loans, or assistance from agencies of the United States.

8. *Elements of the Charges:*

The MBTA provides, in relevant part, that, unless and except as permitted by regulation, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, or attempt to take, capture, or kill any migratory bird. 16 U.S.C. § 703. Each bird listed in the Information is a "migratory bird" as that term is defined in the MBTA. See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13.

9. The Defendant has been advised of the nature of the charges made against it and the elements of the crimes to which it is entering a guilty plea. The Defendant understands that if the case were to go to trial the government would be required to prove each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant further acknowledges that these are the elements of the crimes charged in the Information:

(a) On or about the date(s) set forth in the Information, within the District of Wyoming, the Defendant, through a person or entity acting on its behalf, did take ("kill") approximately 336 "migratory birds," as that term is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12, and as listed in 50 C.F.R. § 10.13, including at least 38 golden eagles, as well as other raptors, and passerine species such as larks, buntings and sparrows, at its Seven Mile Hill wind facility in Carbon County and its Glenrock/Rolling Hills wind facility in Converse County.

(b) The taking was unlawful, in that neither the Defendant nor the person or entity acting on its behalf obtained a permit or other valid authorization to take the migratory birds listed in the charge.

10. The Defendant understands that by entering the guilty pleas, the government will not be required to present proof of its guilt and the elements recited herein because there will be no trial if the Court accepts its pleas of guilty and the Plea Agreement of the parties.

11. *Recitation of Rights:*

(a) The government has the right in a prosecution for perjury or false statement to use any statement made under oath by any representative of the Defendant during the entry of pleas in this case.

(b) If the Defendant persisted in a plea of not guilty to the charges against it, it would have the right to a public and speedy trial in the United States District Court.

(c) The jury would find the facts and determine, after hearing all the evidence, whether or not it was persuaded of the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(d) The Defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at trial and every other stage of these proceedings.

(e) At a trial the government would be required to present its witnesses and other evidence against the Defendant. The Defendant would be able to confront those government witnesses and its attorney would be able to cross-examine them. In turn, the Defendant could present witnesses and other evidence in its own behalf. If the witnesses for the Defendant would not appear voluntarily, it could require their attendance through the subpoena power of the court.

(f) If convicted, and within ten days of the entry of the Judgment and Commitment, the Defendant would have the right to appeal its conviction to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review to determine if any errors were made which would entitle it to reversal of conviction.

12. *Waiver of Rights by Plea:* The Defendant understands that by pleading guilty pursuant to this Agreement it is waiving all the rights set forth in paragraph 11. The Defendant's attorney and corporate representative understand those rights and the consequences of its waiver of those rights.

13. *Corporate Authorization:* Prior to entry of plea, the Defendant will provide to the Court and the Department a corporate resolution of the Defendant's Board of Directors authorizing the entry of plea and compliance with all provisions of this Plea Agreement, and that the Defendant's designated officer is authorized to appear on behalf of the Defendant to enter the guilty pleas in the District of Wyoming and appear for imposition of the sentence.

14. The parties acknowledge that, inasmuch as the violations to which the Defendant will plead guilty are Class B misdemeanors, the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do not apply. USSG §1B1.9. The parties stipulate and agree to a sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) as follows:

15. (a) The parties stipulate and agree to a fine of $200,000 for each Count in this case—for a total fine amount of $400,000. In order to resolve this matter expeditiously, the parties have not attempted to calculate the precise amount of gain accrued to the Defendant by the operation of the two wind facilities described in the Information or specific turbines that have unlawfully killed birds. Instead, the parties stipulate that the proposed fine amount is less than twice the "gross gain" realized by the Defendant as the result of the criminal conduct in this case. The parties agree that the $400,000 fine imposed is properly directed to the North American Wetlands Conservation Fund for wetlands conservation work in Wyoming, as specifically provided in the North American Wetlands Conservation Act. 16 U.S.C. § 4406(b).[1]

(b) The parties stipulate and agree that the Defendant shall be sentenced to a term of sixty months' probation with the following specific conditions imposed. Specifically, the parties stipulate and agree:

(i) The Defendant will implement a Migratory Bird Compliance Plan ("MBCP" – Attachment B hereto), developed with the assistance of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") and the Department. The purpose of the MBCP is to (1) avoid and minimize golden eagle and other avian mortalities at the Defendant's four wholly-owned wind facilities in Wyoming— Seven Mile Hill, Glenrock/Rolling Hills, Dunlap, and High Plains/McFadden Ridge. As noted therein, the parties agree that the Defendant shall not be required to spend more than $600,000 annually to implement the MBCP, recognizing that

[1] "The sums received under Section 707 of this title [MBTA] as penalties or fines, or from forfeitures of property are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of the Interior for purposes of allocation under section 4407 of this title [NAWCA Allocations Section]."

actual costs may vary from year to year based on advances in science and technology and the specific measures implemented during the term of the MBCP.

(ii). The Defendant, USFWS, and the Department will meet at least once every six months during the first two years of the probationary period, and once every twelve months thereafter, during probation, to discuss the Defendant's progress in implementing the MBCP, and to address any issues or mutually agreed amendments necessary to ensure its effectiveness. Every twelve months during the probationary period, the Defendant shall report in writing to the Court, the USFWS, and the Department concerning the progress it has made implementing the MBCP.

(iii). The Defendant will make restitution to the state of Wyoming by depositing $200,000 within the first six months of probation, in a fund or account as directed by the Wyoming Game & Fish Department, of which $100,000 will be used by the agency solely for responding to incidents involving federally protected wildlife or birds:

(iv). The Defendant will perform community service by making a $ 1,900,000 payment within the first six months of probation to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, a private, non-profit, § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, established by Congress in 1984 and dedicated to the conservation of fish, wildlife and plants and the habitat on which they depend. The funds will be directed to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation with the proviso that they be used in projects designed to conserve populations of golden eagles that utilize the areas in which the Defendant's Wyoming wind facilities are located, increase understanding of ways to minimize and monitor interactions between golden eagles and commercial wind power facilities, and rescue/rehabilitate golden eagles and other raptors found injured at or near wind facilities. The Defendant will not claim this payment or any other community service or restitution amount herein as a tax deduction or characterize it in any manner or forum as a donation or contribution.

16. *Non-Prosecution:* The purpose of the MBCP is to provide a collaborative framework for the Defendant's implementation of measures that will ensure compliance with the requirements of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA") and the Bald and Golden Eagle Act ("Eagle Act") during the term of the MBCP. Although the purpose of the MBCP is to minimize and mitigate future unpermitted bird mortalities at the Defendant's Wyoming wind facilities referenced in the MBCP, the parties acknowledge that some birds, including eagles, may be killed at the Defendant's wind facilities referenced in the MBCP despite conscientious implementation of the MBCP. As part of this Plea Agreement and in consideration of the Defendant's plea of guilty to Counts One and Two of the Information, the Defendant's promises and commitments in this Plea Agreement, and the Defendant's compliance with both this Agreement and the MBCP, the government agrees to forego additional criminal prosecution of the Defendant in the District of Wyoming for any other criminal offenses involving the unlawful taking of migratory birds, including eagles, at and by its currently operating Wyoming wind facilities which: (a) occurred before the date of this Plea Agreement; (b) are known to the government at the time of the signing of this Plea Agreement; and (c) are not presently the subject of negotiation or litigation between the Defendant or its subsidiaries, agents, or employees, and the government. The government further agrees not to prosecute the Defendant under the MBTA or the Eagle Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d) for unpermitted takings of migratory birds or other avian wildlife at and by its currently-operating Wyoming wind facilities that occur after the date of this Plea Agreement, provided the Defendant remains in compliance with the MBCP and other terms of this Agreement. This Plea Agreement applies

only to violations of the MBTA committed by the Defendant at its four Wyoming wind facilities described herein and has no effect on any proceedings against any entity or individual not expressly mentioned herein, including the actual or potential criminal liability of any individuals. The government has informed the Defendant, however, that it does not intend to prosecute any individuals employed by it for any conduct described herein, or related hereto, unless it obtains new and material incriminating information not presently known to the government. On a schedule to be determined by the parties within six months of sentencing, the Defendant will apply for, and diligently pursue, Programmatic Eagle Take Permit(s) ("ETPs") for the Wyoming wind facilities referenced in the MBCP. Given the complex scientific and regulatory nature of this recently-established ETP program, the parties expect the application process will be lengthy. Therefore, the government will extend its "non-prosecution" agreement under the Eagle Act and the MBTA beyond the probationary period, provided that Defendant continues to implement the MBCP and diligently pursue the ETPs in good faith, until the earlier of the following two events: 1) the Defendant has either obtained ETPs for the Wyoming wind facilities, referenced in the MBCP, that have taken eagles and any appeals of such permits have been resolved, or 2) ten years from the date of sentencing by the Court. The MBCP will terminate at each of Defendant's four Wyoming wind facilities referenced in the MBCP upon the issuance of a final ETP for that facility or upon termination of the non-prosecution period, whichever is earlier. The Defendant understands and agrees that neither this paragraph nor this Plea Agreement limits the prosecuting authority of any federal, state or local regulatory or prosecuting entity, other than the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Wyoming and the Environmental Crimes Section or their successor agency or department. Furthermore, this Plea Agreement does not provide or promise any waiver of any civil or administrative actions, sanctions, or penalties that may apply, including but not limited to: fines, penalties, claims for damages to natural resources, suspension, debarment, listing to restrict rights and opportunities of Defendant to contract with or receive assistance, loans, and benefits from U.S. agencies, licensing, injunctive relief, or remedial action to comply with any applicable regulatory requirement.

17. *Appeal Waiver:* The Defendant knowingly and voluntarily, after consultation with counsel, waives the right to appeal the conviction and sentence that is received as a result of this Plea Agreement.

18. *Voluntary Plea:* The Defendant's attorney acknowledges that no threats, promises, or representations have been made, nor agreements reached, other than those set forth in this Agreement to induce the Defendant to plead guilty.

19. *Special Assessment/Financial Obligations:* The Defendant recognizes that it will be responsible for a mandatory assessment of $50 on each count of the Information, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. The Defendant understands and agrees that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3613, the monetary penalties in this Agreement imposed by the Court will be due and payable as stipulated in this Agreement and subject to immediate enforcement by the United States. If the Court imposes a schedule of payments, the Defendant understands that the schedule of payments is merely a minimum schedule of payments and not the only method, nor a limitation on the methods available to the United States to enforce the judgment.

20. *Entire Agreement:* Any statements or representations made by the United States, the Defendant, or its counsel prior to the full execution of this Plea Agreement are superseded by this Plea Agreement. No promises or representations have been made by the United States

or the Defendant except as set forth in writing in this Plea Agreement. This Plea Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties. Any term or condition which is not expressly stated as part of this Plea Agreement is not to be considered part of the agreement.

CHRISTOPHER A. CROFTS
United States Attorney
Attorney for the Government

JASON M. CONDER
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorney for the Government

ROBERT S. ANDERSON
Senior Counsel
Environmental Crimes Section
Attorney for the Government

I am the authorized corporate representative of Defendant. I have read this Plea Agreement and every part of it has been carefully reviewed with responsible management and officers of Defendant and its counsel, David Freudenthal. I understand the terms of this Plea Agreement and Defendant voluntarily agrees to those terms. Defendant understands its rights, possible defenses, and the consequences of entering into this Plea Agreement. No promises or inducements have been made to Defendant or to me other than those contained in this Plea Agreement. No one has threatened or forced Defendant in any way to enter into this Plea Agreement. Defendant is satisfied with its representation and counsel by David Freudenthal in this matter.

Date: 12-19-14 BY: ______________________
Micheal G. Dunn
President and CEO
PacifiCorp Energy, a division of
PacifiCorp

I am Defendant's attorney. I have carefully discussed this Plea Agreement with the authorized representative(s) of Defendant. I have fully advised Defendant of the corporation's rights, possible defenses, and the consequences of entering into this Plea Agreement. I believe the decision of Defendant to enter into this Plea Agreement is informed and voluntary.

Date: 12/19/14 BY: ______________________
David Freudenthal,
Crowell and Moring, LLP

ATTACHMENT A

JOINT STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Joint Statement of Facts is incorporated by reference as part of the Plea Agreement between the Defendant PACIFICORP ENERGY, a division of PacifiCorp (hereinafter "the Defendant"), and the United States Attorney for the District of Wyoming and the Environment and Natural Resources Division, Environmental Crimes Section (together, the "Department" or the "government"). The parties stipulate that the following information is true and accurate to the best of their knowledge. Defendant admits, accepts, and acknowledges that it is responsible for the acts and omissions of its officers, directors, employees, and agents as set forth below. If this matter were to proceed to trial, the Department would prove beyond a reasonable doubt, by admissible evidence, the facts alleged below and set forth in the criminal Information attached to this Agreement. This evidence would establish the following:

I. Background

A. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA") provides for a Class B misdemeanor penalty for unpermitted takings of migratory birds. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707. "Take" means "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" or to attempt to do so. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12. "Kill" is not further defined. A list of bird species protected by the MBTA, including passerines, waterfowl, raptors (including golden eagles), and shorebirds, is found at 50 C.F.R. § 10.13. Criminal liability of corporations for violating the MBTA has been upheld in the Tenth Circuit. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Apollo Energies*, 611 F.3d 679, 683 (10th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc.*, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Colo. 1999).

B. Golden eagles are not listed as threatened or endangered under U.S. law. However, they are one of many species protected by the MBTA, and are more specifically protected under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (hereinafter "the Eagle Act"), which provides a Class A misdemeanor penalty for the first offense of taking a bald or golden eagle knowingly, or with wanton disregard for the consequences of an act. Second and subsequent violations are Class E felonies.

C. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") is the agency tasked with enforcing and implementing the MBTA and Eagle Act. There is currently no means or mechanism to acquire a programmatic permit to take a non-eagle migratory bird by operation of an industrial facility such as a wind project. However, as set forth in the USFWS's 2003 Interim Guidance on Avoiding and Minimizing Impacts from Wind Turbines, and its replacement, the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, the USFWS Office of Law Enforcement focuses its resources on investigating and prosecuting those who take migratory birds without identifying and implementing reasonable and effective measures to avoid take, exercising enforcement and prosecutorial discretion regarding individuals and companies that make good-faith efforts to avoid the take of migratory birds. In 2009, following "delisting" of the bald eagle under the Endangered Species Act, the USFWS enacted the "Eagle Permit Rule" to allow issuance of programmatic (ongoing) and individual (one-time) permits for the non-purposeful take of bald and golden eagles. Between 2011 and 2013, the USFWS developed guidance on development of eagle conservation plans which are a precursor to applying for a programmatic take permit of eagles at commercial wind projects.

D. Counts One and Two of the Information each charge a violation of the MBTA's Class B misdemeanor "take" prohibition. The government has exercised its discretion to charge this case under the MBTA, rather than the Eagle Act, for reasons stated below.

II. Defendant's Development Of, and Avian Takings At, the Seven Mile Hill Wind Facility

A. Between 2007 and December 2008, Defendant developed a multi-project commercial facility in Carbon County, Wyoming, called the Seven Mile Hill wind powered energy facility (hereinafter "Seven Mile Hill"). The facility, sited primarily on private land used for cattle grazing, eventually comprised seventy-nine (79) 1.5 megawatt wind turbines. Development of Seven Mile Hill required no federal permitting by the USFWS, but was authorized by the Wyoming Industrial Siting Council and was issued a road-access "Right of Way" grant from the Bureau of Land Management. As is common during the development process for commercial wind projects, Defendant hired consultants to evaluate use of the site by wildlife, including birds, and determine the expected impact on such wildlife from the facility. The consultants advised Defendant that, in addition to big game and other wildlife protected by state law, golden eagles and other species of raptors and migratory birds protected under federal law were observed in the project area and some were likely to be killed by collision with the wind turbines.

B. As part of its Wyoming Industrial Siting Council permit application, Defendant evaluated raptor usage in the project area, and the company developed raptor mortality estimates. The USFWS did not have the opportunity to review the avian use studies, mortality estimates, or turbine siting plan for Seven Mile Hill prior to the date when it became operational, and did not authorize any take of federally-protected avian species at the facility. The government contends the Seven Mile Hill Project was constructed contrary to relevant agency guidance regarding avoiding and minimizing avian take by wind facilities in effect during the period.

C. Consistent with the Wyoming state industrial siting permit, Defendant conducted three years of fatality monitoring at Seven Mile Hill after construction, which consisted of periodically searching for avian carcasses in the areas surrounding a portion of the turbines and meteorological towers. Defendant reported the findings to a technical advisory committee which consisted of representatives from the USFWS, Western EcoSystems Technology, Inc., Wyoming Game & Fish, and the Medicine Bow Conservation District. Between May 2009 and the date of these pleadings, the carcasses of 15 golden eagles, along with 56 additional non-eagle migratory birds (including raptors, larks, sparrows, and others, as described in the Information), were found at the facility. The eagle carcasses were sent to the USFWS National Forensics Laboratory in Ashland, Oregon, for forensic necropsy. Of those which were fresh enough and complete enough to analyze, several were determined to have been killed by blunt force-trauma consistent with turbine blade collision.

D. Defendant responded to the avian mortalities at Seven Mile Hill by developing a Bird and Bat Conservation Strategy ("BBCS") for the facility, as recommended in the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, that includes additional eagle nesting/use studies, as well as a series of measures aimed at reducing the collision risk to eagles, including observer-based turbine curtailment (shut down), removal of carrion, and the testing of a system designed to detect and deter eagles and other large raptors from flying near turbines. Defendant will apply for a Programmatic Eagle Take Permit for Seven Mile Hill, pursuant to the Migratory Bird Compliance Plan that is Attachment B hereto.

III. Defendant's Development Of, and Avian Takings At, the Glenrock/Rolling Hills Wind Facility

A. Between 2006 and December 2008, Defendant developed a multi-project commercial facility called the Glenrock/Rolling Hills wind powered energy facility (hereinafter "GRH") on lands that included the former Dave Johnston Coal Mine owned by the Defendant in Converse County, Wyoming. The mine ceased commercial operation in the early 1980s. As part of mine reclamation efforts, the USFWS required Defendant to construct two artificial eagle nest platforms at the site. Defendant voluntarily erected seven platforms, and other perching structures. Reclamation succeeded: by 2006 the site had nests being used by raptors, including golden eagles.

B. As it did for Seven Mile Hill, Defendant hired consultants to evaluate use of GRH by wildlife, including birds, and determine the expected impact on such wildlife from the project. Similar to Seven Mile Hill, the consultants advised Defendant that, in addition to big game and other wildlife protected by state law, golden eagles and other species of raptors and migratory birds protected under federal law were observed in the project area and some were likely to be killed by collision with wind turbines. As part of its Wyoming Industrial Siting Council permit application, Defendant evaluated raptor usage in the project area, and the Defendant developed raptor mortality estimates.

C. Defendant sought and obtained from the USFWS a permit to relocate three artificial golden eagle nest platforms within the GRH footprint that the company had constructed during mine reclamation. However, the USFWS did not have the opportunity to review the avian use studies, mortality estimates, or turbine siting plan for GRH prior to the date when it became operational, and did not authorize any take of federally-protected avian species at the facility. The government contends the GRH Project was constructed contrary to relevant agency guidance regarding avoiding and minimizing avian take by wind facilities in effect during the period.

D. GRH became operational in late 2008 and early 2009, and consisted of one hundred fifty-eight (158) 1.5 megawatt turbines with a total capacity of 237 megawatts. Consistent with the Wyoming state industrial siting permit, Defendant conducted three years of fatality monitoring at the GRH project after construction, which consisted of periodically searching for avian carcasses in the areas surrounding a portion of the turbines and meteorological towers. Defendant reported the findings to a technical advisory committee consisting of the USFWS, Western EcoSystems Technology, Inc., and Wyoming Game and Fish. Between August 2009 and the date of these pleadings, the carcasses of 23 golden eagles, along with 242 additional non-eagle migratory bird carcasses (including raptors, larks, sparrows, and others, as described in the Information), were found at the GRH project. The eagle carcasses were sent to the USFWS National Forensics Laboratory in Ashland, Oregon, for forensic necropsy. Of those which were fresh enough and complete enough to analyze, more than a dozen were determined to have been killed by blunt-force trauma consistent with turbine blade collision.

E. Defendant responded to the avian mortalities at GRH by developing a BBCS for GRH, as recommended in the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, that includes additional eagle nesting/use studies and mitigation measures aimed at reducing the collision risk to eagles, including observer-based turbine curtailment (shut down), and removal of carrion and prey habitat. Defendant will apply for a Programmatic Eagle Take Permit for GRH, pursuant to the Migratory Bird Compliance Plan that is Attachment B hereto.

IV. Defendant's Other Wyoming Wind Facilities

A. In addition to the Seven Mile Hill and GRH facilities, Defendant owns and operates two other wind power facilities in Wyoming called "Dunlap" and "High Plains/McFadden Ridge."

B. The Dunlap facility is located in Carbon County, Wyoming. It consists of seventy-four (74) wind turbines having a capacity of 111.0 megawatts. Defendant commenced commercial operations at Dunlap in October 2010. Consistent with its state siting permit, Defendant conducted three years of post-construction monitoring and reporting at Dunlap in a manner similar to the monitoring and reporting described above. The company reported finding five dead golden eagles and one dead bald eagle at Dunlap (including one eagle carcass discovered prior to commercial operation), along with 83 other non-eagle migratory birds, between April 2010 and the date of these pleadings. It shared these monitoring results with the USFWS. Defendant developed a draft BBCS for this facility, as recommended in the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, and will apply for a Programmatic Eagle Take Permit for Dunlap, pursuant to the Migratory Bird Compliance Plan that is Attachment B hereto.

C. High Plains/McFadden Ridge is located in Carbon and Albany Counties, Wyoming. It consists of eighty-five (85) wind turbines having a capacity of 127.5 megawatts. Defendant commenced commercial operations at High Plains/McFadden Ridge in September 2009. Pursuant to its state siting permit, Defendant conducted three years of post-construction monitoring and reporting at High Plains/McFadden Ridge in a manner similar to the monitoring and reporting described above. The company reported finding four dead golden eagles and two dead bald eagles, along with 84 other non-eagle migratory birds, at the facility between October 2009 and the date of these pleadings. It shared these monitoring results with the USFWS. Defendant developed and implemented a BBCS for this facility, as recommended in the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines, and will apply for a Programmatic Eagle Take Permit for High Plains/McFadden Ridge, pursuant to the Migratory Bird Compliance Plan that is Attachment B hereto.

V. Conclusion

A. The parties agree that the evidence described herein indicates that Defendant's unpermitted takings of eagles and other migratory birds at its Seven Mile Hill and GRH wind facilities were in violation of the MBTA and arguably could be charged under the Eagle Act. However, the Department has exercised its discretion to enter into this plea agreement and charge Defendant with two misdemeanor violations of the MBTA due to Defendant's development of BBCSs for the four Wyoming wind facilities referenced in the Migratory Bird Compliance Plan, the company's cooperation during the investigation of this case, the company's willingness to acknowledge the facts contained herein and enter into the Plea Agreement, the company's voluntary and timely reporting of unpermitted avian takes, and the company's significant efforts to minimize and mitigate for past and future takes of eagles and other migratory birds at its wind power facilities in Wyoming. But for such cooperation, the government would seek additional charges, substantially greater fine amounts, and additional sanctions.

B. The Department and the USFWS believe, based on interactions with Defendant's counsel and management in the past eighteen months, and the facts discussed herein, that Defendant has taken measures to protect migratory birds and safeguard public wildlife resources in the operation of its wind projects in Wyoming.

ATTACHMENT B

MIGRATORY BIRD COMPLIANCE PLAN ("MBCP")

INTRODUCTION

1. This MBCP is an element of the Plea Agreement in this case and has been developed by the defendant, PacifiCorp, an Oregon Corporation ("PacifiCorp"), the United States Department of Justice ("Department") and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS"). PacifiCorp, the Department and the USFWS are individually referred to in this MBCP as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties." The purpose of this MBCP is to provide a collaborative framework for PacifiCorp's implementation of measures that will ensure compliance with the requirements of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA") and the Bald and Golden Eagle Act ("BGEPA") during the term of the MBCP.

2. The Department is aware that during the past twenty-four (24) months, PacifiCorp has been voluntarily implementing many of the measures described herein to avoid and minimize the unpermitted take of eagles and other migratory birds at its Seven Mile Hill ("SMH"), Glenrock/Rolling Hills ("GRH"), Dunlap and High Plains/McFadden Ridge ("HP/MR") wind sites in Wyoming (individually a "Wind Site" and collectively the "Wind Sites").

3. Avoidance, minimization and mitigation strategies aimed at protecting avian wildlife at commercial wind projects have been developed by the USFWS and industry at the national and regional level in documents including the 2003 Service Interim Guidance on Avoiding and Minimizing Wildlife Impacts from Wind Turbines, the 2009 Eagle Rule published by the USFWS on September 11, 2009, under BGEPA ("Eagle Rule"), the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines ("2012 LBWEG"), and the 2013 Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance Module 1 – Land-Based Wind Energy Version 2 ("2013 ECPG") and the 2013 USFWS Region 6 Recommendations for Avoidance and Minimization of Impacts to Golden Eagles at Wind Energy Facilities and Guidance on Outlines and Components of Eagle Conservation Plans ("ECPs") and Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies. These documents contemplate compliance measures for commercial wind facilities that are in the development stage as well as projects, like the Wind Sites in this case, which became operational prior to development of some of the relevant guidance. The enforceability and effect of these documents, as well as any other relevant guidance, policy, regulations or recommendations developed by USFWS during the term of the MBCP, are neither diminished nor enhanced by their reference herein.

4. As described in the 2013 ECPG, Advanced Conservation Practices ("ACPs") are scientifically-supportable measures approved by the USFWS that represent the best available techniques to reduce eagle disturbance and ongoing mortalities to a level where remaining take is unavoidable (50 CFR 22.3). Because the best information currently available indicates there are no conservation measures that have been scientifically shown to reduce eagle disturbance and blade-strike mortality at wind projects, the USFWS has not currently approved any ACPs for wind energy projects. All ACPs are currently considered by the USFWS to be "experimental."

5. As described in the 2012 LBWEG, the USFWS has recommended that developers prepare written records of their actions to avoid, minimize and compensate for potential adverse impacts. In the past, the USFWS has referred to these as Avian and Bat Protection Plans (ABPP). However, ABPPs have more recently been used for transmission projects and less for other types of development. For this reason the USFWS has introduced a distinct concept for wind energy projects called Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies ("BBCS"). A developer may prepare a BBCS in stages, over time, as analysis and studies are undertaken for each tier of the 2012 LBWEG. Each BBCS is unique for each wind energy project and subject to periodic amendment as knowledge about the project's impact on avian wildlife and the efficacy of minimization measures evolves over time.

6. Under the Eagle Rule, the USFWS can issue permits that authorize individual instances of take of bald and golden eagles when the take is associated with, but not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity, and cannot practicably be avoided. The regulations also authorize permits for "programmatic" take, which means that instances of "take" may not be isolated, but may recur. The programmatic take permits are the most germane permits for wind energy facilities. (2013 ECPG Exec. Summary, Chapter 4)

7. Where wind energy facilities cannot avoid taking eagles and eagle populations are not healthy enough to sustain additional mortality, Eagle Take Permit ("ETP") applicants must reduce the unavoidable mortality to a no net-loss standard for the duration of the permitted activity. No net-loss means that these actions either reduce another ongoing form of mortality to a level equal to or greater than the unavoidable mortality, or lead to an increase in carrying capacity that allows the eagle population to grow by an equal or greater amount. Actions to reduce eagle mortality or increase carrying capacity to this no net-loss standard are known as "compensatory mitigation" in the 2013 ECPG. Examples of compensatory mitigation activities might include retrofitting power lines to reduce eagle electrocutions, removing road-killed animals along roads where vehicles hit and kill scavenging eagles, or increasing prey availability. (2013 ECPG, Exec. Summary, Chapter 8)

IMPLEMENTATION

1. The Parties agree that the foundation of effectively minimizing take of eagles and other migratory birds at an operating wind project is scientifically-based avian use studies and fatality monitoring, along with data concerning historical take of eagles and other birds at the projects, which provide the data needed to understand the nature of the risk posed to avian wildlife by turbines and other infrastructure at the project, and to inform decisions about which experimental ACPs are most likely to minimize take.

2. **Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies:**
    a. PacifiCorp has exercised prudence by voluntarily developing and implementing a draft BBCS for each Wind Site.
        i. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall revise the draft BBCS for each Wind Site in consultation with the USFWS Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office and the USFWS Ecological Services Wyoming Field Office.

3. **Mortality Monitoring/Reporting/Disposition, Nest Monitoring**
    a. PacifiCorp has conducted pre- and post-construction avian use studies and mortality monitoring at the Wind Sites.
        i. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within four months of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall voluntarily provide data requested by the USFWS collected in avian use studies, coordinate with the USFWS regarding additional studies necessary to increase knowledge regarding use and occupation of the Wind Sites by eagles and, to the extent agreed upon by the Parties, other migratory birds.
        ii. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall provide to the USFWS the protocols currently in use, and all data collected in the mortality monitoring studies conducted at the Wind Sites. Within three months after transmittal of the protocols, the Parties will collaborate and agree on any changes to current monitoring protocols necessary to ensure that scientifically-based protocols are being employed that provide reliable data regarding impacts of the Wind Sites on eagles and other migratory birds.
        iii. PacifiCorp will conduct nest searches within six months of sentencing using the protocol contained in Attachment 1, subsection A.6 . Within six months from the date of sentencing, the Parties will meet and determine whether changes to the nest search protocol are necessary to improve its

effectiveness. Any changes to the nest search protocol contained in Attachment 1 shall require the written agreement of the Parties.

iv. Within four months of sentencing, PacifiCorp will apply for, and submit applications for renewal of as necessary, a Special Use – Utility (SPUT) Permit, pursuant to 50 CFR 21.27.

4. **<u>Experimental Advanced Conservation Practices, Best Management Practices</u>:**

a. PacifiCorp has voluntarily implemented several experimental ACPs at one or more of its Wind Sites; including experimental turbine curtailment, carrion removal, prey habitat reduction, and testing of an avian detection and deterrent system.

i. Within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp will propose a date to meet with the USFWS Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office and the USFWS Ecological Services Wyoming Field Office to discuss the progress of the experimental ACPs discussed herein and agree on any changes thereto.

ii. Sound and Light Deterrent Testing:

1. PacifiCorp will complete an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of an audible sound and visual light deterrent at the GRH Wind Site.
2. PacifiCorp will provide a report of the deterrent testing to the USFWS within 12 months of sentencing.
3. If the deterrent test extends beyond 12 months from the date of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall provide a final report to the USFWS following completion of the test.

iii. Informed Curtailment.

1. Within one month of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall implement the Initial Informed Curtailment Protocol set forth in Attachment 2.
2. The Parties agree that if information and experience with informed curtailment performed at the GRH Wind Site and the SMH Wind Site during 2012, 2013 and 2014 identifies cost-effective alternative methods to reduce the risk of eagle interaction with wind turbines that the Parties agree are equally or more effective than Informed Curtailment, PacifiCorp shall not be prevented from implementing such alternative method fully or partially in lieu of Informed Curtailment. Examples of such alternative methods include, but are not limited to, adjusting wind turbine operation parameters by making changes to the supervisory control and data acquisition ("SCADA") system; curtailment of one or more high-risk turbines during high-risk hours and/or months; or other experimental ACPs.

3. The Parties agree that lost generation revenue resulting from Informed Curtailment shall not be included in the cost cap established in Section 6; provided, however, the Parties shall not be prevented from taking lost generation revenue into consideration when considering alternate methods contemplated in the subsection immediately above.

iv. Carrion Removal. PacifiCorp will timely remove carrion from each Wind Site subject to applicable state and local laws and taking into consideration safety-related issues (e.g., snow, lightning) and contactor availability. In the case of livestock, PacifiCorp will timely coordinate with the owner to allow the owner to either remove the carrion timely or give permission to PacifiCorp to remove the carrion.

v. Roadway Carrion. Contingent on any applicable permits or any entity with authority regarding roadway carrion not imposing burdensome or added cost requirements, PacifiCorp shall timely have removed any large ungulate incidentally reported to PacifiCorp that is located on a Wyoming state highway and within one mile of a Wind Site boundary.

vi. Guyed towers. PacifiCorp will remove or replace guyed meteorological towers at a Wind Site if the guying is demonstrated to cause eagle injury or mortality. If replacement is chosen, PacifiCorp will replace the meteorological tower with an un-guyed tower.

5. **Programmatic Take Permits**

a. In anticipation of applying for programmatic ETPs for each Wind Site, PacifiCorp has begun drafting ECPs informed by the 2013 ECPG and has submitted a draft GRH ECP and a draft SMH ECP to the USFWS. The Parties understand that the process of completing an application for a programmatic ETP will be lengthy, given the novel nature of the permitting regime, potential future amendments of the Eagle Rule, and the heavy workload of USFWS personnel who are dealing with many other companies and projects.

i. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within nine months of sentencing, PacifiCorp and the USFWS Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office shall develop a mutually agreed schedule for PacifiCorp to submit or re-submit an ECP for each Wind Site; and for the time period in which the Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office will provide initial reply comments and reply comments associated with a resubmitted ECP or ECP revisions.

6. **Cost of MBCP Implementation**
   a. PacifiCorp shall not be required to spend more than $600,000 per calendar year, in total for the Wind Sites (the "Annual Cost Cap"), developing and implementing items in this MBCP, as described herein, provided, *however*, the Parties agree that neither the cost of compensatory mitigation (defined below in paragraph 7) nor the cost of lost generation resulting from Informed Curtailment shall be included in tracking costs subject to the Annual Cost Cap.
   b. If the initiation or termination of the MBCP results in a partial calendar year, the Annual Cost Cap shall be pro-rated by the number of days the MBCP is in effect during such calendar year.
   c. The Annual Cost Cap applies to the following activities:
      i. Additional 2012 LBWEG tier 2, 3, 4 or 5 USFWS requested data or studies;
      ii. Other data the USFWS requests;
      iii. mortality monitoring (avian or bat) and associated reporting;
      iv. nest searches and associated reporting;
      v. implementing and reporting Informed Curtailment;
      vi. carrion removal, disposal, and reporting;
      vii. future unspecified activities, adaptive management and/or experimental ACPs; and
      viii. enabling/disabling changes to the SCADA, or other control-oriented costs, associated with a Wind Site.
   d. On or before March 15 of each year that this MBCP is in effect for any Wind Site, PacifiCorp will provide the USFWS and Department a written accounting of monies spent during the previous calendar year to implement the MBCP, broken down by Wind Site and category of action(s) implemented.

7. **Compensatory Mitigation**
   a. The Parties acknowledge that additional migratory birds, including eagles, are likely to be taken at PacifiCorp's Wyoming Wind Sites during the term of this MBCP, despite the implementation of experimental ACPs.
   b. Unless other compensatory mitigation measures are agreed to by the Parties, PacifiCorp will conduct compensatory mitigation for each eagle killed at a Wind Site between the date of sentencing and the termination of this MBCP by retrofitting 9.26 power poles operated by PacifiCorp, in the Bird Conservation Region ("BCR") encompassing the Wind Site where the taking occurs ("Compensatory Mitigation"). Compensatory Mitigation will be performed by retrofitting power poles which have been identified as posing a high electrocution risk to eagles, and which are not the subject of a pre-existing retrofitting plan based on any other criminal or civil agreement between PacifiCorp or any of its

affiliates and a government entity. If there are insufficient high-risk power poles within the affected BCR to accomplish Compensatory Mitigation as contemplated herein, the Parties will meet and agree on alternative methods of compensatory mitigation which shall cost approximately the same as PacifiCorp's average cost to retrofit power-poles.

c. On a schedule to be determined within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp and the USFWS will collaborate to jointly develop a plan for such retrofitting that includes scheduling, pole identification, prioritization of both pole types and geographic areas for Compensatory Mitigation within the appropriate BCR, and cost/completion reporting.

d. The Parties agree that nothing in this MBCP requires PacifiCorp to perform pole retrofits, associated with PacifiCorp-owned poles or otherwise, for third parties (i.e., pole retrofits associated with third party owned or operated wind projects).

e. As noted above, the cost of Compensatory Mitigation shall not be counted against the Annual Cost Cap.

8. **MBCP Term, Applicability and Termination**

a. The term of the MBCP shall begin on the date the Plea Agreement, Statement of Facts, and the MBCP are accepted by the Court. The MBCP shall terminate for a given Wind Site upon the earlier of: (1) the issuance of a Programmatic ETP for that Wind Site, whereupon the terms of such ETP shall supersede all terms of this MBCP, or (2) the termination of the non-prosecution period set forth in the Plea Agreement.

Attachment 1 – Initial Mortality Monitoring/Eagle Nest Search Protocols

PacifiCorp shall perform mortality monitoring at each Wind Site as described below in subsections A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 and A5.

A.1 GRH Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from May 2009 through May 2012), PacifiCorp will monitor the 54 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A.2 SMH Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from May 2009 through May 2012), PacifiCorp will monitor the 27 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A.3 Dunlap Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from March 2011 through February 2014), PacifiCorp will monitor the 26 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A.4 HP/MR Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from October 2009 through October 2012), PacifiCorp will monitor the 29 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A5. All Wind Sites. At each Wind Site, square plots (160 m [525 ft] on a side) will be searched at each of the selected turbines. Since emphasis will be placed on detecting large bird carcasses (i.e. eagles), transects will be spaced approximately 20 m (33 ft to 50 ft) apart. In addition, since the possibility exists for eagle carcasses to occur in all areas of the project, surveyors will also inspect all other turbines in the project consistent with the schedule in A.1 through A.4 above, this inspection will include conducting a visual inspection from the turbine pad as well as examination on foot of any areas hidden from view of the turbine pad. Searches will not be performed when weather conditions make turbines inaccessible or unsafe to access in a standard road vehicle.

Modifications to this protocol may be warranted over time as new information becomes available.

PacifiCorp shall perform nest searches at each Wind Site as described below in subsection A.6.

A.6 Wind Site Nest Site Searches. PacifiCorp will conduct annual eagle nest surveys and will monitor known active eagle nests within 2.5 miles of the Wind Site (subject to weather conditions, safety, and landowner access to nests) to determine if local breeding pairs have been impacted by any identified eagle mortalities. These additional nest monitoring efforts will be conducted within five business days (subject to contractor availability) of the discovery of an eagle carcass at a Wind Site. In addition, to avoid, minimize or mitigate impacts to abandoned eggs or nest young, PacifiCorp will notify USFWS if local nesting impacts are documented.

Modifications to this protocol may be warranted over time as new information becomes available.

Attachment 2

Initial Informed Curtailment Protocol

Glenrock/Rolling Hills/Glenrock III (GRH) Wind Site

and

Seven Mile Hill/Seven Mile Hill II (SMH) Wind Site

This Informed Curtailment protocol applies to PacifiCorp's Glenrock/Rolling Hills/Glenrock III (GRH) Wind Site and Seven Mile Hill/Seven Mile Hill II (SMH) Wind Site during established time periods and conditions. "Informed Curtailment" means the use of biological monitors stationed at a Wind Site, when safe to do so, that have the capability to call for curtailment of one or more turbines based on the protocol set forth in Attachment 2.

The informed curtailment of wind turbine generators due to eagle proximity is an experimental ACP method intended to help reduce potential turbine collisions with eagles. The goal of informed curtailment is to identify risky eagle flight behavior/pathways and notify site personnel prior to potential turbine interaction. Curtailment of turbines will be based on knowledge of eagle activity and observed behaviors for the GRH Wind Site and the SMH Wind Site. An observer will notify site personnel whenever eagle flights are observed near/toward individual turbines or a grouping of turbines. An observer will also notify site personnel when risk is reduced to an acceptable level to release the turbine or grouping of turbines from curtailment.

Due to the geographic extent of the GRH Wind Site and the SMH Wind Site, an observer may not be able to visually identify every eagle in the vicinity of turbines. Positioning of an observer will be as appropriate to maximize eagle detection in known eagle high use areas. An observer will be mobile, as necessary, to best detect potential risky flights by eagles. The location of an observer may also be altered over time as eagle activity changes at the GRH Wind Site or the SMH Wind Site.

An observer will notify site personnel of a recommendation to implement turbine curtailment if:

- Eagle(s) are observed within 800 meters of a turbine or grouping of turbines;
- Eagle(s) flight paths are reasonably likely to cross through or near turbine(s) based on observed heading or assumed trajectory;
- Eagle(s) are observed actively foraging within or near turbines or a group of turbines; or
- Any other behavior is observed in which an observer believes it is reasonably likely that an eagle(s) is moving toward a potential collision with a turbine.

An observer will use their professional judgment based on knowledge of the GRH Wind Site or the SMH Wind Site and eagle behavior; *however*, it is understood that eagle activity and other environmental variables (e.g., wind conditions) are unpredictable.

An observer will monitor eagle activity while within sight, or until a higher priority risk is observed (e.g., eagle approaching turbines). An observer will notify site personnel with an "all clear" once eagle risk is reduced to an acceptable level as determined by the observer. Site personnel will notify the observer when turbine curtailment has ended. The following is a list of factors that an observer will consider when deciding when to notify facility personnel to resume turbine activity:

- No eagle activity has been observed for 10 consecutive minutes in a turbine group;
- Eagle is perched beyond 800 meters from closest turbine or turbine group;
- Eagle flight direction observed away from turbines or turbine group and eagle is beyond a 1,600 meter buffer;
- Eagle is observed increasing elevation above turbines or turbine group in patterned behavior at least 400 meters above ground level; or
- Time of day, visibility, or other factors.

Informed Curtailment will not occur if weather conditions create potentially unsafe conditions for an observer, or if observer visibility is heavily impaired.

Under this Protocol, PacifiCorp will employ biological monitors for the purpose of Informed Curtailment according to the following schedule:

GRH Site – Two biological monitors seven days per week, seven hours per day (0900 hours to 1600 hours, Mountain time), during the months of October, November, December, January, February and March.

SMH Site – One biological monitor seven days per week, five hours per day (0900 hours to 1400 hours, Mountain time), during the months of January, February, and March.

Modifications to this protocol may be warranted over time as new information becomes available.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 206

Exhibits in Support Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

OPUC Data Request 21

GRID Model, Coal Costs - Please refer to PacifiCorp's response to OPUC DR 10 part c. Please provide copies of the court orders and rulings for the cases referenced in the response. Please also provide copies of any written briefs, expert reports, and expert testimony that were submitted in the case record.

Response to OPUC Data Request 21

The Company objects to this request as unduly burdensome, overly broad, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Company responds as follows:

Please refer to Attachment OPUC 21, which provides a copy of the United States (U.S.) District Court, for the District of Wyoming, judgment in Case 14-CR-301-KHR, United States of America versus PacifiCorp Energy dated December 19, 2014.

Staff/206
Kaufman/2

United States District Court
For The District of Wyoming

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs.

PACIFICORP ENERGY, a division of PACIFICORP

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

CASE NUMBER: 14-CR-301-KHR

David Freudenthal
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT: pleaded guilty to counts 1 & 2.

ACCORDINGLY, the court has adjudicated that the defendant is guilty of the following offense(s):

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Date Offense Concluded	Count Number(s)
16 USC 703, 707(a)	Unlawful Take of Migratory Birds	December 19, 2014	1
16 USC 703, 707(a)	Unlawful Take of Migratory Birds	December 19, 2014	2

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 5 of this Judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of mailing address until all fines, community service/restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.

Defendant's USM No: **N/A**

December 19, 2014
Date of Imposition of Sentence

Kelly H. Rankin
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

12/22/14
Date

MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

The defendant is hereby placed on unsupervised probation for a term of sixty (60) months.

While on probation, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

The defendant shall make special assessment, fine and community service/restitution payments as ordered by the Court and is required to notify the Court of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to meet these monetary obligations.

The Defendant shall implement a Migratory Bird Compliance Plan ("MBCP" – Attachment B hereto), developed with the assistance of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") and the Department. The purpose of the MBCP is to (1) avoid and minimize golden eagle and other avian mortalities at the Defendant's four wholly-owned wind facilities in Wyoming—Seven Mile Hill, Glenrock/Rolling Hills, Dunlap, and High Plains/McFadden Ridge. As noted therein, the Defendant shall not be required to spend more than $600,000 annually to implement the MBCP, recognizing that actual costs may vary from year to year based on advances in science and technology and the specific measures implemented during the term of the MBCP.

The Defendant, USFWS, and the Department shall meet at least once every six months during the first two years of the probationary period, and once every twelve months thereafter, during probation, to discuss the Defendant's progress in implementing the MBCP, and to address any issues or mutually agreed amendments necessary to ensure its effectiveness. Every twelve months during the probationary period, the Defendant shall report in writing to the Court, the USFWS, and the Department concerning the progress it has made implementing the MBCP.

The Defendant shall make restitution to the state of Wyoming by depositing $200,000 within the first six months of probation, in a fund or account as directed by the Wyoming Game & Fish Department, of which $100,000 which shall be used by the agency solely for responding to incidents involving federally protected wildlife or birds:

The Defendant shall perform community service by making a $ 1,900,000 payment within the first six months of probation to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, a private, non-profit, § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, established by Congress in 1984 and dedicated to the conservation of fish, wildlife and plants and the habitat on which they depend. The funds shall be directed to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation with the proviso that they be used in projects designed to conserve populations of golden eagles that utilize the areas in which the Defendant's Wyoming wind facilities are located, increase understanding of ways to minimize and monitor interactions between golden eagles and commercial wind power facilities, and rescue/rehabilitate golden eagles and other raptors found injured at or near wind facilities. The Defendant shall not claim this payment or any other community service or restitution amount herein as a tax deduction or characterize it in any manner or forum as a donation or contribution.

FINANCIAL PENALTIES

The defendant shall pay the following total financial penalties in accordance with the schedule of payments set out below.

Count	**Assessment**	**Community Service**	**Restitution**	**Fine**
1	$50.00	$1,900,000.00 Concurrent with Count 2 (to be paid to the National Fish & Wildlife Foundation)	$200,000.00 Concurrent with Count 2 (to be paid to the Wyoming Game & Fish Department)	$200,000.00 (to be paid to the North American Wetlands Conservation Act)
2	$50.00	$1,900,000.00 Concurrent with Count 1 (to be paid to the National Fish & Wildlife Foundation)	$200,000.00 Concurrent with Count 1 (to be paid to the Wyoming Game & Fish Department)	$200,000.00 (to be paid to the North American Wetlands Conservation Act)
Totals:	$100.00	$1,900,000.00	$200,000.00	$400,000.00

FINE AND/OR COMMUNITY SERVICE/RESTITUTION

The fine, assessments, and community service/restitution, is inclusive of all penalties and interest, if applicable.
All of the below payment options are subject to penalties for default and delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

FINE/COMMUNITY SERVICE/RESTITUTION

The defendant shall make all monetary payments to the Office of the Clerk of Court in the following amounts:

Name of Payee	**Amount of Community Service**
Office of the Clerk United States District Court 2120 Capitol Avenue 2nd Floor, Room 2131 Cheyenne, WY 82001	$1,900,000.00 **Amount of Restitution** $200,000.00 **Amount of Fine** $400,000.00 **Amount of Special Assessment** $100.00

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment; (2) community service/restitution; (3) fine principal; (4) interest; (5) penalties.

The total fine and other monetary penalties shall be due as follows:

Fine and Special Assessment due immediately.

Community Service/Restitution due in full within six (6) months of the beginning of the term of probation (June 19, 2015).

All financial penalty payments are to be made to the Clerks Office.

ATTACHMENT B

MIGRATORY BIRD COMPLIANCE PLAN ("MBCP")

INTRODUCTION

1. This MBCP is an element of the Plea Agreement in this case and has been developed by the defendant, PacifiCorp, an Oregon Corporation ("PacifiCorp"), the United States Department of Justice ("Department") and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS"). PacifiCorp, the Department and the USFWS are individually referred to in this MBCP as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties." The purpose of this MBCP is to provide a collaborative framework for PacifiCorp's implementation of measures that will ensure compliance with the requirements of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA") and the Bald and Golden Eagle Act ("BGEPA") during the term of the MBCP.

2. The Department is aware that during the past twenty-four (24) months, PacifiCorp has been voluntarily implementing many of the measures described herein to avoid and minimize the unpermitted take of eagles and other migratory birds at its Seven Mile Hill ("SMH"), Glenrock/Rolling Hills ("GRH"), Dunlap and High Plains/McFadden Ridge ("HP/MR") wind sites in Wyoming (individually a "Wind Site" and collectively the "Wind Sites").

3. Avoidance, minimization and mitigation strategies aimed at protecting avian wildlife at commercial wind projects have been developed by the USFWS and industry at the national and regional level in documents including the 2003 Service Interim Guidance on Avoiding and Minimizing Wildlife Impacts from Wind Turbines, the 2009 Eagle Rule published by the USFWS on September 11, 2009, under BGEPA ("Eagle Rule"), the 2012 Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines ("2012 LBWEG"), and the 2013 Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance Module 1 – Land-Based Wind Energy Version 2 ("2013 ECPG") and the 2013 USFWS Region 6 Recommendations for Avoidance and Minimization of Impacts to Golden Eagles at Wind Energy Facilities and Guidance on Outlines and Components of Eagle Conservation Plans ("ECPs") and Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies. These documents contemplate compliance measures for commercial wind facilities that are in the development stage as well as projects, like the Wind Sites in this case, which became operational prior to development of some of the relevant guidance. The enforceability and effect of these documents, as well as any other relevant guidance, policy, regulations or recommendations developed by USFWS during the term of the MBCP, are neither diminished nor enhanced by their reference herein.

4. As described in the 2013 ECPG, Advanced Conservation Practices ("ACPs") are scientifically-supportable measures approved by the USFWS that represent the best available techniques to reduce eagle disturbance and ongoing mortalities to a level where remaining take is unavoidable (50 CFR 22.3). Because the best information currently available indicates there are no conservation measures that have been scientifically shown to reduce eagle disturbance and blade-strike mortality at wind projects, the USFWS has not currently approved any ACPs for wind energy projects. All ACPs are currently considered by the USFWS to be "experimental."

5. As described in the 2012 LBWEG, the USFWS has recommended that developers prepare written records of their actions to avoid, minimize and compensate for potential adverse impacts. In the past, the USFWS has referred to these as Avian and Bat Protection Plans (ABPP). However, ABPPs have more recently been used for transmission projects and less for other types of development. For this reason the USFWS has introduced a distinct concept for wind energy projects called Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies ("BBCS"). A developer may prepare a BBCS in stages, over time, as analysis and studies are undertaken for each tier of the 2012 LBWEG. Each BBCS is unique for each wind energy project and subject to periodic amendment as knowledge about the project's impact on avian wildlife and the efficacy of minimization measures evolves over time.

6. Under the Eagle Rule, the USFWS can issue permits that authorize individual instances of take of bald and golden eagles when the take is associated with, but not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity, and cannot practicably be avoided. The regulations also authorize permits for "programmatic" take, which means that instances of "take" may not be isolated, but may recur. The programmatic take permits are the most germane permits for wind energy facilities. (2013 ECPG Exec. Summary, Chapter 4)

7. Where wind energy facilities cannot avoid taking eagles and eagle populations are not healthy enough to sustain additional mortality, Eagle Take Permit ("ETP") applicants must reduce the unavoidable mortality to a no net-loss standard for the duration of the permitted activity. No net-loss means that these actions either reduce another ongoing form of mortality to a level equal to or greater than the unavoidable mortality, or lead to an increase in carrying capacity that allows the eagle population to grow by an equal or greater amount. Actions to reduce eagle mortality or increase carrying capacity to this no net-loss standard are known as "compensatory mitigation" in the 2013 ECPG. Examples of compensatory mitigation activities might include retrofitting power lines to reduce eagle electrocutions, removing road-killed animals along roads where vehicles hit and kill scavenging eagles, or increasing prey availability. (2013 ECPG, Exec. Summary, Chapter 8)

IMPLEMENTATION

1. The Parties agree that the foundation of effectively minimizing take of eagles and other migratory birds at an operating wind project is scientifically-based avian use studies and fatality monitoring, along with data concerning historical take of eagles and other birds at the projects, which provide the data needed to understand the nature of the risk posed to avian wildlife by turbines and other infrastructure at the project, and to inform decisions about which experimental ACPs are most likely to minimize take.

2. **<u>Bird and Bat Conservation Strategies:</u>**
   a. PacifiCorp has exercised prudence by voluntarily developing and implementing a draft BBCS for each Wind Site.
      i. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall revise the draft BBCS for each Wind Site in consultation with the USFWS Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office and the USFWS Ecological Services Wyoming Field Office.

3. **<u>Mortality Monitoring/Reporting/Disposition, Nest Monitoring</u>**
   a. PacifiCorp has conducted pre- and post-construction avian use studies and mortality monitoring at the Wind Sites.
      i. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within four months of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall voluntarily provide data requested by the USFWS collected in avian use studies, coordinate with the USFWS regarding additional studies necessary to increase knowledge regarding use and occupation of the Wind Sites by eagles and, to the extent agreed upon by the Parties, other migratory birds.
      ii. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall provide to the USFWS the protocols currently in use, and all data collected in the mortality monitoring studies conducted at the Wind Sites. Within three months after transmittal of the protocols, the Parties will collaborate and agree on any changes to current monitoring protocols necessary to ensure that scientifically-based protocols are being employed that provide reliable data regarding impacts of the Wind Sites on eagles and other migratory birds.
      iii. PacifiCorp will conduct nest searches within six months of sentencing using the protocol contained in Attachment 1, subsection A.6 . Within six months from the date of sentencing, the Parties will meet and determine whether changes to the nest search protocol are necessary to improve its

effectiveness. Any changes to the nest search protocol contained in Attachment 1 shall require the written agreement of the Parties.

iv. Within four months of sentencing, PacifiCorp will apply for, and submit applications for renewal of as necessary, a Special Use – Utility (SPUT) Permit, pursuant to 50 CFR 21.27.

4. **Experimental Advanced Conservation Practices, Best Management Practices:**

a. PacifiCorp has voluntarily implemented several experimental ACPs at one or more of its Wind Sites; including experimental turbine curtailment, carrion removal, prey habitat reduction, and testing of an avian detection and deterrent system.

i. Within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp will propose a date to meet with the USFWS Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office and the USFWS Ecological Services Wyoming Field Office to discuss the progress of the experimental ACPs discussed herein and agree on any changes thereto.

ii. Sound and Light Deterrent Testing:

1. PacifiCorp will complete an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of an audible sound and visual light deterrent at the GRH Wind Site.
2. PacifiCorp will provide a report of the deterrent testing to the USFWS within 12 months of sentencing.
3. If the deterrent test extends beyond 12 months from the date of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall provide a final report to the USFWS following completion of the test.

iii. Informed Curtailment.

1. Within one month of sentencing, PacifiCorp shall implement the Initial Informed Curtailment Protocol set forth in Attachment 2.
2. The Parties agree that if information and experience with informed curtailment performed at the GRH Wind Site and the SMH Wind Site during 2012, 2013 and 2014 identifies cost-effective alternative methods to reduce the risk of eagle interaction with wind turbines that the Parties agree are equally or more effective than Informed Curtailment, PacifiCorp shall not be prevented from implementing such alternative method fully or partially in lieu of Informed Curtailment. Examples of such alternative methods include, but are not limited to, adjusting wind turbine operation parameters by making changes to the supervisory control and data acquisition ("SCADA") system; curtailment of one or more high-risk turbines during high-risk hours and/or months; or other experimental ACPs.

3. The Parties agree that lost generation revenue resulting from Informed Curtailment shall not be included in the cost cap established in Section 6; provided, however, the Parties shall not be prevented from taking lost generation revenue into consideration when considering alternate methods contemplated in the subsection immediately above.

iv. Carrion Removal. PacifiCorp will timely remove carrion from each Wind Site subject to applicable state and local laws and taking into consideration safety-related issues (e.g., snow, lightning) and contactor availability. In the case of livestock, PacifiCorp will timely coordinate with the owner to allow the owner to either remove the carrion timely or give permission to PacifiCorp to remove the carrion.

v. Roadway Carrion. Contingent on any applicable permits or any entity with authority regarding roadway carrion not imposing burdensome or added cost requirements, PacifiCorp shall timely have removed any large ungulate incidentally reported to PacifiCorp that is located on a Wyoming state highway and within one mile of a Wind Site boundary.

vi. Guyed towers. PacifiCorp will remove or replace guyed meteorological towers at a Wind Site if the guying is demonstrated to cause eagle injury or mortality. If replacement is chosen, PacifiCorp will replace the meteorological tower with an un-guyed tower.

5. <u>**Programmatic Take Permits**</u>

a. In anticipation of applying for programmatic ETPs for each Wind Site, PacifiCorp has begun drafting ECPs informed by the 2013 ECPG and has submitted a draft GRH ECP and a draft SMH ECP to the USFWS. The Parties understand that the process of completing an application for a programmatic ETP will be lengthy, given the novel nature of the permitting regime, potential future amendments of the Eagle Rule, and the heavy workload of USFWS personnel who are dealing with many other companies and projects.

i. On a schedule to be determined by the Parties within nine months of sentencing, PacifiCorp and the USFWS Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office shall develop a mutually agreed schedule for PacifiCorp to submit or re-submit an ECP for each Wind Site; and for the time period in which the Region 6 Migratory Bird Management Office will provide initial reply comments and reply comments associated with a resubmitted ECP or ECP revisions.

6. **Cost of MBCP Implementation**
   a. PacifiCorp shall not be required to spend more than $600,000 per calendar year, in total for the Wind Sites (the "Annual Cost Cap"), developing and implementing items in this MBCP, as described herein, provided, *however*, the Parties agree that neither the cost of compensatory mitigation (defined below in paragraph 7) nor the cost of lost generation resulting from Informed Curtailment shall be included in tracking costs subject to the Annual Cost Cap.
   b. If the initiation or termination of the MBCP results in a partial calendar year, the Annual Cost Cap shall be pro-rated by the number of days the MBCP is in effect during such calendar year.
   c. The Annual Cost Cap applies to the following activities:
      i. Additional 2012 LBWEG tier 2, 3, 4 or 5 USFWS requested data or studies;
      ii. Other data the USFWS requests;
      iii. mortality monitoring (avian or bat) and associated reporting;
      iv. nest searches and associated reporting;
      v. implementing and reporting Informed Curtailment;
      vi. carrion removal, disposal, and reporting;
      vii. future unspecified activities, adaptive management and/or experimental ACPs; and
      viii. enabling/disabling changes to the SCADA, or other control-oriented costs, associated with a Wind Site.
   d. On or before March 15 of each year that this MBCP is in effect for any Wind Site, PacifiCorp will provide the USFWS and Department a written accounting of monies spent during the previous calendar year to implement the MBCP, broken down by Wind Site and category of action(s) implemented.

7. **Compensatory Mitigation**
   a. The Parties acknowledge that additional migratory birds, including eagles, are likely to be taken at PacifiCorp's Wyoming Wind Sites during the term of this MBCP, despite the implementation of experimental ACPs.
   b. Unless other compensatory mitigation measures are agreed to by the Parties, PacifiCorp will conduct compensatory mitigation for each eagle killed at a Wind Site between the date of sentencing and the termination of this MBCP by retrofitting 9.26 power poles operated by PacifiCorp, in the Bird Conservation Region ("BCR") encompassing the Wind Site where the taking occurs ("Compensatory Mitigation"). Compensatory Mitigation will be performed by retrofitting power poles which have been identified as posing a high electrocution risk to eagles, and which are not the subject of a pre-existing retrofitting plan based on any other criminal or civil agreement between PacifiCorp or any of its

affiliates and a government entity. If there are insufficient high-risk power poles within the affected BCR to accomplish Compensatory Mitigation as contemplated herein, the Parties will meet and agree on alternative methods of compensatory mitigation which shall cost approximately the same as PacifiCorp's average cost to retrofit power-poles.

c. On a schedule to be determined within six months of sentencing, PacifiCorp and the USFWS will collaborate to jointly develop a plan for such retrofitting that includes scheduling, pole identification, prioritization of both pole types and geographic areas for Compensatory Mitigation within the appropriate BCR, and cost/completion reporting.

d. The Parties agree that nothing in this MBCP requires PacifiCorp to perform pole retrofits, associated with PacifiCorp-owned poles or otherwise, for third parties (i.e., pole retrofits associated with third party owned or operated wind projects).

e. As noted above, the cost of Compensatory Mitigation shall not be counted against the Annual Cost Cap.

8. **<u>MBCP Term, Applicability and Termination</u>**

a. The term of the MBCP shall begin on the date the Plea Agreement, Statement of Facts, and the MBCP are accepted by the Court. The MBCP shall terminate for a given Wind Site upon the earlier of: (1) the issuance of a Programmatic ETP for that Wind Site, whereupon the terms of such ETP shall supersede all terms of this MBCP, or (2) the termination of the non-prosecution period set forth in the Plea Agreement.

Attachment 1 – Initial Mortality Monitoring/Eagle Nest Search Protocols

PacifiCorp shall perform mortality monitoring at each Wind Site as described below in subsections A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 and A5.

A.1 GRH Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from May 2009 through May 2012), PacifiCorp will monitor the 54 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A.2 SMH Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from May 2009 through May 2012), PacifiCorp will monitor the 27 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A.3 Dunlap Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from March 2011 through February 2014), PacifiCorp will monitor the 26 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A.4 HP/MR Wind Site. PacifiCorp will utilize qualified individuals to perform carcass searches at selected turbines two times a month (approximately every two weeks). To ensure comparability to the three years of standardized monitoring (previously conducted from October 2009 through October 2012), PacifiCorp will monitor the 29 turbines originally selected for standardized monitoring.

A5. All Wind Sites. At each Wind Site, square plots (160 m [525 ft] on a side) will be searched at each of the selected turbines. Since emphasis will be placed on detecting large bird carcasses (i.e. eagles), transects will be spaced approximately 20 m (33 ft to 50 ft) apart. In addition, since the possibility exists for eagle carcasses to occur in all areas of the project, surveyors will also inspect all other turbines in the project consistent with the schedule in A.1 through A.4 above, this inspection will include conducting a visual inspection from the turbine pad as well as examination on foot of any areas hidden from view of the turbine pad. Searches will not be performed when weather conditions make turbines inaccessible or unsafe to access in a standard road vehicle.

Modifications to this protocol may be warranted over time as new information becomes available.

PacifiCorp shall perform nest searches at each Wind Site as described below in subsection A.6.

> **A.6 Wind Site Nest Site Searches.** PacifiCorp will conduct annual eagle nest surveys and will monitor known active eagle nests within 2.5 miles of the Wind Site (subject to weather conditions, safety, and landowner access to nests) to determine if local breeding pairs have been impacted by any identified eagle mortalities. These additional nest monitoring efforts will be conducted within five business days (subject to contractor availability) of the discovery of an eagle carcass at a Wind Site. In addition, to avoid, minimize or mitigate impacts to abandoned eggs or nest young, PacifiCorp will notify USFWS if local nesting impacts are documented.

Modifications to this protocol may be warranted over time as new information becomes available.

Attachment 2

Initial Informed Curtailment Protocol

Glenrock/Rolling Hills/Glenrock III (GRH) Wind Site

and

Seven Mile Hill/Seven Mile Hill II (SMH) Wind Site

This Informed Curtailment protocol applies to PacifiCorp's Glenrock/Rolling Hills/Glenrock III (GRH) Wind Site and Seven Mile Hill/Seven Mile Hill II (SMH) Wind Site during established time periods and conditions. "Informed Curtailment" means the use of biological monitors stationed at a Wind Site, when safe to do so, that have the capability to call for curtailment of one or more turbines based on the protocol set forth in Attachment 2.

The informed curtailment of wind turbine generators due to eagle proximity is an experimental ACP method intended to help reduce potential turbine collisions with eagles. The goal of informed curtailment is to identify risky eagle flight behavior/pathways and notify site personnel prior to potential turbine interaction. Curtailment of turbines will be based on knowledge of eagle activity and observed behaviors for the GRH Wind Site and the SMH Wind Site. An observer will notify site personnel whenever eagle flights are observed near/toward individual turbines or a grouping of turbines. An observer will also notify site personnel when risk is reduced to an acceptable level to release the turbine or grouping of turbines from curtailment.

Due to the geographic extent of the GRH Wind Site and the SMH Wind Site, an observer may not be able to visually identify every eagle in the vicinity of turbines. Positioning of an observer will be as appropriate to maximize eagle detection in known eagle high use areas. An observer will be mobile, as necessary, to best detect potential risky flights by eagles. The location of an observer may also be altered over time as eagle activity changes at the GRH Wind Site or the SMH Wind Site.

An observer will notify site personnel of a recommendation to implement turbine curtailment if:

- Eagle(s) are observed within 800 meters of a turbine or grouping of turbines;
- Eagle(s) flight paths are reasonably likely to cross through or near turbine(s) based on observed heading or assumed trajectory;
- Eagle(s) are observed actively foraging within or near turbines or a group of turbines; or
- Any other behavior is observed in which an observer believes it is reasonably likely that an eagle(s) is moving toward a potential collision with a turbine.

An observer will use their professional judgment based on knowledge of the GRH Wind Site or the SMH Wind Site and eagle behavior; *however*, it is understood that eagle activity and other environmental variables (e.g., wind conditions) are unpredictable.

An observer will monitor eagle activity while within sight, or until a higher priority risk is observed (e.g., eagle approaching turbines). An observer will notify site personnel with an "all clear" once eagle risk is reduced to an acceptable level as determined by the observer. Site personnel will notify the observer when turbine curtailment has ended. The following is a list of factors that an observer will consider when deciding when to notify facility personnel to resume turbine activity:

- No eagle activity has been observed for 10 consecutive minutes in a turbine group;
- Eagle is perched beyond 800 meters from closest turbine or turbine group;
- Eagle flight direction observed away from turbines or turbine group and eagle is beyond a 1,600 meter buffer;
- Eagle is observed increasing elevation above turbines or turbine group in patterned behavior at least 400 meters above ground level; or
- Time of day, visibility, or other factors.

Informed Curtailment will not occur if weather conditions create potentially unsafe conditions for an observer, or if observer visibility is heavily impaired.

Under this Protocol, PacifiCorp will employ biological monitors for the purpose of Informed Curtailment according to the following schedule:

GRH Site – Two biological monitors seven days per week, seven hours per day (0900 hours to 1600 hours, Mountain time), during the months of October, November, December, January, February and March.

SMH Site – One biological monitor seven days per week, five hours per day (0900 hours to 1400 hours, Mountain time), during the months of January, February, and March.

Modifications to this protocol may be warranted over time as new information becomes available.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 207

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

CUB Data Request 13

See UE 307/PAC/100/Dickman/11, which states that "several of the Company's coal-fired plants have supply agreements with minimum take volumes".

(a) Please explain how the Company values the coal, within the minimum take volume. In particular, please address, how (and if) the market price is applied) and how the analysis alters (if at all) when the mine is a mine-mouth mine.

Response to CUB Data Request 13

The Company’s response to CUB Data Request 13 is submitted following further clarification of the request as provided by the Citizens’ Utility Board of Oregon’s (CUB) counsel.

(a) Coal at the minimum take volume is valued under the terms for minimum take which are specified within the contract. Pricing is not based on the current market price of coal. For the Bridger Coal mine, the cost per ton ($/ton) is based on the mine’s operating costs divided by the number of tons delivered. For other mines, the pricing is based on the minimum take contractual provisions, which can also include costs such as liquidated damages, reimbursement of fixed capital costs, etc. The analysis does not change whether the mine is remote or mine-mouth.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 208

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

CUB Data Request 35

See the Company's response to CUB DR 13. How does the Company value coal: (a) within GRID and (b) in dispatch decision, above the minimum take volume?

Response to CUB Data Request 35

(a) The Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision Tool (GRID) uses two "tiers" of fuel prices for coal plants:

- **Dispatch Tier:** This fuel price is used along with the thermal resource attributes and heat rate inputs to determine the incremental cost of the coal generation resource in the dispatch decision. This fuel price represents the incremental cost of additional tons of coal during the forecast period. For contract coal this price is generally determined by the terms of the contract. For coal sourced from Company-owned mines this price is determined by the operating cost required to produce the next ton of coal.

- **Costing Tier:** This fuel price represents the average cost of the total coal tonnage in the forecast period and is applied to the coal volumes as determined by the GRID model. The resulting total fuel costs are reported in the net power costs (NPC) results as total coal fuel burn expense.

(b) If a unit uses more than its minimum take volume the fuel price applicable to incremental volumes above the minimum should be used. Below the minimum take volume, the incremental fuel price should be set at or near zero (GRID requires that fuel price inputs be greater than zero). This incremental fuel price is input into GRID as the Dispatch Tier fuel price to be used in the dispatch decision.

GRID logic only supports a single incremental fuel price in the dispatch decision for each coal unit. Consequently, iterative GRID runs are necessary to ensure that coal burn volumes are consistent with minimum take requirements across the coal fleet. If volumes are below the minimum take at a coal unit, the fuel price inputs are reduced (driving up volume taken by GRID) until the minimum take is achieved or the incremental fuel price reaches approximately zero.

Please refer to the confidential attachments provided with the Company's response to ICNU Data Request 008, which provide the work papers supporting the modeling of minimum take volumes in the Company's filing.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
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STAFF EXHIBIT 209

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 209 contains Highly Confidential Information and is subject to

Modified Protective Order No. 16-231.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 210

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 210 contains Highly Confidential Information and is subject to

Modified Protective Order No. 16-231.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 211

Exhibits in Support Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
July 1, 2016
OPUC Data Request 177

OPUC Data Request 177

Please Respond to DR 126 through 177 with respect to Trapper Mining Company

Please provide PacifiCorp's hedging policy for each type of hedged cost, including but not limited to:

a. Purchased Power;
b. Sold Power;
c. Natural gas;
d. Coal; and
e. Interest.

Response to OPUC Data Request 177

Please refer to the response to OPUC 126. As the Company is not the operator of the Trapper Mine, none of these costs are hedged under PacifiCorp's hedging policy.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 212

Exhibits in Support Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 212 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
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OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 213

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 213 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 214

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 28, 2016
OPUC Data Request 57

OPUC Data Request 57

Please refer to the response to OPUC DR 56 part a. above. For each asset identified in DR 56 part a. that has not been subject to a prudence review, and that has an original book value greater than $150,000, please provide the following data:

(a) Comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of whether and when investment should be built;

(b) Evaluation of range of alternative investment dates;

(c) Evidence of likelihood of disruptions based on historical experience; and

(d) Evidence on the range of possible reliability incidents.

Response to OPUC Data Request 57

The Company objects to this request on the basis that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome, and not likely to lead to admissible evidence relevant to this proceeding. Notwithstanding the foregoing objection, the Company responds as follows:

(a) Not applicable. Assets are subject to prudence reviews in as indicated in the response to OPUC 56 subpart (b).

(b) Not applicable. Assets are subject to prudence reviews as indicated in the response to OPUC 56 subpart (b).

(c) Not applicable. Assets are subject to prudence reviews as indicated in the response to OPUC 56 subpart (b).

(d) Not applicable. Assets are subject to prudence reviews as indicated in the response to OPUC 56 subpart (b).

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 215

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 215 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 216

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 16, 2016
OPUC Data Request 35

OPUC Data Request 35

Please provide the continuing property records for Bridger Coal Company.

Response to OPUC Data Request 35

Please refer to Attachment OPUC 35.

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
July 1, 2016
OPUC Data Request 35 – 1st Supplemental

OPUC Data Request 35

Please provide the continuing property records for Bridger Coal Company.

1st Supplemental Response to OPUC Data Request 35

In response to questions from OPUC counsel seeking information from Bridger Coal Company in the form of continuing property records, PacifiCorp provides the following supplemental response.

Bridger Coal Company, as a mining company, does not use the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission uniform system of accounts. Bridger Coal Company tracks individual assets using straight line depreciation, and does not track depreciation by asset class utilizing the group depreciation methodology.

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
SYSTEM, MINE DRAINAGE	1-Nov-81	STL	43.02	55,617.59	47,509.12	8,108.47
SYSTEM, SEDIMENT/DRAINAGE	1-Dec-83	STL	41.01	140,272.82	116,502.45	23,770.37
RESERVE EXPLORATION-DEVELOPMENT - RAMP 58 SECTIONS 11 & 12	01-Jul-10	STL	10	63,797.08	36,294.13	27,502.95
RESERVE EXPLORATION-DEVELOPMENT - RAMP 62 TO 63	01-Jul-10	STL	5	39,858.54	39,858.54	-
RESERVE EXPLORATION - DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - RAMP 53-62	30-May-13	STL	24.7	98,146.19	11,605.00	86,541.19
RESERVE EXPLORATION - DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - RAMP 60-63	30-May-13	STL	24.7	45,026.76	5,324.16	39,702.60
RESERVE EXPLORATION - DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - RAMP 2 AREA	4-Jan-16	STL	21-10	28,799.15	190.46	28,608.69
RESERVE EXPLORATION - DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - RAMP 60 AREA	4-Jan-16	STL	21-10	57,598.29	380.92	57,217.37
BLDG, MINE SERVICE CENTER - MAIN SHOP	1-Feb-75	STL	49.11	2,612,827.43	2,271,832.18	340,995.25
BLDG, EXPN SERVICE CENTER - GAS SHOP	1-Aug-78	STL	46.05	1,803,051.56	1,537,676.99	265,374.57
BLDG, IMPRV MAINTENANCE - WELDING SHOP ADDITION	1-Mar-81	STL	43.1	66,005.61	56,882.17	9,123.44
BLDG, 87 IMPRVMT MAINTNCE	1-Dec-87	STL	37.01	379,915.40	298,271.83	81,643.57
SHOP PARKING LOT	1-Oct-91	STL	33.03	117,332.58	87,008.35	30,324.23
REPAIR WELD SHOP BUCKET BAY	1-Sep-92	STL	10	50,475.00	50,475.00	-
MAIN FUEL ISLAND REPAIRS	1-Jul-93	STL	31.06	273,826.76	197,829.69	75,997.07
RAMP 55 1/2 EXPLOSIVE STORAGE SITE (EARTH WORK, ELECTRICAL, CONTAINM	15-Dec-95	STL	29	185,794.48	89,769.85	96,024.63
RAMP 53 & 55 MAIN FUEL ISLAND UPGRADE	31-Jan-96	STL	28.11	189,132.12	91,188.54	97,943.58
FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM - MAIN OFFICE	31-Jan-97	STL	27.11	65,169.36	1,225.00	63,944.36
ERECTION LOT VENTILATION	15-Jan-98	STL	26.11	85,808.85	39,150.31	46,658.54
SHOP VENTILATION SYSTEM	1-Jan-99	STL	26	75,415.36	33,356.58	42,058.78
ROOF REPAIRS ADMIN/MAINT	1-Nov-98	STL	26	445,466.35	198,090.26	247,376.09
MAINT SHOP & WASH BAY	1-Feb-99	STL	38.11	3,817,324.02	2,013,612.74	1,803,711.28
SILO MSI	1-Sep-02	STL	10	31,618.35	31,618.35	-
RESURFACE EMPLOYEE PARKING LOT	1-Nov-03	STL	21.02	97,589.29	35,465.43	62,123.86
AREA LIGHTING - PARKING LOT (ADJACENT TO OFFICE & MAINTENANCE FACIL	31-Dec-07	STL	35	244,525.37	67,735.50	176,789.87
POWERLINE RAMP 8 & RAMP 9	31-Mar-09	STL	28.9	188,629.78	46,339.60	142,290.18
POWERLINE RECLOSURE TO INNER LOOP	31-Mar-09	STL	28.9	157,797.57	38,765.20	119,032.37
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (MAIN OFFICE)	1-May-09	STL	5	28,316.08	28,316.12	(0.04)
POWER LINE RAMP 55.5 TO RAMP 58	18-Dec-09	STL	28.01	342,870.12	75,362.23	267,507.89
SECURITY ACCESS-ID CARD READER-LIGHT VEHICLE SHOF	03-May-10	STL	5	8,394.17	8,394.17	-
SECURITY ACCESS-ID READER - MAIN OFFICE	03-May-10	STL	5	2,604.65	2,604.73	(0.08)
RAMP 4 SOLLD WASTE SITE EXPANSION - 2010	01-Jul-10	STL	3	28,852.07	28,852.22	(0.15)
MAIN WATER LINE-175 PSI PRESSURE REDUCING VALVE	16-Sep-10	STL	26	32,440.00	6,626.38	25,813.62
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL-MAIN OFFICE	1-Dec-10	STL	4	8,945.06	8,945.16	(0.10)
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL-MAINTENANCE SHOP	1-Dec-10	STL	4	5,090.64	5,090.64	-
SECURITY CAMERAS - MAIN OFFICE	1-Dec-10	STL	5	20,911.62	20,911.62	-
SEDCO MONITORING SURFACE WATER PUMP STATION 3	12-Aug-11	STL	5	10,972.21	5,120.38	5,851.83
SEDCO MONITORING SURFACE WATER PUMP STATION 10	12-Aug-11	STL	5	10,972.21	5,120.38	5,851.83
SEDCO MONITORING SURFACE WATER PUMP STATION 13	12-Aug-11	STL	5	10,972.20	5,120.38	5,851.82
SECURITY CAMERAS - MAIN PARKING LOT	1-Nov-11	STL	5	3,939.99	3,480.30	459.69
VEHICLE HOIST - GAS SHOP	21-Dec-11	STL	15	186,381.42	53,843.46	132,537.96
SEDCO MONITORING - SURFACE WATER PUMP STATION #8	21-Aug-12	STL	25.4	16,042.10	2,314.32	13,727.78
SEDCO MONITORING - SURFACE WATER PUMP STATION #9	21-Aug-12	STL	25.4	16,042.10	2,314.32	13,727.78
SEDCO MONITORING - SURFACE WATER PUMP STATION #14	7-Sep-12	STL	25.4	16,042.12	2,269.11	13,773.01
METEOROLOGICAL STATION	8-Aug-13	STL	10	9,812.00	2,613.99	7,198.01
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - #81-05R-UOB	1-Apr-15	STL	22.9	20,424.08	897.75	19,526.33
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - #81-05R-LOB	1-Apr-15	STL	22.9	20,424.08	897.75	19,526.33
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - #81-05R-IB	1-Apr-15	STL	22.9	20,424.08	897.75	19,526.33
RAMP 4 SOLID WASTE SITE EXPANSION - 2015	30-Oct-15	STL	5	151,782.02	15,178.20	136,603.82
TUFF SHED-12'X14' - GAS SHOF	2-Nov-15	STL	10	5,421.19	225.90	5,195.29
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - 15-01-SP	5-Nov-15	STL	22.2	12,716.76	239.05	12,477.71
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - 13-01-UOB	5-Nov-15	STL	22.2	12,716.76	239.05	12,477.71
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - 13-01-LOB	5-Nov-15	STL	22.2	12,716.76	239.05	12,477.71
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - 13-01-1B	5-Nov-15	STL	22.2	12,716.77	239.05	12,477.72
PRILL SILO - 100 TON (BRADLEY METALS)	15-Jan-16	STL	20	118,442.30	1,270.79	117,171.51
PRILL SILO - 100 TON (BRADLEY METALS)	15-Jan-16	STL	20	118,442.29	1,270.79	117,171.50
MAINTENANCE SHOP - RAIN GUTTER INSTALLATION	7-Jan-16	STL	21-11	125,807.38	1,360.51	124,446.87
AREA LIGHTING - RAMP 9 WATER HORSE	4-Nov-15	STL	21-11	44,532.47	684.54	43,847.93
AREA LIGHTING - RAMP 59 WATER HORSE	15-Oct-15	STL	21-11	52,028.54	975.39	51,053.15
SURVEILLANCE VIDEO NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADE - 2015	11/10/215	STL	5-0	9,884.27	300.96	9,583.31
CONVEYOR SYSTEM	1-Jan-90	STL	48	163,360.00	110,013.75	53,346.25
SOUTHWING CONVEYOR	15-Dec-92	STL	32.01	100,000.00	72,997.70	27,002.30
ROADS, PERMANENT ACCESS	1-Jul-74	STL	50.06	122,563.36	114,905.11	7,658.25
ROADS, PERMANENT HAUL	1-Oct-74	STL	50.03	1,900,138.83	1,776,018.66	124,120.17
ROAD CONSTRUCTION 1977	1-Mar-78	STL	46.1	154,341.96	143,557.40	10,784.56
ROAD, SOUTHERN HAUL	1-Jul-89	STL	35.06	701,699.99	535,626.75	166,073.24
SOUTHERN HAUL ROAD	1-Aug-91	STL	33.05	404,159.35	300,471.09	103,688.26
SOUTHERN HAUL ROAD	1-Apr-93	STL	31.09	760,683.45	552,745.27	207,938.18
SOUTHERN HAUL ROAD (SOUTH OF RAMP 1)	1-Jan-94	STL	30.11	915,860.00	658,063.49	257,796.51
HAUL ROAD - RAMP 53 TO RAMP 54 (1994)	1-Dec-94	STL	30.01	588,274.04	413,573.07	174,700.97
HAUL ROAD - RAMP 54 TO RAMP 58 (1995)	15-Aug-95	STL	29.04	193,662.19	94,357.90	99,304.29
HAUL ROAD - RAMP 56 TO RAMP 60	30-Nov-96	STL	28.01	280,000.00	132,064.58	147,935.42
1997 HAUL ROAD R60-R61	15-Feb-98	STL	22.1	311,009.83	141,545.06	169,464.77
HAUL ROAD - RAMP 61 TO RAMP 62 (1998)	1-May-99	STL	25.08	339,381.48	148,479.39	190,902.09
TRANSMISSION LINES	1-Jun-74	STL	50.07	167,361.72	147,551.48	19,810.24
#6 SUBSTATION	1-Nov-78	STL	59.02	21,488.13	16,754.16	4,733.97
#1 SUBSTATION	1-Aug-74	STL	63.05	382,054.01	315,924.38	66,129.63
GEAR PROPEL BULL 365CF86	1-Mar-77	STL	23	103,508.43	103,508.43	-
#4 SUBSTATION	1-Dec-77	STL	60.01	328,127.25	259,183.68	68,943.57
SYSTEM, POWER DISTRBTION	1-Jun-79	STL	58.07	482,798.68	383,403.10	99,395.58
CABLE, TRAIL	1-Apr-80	STL	5	15,893.71	15,893.71	-
#10 SUBSTATION	1-Mar-81	STL	56.1	207,807.99	168,491.60	39,316.39
BREAKERS, VACUMM	1-Jun-81	STL	56.07	85,513.29	69,001.46	16,511.83
TRANSFORMERS	1-Nov-82	STL	42.02	74,505.06	62,796.62	11,708.44
MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS	1-Nov-82	STL	42.02	27,755.52	23,393.49	4,362.03

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
POWERLINE, TIE	1-May-83	STL	41.08	74,133.71	62,062.76	12,070.95
POWERLINE, EXTENSION	1-Oct-80	STL	44.03	31,872.69	27,618.25	4,254.44
POWERLINE, EXTENSION	1-Jan-80	STL	45	167,798.35	156,967.59	10,830.76
POWERLINE, '85 CONSTRUCTI	1-Feb-86	STL	38.11	63,440.77	51,128.69	12,312.08
#7 SUBSTATION	1-Jun-87	STL	37.07	134,466.27	108,847.55	25,618.72
POWERLINE - SUPPLEMENTAL FEEDER	1-Nov-87	STL	37.02	127,162.99	102,182.97	24,980.02
CABLE, 400MCM TRAIL	1-May-88	STL	7	93,714.96	93,714.96	-
CABLE, 400MCM TRAIL	1-Jan-89	STL	7	102,095.20	102,095.20	-
POWERLINE NORTH/SOUTH	1-Feb-90	STL	47.11	1,013,157.26	658,630.87	354,526.39
POWERLINE, AIR QUALITY	1-Dec-90	STL	47.01	16,000.00	10,547.01	5,452.99
MILLER AIR PACK WELDERS	1-Jul-92	STL	5	49,234.41	49,234.41	-
TRAIL CABLE	1-Mar-92	STL	7	87,744.80	87,744.80	-
POWER CABLE ADDITION	1-Dec-92	STL	7	141,585.60	141,585.60	-
RAMP 54 POWERLINE	1-Aug-92	STL	45.05	21,428.54	13,687.84	7,740.70
TRAIL CABLE	1-Oct-93	STL	5	68,386.50	68,386.50	-
SOUTH WING CONVEYOR ELECTRIC METERING	1-Jul-93	STL	44.06	60,500.00	36,979.96	23,520.04
TRAIL CABLE REPLACEMENT	1-Aug-94	STL	10	51,292.90	51,292.90	-
WATER LINE FROM BRIDGER POWER PLANT TO RAMP 2 WATER HORSE	1-Aug-94	STL	43.05	311,268.14	187,371.08	123,897.06
SOUTH POWERLINE EXTENSION	1-Jul-95	STL	42.06	792,988.77	459,633.50	333,355.27
#8 SUBSTATION	15-Dec-95	STL	42.01	127,046.30	73,665.37	53,380.93
SOUTHERN POWERLINE LOOP	15-Feb-98	STL	22.1	532,824.28	242,496.18	290,328.10
BARGE WATER PUMPS (TWO EACH)	30-Apr-98	STL	5	198,525.85	198,525.85	-
LIGHT PLANT - MAXI-LITE 695	1-Feb-99	STL	5	12,561.15	12,561.15	-
POWERLINE, 98 RELOCATION	1-Feb-99	STL	38.11	300,846.18	158,444.96	142,401.22
#11 SUBSTATION	1-Oct-98	STL	20	154,709.42	68,978.70	85,730.72
MILLER, BIG BLUE 600 AMP WELDER (NEW)	1-Aug-03	STL	5	16,798.88	16,798.88	-
MILLER, BIG BLUE 600 AMP WELDER (USED)	1-Dec-03	STL	5	14,943.62	14,943.62	-
#5 SUBSTATION	1-Apr-03	STL	21.08	18,200.00	6,808.54	11,391.46
POWERLINE FEED TO MAIN OFFICE AREA	1-Apr-04	STL	20.09	171,011.94	60,804.27	110,207.67
LIGHT PLANT-ALLIGHT-MS9K-10-2101-LIGHT TOWEF	30-Nov-07	STL	10	39,100.00	33,185.65	5,914.35
VACUUM TRUCK - INTERNATIONAL 7600 SBA 6X4	30-Nov-07	STL	10	292,335.00	248,116.27	44,218.73
MOBILE LIGHT PLANT-ALLIGHT-MS75K-9UX	1-Dec-08	STL	7	46,534.00	46,534.00	-
POWER LINE RAMP 60 TO 63	4-Nov-09	STL	28.01	343,054.07	78,253.47	264,800.60
MAIN CONVEYOR UPGRADE-2009	30-Nov-09	STL	28.01	3,434,404.69	778,756.75	2,655,647.94
WATER PUMP-HYDRA-TECH MODEL HT75DJV	2-Nov-09	STL	5	45,792.00	45,792.00	-
STEAM CLEANER - LANDA-VHG 5-30024C	4-Jan-10	STL	10	7,862.46	5,000.68	2,861.78
MOBILE LIGHT PLANT-ALLIGHT-MS75K-9UX	1-Dec-08	STL	5.04	46,534.00	46,534.00	-
MAIN CONVEYOR - BELT FILTER ENCLOSURES	26-Nov-10	STL	10	28,989.50	15,702.66	13,286.84
WELDER-BIG BLUE AIR OAK CC/CV DELUXE	25-Oct-10	STL	5	23,970.39	23,970.39	-
WELDER-BIG BLUE AIR OAK CC/CV DELUXE	28-Oct-10	STL	5	23,970.38	23,970.38	-
DEWATER PUMP (MOUNTED ON UNIT #2542)	28-Mar-12	STL	3	36,729.00	36,729.00	-
MAIN CONVEYOR-SAMPLING BLDG - WASH-DOWN FACILITIES	3-Aug-12	STL	11.7	36,710.75	12,236.88	24,473.87
TDS #3 STILLING SHED	6-Aug-12	STL	25.5	1,358,768.61	196,019.08	1,162,749.53
LIGHT PLANT - ALLMAND MAXI LITE II	25-Sep-13	STL	5	31,025.15	16,029.69	14,995.46
LIGHT PLANT - ALLMAND MAXI LITE II	25-Sep-13	STL	5	31,025.15	16,029.69	14,995.46
LIGHT PLANT - ALLMAND MAXI LITEII	25-Sep-13	STL	5	31,025.15	16,029.69	14,995.46
LIGHT PLANT - ALLMAND MAXI LITE II	25-Sep-13	STL	5	31,025.15	16,029.69	14,995.46
TRAILING CABLE - DRAGLINE	1-Apr-15	STL	15	113,153.79	7,543.57	105,610.22
PRESSURE WASHER - LANDA 54-30024C	1-May-15	STL	4	8,225.72	1,885.07	6,340.65
RAMP 2 POND WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM	1-Jun-15	STL	22.7	264,968.14	9,777.40	255,190.74
RAMP 2 POND - WATER PUMP	1-Jun-15	STL	10	64,987.61	5,415.60	59,572.01
RECLAMATION SEED CONTAINER - 10' X 10' WITH DOUBLE DOORS	9-Oct-15	STL	10	5,300.00	265.02	5,034.98
TRAILING CABLE - DRAGLINE (1,200')	11-Nov-15	STL	15	64,973.48	1,804.80	63,168.68
DRAGLINE, MARION 8200	1-Apr-81	STL	56.09	22,361,269.24	16,715,026.14	5,646,243.10
BUCKET, 75 YD	1-Nov-81	STL	10	364,638.53	364,638.53	-
DRAGLINE, MARION 8200	1-Sep-74	STL	63.04	6,492,629.60	4,689,510.50	1,803,119.10
CRANE - LIMA 90 TON	1-Aug-86	STL	5	90,000.00	90,000.00	-
TRAILER, LOWBOY 150 TON	1-Jan-85	STL	5	108,614.00	108,614.00	-
WATER WAGON-SCRAPER - CAT 631D	1-Sep-85	STL	19.02	384,557.60	384,557.60	-
MAINTENANCE FLATBED TRUCK - FORD T9000 (5TH WHEEL)	1-Feb-86	STL	5	112,982.69	112,982.69	-
DRAGLINE, BULK LUBE	1-Dec-85	STL	20	21,719.84	21,719.84	-
DRAGLINE, BULK LUBE SYSTEM	1-Jan-86	STL	20	21,719.86	21,719.86	-
CRANE - FMC 150 TON-LINK-BELT	1-Aug-86	STL	5	156,000.00	156,000.00	-
CRANE - DRESSER C150FVA	1-Oct-86	STL	5	83,570.00	83,570.00	-
PLATFORM SCISSOR LIFT - MARK MT25G	1-Jul-87	STL	5	22,056.00	22,056.00	-
LOWBOY TRACTOR - CAT 777B	1-Oct-89	STL	7	580,299.36	580,299.36	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 777B END DUMP	1-Oct-89	STL	7	575,564.08	575,564.08	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 777B END DUMP	1-Oct-89	STL	7	575,564.08	575,564.08	-
MAIN CONVEYOR	1-Jan-90	STL	48	4,913,036.80	3,239,343.23	1,673,693.57
TRUCK DUMP STATION #1	1-Jan-90	STL	48	2,212,800.76	1,490,200.40	722,600.36
DRILL - DRILLTECH C90	1-Jul-91	STL	7	1,114,346.48	1,114,346.48	-
GRADER - CAT 16G	1-Mar-92	STL	5	358,852.83	358,852.83	-
SOUTHWING CONVEYOR	15-Dec-92	STL	45.01	4,334,378.84	2,732,371.93	1,602,006.91
TRUCK DUMP STATION #3	15-Dec-92	STL	45.01	3,104,239.48	1,956,250.54	1,147,988.94
DRAGLINE BUCKET - ESCO 79 CY	1-May-94	STL	10	305,581.50	305,581.50	-
FORKLIFT - HYSTER 6,000#	1-May-94	STL	3	22,169.00	22,169.00	-
DRAGLINE BUCKET - 79 CY	1-Dec-94	STL	10	305,581.50	305,581.50	-
HOOD COVER	1-Jan-90	STL	48	321,350.00	217,648.39	103,701.61
HOOD COVER	1-Jan-90	STL	48	186,925.00	125,883.77	61,041.23
HOOD COVER	15-Dec-92	STL	45.01	482,500.00	304,129.01	178,370.99
BAG HOUSE	1-Jan-90	STL	48	50,000.00	33,672.13	16,327.87
BAG HOUSE	1-Jan-90	STL	48	50,000.00	33,672.13	16,327.87
BAG HOUSE	15-Dec-92	STL	45.01	50,000.00	32,167.57	17,832.43
WRECKER BED - TRUCK UNIT #1584	1-Feb-96	STL	5	21,360.00	21,360.00	-
BELT RIP PROTECTORS	31-Jul-96	STL	5	31,188.75	31,188.75	-

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
LOADER - LETOURNEAU L1400	2-Jul-96	STL	10	2,314,180.92	2,314,180.92	-
INERGEN FOR CONVEYOR	31-Mar-96	STL	5	51,271.00	51,271.00	-
CONVEYOR BELT RIP PROTECT	30-Sep-96	STL	5	56,893.00	56,893.00	-
RECLAMATION TRACTOR - JOHN DEERE 8310 (CONVERTED FROM A COAL DRILL	1-Mar-97	STL	10	133,495.63	133,495.63	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 789B	31-May-97	STL	10	1,497,812.94	1,497,812.94	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 789B	31-May-97	STL	10	1,497,812.94	1,497,812.94	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 789B	15-Jun-97	STL	10	1,497,795.24	1,497,795.24	-
SCRAPERS FOR DRIBBLE CONVEYOR	19-Jan-98	STL	40	9,200.78	5,015.02	4,185.76
TRACK DOZER - CAT D11R	1-Jul-98	STL	10	1,184,069.65	1,184,069.65	-
TRACK DOZER - CAT D11R	1-Jul-98	STL	10	1,184,069.65	1,184,069.65	-
BUYOUT TRUST RESIDUAL INT	1-Sep-98	STL	39.04	7,841,745.23	4,195,095.95	3,646,649.28
WELDING TRUCK - FORD F550 SUPERDUTY 4X4	1-Nov-98	STL	3	28,326.90	28,326.90	-
SKID STEER LOADER - GEHL SL3410	1-Jul-98	STL	5	16,201.50	16,201.50	-
LUBE TRUCK - AUTOCAR ACL-64B	1-Feb-99	STL	7	170,861.45	170,861.45	-
LOADER - HITACHI EX2500	1-May-99	STL	10	2,410,747.50	2,410,747.50	-
TRUCK - FORD F750 4X2 (EQ. # 4294 MOUNTED)	1-Jul-99	STL	3	49,175.02	49,175.02	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 CREWCAB	1-Dec-99	STL	3	27,125.87	27,125.87	-
TRAILER LOWBOY - TOWHAUL RGS-275 TON	1-Oct-99	STL	10	289,836.99	289,836.99	-
FORKLIFT - HYSTER H300XL2	1-Feb-00	STL	7	71,408.30	71,408.30	-
TRACK DOZER - CAT D11R	1-Dec-00	STL	8	1,243,472.60	1,243,472.60	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 1TON 4X4	1-Jan-01	STL	3	23,230.77	23,230.77	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD CREWCAB F350 1TON 4X4	1-Jan-01	STL	3	26,344.38	26,344.38	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 3/4T 4X4 SD	1-Mar-01	STL	3	22,293.43	22,293.43	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 785C	1-Aug-01	STL	10	1,424,699.50	1,424,699.50	-
CRANE - GROVE RT855B	1-Sep-01	STL	10	341,250.00	341,250.00	-
LOADER - LETOURNEAU L1100	1-Mar-01	STL	3	360,178.58	360,178.58	-
DRILL - INGERSOLL RAND DML-LP-1600	1-Nov-01	STL	10	757,824.37	757,824.37	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 785C	1-Oct-01	STL	10	1,427,191.65	1,427,191.65	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 785C	1-Nov-01	STL	10	1,426,147.25	1,426,147.25	-
LOWBOY TRACTOR - CAT 789B	1-Aug-01	STL	10	743,202.38	743,202.38	-
LOADER - KOMATSU WA75 (COMPACT WHEEL)	1-Jan-02	STL	5	77,289.10	77,289.10	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4	1-Oct-01	STL	3	26,313.12	26,313.12	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 CREWCAB 4X4	1-Dec-01	STL	3	25,988.15	25,988.15	-
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4 - FM	1-Nov-01	STL	3	52,163.07	52,163.07	-
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4 - FM	1-Feb-02	STL	3	52,163.07	52,163.07	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4	1-Dec-01	STL	3	22,348.32	22,348.32	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4	1-Jan-02	STL	3	22,348.32	22,348.32	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4	1-Feb-02	STL	3	22,348.32	22,348.32	-
BOOM TRUCK - NATIONAL 446A & FORD 800D	1-Sep-01	STL	10	39,900.00	39,900.00	-
BUCKET, 79 YD MARION DRAGLINE #180	1-Dec-01	STL	10	404,237.50	404,237.50	-
BUCKET-COAL - ESCO	1-Mar-02	STL	10	151,035.15	151,035.15	-
FORKLIFT - YALE GLP060ZG	1-May-02	STL	15	18,699.88	17,349.25	1,350.63
TRACTOR - JOHN DEERE 7810	1-Sep-01	STL	15	110,280.44	107,216.98	3,063.46
MULCHER - BRILLIAN MLS 1483 HARROW	1-Sep-01	STL	15	12,474.25	12,127.63	346.62
GRADER - CAT 16H	1-May-02	STL	8	541,645.53	541,645.53	-
SCRAPER - CAT 657E	1-Jun-02	STL	8	1,242,215.60	1,242,215.60	-
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 785C	1-Aug-02	STL	10	1,467,476.95	1,467,476.95	-
MULCHER - AAREC HAYBUSTER MULCHER	1-May-02	STL	7	8,376.70	8,376.70	-
DUMP TRUCK - VOLVO WG64	1-Oct-02	STL	7	104,478.77	104,478.77	-
DRILL-TRAUX-SEED-RR-1210--RECL	1-Oct-02	STL	7	33,863.70	33,863.70	-
TRACK DOZER - CAT D10R	1-Feb-02	STL	10	845,502.87	845,502.87	-
LOADER - LETOURNEAU L1400	1-Jan-03	STL	10	3,222,130.82	3,222,130.82	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 4X4 SUPERCAB	1-Jan-03	STL	4	29,329.85	29,329.85	-
TRACK DOZER - CAT D11R	1-Aug-03	STL	10	1,378,114.55	1,378,114.55	-
ERT VC 712 SA PACE TRAILER	1-Jun-03	STL	20	6,412.37	4,114.53	2,297.84
SCRAPER - CAT 657E	1-Nov-02	STL	8	1,251,772.93	1,251,772.93	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4 SD CREWCAB	1-Sep-03	STL	4	25,077.13	25,077.13	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4 SD CREWCAB	1-Sep-03	STL	4	25,077.13	25,077.13	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4 SD CREWCAB	1-Sep-03	STL	4	25,077.13	25,077.13	-
WELDING TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4	1-Jan-04	STL	4	58,982.47	58,982.47	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4	1-Nov-03	STL	4	21,016.61	21,016.61	-
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4 - FM	1-Mar-03	STL	4	42,128.07	42,128.07	-
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FREIGHTLINER FL60	1-Mar-03	STL	4	104,145.99	104,145.99	-
WRECKER - FORD F550 4X4 LVS	1-May-03	STL	4	34,136.86	34,136.86	-
FORKLIFT - TAYLOR THD 160	1-Apr-04	STL	7	42,200.00	42,200.00	-
SKID STEER LOADER - CAT 226B	1-Apr-04	STL	7	35,152.57	35,152.57	-
DISK - JOHN DEERE 637	1-Oct-04	STL	7	12,241.16	12,241.16	-
LUBE TRUCK - KENWORTH 500 (AUTOCAR ACL64B LUBE BED)	1-Sep-05	STL	5	237,144.30	237,144.30	-
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4	1-Jun-07	STL	4	29,181.62	29,181.62	-
WELDING TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4 FM (2008)	1-Jun-07	STL	4	29,181.62	29,181.62	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 4X4 SUPERCREW	1-Feb-07	STL	4	29,944.61	29,944.61	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 CREW CAB	1-May-07	STL	4	25,738.26	25,738.26	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 CREW CAB	1-May-07	STL	4	22,486.18	22,486.18	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4 CREW CAB	1-May-07	STL	4	26,608.97	26,608.97	-
TRACTOR - JOHN DEERE 8310	1-Sep-07	STL	17	80,135.00	40,460.30	39,674.70
3203PRX TELESCOPIC CRANE AND CASECO BODY (MOUNTED ON ASSET 03364)	1-Jan-08	STL	5	28,536.50	28,536.50	-
RUBBER TIRE DOZER - LETOURNEAU 950D	1-May-08	STL	10	1,784,364.02	1,412,621.50	371,742.52
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 4X4 SUPERCREW	1-Mar-08	STL	4	29,938.10	29,938.10	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 4X4 SUPERCREW	1-Mar-08	STL	4	29,938.10	29,938.10	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 4X4 SUPERCREW	1-Mar-08	STL	4	29,938.10	29,938.10	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 4X4 SUPERCREW	1-Mar-08	STL	4	29,938.10	29,938.10	-
SPORTS UTILITY VEHICLE - FORD EXPLORER	1-Mar-08	STL	4	24,751.91	24,751.91	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 CREW CAB	1-Apr-08	STL	4	25,314.16	25,314.16	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 CREW CAB	1-Apr-08	STL	4	25,314.16	25,314.16	-
WELDING TRUCK - FORD 550 4X4	1-Apr-08	STL	4	29,041.71	29,041.71	-

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
WELDING TRUCK - FORD 550 4X4	1-Apr-08	STL	4	29,041.71	29,041.71	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 CREW CAB	1-May-08	STL	4	25,314.16	25,314.16	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 REG CAB	1-May-08	STL	4	22,646.72	22,646.72	-
WATER WAGON-SCRAPER - CAT 631G	2-May-08	STL	20	1,053,896.72	418,912.87	634,983.85
DRILL - ATLAS COPCO DM-M3	1-Dec-08	STL	7	2,485,872.60	2,485,872.60	-
GRADER - CAT 16M	1-Nov-08	STL	10	850,847.94	629,171.74	221,676.20
LOADER (CABLE REELER) KOMATSU WA600-6	31-Jan-09	STL	7	454,964.89	454,964.89	-
PORTABLE HEATER (2) (INDIRECT FIRED HEATERS)	1-Jan-09	STL	10	76,496.80	55,283.38	21,213.42
LOADER (CABLE HANDLER) - CAT 914G	27-Feb-09	STL	8	121,051.06	108,441.56	12,609.50
DRAGLINE BUCKET, ESCO 79 YARD	1-May-09	STL	10	655,610.00	453,463.62	202,146.38
LOADER-TOOL CARRIER-CAT IT62H	1-Aug-09	STL	12	336,013.26	186,674.01	149,339.25
SOUTHWING OVERLAND CONVEYOR-BELT REPLACEMENT	1-Dec-09	STL	15	1,564,859.78	660,453.15	904,406.63
TRACK DOZER - CAT D10T	1-Dec-09	STL	10	1,290,423.54	817,268.21	473,155.33
FORKLIFT-GEHL DL-1240H (12000#) TELESCOPING BOOM/ROUGH	1-Dec-09	STL	7	121,420.88	109,856.99	11,563.89
MANLIFT - JLG 150 HAX	10-Nov-09	STL	10	456,705.40	291,208.54	165,496.86
PORTABLE HEATER-#2 (2009)	1-Dec-09	STL	10	34,640.80	21,939.16	12,701.64
PORTABLE HEATER-#1 (2009)	1-Dec-09	STL	10	34,640.80	21,939.16	12,701.64
CABLE HANDLING LOADER - CAT 914G	1-Dec-09	STL	7	123,675.58	111,896.95	11,778.63
BACKHOE - CAT 430E	1-Dec-09	STL	5	118,802.54	118,802.54	-
BACKHOE W/HAMMER - CAT 430E	1-Dec-09	STL	5	147,929.84	147,929.84	-
SKID STEER LOADER - CAT 226B	1-Dec-09	STL	7	27,560.00	24,935.23	2,624.77
FORKLIFT TRUCK	1-Jan-10	STL	5	29,960.90	29,960.90	-
LOADER - CAT 906	11-Jan-10	STL	5	67,953.12	67,953.12	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 XL	1-Feb-10	STL	4	30,129.05	30,129.05	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 XL	1-Feb-10	STL	4	28,587.32	28,587.32	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 XL	1-Feb-10	STL	4	28,587.32	28,587.32	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 XL	1-Feb-10	STL	4	23,469.42	23,469.42	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 XL	1-Feb-10	STL	4	23,538.71	23,538.71	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 XL	1-Feb-10	STL	4	34,019.14	34,019.14	-
LUBE TRUCK - WESTERN STAR 4900SA	12-Apr-10	STL	5	299,310.35	299,310.35	-
LUBE TRUCK - WESTERN STAR 4900	23-Jun-10	STL	5	297,070.20	297,070.20	-
DRAGLINE BUCKET-ESCO 77 CUBIC YARD	23-Jul-10	STL	10	676,909.83	389,223.17	287,686.66
UTILITY BUCKET TRUCK - FORD 750	29-Dec-10	STL	10	131,407.94	70,084.22	61,323.72
#102 DRALINE - ELECTRICAL AND TERMPERATURE MONITORING UPGRADE (201	2-May-11	STL	10	219,014.02	107,681.89	111,332.13
#103 DRAGLINE - ELECTRICAL AND TERMPERATURE MONITORING UPGRADE (20	30-Jun-11	STL	10	213,541.82	103,211.88	110,329.94
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	8-Aug-11	STL	4	25,015.25	25,015.25	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	31-Aug-11	STL	4	25,015.25	25,015.25	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	18-Aug-11	STL	4	25,015.24	25,015.24	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150	8-Aug-11	STL	4	31,221.06	31,221.06	-
AMBULANCE - FORD F350	26-Aug-11	STL	10	148,100.62	69,113.58	78,987.04
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	14-Sep-11	STL	4	24,944.89	24,944.89	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	1-Sep-11	STL	4	24,940.70	24,940.70	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	26-Sep-11	STL	4	24,495.20	24,495.20	-
GENIE SCISSOR MAN-LIFT GS1930	8-Aug-11	STL	10	8,839.29	4,125.00	4,714.29
DRAGLINE BUCKET - 77 CUBIC YARD (# 183)	6-Dec-11	STL	10	746,125.09	323,320.83	422,804.26
DUMP TRUCK - CAT 725 (ARTICULATED)	13-Dec-11	STL	7	290,989.00	180,136.00	110,853.00
FIRE TRUCK - INTERNATIONAL 4800	24-Jan-12	STL	7	97,830.50	59,397.09	38,433.41
WATER TRUCK CAT 777F	27-Feb-12	STL	10	1,626,153.75	677,564.03	948,589.72
DIESEL POWERED FLAGRO FVO1000TR HEATER - 1M BTU - TRAILER	18-Jan-12	STL	10	34,172.34	14,523.24	19,649.10
DIESEL POWERED FLAGRO FVO1000TR HEATER - 1M BTU - TRAILER	18-Jan-12	STL	10	34,172.33	14,523.24	19,649.09
DIESEL POWERED FLAGRO FVO1000TR HEATER - 1M BTU - TRAILER	18-Jan-12	STL	10	34,172.33	14,523.24	19,649.09
CAB & CHASSIS - FORD F450 (D & B DE-WATERING TRUCK)	28-Mar-12	STL	4	29,935.07	29,935.07	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	15-May-12	STL	4	28,328.66	27,738.46	590.20
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250	27-Jun-12	STL	4	27,203.35	26,069.94	1,133.41
TDS #3 WASH-DOWN FACILITIES	3-Aug-12	STL	11.7	36,710.75	12,236.88	24,473.87
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	6-Nov-12	STL	4	28,992.06	24,764.02	4,228.04
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	16-Oct-12	STL	4	28,992.06	25,368.02	3,624.04
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	18-Oct-12	STL	4	28,992.06	25,368.02	3,624.04
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4	22-Oct-12	STL	4	25,672.80	22,463.70	3,209.10
EXCAVATOR - CATERPILLAR-324EL	27-Sep-12	STL	5	255,489.50	183,100.81	72,388.69
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	12-Dec-12	STL	4	25,672.80	21,394.00	4,278.80
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 SUPER CREW CAB 4X4	1-Nov-12	STL	4	32,904.07	28,105.52	4,798.55
MAIN CONVEYOR-WALKWAY LIGHTING - DEADMAN WASH	17-Oct-12	STL	25.02	29,077.40	4,030.48	25,046.92
COAL DRILL - IRWIN (JOHN DEERE)	2-Oct-12	STL	10	534,754.66	187,164.14	347,590.52
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550	6-Feb-13	STL	4	58,403.21	46,235.82	12,167.39
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550	28-Feb-13	STL	4	58,403.21	46,235.82	12,167.39
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	18-Jun-13	STL	4	26,394.79	17,601.21	8,793.58
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 CREW CAB 4X4	14-Jun-13	STL	4	35,422.54	25,102.68	10,319.86
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 CREW CAB 4X4	14-Jun-13	STL	4	35,422.54	25,102.68	10,319.86
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 CREW CAB 4X4	14-Jun-13	STL	4	35,362.54	25,060.18	10,302.36
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	3-Jul-13	STL	4	28,113.40	19,333.30	8,780.10
DIESEL POWERED FLAGRO FVO1000TR HEATER - 1M BTU - TRAILER	31-Jul-13	STL	10	31,184.60	8,575.76	22,608.84
DIESEL POWERED FLAGRO FVO1000TR HEATER - 1M BTU - TRAILER	31-Jul-13	STL	10	31,184.60	8,575.76	22,608.84
DIESEL POWERED FLAGRO FVO1000TR HEATER - 1M BTU - TRAILER	31-Jul-13	STL	10	31,184.60	8,575.76	22,608.84
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	22-Aug-13	STL	4	28,113.40	18,747.06	9,366.34
GRADER - CAT 16M	9-Sep-13	STL	10	908,395.28	234,668.76	673,726.52
WATER TRUCK - CAT 777G	28-Aug-13	STL	10	1,899,543.30	503,818.46	1,395,724.84
MAIN CONVEYOR - BELT REPLACEMENT (2013)	29-Sep-13	STL	10	2,155,534.91	556,846.50	1,598,688.41
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4	17-Oct-13	STL	4	60,292.82	37,664.71	22,628.11
MECHANIC'S TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4	15-Nov-13	STL	4	61,647.42	37,249.81	24,397.61
TRACK DOZER - CAT D-11T	16-Dec-13	STL	10	2,136,934.72	498,618.09	1,638,316.63
WATER WAGON-SCRAPER - CAT 631G	23-Dec-13	STL	20	1,309,540.10	152,779.67	1,156,760.43
ELEMENTAL ANALYZER/SAMPLER BUILDING	23-Dec-13	STL	24	582,601.40	56,445.80	526,155.60
MCLANAHAN SAMPLING SYSTEM	23-Dec-13	STL	15	555,128.22	86,353.27	468,774.95
SATELLITE (INTERNET) ANTENNA - THANE BGAN EXPLORER 325 (D/L 102	2-Jan-14	STL	5	7,706.68	3,467.98	4,238.70

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
SATELLITE (INTERNET) ANTENNA - THANE BGAN EXPLORER 325 (D/L 103	2-Jan-14	STL	5	7,706.67	3,467.98	4,238.69
FIFTH WHEEL TRUCK - FORD F550 4X4 (2013)	2-Jan-14	STL	5	37,010.88	16,654.92	20,355.96
TRAILER - LANDA SLX 10-3282E (STEAM CLEANER)	2-Jan-14	STL	4	30,992.38	17,433.14	13,559.24
TRAILER - LANDA SLX 10-3282E (STEAM CLEANER)	2-Jan-14	STL	4	30,992.38	17,433.14	13,559.24
FLEET FREIGHTLINER - M2106	2-Jan-14	STL	4	166,200.99	93,488.04	72,712.95
SKID STEER LOADER - CAT ST-226B3	2-Jan-14	STL	7	36,847.72	11,843.90	25,003.82
TDS #3 AREA LIGHTING ADDITION	2-Jan-14	STL	24	85,157.86	7,983.59	77,174.27
MAIN CONVEYOR-AREA LIGHTING (WILDLIFE CROSSING)	2-Jan-14	STL	24	43,722.27	4,098.91	39,623.36
LUBE TRUCK - WESTERN STAR 4900B	13-Mar-14	STL	5	310,185.74	129,244.04	180,941.70
TRACK DOZER - CAT D-11T	8-Sep-14	STL	10	2,366,451.06	374,688.09	1,991,762.97
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4	17-Sep-14	STL	4	28,026.29	11,093.72	16,932.57
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4 - 156" BED	9-Sep-14	STL	4	31,568.48	12,495.92	19,072.56
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4 - 156" BED	24-Sep-14	STL	4	31,578.48	12,499.91	19,078.57
HAUL TRUCK - CAT 785D	6-Oct-14	STL	10	2,558,010.08	383,701.50	2,174,308.58
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	1-Oct-14	STL	4	28,026.29	10,509.84	17,516.45
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4 172" BED	1-Oct-14	STL	4	33,406.39	12,527.46	20,878.93
LUBE TRUCK - WESTERN STAR 4900B	23-Mar-15	STL	5	361,373.10	78,297.52	283,075.58
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	24-Feb-15	STL	4	29,137.17	8,498.28	20,638.89
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	24-Mar-15	STL	4	29,137.17	7,891.26	21,245.91
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F550, 4X4	11-Feb-15	STL	4	34,697.73	10,120.18	24,577.55
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	1-Oct-14	STL	5	27,489.47	6,872.40	20,617.07
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F550, 4X4	1-Oct-14	STL	5	34,698.64	6,361.41	28,337.23
TRACK DOZER - CAT D-10T	22-Oct-15	STL	10	1,412,961.46	61,684.79	1,351,276.67
THERMO SCIENTIFIC CQM COAL ANALYZER	30-Nov-15	STL	10	774,845.35	32,285.20	742,560.15
DRILL - ATLAS COPCO DM-M3	9-Dec-15	STL	7	3,150,344.06	150,016.40	3,000,327.66
SKID STEER LOADER - CAT 226B3	21-Oct-15	STL	7	37,226.14	2,659.02	34,567.12
TDS 3 DISCHARGE CONVEYOR BELT	18-Oct-15	STL	3	31,077.55	5,179.62	25,897.93
AUTOCRANE - PRX HW 3203 (MOUNTED ON EQUIPMENT # 1505)	13-Oct-15	STL	5-0	10,098.95	1,009.90	9,089.05
TRUCK DUMP STATION 1 - MCC UPGRADE (BUILDING, EQUPMENT, APPARATUS,	3-Mar-16	STL	21-10	681,557.94	2,601.37	678,956.57
WATER DISPENSER	7-Apr-11	STL	5	2,650.00	2,650.00	-
WATER DISPENSER	27-Oct-11	STL	5	2,650.00	2,385.01	264.99
WATER DISPENSER (REVERSE OSMOSIS) - GAS SHOP	23-Apr-12	STL	5	2,625.00	2,100.00	525.00
WATER DISPENSER (REVERSE OSMOSIS) - WELDER'S LUNCH ROOM	23-Apr-12	STL	5	2,625.00	2,100.00	525.00
TOUGHBOOK	27-Apr-12	STL	5	4,464.60	3,571.68	892.92
SOFTWARE - AUTOCAD	1-Aug-12	STL	2	1,356.60	1,356.60	-
VIDEO DISPLAY MONITOR - LG 42LD452B 42"	8-Jul-13	STL	5	686.50	377.57	308.93
VIDEO DISPLAY MONITOR - LG 42LD452B 42"	8-Jul-13	STL	5	686.50	377.57	308.93
PC WORKSTATION - DISPLAY MONITORS - HP 6300	8-Jul-13	STL	5	846.93	465.81	381.12
IPAD - APPLE WITH WI-FI	9-Apr-14	STL	5	2,391.03	956.40	1,434.63
SOLID WORKS SOFTWARE	17-Nov-14	STL	5	4,234.70	1,199.83	3,034.87
iFIX SOFTWARE LICENSING	2-Jan-15	STL	5	18,507.20	4,626.79	13,880.41
VIDEO DISPLAY MONITOR - 42" TWO-EACH (MAINTENANCE SHOP LUNCH ROOM	13-Oct-15	STL	5	1,259.28	125.93	1,133.35
INDUSTRIAL FIBERSCOPE	1-May-90	STL	5	11,923.60	11,923.60	-
EQUO TIP HARDNESS TESTER - ROCKWELL	1-Jul-89	STL	5	13,381.25	13,381.25	-
MILLING MACHINE - CINCINNATI	1-May-91	STL	15	15,600.00	15,600.00	-
TRAIL CABLE REELS (USED BY CABLE REELER UNIT #783)	1-Dec-91	STL	10	69,691.00	69,691.00	-
SEISMIC TRANSDUCER	1-Nov-91	STL	5	5,777.72	5,777.72	-
WELDING MANIFOLD SYSTEM	1-Dec-95	STL	20	292,009.83	292,009.83	-
SHOP TANK FARM PUMP	15-Jan-98	STL	7	31,616.30	31,616.30	-
LIGHT VEHICLE HOIST - GAS SHOP	15-Feb-98	STL	15	21,880.95	21,880.95	-
PRISM IV VIBRATION ANALYZER (MAINTENANCE)	1-Dec-98	STL	3	33,234.35	33,234.35	-
CABLE FAULT TESTER	1-Jan-99	STL	3	14,822.61	14,822.61	-
BORING BAR	1-Apr-01	STL	10	26,839.00	26,839.00	-
TWO POIST VEHICLE HOIST	1-Jul-02	STL	15	31,343.26	28,731.32	2,611.94
SHOP JACKS W/STANDS (4)	1-Mar-04	STL	5	39,000.54	39,000.54	-
MANLIFT-JLG JLG60HA	1-Sep-06	STL	5	5,000.00	5,000.00	-
PM10 TEOM MONITOR	23-Jul-09	STL	10	49,645.28	33,494.92	16,150.36
THERMAL IMAGING INFRARED CAMERA-FLIR T200	2-Nov-09	STL	5	10,755.88	10,755.88	-
BALEBUSTER-HAYBUSTER 2800	2-Nov-09	STL	15	25,986.22	11,116.30	14,869.92
WIRELSS NETWORK UPGRADE FOR GPS	1-Dec-09	STL	5	29,767.28	29,767.28	-
CAES GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (D11 DOZER)	1-Jan-10	STL	5	14,198.70	14,198.70	-
MOBILE A FRAME SYSTEM (FALL ARREST)	03-May-10	STL	5	52,571.88	52,571.88	-
MOBILE A FRAME SYSTEM (FALL ARREST)	15-Nov-10	STL	5	47,531.14	47,531.14	-
MOBILE A FRAME SYSTEM (FALL ARREST)	15-Nov-10	STL	5	47,531.15	47,531.15	-
FIBER OPTICE CABLE - ADMIN BUILDING TO MAINTENANCE SHOP	1-Jan-11	STL	5	7,933.57	7,933.57	-
WIRELESS NETWORK - ACCESS POINT #1	1-Jul-11	STL	5	6,951.10	6,603.54	347.56
WIRELESS NETWORK - ACCESS POINT #2	1-Jul-11	STL	5	6,951.10	6,603.54	347.56
WIRELESS NETWORK - ACCESS POINT #3	1-Jul-11	STL	5	6,951.10	6,603.54	347.56
WIRELESS NETWORK - ACCESS POINT #4	1-Jul-11	STL	5	6,951.10	6,603.54	347.56
WIRELESS NETWORK - ACCESS POINT #5	1-Jul-11	STL	5	6,951.10	6,603.54	347.56
WIRELESS NETWORK - ACCESS POINT #6	1-Jul-11	STL	5	6,951.10	6,603.54	347.56
HAY BALE PROCESSOR - TUBE-LINE BALE BOSS II	7-Oct-11	STL	10	20,034.00	9,015.30	11,018.70
RECLAMATION RIPPER -JOHN DEERE 915V	28-Feb-12	STL	10	21,954.47	9,147.66	12,806.81
NARROW BAND RADIO SYSTEM	25-Sep-12	STL	10	295,154.29	105,763.63	189,390.66
ROLLER HARROW CHISEL - BRILLION LS-1803	31-Jul-13	STL	7	22,556.70	8,861.54	13,695.16
MULCH CRIMPER/PRESS - WISHEK SP-16	31-Jul-13	STL	7	11,558.71	4,540.90	7,017.81
AIR CONDITIONING SERVICE UNIT - KOOL KARE PLUS - R134A	30-Sep-13	STL	5	4,982.00	2,574.02	2,407.98
AIR CONDITIONING SERVICE UNIT - KOOL KARE - R134A2	30-Sep-13	STL	5	4,982.00	2,574.01	2,407.99
PRESSURE WASHER - LANDA VHG 5-30024C	30-Sep-13	STL	5	8,249.75	4,262.38	3,987.37
AIR COMPRESSOR - VMAC PREDATAIR	30-Sep-13	STL	5	5,846.77	3,020.83	2,825.94
DRAIN CLEANING MACHINE - RIDGID	30-Sep-13	STL	2	820.84	820.84	-
AIR COMPRESSOR - VMAC PREDATAIR	30-Nov-13	STL	5	5,770.77	2,789.19	2,981.58
GLOBAL POITIONING UPGRADE - MOBILE EQUIPMENT FLEET	29-Jan-14	STL	5	306,592.31	137,966.51	168,625.80
LATHE - KINGSTON HD-4.09" BORE	2-Jan-14	STL	10	52,392.25	11,788.24	40,604.01
FLOOR JACK (MAINTENANCE SHOP) - AIR HYD 5M459	2-Jan-14	STL	5	1,378.27	620.21	758.06

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
HORIZONTAL BAND SAW - W.F. WELLS	20-May-14	STL	10	43,067.80	8,254.66	34,813.14
LATHE RADIUS CUTTER - MSCDIRECT - 12" DELUXE	14-Jul-14	STL	3	4,046.97	2,360.77	1,686.20
MAGNETIC BASE FRAME DRILL - ROTO-KUT	9/2/20014	STL	5	1,487.28	470.97	1,016.31
DISK HARROW - JOHN DEERE - FRONTIER - DH1615	3-Oct-14	STL	7	16,194.41	3,470.22	12,724.19
PLASMA CUTTER - ESAB POWER CUT 1300, PT 38	1-Jul-15	STL	5	2,720.89	408.13	2,312.76
TRIMBLE NETR9 REFERENCE STATION	16-Oct-15	STL	7	23,640.97	2,402.54	21,238.43
MANLIFT-JLG 3394RT	16-Nov-15	STL	10	49,751.10	2,473.63	47,277.47
WIZARD RADIAL ARM DRILL	2-Nov-15	STL	10	29,704.90	1,476.92	28,227.98
ASTI REPEATER TRAILER (MESHDYNAMICS 4350 RADIO NODE)	4-Jan-16	STL	7-0	12,871.23	580.77	12,290.46
ASTI REPEATER TRAILER (MESHDYNAMICS 4350 RADIO NODE)	4-Jan-16	STL	7-0	12,871.23	580.77	12,290.46
ASTI REPEATER TRAILER (MESHDYNAMICS 4350 RADIO NODE)	4-Jan-16	STL	7-0	12,871.23	580.77	12,290.46
ASTI REPEATER TRAILER (MESHDYNAMICS 4350 RADIO NODE)	4-Jan-16	STL	7-0	12,871.23	580.77	12,290.46
MESHDYNAMICS 4452 ETHERNET RADIO NODE	4-Jan-16	STL	7-0	9,878.50	445.73	9,432.77
MESHDYNAMICS 4452 ETHERNET RADIO NODE	4-Jan-16	STL	7-0	9,878.50	445.73	9,432.77
ANADARKO LEASE - SECTION 11	1-Jan-13	U OF P	650,000	65,000.00	1,144.10	63,855.90
BLM COAL LEASE - SECTION 12 & 24	1-Jul-14	U OF P	868,540	459,210.74	8,303.48	450,907.26
				166,648,011.99	110,556,489.92	56,091,522.07

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
				166,648,011.99	110,556,489.92	
				-	-	
HIGHWALL STABILIZATION	1-Sep-04	STL	20.04	442,749.18	261,440.22	181,308.96
PORTAL CONSTRUCTION	1-Oct-04	STL	20.03	313,792.24	184,763.34	129,028.90
DEVEL DRILLING FY05	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	168,457.30	95,273.64	73,183.66
DEVEL DRILLING FY06	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	100,123.50	56,626.53	43,496.97
05 MINE DEVELOPMENT	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	5,913,537.82	3,344,498.18	2,569,039.64
PRE 2005 MINE DEVELOPMENT	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	2,567,367.97	1,452,016.94	1,115,351.03
HIGHWALL STABILIZATION - COAL HANDLING FACILITY	1-May-06	STL	16	128,655.52	82,962.22	45,693.30
DEVELMENT DRILLING - 2006	1-Jan-07	STL	18	137,796.15	74,052.85	63,743.30
DEVEL DRILLING 07	1-Aug-07	STL	17	102,507.51	54,765.78	47,741.73
UG SEWAGE LAGOON & SEPTIC SYSTEM	1-Oct-08	STL	17.02	692,763.39	320,370.94	372,392.45
DEVELOPMENT DRILLING-2008	1-Jan-09	STL	15	146,030.47	74,167.28	71,863.19
DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - 2009	1-Dec-09	STL	15.01	242,826.42	108,641.31	134,185.11
HIGH-WALL STABILIZATION - COAL HANDLING FACILITIES	1-Jan-10	STL	15	530,937.64	234,348.17	296,589.47
SURFACE DRAINAGE-RAMP 14 HIGHWALL	1-Feb-10	STL	14.11	315,335.00	138,741.31	176,593.69
FACILITIES SEDIMENT POND #3	12-Aug-11	STL	13.4	26,312.50	10,232.70	16,079.80
FACILITIES SEDIMENT POND #4	12-Aug-11	STL	13.4	26,312.50	10,232.70	16,079.80
FACILITIES SEDIMENT POND #5	12-Aug-11	STL	13.4	26,312.50	10,232.70	16,079.80
FACILITIES SEDIMENT POND #6	12-Aug-11	STL	13.4	26,312.50	10,232.70	16,079.80
MINE DEVELOPMENT LUCITE HILLS	18-Jan-08	STL	30	420,799.02	253,995.75	166,803.27
MINE DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - 2010	2-May-11	STL	13.8	120,273.69	48,273.15	72,000.54
DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - 2011	7-Nov-11	STL	13.2	257,692.27	96,862.95	160,829.32
MINE DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - 2012	15-Jan-13	STL	8.10	34,178.52	10,495.70	23,682.82
MINE DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - 2013	12-Nov-13	STL	8.11	193,238.22	47,896.67	145,341.55
MINE DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - WEST DISTRICT - 2014	1-Dec-14	STL	4	304,483.52	46,843.68	257,639.84
MINE DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - EAST DISTRICT - 2014	1-Dec-14	STL	9	197,914.30	29,320.64	168,593.66
UTILITY BOREHOLE 1401-UTIL (13TH RIGHT)	5-Jan-15	STL	3	142,904.34	59,543.44	83,360.90
MINE DEVELOPMENT DRILLING - 2015	3-Dec-15	STL	7.8	1,019,117.78	44,309.48	974,808.30
14TH RIGHT BLEEDER SUPPORT	1-Sep-15	STL	2-10	202,617.92	21,274.88	181,343.04
OFFICE TRAILERS (2)	1-Nov-04	STL	3	46,329.38	46,329.38	-
POWERLINE FEED TO UG OFFICE TRAILERS	1-Nov-04	STL	20.02	41,315.96	24,256.92	17,059.04
MINE FLOOD WARNING SYSTEM	1-Oct-04	STL	5	20,915.40	20,915.40	-
15/20 MVA SUBSTATION	1-Oct-05	STL	20	1,952,595.49	1,096,117.26	856,478.23
MINE POWER SUPPLY SYS	1-Nov-05	STL	10	28,467.06	28,467.06	-
ELECT DESIGN STUDY	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	54,062.26	30,575.60	23,486.66
WATER SUPPLY WELL	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	523,306.80	295,964.80	227,342.00
FACILITY SECURITY GATE	1-Aug-06	STL	10	50,313.05	48,635.97	1,677.08
OVERHEAD ELECTRICAL POWERLINES	1-Jan-07	STL	18	189,474.41	101,825.11	87,649.30
UPGRADE ROADWAY-FACILITIES TO PORTAL	1-Jan-07	STL	18	67,790.91	36,431.46	31,359.45
FUEL AND WASTE OIL TANK FARM	1-Jan-07	STL	18	110,484.86	59,375.43	51,109.43
UG WAREHOUSE SHOP BUILDING	1-Jan-07	STL	18	1,413,312.17	750,767.86	662,544.31
OFFICE FACILITIES	1-Jul-07	STL	17.06	645,643.78	337,355.18	308,288.60
OFFICE FACILITIES	31-Jul-07	STL	17.06	1,405.72	712.26	693.46
MCC BUILDING 400 KVA	31-Mar-08	STL	16.1	168,060.16	84,662.93	83,397.23
UNDERGROUND FUEL STORAGE BUILDING	1-Apr-08	STL	10	37,072.72	29,653.16	7,419.56
UG MINE WATER SUPPLY WELL NO. 2 FOR POTABLE WATER	1-Apr-08	STL	16.09	147,008.55	74,297.20	72,711.35
UG SURFACE STORAGE FACILITIES	1-Jun-08	STL	20	625,063.15	287,263.00	337,800.15
UNDERGROUND MINE BATH HOUSE	1-Dec-08	STL	16.01	3,163,382.84	1,525,934.29	1,637,448.55
NON-POTABLE WATER SYSTEM	1-Dec-08	STL	16.01	1,403,187.20	676,733.33	726,453.87
PARKING GARAGE, BOOT WASH AND WASH BAY	1-Dec-08	STL	16.01	1,777,995.10	860,204.00	917,791.10
PALLET RACKS-MATERIAL STORA	31-Jan-09	STL	8	7,143.38	6,473.67	669.71
DIESEL STORAGE TANK FARM	1-Jan-09	STL	15	60,891.24	30,928.65	29,962.59
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY D	31-Mar-09	STL	15.09	154,328.39	73,542.62	80,785.77
SURFACE SWITCHING-RECLOSING	31-Mar-09	STL	15.09	467,902.32	222,971.05	244,931.27
SECURITY-ID BADGE SYSTEM	30-Apr-09	STL	5	4,812.67	4,812.67	-
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (UG OFFICE)	1-May-09	STL	5	10,586.54	10,586.54	-
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (UG WAREHOUSE)	1-May-09	STL	5	7,812.23	7,812.23	-
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (UG BATHHOUSE)	1-May-09	STL	5	3,605.41	3,605.41	-
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (UG ENGINEERING	1-May-09	STL	5	4,398.65	4,398.65	-
BATHHOUSE ENCLOSED WALKWAY	31-Oct-09	STL	14.03	232,833.00	111,512.53	121,320.47
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY DOWN AREA & RAMP 14	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	80,351.84	36,431.18	43,920.66
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY DOWN AREA & RAMP 14	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	80,351.84	36,431.18	43,920.66
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY DOWN AREA & RAMP 14	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	80,351.81	36,431.18	43,920.63
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY DOWN AREA & RAMP 14	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	80,351.84	36,431.18	43,920.66
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY DOWN AREA & RAMP 14	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	80,351.83	36,431.18	43,920.65
SURFACE AREA LIGHTING-LAY DOWN AREA & RAMP 14	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	80,351.83	36,428.80	43,923.03
RETAINING WALL-PORTAL	1-Jan-10	STL	15	162,154.00	71,548.40	90,605.60
PARKING GARAGE-FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM	1-Jan-10	STL	10	68,243.14	41,528.15	26,714.99
RAMP 11 WATER DISPOSAL PIPELINE TO JB BRIDGER POWER	1-Mar-10	STL	14.09	4,977,819.91	2,174,292.31	2,803,527.60
RAMP 4 SOLID WASTE SITE EXPANSION - 2010	1-Jul-10	STL	3	58,578.46	58,578.31	0.15
RAMP 11 VALVE BOX	1-Jul-10	STL	14.06	1,220,400.46	512,212.14	708,188.32
RAMP 8 DE-WATERING WELL	1-Jul-10	STL	14.06	61,348.76	26,119.13	35,229.63
RAMP 8 DE-WATERING WELL-PUMP	1-Jul-10	STL	3	59,846.50	26,301.99	33,544.51
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE	2-Nov-10	STL	13.02	1,148,297.30	487,838.69	660,458.61
AREA LIGHT - TRUCK DUMP STATION #2 STOCKPILE	13-Jan-11	STL	13	103,485.83	20,122.20	83,363.63
SURFACE STORAGE CONTAINERS-20' (FIVE EACH)	14-Feb-11	STL	10	14,702.80	7,596.40	7,106.40
UG MINE-SECURED STORAGE FACILITY	1-Aug-11	STL	12.5	64,504.30	25,085.05	39,419.25
WAREHOUSE CONCRETE APRON PAD - 30'X60'X4"	1-Aug-11	STL	13.5	21,451.81	8,342.35	13,109.46
POWERLINE - ALTERNATE UNDERGROUND FEED	25-Oct-11	STL	13.3	61,914.00	23,544.66	38,369.34

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
ROM FACILITY - SOUTH RETAINING WALL	1-Jul-11	STL	13.6	82,702.60	32,510.61	50,191.99
ROM FACILITY - NORTH RETAINING WALL	1-Jul-11	STL	13.6	61,854.53	24,315.15	37,539.38
ROM FACILITY - DRAINAGE PADS	1-Jul-11	STL	13.6	56,178.50	22,083.99	34,094.51
WATER TREATMENT - CLARIFIER FACILITY	9-Dec-11	STL	13.1	3,896,669.89	1,447,334.57	2,449,335.32
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL BCX-26-UOB	3-Jan-12	STL	13	27,825.22	10,209.20	17,616.02
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL BCX-26-LOB	3-Jan-12	STL	13	52,574.66	19,289.83	33,284.83
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL BCX-26-IB	3-Jan-12	STL	13	71,154.48	26,106.96	45,047.52
ROM BUILDING - NATURAL GAS HEATER (SKID MOUNTED)	2-Feb-12	STL	12	70,463.50	24,466.46	45,997.04
ROM BUILDING - NATURAL GAS HEATER (SKID MOUNTED)	2-Feb-12	STL	12	23,492.78	8,157.19	15,335.59
WAREHOUSE CONCRETE PAD (EXTENSION)	29-Oct-12	STL	12.03	23,415.43	7,565.00	15,850.43
CONCRETE TRANSFORMER PAD (ADJACENT TO WAREHOUSE)	29-Oct-12	STL	12.03	18,313.84	5,916.84	12,397.00
CONCRETE PADS (SURROUNDING OFFICE/SHOP/WAREHOUSE)	2-Oct-12	STL	12.03	26,924.44	8,698.64	18,225.80
PALLET RACKS (INSTALLED IN PARKING GARAGE)	6-Oct-12	STL	12.03	3,138.50	1,013.92	2,124.58
WAREHOUSE-MODULAR OFFICE - 15' X 16' X 8' HIGH	1-Mar-13	STL	11	9,350.57	2,642.61	6,707.96
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL - BCX-48-UOB	2-Jan-13	STL	10.2	52,095.48	15,303.96	36,791.52
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL - BCX-2010-D LOB	2-Jan-13	STL	10.2	104,833.82	30,796.98	74,036.84
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL - BCX-2010-D UOB	2-Jan-13	STL	10.2	38,439.33	11,292.39	27,146.94
OFFICE BUILDING - ENGINEERING	17-Jul-13	STL	10.1	147,457.90	38,665.82	108,792.08
METEOROLOGICAL STATION	8-Aug-13	STL	10	9,812.00	2,613.98	7,198.02
METAL LANDING-STEPS AND RAMP - EAST OFFICE TRAILER	17-Jul-13	STL	10.7	19,500.00	4,842.54	14,657.46
SURFACE ACCES ROAD - DISTRICT 2 TO 12TH RIGHT BLEEDER	26-Dec-13	STL	3	94,986.33	65,821.20	29,165.13
HYDROLOGIC MONITORING WELL - BCX-48IB	2-Jan-14	STL		116,635.56	27,383.94	89,251.62
OIL SKIMMER FACILITY	31-Mar-14	STL	8.7	185,918.90	41,132.50	144,786.40
CONTINENTAL DIVIDE ACCESS ROAD & PUMPABLE CRIB SITE	30-Oct-14	STL	4	218,290.08	81,858.78	136,431.30
CLARIFIER - PUMP BACK SYSTEM	17-Dec-14	STL	9	82,170.56	12,173.44	69,997.12
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - #713-WR	1-Apr-15	STL	8.3	20,424.07	2,450.88	17,973.19
GROUND WATER MONITORING WELL - #BCX-37-UOB	1-Apr-15	STL	8.3	20,424.08	2,475.63	17,948.45
JERSEY BARRIERS-CONCRETE 5' TALL, 10' SECTIONS - RAMP 14 HIGHWALL	15-Jan-15	STL	8.3	24,127.00	3,513.60	20,613.40
STORAGE CONTAINER - CONEX	28-Jul-15	STL	8	4,080.00	382.50	3,697.50
STORAGE CONTAINER - CONEX	28-Jul-15	STL	8	4,080.00	382.50	3,697.50
STORAGE CONTAINER - CONEX	28-Jul-15	STL	8	4,080.00	382.50	3,697.50
SURFACE FUELING FACILITY	29-Oct-15	STL	7.9	265,340.67	17,118.75	248,221.92
RAMP 4 SOLID WASTE SITE EXPANSION - 2015	30-Oct-15	STL	5	308,163.50	30,816.35	277,347.15
VARIOUS PROJECT AFUDC	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	147,039.65	83,160.64	63,879.01
ROAD CONSTRUCTION 1978	1-Feb-80	STL	44.11	3,234,830.77	2,736,059.59	498,771.18
SITE IMPROVEMENT - GRAVEL	31-Dec-07	STL	20	332,893.49	177,071.00	155,822.49
UNDERGROUND ACCESS ROAD AND ASPHALTING	30-Nov-07	STL	17.02	2,574,774.89	1,310,013.49	1,264,761.40
UG ACCESS ROAD - GATE TO MINE	11-Dec-08	STL	16.01	2,556,600.34	1,231,310.63	1,325,289.71
NO. POWERLINE EXTENSION	1-Jan-82	STL	42.11	62,329.54	53,822.70	8,506.84
WEST DISTRICT FEEDER CABLE (D/L TRAILING CABLE)	1-Sep-84	STL	10	60,453.00	60,453.00	-
WEST DISTRICT FEEDER CABLE (D/L TRAILING CABLE)	1-Jul-85	STL	5	16,774.34	16,774.34	-
WEST DISTRICT FEEDER CABLE (D/L TRAILING CABLE)	1-Jan-86	STL	5	20,656.80	20,656.80	-
WEST DISTRICT FEEDER CABLE (D/L TRAILING CABLE)	1-May-86	STL	10	29,709.63	29,709.63	-
WEST DISTRICT FEEDER CABLE (D/L TRAILING CABLE)	1-Jul-87	STL	7	22,995.00	22,995.00	-
WEST DISTRICT FEEDER CABLE (D/L TRAILING CABLE)	1-May-88	STL	7	12,806.00	12,806.00	-
MOTIVATOR-CUMMINS KTA-38 (OLD 850)	1-Dec-91	STL	10	188,008.00	188,008.00	-
97 FORD TAURUS 4DR GL (formerly 2332)	31-May-97	STL	5	17,201.10	17,201.10	-
98 FORD EXPLORER (OLD 2335)	30-Apr-98	STL	3	26,149.94	26,149.94	-
FORD F350 CREWCAB 4X4 (OLD 2829)	1-Oct-98	STL	3	25,181.10	25,181.10	-
99 FORD F550 SUPRDTY 4X4 (OLD 1575)	1-Oct-98	STL	3	28,326.90	28,326.90	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 (formerly 2843)	1-Feb-01	STL	3	22,293.43	22,293.43	-
02 FORD F350 4X4 (formerly 2851)	1-Oct-01	STL	3	26,313.12	26,313.12	-
FORD F350 4X4 SUPERCREW (OLD 2852)	1-Dec-01	STL	3	25,988.15	25,988.15	-
02 FORD F250 4X4 (OLD 2365)	1-Nov-01	STL	3	22,348.32	22,348.32	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 (formerly 2366)	1-Oct-01	STL	3	22,348.32	22,348.32	-
03 FORD EXPLORER (OLD 2206)	1-Jan-03	STL	4	26,567.92	26,567.92	-
DODGE 2500 4X4	1-Sep-04	STL	4	44,154.23	44,154.23	-
AUXILIARY FACE FAN-SPENDRUP 2802X	1-Oct-04	STL	6	100,841.39	100,841.39	-
AUXILIARY FACE FAN-SPENDRUP 2802X	1-Oct-04	STL	6	100,841.38	100,841.38	-
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	1-Oct-04	STL	3	47,995.86	47,995.86	-
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	1-Oct-04	STL	3	47,995.85	47,995.85	-
SWITCH, TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING	30-Nov-04	STL	10	68,228.67	68,228.67	-
LOADER-KOMATSU WA380-3	1-Sep-04	STL	10	117,925.79	117,925.79	-
POWER CENTER-2000 KVA - INTERMOUNTAIN ELECTRONICS	1-Aug-04	STL	10	124,880.36	124,880.36	-
VAPORIZER, RANSOM (COMPONENT OF UG HEATING SYSTEM)	1-Dec-04	STL	10	10,500.00	10,500.00	-
DUSTER SLINGER ROCK	1-Jan-05	STL	5	13,187.50	13,187.50	-
72" TERMINAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA - MAIN NORTH	1-Nov-05	STL	10	1,422,108.51	1,422,108.51	-
72" TERMINAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA - MAIN WEST	1-Jan-06	STL	10	1,161,552.85	1,161,552.85	-
60" TERMINAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA	1-Nov-05	STL	8	1,130,024.51	1,130,024.51	-
MAINLINE EXTENSION - FY 2006	1-Nov-05	STL	10	3,607,521.39	3,607,521.39	-
SUPPLY TRAILERS-LEMAR INC (THREE EACH)	1-Jan-05	STL	5	38,620.86	38,620.86	-
PARTS SKID (TWO EACH) / TOOL SKID (TWO EACH)-LEMAR INC.	1-Nov-05	STL	6	32,069.70	32,069.70	-
15KV HV CABLE	1-Nov-04	STL	10	40,468.82	40,468.82	-
POWER CENTER-2100 KVA CM SECTION	1-Nov-05	STL	10	203,099.40	203,099.40	-
BOOSTER PUMP	1-Sep-05	STL	8	18,480.00	18,480.00	-
TOW VEHICLE - EIMCO 975	1-Mar-05	STL	6	106,686.75	106,686.75	-
10ITX AND ACCESSORY	1-Aug-05	STL	8	19,290.69	19,290.69	-
POLYETHYLENE FUSER-MCA 12"	1-Aug-05	STL	5	26,453.70	26,453.70	-
TURBO DRILL	1-Jul-05	STL	10	10,170.00	10,170.00	-
FAULT WIZARD - MODEL 1UPFW	1-Jun-05	STL	5	10,158.75	10,158.75	-
ROOF BOLTER-FLETCHER HDDR 12	1-Dec-04	STL	8	358,980.87	358,980.87	-
FEEDER BREAKER-DBT/LA 7MFHB56A	1-Nov-04	STL	6	340,500.03	340,500.03	-
LOADER-CAT 992D	1-Nov-05	STL	5	326,303.16	326,303.16	-
SECTION KITCHEN SKIDS-(TWO EACH)	1-Nov-05	STL	10	22,021.28	22,021.28	-
HV SWITCH GEAR & TRIPLE SWITCH	1-Nov-05	STL	20	608,528.63	340,098.19	268,430.44

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
CONTINUOUS MINER-JOY 12-CM-12	1-Nov-05	STL	8	1,348,571.13	1,348,571.13	-
FEEDER BREAKER-DBT/LA 7MFHB56A	1-Nov-05	STL	6	381,880.80	381,880.80	-
DODGE 2500 QUADCAB - FLATBED	1-Dec-05	STL	4	32,584.65	32,584.65	-
ROOF BOLTER-FLETCHER CHDDR 17	1-Feb-06	STL	8	811,226.47	811,226.47	-
MAIN FAN TEMPORARY	1-Oct-04	STL	6	41,392.36	41,392.36	-
TRANSFORMER 7200 V	1-Jan-06	STL	7	20,000.00	20,000.00	-
SLINGER DUSTER CMS 2	1-Nov-05	STL	5	7,338.27	7,338.27	-
CABLE-BELT REEL INSERT (FOR TRAILER)	1-Apr-06	STL	7	6,195.00	6,195.00	-
500 GAL FUEL SKIDS-MAC'S MINING (TWO EACH)	1-Apr-06	STL	5	22,247.82	22,247.82	-
ROAD BUILDER - GETMAN RDG-1504	1-Apr-06	STL	6	413,344.09	413,344.09	-
WAREHOUSE FORKLIFT-CLARK GPS20MC	1-Apr-06	STL	5	5,040.00	5,040.00	-
SKID STEER LOADER-RC85-ASV	1-Apr-06	STL	8	45,202.50	45,202.50	-
72" CONVEYOR TRAMP IRON MAGNET-ERIEZ	1-Jan-06	STL	15	188,900.78	150,875.33	38,025.45
BELT STORAGE UNIT-DBT AMERICA	1-May-06	STL	5	407,602.57	407,602.57	-
60" BELT TERMINGAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA	1-Jan-06	STL	8	886,675.28	886,675.28	-
VENTILATION SHAFT	1-Oct-05	STL	20	1,035,241.34	614,762.15	420,479.19
OVERLAND BELT SYSTEM SCALE	1-Jun-06	STL	10	9,571.58	9,411.94	159.64
UG ROCK DUST TRANS TANKS	1-Mar-06	STL	10	69,792.63	69,792.63	-
AIR COMPRESSOR SYSTEM	1-May-06	STL	10	321,979.24	319,284.13	2,695.11
BULK ROCK DUST SILO & COMPRESSOR	1-May-06	STL	10	145,541.64	144,328.83	1,212.81
BATTERY POWERED SHIELD HAULER-DBT 650	1-Sep-06	STL	8	565,604.22	565,604.22	-
ROCK DUSTERS (3)	1-Sep-06	STL	5	120,104.25	120,104.25	-
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH-15 KV INTERMOUNTAIN ELECTRONICS	1-Aug-06	STL	10	65,818.40	63,624.51	2,193.89
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH-15 KV INTERMOUNTAIN ELECTRONICS	1-Aug-06	STL	10	65,818.41	63,624.51	2,193.90
05 CHEV 3500 EXPRESS VAN-15 PASS	1-Apr-06	STL	6	20,744.67	20,744.67	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP	1-Feb-06	STL	6	51,232.20	51,232.20	-
DODGE QUADCAB	1-Nov-06	STL	5	35,007.14	35,007.14	-
DODGE QUADCAB	1-Nov-06	STL	5	36,461.46	36,461.46	-
60" TERMINAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA BOOSTER 1	1-Dec-06	STL	8	1,051,785.65	1,051,785.65	-
60" TERMINAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA BOOSTER 2	1-Dec-06	STL	8	1,086,339.07	1,086,339.07	-
BATTERY POWERED SHIELD HAULER-DBT 650	1-Dec-06	STL	5	643,401.54	643,401.54	-
LONGWALL SHEARER TRAILER-MAC'S MINING	1-Dec-06	STL	5	113,548.48	113,548.48	-
UTILITY LOADER-BOBCAT MT55	1-Jan-07	STL	5	21,209.74	21,209.74	-
LONGWALL MONORAIL TRAILERS-MAC'S MINING (FOUR EACH)	1-Jan-07	STL	8	143,312.00	143,312.00	-
TWIN HEAD CUTTER ATTACHMENT FOR SKID STEER	1-Nov-06	STL	5	29,652.00	29,652.00	-
CONVEYOR BELT WINDER-72"	1-Nov-06	STL	8	19,080.00	19,080.00	-
TOW VEHICLE - GETMAN GR2100	1-Jan-07	STL	8	309,743.00	309,743.00	-
MOBILE ROCK DUSTER - EIMCO 975	1-Jan-07	STL	6	208,884.53	208,884.53	-
MANTRIP - TERRAPRO 7090-12 PC	1-Jan-07	STL	5	87,352.00	87,352.00	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Jan-07	STL	5	50,960.04	50,960.04	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Jan-07	STL	5	62,905.92	62,905.92	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Jan-07	STL	5	50,960.04	50,960.04	-
SURFACE FRONT END LOADER-CAT 930G	1-Dec-06	STL	5	152,110.00	152,110.00	-
ROCK DUST TRANSFER TANKS (2)	1-Feb-07	STL	10	63,339.24	58,060.98	5,278.26
BATTERIES - VERSATRAC HAULER (TWO - EACH)	1-Jan-07	STL	5	114,708.56	114,708.56	-
DODGE AMBULANCE	1-Feb-07	STL	10	51,096.46	46,838.34	4,258.12
MATERIAL TRAILERS	1-Feb-07	STL	5	151,461.22	151,461.22	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Mar-07	STL	5	61,970.66	61,970.66	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Mar-07	STL	5	50,737.74	50,737.74	-
LW SHEARER RANGING ARM SKIDS	1-Mar-07	STL	5	101,560.72	101,560.72	-
MINE VENTILATION FAN	1-Mar-07	STL	18	3,726,840.38	1,962,450.10	1,764,390.28
OVERLAND CONV-TRANSFER ENCLOSURES	1-Mar-07	STL	5	421,625.53	421,625.53	-
COAL STORAGE FACILITY	1-Mar-07	STL	18	2,298,423.84	1,214,251.75	1,084,172.09
BELT STACKING SYSTEM	1-Mar-07	STL	18	4,617,044.80	2,438,041.65	2,179,003.15
PORTAL AREA ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	1-Mar-07	STL	18	2,749,469.60	1,452,538.14	1,296,931.46
COAL RECLAIM SYSTEM	1-Mar-07	STL	18	3,289,133.67	1,736,884.76	1,552,248.91
LW SHEARER	5-Mar-07	STL	7	2,426,585.30	2,426,585.30	-
LW FACE SHIELDS	5-Mar-07	U OF P		31,301,612.47	16,428,369.82	14,873,242.65
LW FACE CONVEYOR	5-Mar-07	STL	7	4,821,186.90	4,821,186.90	-
LW STAGELOADER CRUSHER UNIT 1	5-Mar-07	STL	7	1,601,733.69	1,601,733.69	-
LW STAGELOADER SCRUBBER	5-Mar-07	STL	7	47,869.60	47,869.60	-
LW ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	5-Mar-07	STL	10	1,464,013.23	1,244,411.22	219,602.01
LW EMULSION PUMP STATION	5-Mar-07	STL	10	693,982.00	589,884.65	104,097.35
LW MONORAIL SYSTEM	5-Mar-07	STL	10	247,200.31	210,120.23	37,080.08
LW TAILGATE ROCK DUSTER	5-Mar-07	STL	5	26,970.18	26,970.18	-
LONGWALL MOBILE TAILPIECE - DBT 349968	5-Mar-07	STL	10	392,720.11	340,357.47	52,362.64
LONGWALL SECTION KITCHEN	5-Mar-07	STL	5	11,356.10	11,356.10	-
POWER CENTER-2100 KVA	1-Feb-07	STL	5	191,380.88	191,380.88	-
LW POWER WINCH	1-Apr-07	STL	5	184,361.14	184,361.14	-
OVERLAND CONVEYOR HOODS	1-Feb-06	STL	18.11	600,896.00	336,396.46	264,499.54
CAN SETTER - EIMCO 922	1-May-07	STL	5	187,236.12	187,236.12	-
LHD SCOOP - WAGNER 3.5 CY	1-May-07	STL	8	306,138.56	306,138.56	-
DODGE RAM 2500	1-Jul-05	STL	4	44,939.18	44,939.18	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Jun-07	STL	5	52,661.46	52,661.46	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 MANTRIP - FLATBED	1-Jun-07	STL	5	52,395.54	52,395.54	-
BLEEDER VENT DEWATER SYS PHASE 1	5-Mar-07	STL	10	349,211.41	271,886.05	77,325.36
BELT STORAGE UNIT-CONTINENTAL	1-Jul-07	STL	5	141,160.24	141,160.24	-
SURVEYING INSTRUMENT-LEICA TCR-403 TOTAL STATION	1-Sep-07	STL	8	9,779.37	9,779.37	-
ROOF BOLTER-FLETCHER CHDDR 17	1-Aug-07	STL	8	867,248.88	867,248.88	-
DODGE QUADCAB 3500 FLATBED	1-Sep-07	STL	5	55,746.78	55,746.78	-
TOW VEHICLE - GETMAN GR2100	1-Oct-07	STL	8	293,245.00	293,245.00	-
#2 OVERLAND CONVEYOR (EXCLUDING BELT)	1-Feb-06	STL	31.11	4,490,302.81	2,560,811.24	1,929,491.57
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH-15 KV INTERMOUNTAIN ELECTRONICS	31-Dec-07	STL	8	73,082.76	73,082.76	-
EIMCO WINNIE DUSTER (MOUNTED ON 230165 / 03111)	30-Nov-07	STL	6	13,200.00	13,200.00	-
EMULSION PUMP SYSTEM FOR THE LONGWALL EXTRACTION FACE	31-Dec-07	STL	8	237,381.70	237,381.70	-

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
SAFETY NEW REGULATION SCSR'S AND GAS DETECTORS	30-Nov-07	STL	5	49,322.31	49,322.31	-
BLEEDER VENTILATION & DE-WATERING SYSTEM	31-Dec-07	STL	10	1,963,533.28	1,611,349.71	352,183.57
AUXILIARY FACE FAN-SPENDRUP 2802X	1-Jan-08	STL	5	105,470.00	105,470.00	-
AIR DRILL - MINOVA TURBO (TWO EACH)	29-Feb-08	STL	3	25,270.40	25,270.40	-
ROOF BOLTER BOOMS FOR FLETCHER BOLTERS	29-Feb-08	STL	8	261,685.19	261,685.19	-
CHAIN TUBS FOR LONGWALL EXTRACTION	31-Mar-08	STL	7	96,420.60	96,420.60	-
DIESEL STORAGE TANK 500 GALLON-MAC'S MINING	31-Jan-08	STL	5	7,791.00	7,791.00	-
BELT STORAGE UNIT-DBT AMERICA	31-Mar-08	STL	5	565,623.10	565,623.10	-
72" IN-LINE INTEMEDIATE LOADING SECTION-DBT AMERICA	31-Mar-08	STL	10	40,332.80	32,602.35	7,730.45
TEKSEAL PLACER MACHINE	29-Feb-08	STL	8	57,326.36	57,326.36	-
MINE REFUGE CHAMBERS (4)	1-Apr-08	STL	16.09	409,597.04	337,069.20	72,527.84
COAL BLADE-68 CUBIC YARD (FOR CAT D10R)	1-Apr-08	STL	10	51,054.00	40,763.96	10,290.04
LONGWALL STAGELOADER SCUBBER	1-Apr-08	STL	6	48,390.80	48,390.80	-
LONGWALL SHIELD TRAILER (TWO EACH) UINTAH MACHINE	30-Apr-08	STL	8	508,977.70	508,977.70	-
LONGWALL STAGELOADER AND CRUSHER	1-May-08	STL	6	2,039,355.31	2,039,355.31	-
LONGWALL MOBILE TAILPIECE - DBT 349968	1-May-08	STL	6	535,872.35	535,872.35	-
LONGWALL ELECTRICAL SYSTEM (INCLUDING	1-May-08	STL	6	1,650,797.63	1,650,797.63	-
LONGWALL ARMORED FACE CONVEYOR	31-May-08	STL	5	3,854,009.69	3,854,009.69	-
72" BELT WINDER-IRWIN	1-Jun-08	STL	10	130,025.00	101,852.91	28,172.09
PAN BOLTERS - ARO S4100-1350 (TWO-EACH)	1-Jun-08	STL	8	462,107.00	452,478.54	9,628.46
COAL SCAN MODEL 2100 ASH ANALYZER - MAIN NORTH	1-Jul-08	STL	5	193,077.69	193,077.69	-
60" TERMINAL GROUP-DBT AMERICA (TRIPPER DRIVE)	1-Jul-08	STL	10	1,235,519.93	957,527.92	277,992.01
NORTH WING CONVEYOR BELT	31-Aug-08	STL	10	970,201.58	741,909.64	228,291.94
LHD SCOOP - SANDVIK LS175	1-Dec-08	STL	6	551,796.95	404,651.10	147,145.85
MAINLINE SEALS LONGWALL PANEL #1	1-Dec-08	STL	16.01	201,389.40	104,844.58	96,544.82
ADDITIONAL CAPACITY BLEEDER DEWATERING	11-Dec-08	STL	2	1,022,710.21	1,022,710.21	-
SKID STEER LOADER - MUSTANG 2086	31-Jan-09	STL	6	93,068.00	93,068.00	-
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL TRAILER-MAC'S MINING (NINE-EACH	1-Jan-09	STL	5	204,924.50	204,924.50	-
POWER CENTER-2100 KVA	1-Feb-09	STL	10	252,472.93	180,938.90	71,534.03
ROOF BOLTER-FLETCHER DDR-17B	1-Feb-09	STL	8	898,538.15	804,578.70	93,959.45
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	1-Feb-09	STL	8	679,405.85	608,615.71	70,790.14
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	1-Feb-09	STL	8	679,405.84	608,634.34	70,771.50
BATTERY POWERED SHIELD HAULER-DBT 650	31-Mar-09	STL	6	797,389.88	797,389.88	-
TRAILING SHIELDS W/E-BAR	31-Mar-09	STL	8	57,602.47	51,002.22	6,600.25
BATTERY P0WERED SECTION SCOOP-BUCYRUS 488	31-Mar-09	STL	6	392,521.45	392,521.45	-
BATTERY P0WERED SECTION SCOOP-BUCYRUS 488	31-Mar-09	STL	6	392,521.45	392,521.45	-
48" HAULAGE CONVEYOR (USED FOR PONY DRIVE SYSTEM)	15-Jun-09	STL	8	211,157.97	180,364.08	30,793.89
3RD RIGHT MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS	1-Aug-09	STL	15.05	146,870.00	73,416.63	73,453.37
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH-LINE POWER	30-Sep-09	STL	10	67,254.88	44,276.08	22,978.80
MAINLINE EXTENSION-2009	1-Oct-09	STL	10	379,421.22	250,207.90	129,213.32
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER-MAC'S MINING	30-Nov-09	STL	5	20,606.40	20,606.40	-
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER-MAC'S MINING	30-Nov-09	STL	5	20,606.40	20,606.40	-
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER-MAC'S MINING	30-Nov-09	STL	5	20,606.40	20,606.40	-
MINE REFUGE CHAMBER #1	30-Nov-09	STL	9.06	98,495.20	66,629.06	31,866.14
MINE REFUGE CHAMBER #1	30-Nov-09	STL	9.06	98,495.20	66,629.06	31,866.14
NORTH WING CONVEYOR UPGRADE-2009	30-Nov-09	STL	15.01	3,968,088.67	1,730,575.49	2,237,513.18
HAULAGE CONVEYOR-METAL DETECTOR-18"H	1-Dec-09	STL	8	19,410.58	15,366.68	4,043.90
CONVEYOR BELT WINDER - 72" IRWIN	1-Jan-10	STL	8	70,543.39	55,112.01	15,431.38
FEEDER BREAKER-BUCYRUS AMERICA 7MFHB56A	11-Jan-10	STL	6	736,056.32	736,056.32	-
TOW VEHICLE - FLETCHER 3885-AD	11-Jan-10	STL	8	502,603.08	392,455.21	110,147.87
LONGWALL SHIELD EXTRACTOR (MULE) - PETITTO 2555	4-Jan-10	STL	10	1,017,483.00	635,402.90	382,080.10
STEP UP TRANSFORMER-SMC	1-Jan-10	STL	10	17,871.60	11,169.75	6,701.85
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - DOMESTIC NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	10,806.64	10,806.64	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - DOMESTIC NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	10,806.64	10,806.64	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - DOMESTIC NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	10,806.63	10,806.63	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - IMPORT NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	11,191.38	11,191.38	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - IMPORT NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	11,191.38	11,191.38	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - IMPORT NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	11,191.38	11,191.38	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - IMPORT NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	11,191.39	11,191.39	-
PORTABLE AIR DRILL - IMPORT NEW MICRON COBRA	6-Jan-10	STL	4	11,191.39	11,191.39	-
LOADER - BOBCAT 5600	1-Jan-10	STL	5	54,164.05	54,164.05	-
SELF CONTAINED SELF RESCUERS (35 UNITS)	1-Feb-10	STL	2	24,115.00	24,115.00	-
LONGWALL SHIELD TRAILER (ONE EACH) UINTAH MACHINE	1-Feb-10	STL	8	235,492.00	181,525.07	53,966.93
CONTINUOUS MINER-JOY 12-CM-12 11BX	1-Mar-10	STL	8	1,982,570.92	1,506,231.48	476,339.44
LONGWALL MONORAIL CABLE HANDLING SYSTEM	1-Mar-10	STL	10	595,845.03	362,472.44	233,372.59
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	16-Mar-10	STL	4	52,338.16	52,338.16	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	16-Mar-10	STL	4	53,345.02	53,345.02	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	16-Mar-10	STL	4	53,345.03	53,345.03	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	2-Mar-09	STL	5	55,063.57	55,063.57	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	2-Mar-09	STL	5	55,063.57	55,063.57	-
VENTILATION BLEEDER SHAFT-DISTRICT 2	1-Mar-10	STL	4	1,793,072.03	1,793,072.03	-
FACE CONVEYOR PANLINE	1-Mar-10	STL	8	2,536,671.90	1,928,927.56	607,744.34
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-4TH RIGHT	18-Mar-10	STL	14.09	206,662.00	99,698.21	106,963.79
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	22-Mar-10	STL	8	796,491.85	603,505.38	192,986.47
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	22-Mar-10	STL	8	796,491.84	603,505.38	192,986.46
GATE-END SHIELD (ONE EACH)	1-Mar-10	U OF P	-	406,391.39	208,299.31	198,092.08
LINE & GATE SHIELDS (FOUR-LINE / ONE-GATE)	1-Mar-10	U OF P	-	1,960,112.52	839,269.84	1,120,842.68
DISTRICT 2 DEWATERING SYSTEM	1-Mar-10	STL	7.09	2,373,272.19	1,665,854.36	707,417.83
DISTRICT 2 DEWATERING SYSTEM-PIPELINE	1-Mar-10	STL	7.09	1,559,300.57	1,094,508.91	464,791.66
DISTRICT 2 DEWATERING SYSTEM-PUMPS	1-Mar-10	STL	7.09	1,214,824.69	852,713.53	362,111.16
DIESEL POWERED GENERATOR SET-CATERPILLAR 60-SERIES	22-Apr-10	STL	10	258,058.51	154,835.16	103,223.35
SECTION EXTENSION-2010	1-Apr-10	STL	5	304,382.15	304,382.15	-
POWER CENTER-2500 KVA BELT INTERMOUNTAIN ELECTRONICS	1-May-10	STL	10	311,752.20	184,453.40	127,298.80
DIESEL GENERATOR (BACKUP TO DISTRICT #2 VERTICAL TURBINE PUMP STATIO	29-Jul-10	STL	14.05	520,460.00	228,737.15	291,722.85
2500 KVA POWER CENTER-INTERMOUNTAIN ELECTRONICS	15-Oct-10	STL	10	305,235.00	167,879.26	137,355.74

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
72" TERMINAL GROUP-BUCYRUS AMERICA - 7TH RIGHT SUB MAINS - 1	15-Oct-10	STL	10	1,304,015.79	887,268.44	416,747.35
MAINLINE EXTENSION-2010	15-Oct-10	STL	10	838,210.50	570,328.72	267,881.78
72" TAIL SECTION/BRAKE - MODEL ST500AC1	29-Nov-10	STL	10	149,539.60	101,250.70	48,288.90
60" TERMINAL GROUP	10-Nov-10	STL	8	1,215,003.04	822,658.28	392,344.76
ROOF BOLTER - FLETCHER CHDDR-17B	31-Dec-10	STL	8	1,020,029.64	680,019.76	340,009.88
DIESEL POWERED SHIELD HAULER	23-Dec-10	STL	6	900,907.60	800,806.73	100,100.87
2500 KVA POWER CENTER	22-Nov-10	STL	10	295,387.50	160,001.52	135,385.98
RAMP 14 PIT - BELT FILTER ENCLOSURES	26-Nov-10	STL	10	28,989.51	15,702.66	13,286.85
NORTH WING TRANSFER - BELT FILTER ENCLOSURES (SIX)	26-Nov-10	STL	10	28,989.51	15,702.66	13,286.85
OVERLAND CONVEYOR - BELT FILTER ENCLOSURES (SIX)	26-Nov-10	STL	10	28,989.51	15,702.66	13,286.85
OVERLAND CONVEYOR - BELT FILTER ENCLOSURES (SIX)	26-Nov-10	STL	10	28,989.51	15,702.66	13,286.85
OVERLAND CONVEYOR - BELT FILTER ENCLOSURES (SIX)	26-Nov-10	STL	10	28,989.51	15,702.66	13,286.85
UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY-OVERLAND #2 CONVEYOR MCC	3-Jan-11	STL	3	4,201.30	4,201.30	-
UNDEGROUND CONCRETE PUMPING SYSTEM	2-Dec-10	STL	8	60,382.15	40,678.44	19,703.71
ROOF BOLTER - FLETCHER CHDDR-17B	24-Feb-11	STL	8	1,020,029.64	658,769.14	361,260.50
CONVEYOR BACKSTOP (MAIN WEST)	2-Mar-11	STL	8	69,523.65	44,176.44	25,347.21
MINE REFUGE CHAMBER	23-Mar-11	STL	9	102,606.00	58,344.56	44,261.44
MINE REFUGE CHAMBER	23-Mar-11	STL	9	102,606.00	58,344.56	44,261.44
WET DUSTER - EMTECH - MODEL S115-L60T	10-May-11	STL	5	11,299.60	11,111.35	188.25
WET DUSTER - EMTECH - MODEL S115-L60T	10-May-11	STL	5	11,299.60	11,111.35	188.25
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	5-May-11	STL	8	804,239.74	494,272.34	309,967.40
SHUTTLE CAR-JOY 10-SC-32	10-May-11	STL	8	804,239.73	494,272.34	309,967.39
CONTINUOUS MINER-JOY 12CM-11BX	17-Jun-11	STL	8	2,164,279.87	1,307,585.72	856,694.15
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS - 5TH RIGHT	1-Apr-11	STL	13.5	111,165.00	73,295.52	37,869.48
2500 KVA BELT POWER CENTER	3-Jan-11	STL	10	295,114.05	154,934.84	140,179.21
2500 KVA BELT POWER CENTER	31-May-11	STL	10	295,387.50	145,232.13	150,155.37
SECTION EXTENSION - 60 CONVEYOR BELT	14-Oct-11	STL	5	163,509.43	147,158.52	16,350.91
SECTION EXTENSION - 60" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE	14-Oct-11	STL	5	437,489.25	393,740.37	43,748.88
SECTION EXTENSION - HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE	14-Oct-11	STL	5	124,495.00	112,045.56	12,449.44
72" TERMINAL GROUP - CONTINENTAL - 7TH RIGHT SUB MAINS - 2	3-Nov-11	STL	10	1,069,528.07	674,821.32	394,706.75
LHD SCOOP - SANDVIK LS 175	26-Oct-11	STL	10	681,982.89	306,892.27	375,090.62
LHD SCOOP - SANDVIK LS 175	14-Nov-11	STL	10	681,982.89	301,209.08	380,773.81
CAN SETTER ATTACHMENT #1	21-Nov-11	STL	10	29,461.64	13,012.19	16,449.45
CAN SETTER ATTACHMENT #2	21-Nov-11	STL	10	21,702.44	9,585.21	12,117.23
MAINLINE EXTENSION - 72" CONVEYOR BELT	3-Nov-11	STL	10	287,753.39	181,558.62	106,194.77
MAINLINE EXTENSION - 72" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE	3-Nov-11	STL	10	202,167.10	127,557.78	74,609.32
TDS #2 WASH-DOWN FACILITIES	1-Dec-11	STL	13.1	36,710.76	13,635.41	23,075.35
OVERLAND #1 TRANSFER WASH-DOWN FACILITIES	1-Dec-11	STL	13.1	36,710.77	13,635.41	23,075.36
OVERLAND #2 TRANSFER WASH-DOWN FACILITIES	1-Dec-11	STL	13.1	36,710.78	13,635.41	23,075.37
LHD SCOOP - SANDVIK LS 175 #3	13-Dec-11	STL	10	681,782.88	295,439.17	386,343.71
POWER CENTER - 2100 KVA (SECTION)	27-Dec-11	STL	10	259,601.42	112,493.95	147,107.47
DYNAMOMETER & COMMUNICATOR	5-Dec-11	STL	5	19,928.00	17,270.92	2,657.08
TRANSFORMER - 2500 KVA (SURFACE FACILITIES - CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	10	52,629.00	19,547.87	33,081.13
TRANSFORMER - 1500 KVA BETZ (SURFACE CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	10	28,461.00	10,571.17	17,889.83
TRANSFORMER - 2500 KVA (SURFACE FACILITIES CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	10	46,269.00	17,185.57	29,083.43
TRANSFORMER - 1500 KVA (SURFACE FACILITIES CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	10	31,641.00	11,752.40	19,888.60
TRANSFORMER - 1500 KVA (SURFACE FACILITIES CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	10	28,461.00	10,571.17	17,889.83
MINE VENTILATION FAN (CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	10	365,790.00	135,864.78	229,925.22
LONGWALL TRAILING SHIELD (JOY)	1-Dec-11	STL	4	90,668.62	90,668.62	-
SUBMERSIBLE WELL PUMP (SURFACE FACILITIES CRITICAL SPARE)	1-Dec-11	STL	5	19,359.90	16,778.59	2,581.31
MAINLINE EXTENSION - HIGH PRESSURE PIPELINE	3-Nov-11	STL	10	22,767.14	14,365.00	8,402.14
MAINLINE EXTENSION - DE-WATERING PIPELINE	3-Nov-11	STL	10	8,629.94	5,445.10	3,184.84
MAINLINE EXTENSION - ROCK DUST PIPELINE	3-Nov-11	STL	10	112,150.62	70,761.74	41,388.88
DIESEL POWERED SHIELD HAULER	9-Jan-12	STL	6	942,873.24	667,868.54	275,004.70
72" CALIBRATION WEIGHT SET	3-Jan-12	STL	5	6,372.72	5,416.79	955.93
48" CALIBRATION WEIGHT SET	3-Jan-12	STL	5	2,406.20	2,045.26	360.94
SECTION EXTENSION - HIGH PRESSURE PIPELINE	3-Jan-12	STL	5	75,916.45	64,528.97	11,387.48
SECTION EXTENSION - DE-WATERING PIPELINE	3-Jan-12	STL	5	51,594.75	43,855.53	7,739.22
SECTION EXTENSION - TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	3-Jan-12	STL	5	131,485.08	111,762.30	19,722.78
ROOF BOLTER - FLETCHER CHDDR-17B	12-Feb-12	STL	8	1,071,592.73	558,121.19	513,471.54
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH	15-Feb-12	STL	10	90,499.62	37,708.15	52,791.47
60" TRIPPER DRIVE - BUCYRUS AMERICA	6-Feb-12	STL	8	1,044,193.10	543,850.54	500,342.56
EMULSION POWERED DRILL - LONG Z	15-Mar-12	STL	5	11,382.32	9,295.61	2,086.71
EMULSION POWERED DRILL - LONG Z (REVERSE HANDED)	15-Mar-12	STL	5	11,382.32	9,295.61	2,086.71
EMULSION POWERED DRILL - LONG Z (REVERSE HANDED)	15-Mar-12	STL	5	11,382.32	9,295.61	2,086.71
TDS #2 RECLAIM FEEDER	10-Apr-12	STL	12.9	568,889.24	88,371.04	480,518.20
TDS #2 CONVEYOR SYSTEM - R22	10-Apr-12	STL	12.9	235,440.92	36,573.22	198,867.70
TDS #2 RECLAIM SYSTEM	10-Apr-12	STL	12.9	2,158,729.03	335,336.58	1,823,392.45
TDS #2 AREA LIGHTING SYSTEM	10-Apr-12	STL	12.9	255,779.10	39,732.56	216,046.54
FUSION MACHINE-MCELROY MODEL 412	3-Jul-12	STL	5	34,485.63	25,864.20	8,621.43
TRASH TUB SKIDS (TWO)	12-Jul-12	STL	3	13,463.10	13,463.10	-
BULK ROCK DUST SYSTEM - AIR COMPRESSOR-200 HP (ONE EACH)	12-Jul-12	STL	10	80,243.97	30,091.47	50,152.50
BULK ROCK DUST SYSTEM - DRYER (ONE EACH)	12-Jul-12	STL	10	34,588.39	12,970.62	21,617.77
BULK ROCK DUST SYSTEM - 60" SKID MOUNTED ROCK DUST TANK #1	12-Jul-12	STL	10	57,639.62	21,614.85	36,024.77
BULK ROCK DUST SYSTEM - 60" SKID MOUNTED ROCK DUST TANK #2	12-Jul-12	STL	10	57,639.62	21,614.85	36,024.77
MAINLINE EXTENSION - 72" CONVEYOR BELT	2-Jul-12	STL	10	709,277.11	419,966.63	289,310.48
MAINLINE EXTENSION - 72" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE	2-Jul-12	STL	10	355,701.22	210,612.58	145,088.64
MAINLINE EXTENSION - HIGH VOLTAGE POWER CABLE	2-Jul-12	STL	10	74,947.88	44,377.10	30,570.78
MAINLINE EXTENSION - HIGH PRESSURE WATER PIPELINE	2-Jul-12	STL	10	72,616.33	42,996.54	29,619.79
MAINLINE EXTENSION - BULK ROCK DUST PIPELINE	2-Jul-12	STL	10	44,175.80	26,156.70	18,019.10
SECTION EXTENSION - 60" CONVEYOR BELT	2-Jul-12	STL	5	119,360.35	89,520.26	29,840.09
72" TERMINAL GROUP - FMC - 10TH RIGHT SUB MAINS	2-Jul-12	STL	10	1,166,047.68	690,422.91	475,624.77
2500 KVA POWER CENTER	2-Jul-12	STL	10	303,658.20	179,797.56	123,860.64
BATTERY POWERED SECTION SCOOP - FAIRCHILD	7-Aug-12	STL	8	489,610.42	224,404.78	265,205.64
BATTERY POWERED SECTION SCOOP - FAIRCHILD	7-Aug-12	STL	8	489,610.42	224,404.78	265,205.64

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
OVERLAND CONVEYOR #1 BELT (BELT ONLY)	28-Sep-12	STL	11.4	196,401.35	175,942.77	20,458.58
OVERLAND CONVEYOR #2 - BELT (BELT ONLY)	28-Sep-12	STL	11.4	402,284.63	293,190.42	109,094.21
OVERLAND CONVEYOR #3 - BELT (BELT ONLY)	28-Sep-12	STL	11.4	441,303.46	259,945.81	181,357.65
CONTINUOUS MINER-JOY 12CM12-11BX	17-Sep-12	STL	8	2,443,734.83	1,094,589.54	1,349,145.29
UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY - SURFACE VENTILATION FAN	28-Aug-12	STL	6	5,344.50	3,266.08	2,078.42
UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY - DISTRICT 2 DEWATERING CONTROL	28-Aug-12	STL	6	5,344.50	3,266.08	2,078.42
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4 W/MANTRIP BODY	12-Sep-12	STL	5	80,400.90	57,620.66	22,780.24
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4 W/MANTRIP BODY	23-Sep-12	STL	5	81,062.75	58,095.05	22,967.70
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4 W/MANTRIP BODY	2-Oct-12	STL	5	81,062.75	56,744.00	24,318.75
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4 W/MANTRIP BODY	4-Oct-12	STL	5	81,062.75	56,744.00	24,318.75
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4 W/MANTRIP BODY	15-Oct-12	STL	5	81,062.75	56,744.00	24,318.75
DODGE RAM 3500 MANTRIP	19-Oct-12	STL	5	81,062.75	56,744.00	24,318.75
AUXILIARY FACE FAN - SPENDRUP	30-Oct-12	STL	10	155,557.50	54,445.11	101,112.39
ROOF BOLTER - FLETCHER CHDDR-17	30-Oct-12	STL	8	1,096,477.34	479,708.84	616,768.50
MANTRIP - BAM	15-Oct-12	STL	4	36,737.50	32,145.22	4,592.28
MANTRIP - BAM	7-Nov-12	STL	4	36,737.50	31,379.86	5,357.64
MANTRIP - BAM	28-Nov-12	STL	4	36,737.50	31,379.86	5,357.64
DIESEL WELDER (MOUNTED ON TRAILER)	29-Nov-12	STL	5	23,903.67	16,334.14	7,569.53
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4 W/MANTRIP BODY	20-Oct-12	STL	5	81,062.75	56,744.00	24,318.75
IN-LINE DEWATERING SYSTEM (SIEVE) - BRAIN/SCHAUENBURG	20-Dec-12	STL	8	913,308.74	380,545.26	532,763.48
LUBE TRUCK - DODGE 3500	7-Jan-13	STL	6	102,669.90	55,206.51	47,463.39
LUBE TRUCK - DODGE 3500	7-Jan-13	STL	6	102,669.90	55,206.51	47,463.39
LUBE TRUCK - DODGE 3500	15-Jan-13	STL	6	102,669.91	55,206.51	47,463.40
SECTION EXTENSION - HIGH VOLTAGE CABLE	1-Jan-13	STL	5	31,600.00	20,540.01	11,059.99
SECTION EXTENSION - HIGH PRESSURE WATER PIPELINE	1-Jan-13	STL	5	94,427.33	61,377.75	33,049.58
SECTION EXTENSION - 60" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE	1-Jan-13	STL	5	153,778.75	99,956.19	53,822.56
MAINLINE EXTENSION - HIGH PRESSURE WATER PIPELINE	1-Jan-13	STL	10	46,922.40	26,142.47	20,779.93
BULK ROCK DUST SYSTEM - 60" SKID MOUNTED ROCK DUST TANK #3	12-Jul-12	STL	10	57,639.62	21,614.85	36,024.77
BULK ROCK DUST SYSTEM - 60" SKID MOUNTED ROCK DUST TANK #4	12-Jul-12	STL	10	57,639.62	21,614.85	36,024.77
SECTION KITCHEN	1-Mar-13	STL	10	13,099.80	4,039.12	9,060.68
DIESEL POWERED SHIELD HAULER - CATERPILLAR VT-650D VERSA TRAC	25-Apr-13	STL	6	953,055.16	476,527.60	476,527.56
72" TERMINAL GROUP - FMC - MAIN WEST #3	23-Mar-13	STL	10	1,145,017.87	409,266.57	735,751.30
2500 KVA BELT DRIVE POWER CENTER	23-Mar-13	STL	10	300,793.50	92,744.63	208,048.87
WATER TRAILER (2,500 GALLON - UINTAH MACHINE & MANUFACTURING	10-May-13	STL	5	51,159.15	29,842.83	21,316.32
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER	2-Jan-13	STL	5	31,237.50	20,304.39	10,933.11
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER	8-Apr-13	STL	5	31,535.00	18,920.99	12,614.01
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER	12-Apr-13	STL	5	31,535.00	18,920.99	12,614.01
FIFTH-WHEEL MATERIAL HAULAGE TRAILER	29-Apr-13	STL	5	31,535.00	18,920.99	12,614.01
MAINLINE 72" CONVEYOR BELT	28-Jun-13	STL	5.2	1,625,218.56	850,114.26	775,104.30
MAINLINE 72" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE	28-Jun-13	STL	5.2	691,068.45	361,481.90	329,586.55
MAINLINE HIGH PRESSURE PIPELINE	28-Jun-13	STL	5.2	136,871.77	71,594.47	65,277.30
MAINLINE ROCK DUST PIPELINE	28-Jun-13	STL	5.2	141,047.47	73,778.65	67,268.82
MAINLINE VENTILATON SEALS - 5TH RIGHT	2-Sep-13	STL	4	226,602.64	146,347.55	80,255.09
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS - 6TH RIGHT	20-Sep-13	STL	4	187,845.27	111,984.69	75,860.58
TOOL BOX SKID (FABRICATED IN SURFACE MINE MAINT. SHOP)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	7,910.50	3,955.24	3,955.26
TOOL BOX SKID (FABRICATED AT SURFACE MINE MAINT. SHOP)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	7,910.50	3,955.24	3,955.26
SECTION SHOP CAR (FABRICATED AT THE SURFACE MINE MAINT. SHOP)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	7,796.22	3,898.11	3,898.11
SECTION SHOP CAR (FABRICATED AT THE SURFACE MINE MAINT. SHOP)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	7,796.23	3,898.11	3,898.12
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH	31-Oct-13	STL	10	90,499.62	22,624.89	67,874.73
DODGE RAM 3500 CREWCAB W/MANTRIP BODY	4-Nov-13	STL	5	85,545.61	41,347.04	44,198.57
DODGE RAM 3500 CREWCAB W/MANTRIP BODY	4-Nov-13	STL	5	85,545.61	41,347.04	44,198.57
DODGE RAM 3500 CREWCAB W/MANTRIP BODY	4-Nov-13	STL	5	85,545.61	41,347.04	44,198.57
48" TERMINAL GROUP - CATERPILLAR GLOBAL MINING, LLC	11-Dec-13	STL	4	477,000.00	278,250.00	198,750.00
GRAVEL TRAILER - MAC'S MINING	19-Dec-13	STL	5	30,210.00	14,098.00	16,112.00
PUMP DISTRIBUTION BOXES - 2013	9-Dec-13	STL	5	56,348.09	26,295.69	30,052.40
DODGE RAM 3500 CREWCAB W/MANTRIP BODY	4-Dec-13	STL	5	85,545.61	39,921.28	45,624.33
DODGE RAM 3500 CREWCAB W/MANTRIP BODY	17-Dec-13	STL	5	85,545.62	39,921.28	45,624.34
72" TERMINAL GROUP - FMC MAIN WEST #4	4-Jan-14	STL	4	1,419,509.02	798,473.70	621,035.32
BATTERY POWERED SECTION SCOOP - FAIRCHILD - 35CWH-AC	4-Jan-14	STL	8	512,127.38	144,035.82	368,091.56
BATTERY POWERED SECTION SCOOP - FAIRCHILD - 35C-WH-AC	9-Jan-14	STL	8	512,127.38	144,035.82	368,091.56
TOW VEHICLE - JH FLETCHER 3885-AD	8-Jan-14	STL	8	556,575.72	156,536.86	400,038.86
BULK ROCK DUST TRAILER - MAC'S MINING	31-Jan-14	STL	5	157,781.00	71,001.44	86,779.56
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION BOX - 480 VOLT - INTERMOUNTAIN	1-Nov-13	STL	5	11,932.42	5,767.27	6,165.15
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION BOX - 480 VOLT - INTERMOUNTAIN	13-Nov-13	STL	5	11,932.42	5,660.99	6,271.43
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION BOX - 480 VOLT - INTERMOUNTAIN	13-Nov-13	STL	5	11,932.42	5,660.99	6,271.43
SKID STEER LOADER - GEHL V 400	25-Feb-14	STL	5	103,584.26	44,886.49	58,697.77
SKID STEER LOADER - GEHL V 400	25-Feb-14	STL	5	103,584.26	44,886.49	58,697.77
SKID STEER LOADER - GEHL V 400	11-Feb-14	STL	5	103,584.26	44,886.49	58,697.77
FIFTH WHEEL SUPPLY TRAILER - UINTAH MACHINE	2-Jan-14	STL	5	31,535.00	14,190.74	17,344.26
FIFTH WHEEL SUPPLY TRAILER - UINTAH MACHINE	2-Jan-14	STL	5	31,535.00	14,190.74	17,344.26
FIFTH WHEEL SUPPLY TRAILER - UINTAH MACHINE	2-Jan-14	STL	5	31,535.00	14,190.74	17,344.26
FEEDER BREAKER - JOY UFB-14B-59-106C	13-Mar-14	STL	6	750,453.68	260,574.19	489,879.49
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS - 7TH RIGHT	1-Apr-14	STL	4.4	184,212.08	80,383.44	103,828.64
TOW VEHICLE - JH FLETCHER 3885-AD	28-Apr-14	STL	8	556,043.77	139,010.91	417,032.86
MAINLINE HIGH VOLTAGE POWER CABLE	1-May-14	STL	10	78,476.46	33,425.21	45,051.25
MAINLINE AIRLINES	1-May-14	STL	4.4	2,939.16	1,251.89	1,687.27
SECTION EXTENION - 60" CONVEYOR BELT	1-May-14	STL	5	118,900.10	45,578.41	73,321.69
SECTION EXTENION - 60" CONVEYOR STRUCURE	1-May-14	STL	5	52,772.08	20,229.19	32,542.89
SECTION EXTENION - HIGH PRESSURE PIPE	1-May-14	STL	5	114,798.69	44,006.15	70,792.54
SECTION 48" CONVEYOR BELT (1,339 FEET)	1-May-14	STL	5	110,825.94	42,483.28	68,342.66
OIL SKID	2-Jun-14	STL	5	7,038.40	2,580.75	4,457.65
OIL SKID	2-Jun-14	STL	5	7,038.40	2,580.75	4,457.65
72" BW TRIPPER BOOM DISCHARGE ASSEMBLY	2-Jan-14	STL	4.4	318,000.00	165,115.31	152,884.69
BELT DRIVE POWER CENTER - 2500 KVA	27-Jun-14	STL	10	303,658.20	55,670.68	247,987.52
BELT STORAGE UNIT - 60" - CONTINENTAL	5-May-14	STL	5	621,769.50	238,344.99	383,424.51

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
DE-WATERING PUMPS - 2014	1-Jul-14	STL	2	150,785.37	131,937.16	18,848.21
DE-WATERING PUMP DISTRIBUTION BOXES - 2014	8-Oct-14	STL	5	133,663.31	40,098.98	93,564.33
12TH RIGHT HORIZONTAL BOREHOLES (THREE HOLES FOR DRAINAGE	15-Nov-14	STL	4	298,953.00	105,879.23	193,073.77
13TH RIGHT BLEEDER SHAFT	2-Nov-14	STL	4	2,010,872.45	711,722.85	1,299,149.60
13TH RIGHT DE-WATERING SYSTEM - 2014	12-Nov-14	STL	4	200,623.49	71,054.22	129,569.27
13TH RIGHT BLEEDER - ROOF SUPPORT	2-Jan-15	STL	3	857,257.56	357,190.65	500,066.91
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS - 10TH RIGHT	2-Jan-15	STL	3	562,320.59	234,300.30	328,020.29
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS - 13TH RIGHT	2-Jan-15	STL	3	657,178.27	273,824.25	383,354.02
TRIPLE SECTIONALIZING SWITCH	12-Apr-15	STL	10	100,870.55	10,087.06	90,783.49
COMMUNICATION SINGLE CIRCUIT DISTRIBUTION BOX - 12470V	2-Feb-15	STL	5	8,513.92	1,986.60	6,527.32
COMMUNICATION SINGLE CIRCUIT DISTRIBUTION BOX - 12470V	2-Feb-15	STL	5	8,513.92	1,986.60	6,527.32
COMMUNICATION SINGLE CIRCUIT DISTRIBUTION BOX - 12470V	2-Feb-15	STL	5	8,513.92	1,986.60	6,527.32
BELT DE-ICER STORAGE TANK-6,000 GALLON	11-Feb-15	STL	8.4	2,120.00	296.80	1,823.20
PERSONAL DUST MONITOR-THERMO SCIENTIFIC PDM3700	11-Aug-15	STL	5	173,220.96	23,096.16	150,124.80
MAINLINE EXTENSION - 72" CONVEYOR BELT	1-May-15	STL	3.6	366,254.57	95,923.85	270,330.72
COMPRESSOR-VANAIR MODEL-VIPER 80 (MOUNTED ON ASSET # 01304/UNIT # 150	2-Jan-15	STL	5	11,716.29	2,929.05	8,787.24
WELDER-MILLER TRAILBLAZER 325 (MOUNTED ON ASSET # 01304 / UNIT # 150194	2-Jan-15	STL	5	7,180.20	1,795.05	5,385.15
JOY LONGWALL MINING SYSTEM	1-Sep-15	UOFP	15,344	17,753,949.65	1,306,322.30	16,447,627.35
ANTI-FREEZE TRAILER-FABRICATED BY UINTAH MACH. (TANK & PUMP	28-Sep-15	STL	5	14,778.40	1,724.15	13,054.25
12TH RIGHT PUMP D-LINE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION (MONITOR ELECTRICAL	27-Aug-15	STL	3	15,852.00	3,522.64	12,329.36
MAINLINE HIGH PRESSURE PIPELINE	12-Nov-15	STL	3	52,962.96	7,355.95	45,607.01
MAINLINE AIR PIPELINE	12-Nov-15	STL	3	23,670.00	3,287.50	20,382.50
MAINLINE BULK ROCK DUST PIPELINE	12-Nov-15	STL	3	69,078.17	9,594.19	59,483.98
MAINLINE 72" CONVEYOR BELT (1,000 FEET)	2-Nov-15	STL	3	108,542.10	15,075.30	93,466.80
MAINLINE 72" CONVEYOR BELT (1,000 FEET)	1-Sep-15	STL	3	137,059.62	20,186.16	116,873.46
MAINLINE 72" CONVEYOR BELT (667 FEET)	20-Oct-15	STL	3	82,001.21	12,923.60	69,077.61
DIESEL POWERED SHIELD HAULER-WAGNER MODEL 3412	21-Dec-15	STL	6	132,500.00	7,361.11	125,138.89
TOW VEHICLE - EIMCO 980L	21-Dec-15	STL	8	79,500.00	3,312.51	76,187.49
TOW VEHICLE - EIMCO 980L	21-Dec-15	STL	8	108,650.00	4,527.08	104,122.92
ROAD GRADER - GETMAN MODEL RDG-1504C	21-Dec-15	STL	6	212,000.00	11,777.76	200,222.24
BATTERY POWERED SECTION SCOOP-FAIRCHILD	21-Dec-15	STL	8	175,960.00	7,331.67	168,628.33
BATTERY POWERED SECTION SCOOP-FAIRCHILD	21-Dec-15	STL	8	194,332.98	8,097.20	186,235.78
48" PONY DRIVE - DBT	31-Dec-15	STL	8	53,662.50	2,235.92	51,426.58
FEEDER BREAKER - LONG AIRDOX 4MFBH-48A	3-Aug-15	STL	6	58,300.00	6,477.76	51,822.24
FEEDER BREAKER - LONG AIRDOX 6MFBM-A8A	3-Aug-15	STL	6	57,592.98	6,399.20	51,193.78
MAINLINE EXTENSION-DEWATERING LINE	1-May-15	STL	3.6	11,214.80	2,937.22	8,277.58
#1 OVERLAND CONVEYOR (EXCLUDING BELT)	1-Feb-06	STL	17.6	2,072,447.45	1,207,577.12	864,870.33
#3 OVERLAND CONVEYOR (EXCLUDING BELT)	1-Feb-06	STL	31.11	4,950,848.68	2,823,459.69	2,127,388.99
SECTION EXTENSION-60" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE (3,935 FEET)	1-Dec-15	STL	5	518,350.26	34,556.68	483,793.58
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-8TH RIGHT	30-Mar-15	STL	3.8	144,481.77	42,687.84	101,793.93
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-9TH RIGHT	21-May-15	STL	3.6	192,642.36	50,453.92	142,188.44
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-12TH RIGHT	31-Aug-15	STL	3.3	144,481.77	29,637.28	114,844.49
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-MAIN WEST 3	15-Aug-15	STL	3.3	240,802.96	49,395.44	191,407.52
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-13TH RIGHT	31-Aug-15	STL	3.3	144,481.77	29,637.28	114,844.49
MAINLINE VENTILATION SEALS-14TH RIGHT	31-Aug-15	STL	3.3	48,160.60	9,879.12	38,281.48
MAINLINE EXTENSION - 60" CONVEYOR BELT (1,200 FEET)	11-Jan-16	STL	7-7	114,861.60	3,786.66	111,074.94
MAINLINE EXTENSON - 60" CONVEYOR STRUCTURE (500 FEET)	11-Jan-16	STL	7-7	66,031.28	2,176.86	63,854.42
MANTRIP - BAM BJ SERIES	5-Jan-16	STL	5-0	54,855.00	2,742.75	52,112.25
MANTRIP - BAM BJ SERIES	6-Jan-16	STL	5-0	54,855.00	2,742.75	52,112.25
MANTRIP - BAM BJ SERIES	6-Jan-16	STL	4-9	54,855.00	2,742.75	52,112.25
DEWATERING PUMPS - 2015	28-Jan-16	STL	2-0	126,035.76	15,754.47	110,281.29
MAINLINE EXTENSION MAR-07	1-Mar-07	STL	10	60,625.00	47,200.94	13,424.06
MAINLINE EXTENSION APR-07	1-Apr-07	STL	10	47,250.00	36,712.23	10,537.77
MAINLINE EXTENSION MAY-07	1-May-07	STL	10	12,375.00	9,594.97	2,780.03
MAINLINE EXTENSION JUN-07	1-Jun-07	STL	10	40,750.00	31,529.28	9,220.72
MAINLINE EXTENSION JUL-07	1-Jul-07	STL	10	29,250.00	22,582.63	6,667.37
MAINLINE EXTENSION AUG-07	1-Aug-07	STL	10	16,000.00	12,325.94	3,674.06
MAINLINE EXTENSION SEP-07	1-Sep-07	STL	10	15,000.00	11,529.82	3,470.18
MAINLINE EXTENSION DEC	31-Dec-07	STL	10	317,611.24	242,451.21	75,160.03
MAINLINE EXTENSION APR-08	1-Apr-08	STL	5	21,761.80	17,264.42	4,497.38
MAINLINE EXTENSION DEC-08	11-Dec-08	STL	5	781,457.29	572,981.08	208,476.21
NORTH WING CONVEYOR	1-Jan-90	STL	35	3,189,116.12	2,458,386.51	730,729.61
TRUCK DUMP STATION #2	1-Jan-90	STL	35	2,212,800.76	1,705,776.49	507,024.27
GRADER - CAT 16H (OLD # 705)	22-Jul-98	STL	10	470,247.20	470,247.20	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 SUPERDUTY 4X4 (SF # 2355)	1-Oct-98	STL	3	21,488.25	21,488.25	-
PICKUP TRUCK - F250 SUPERDUTY 4X4 (OLD SF # 2360)	1-Oct-98	STL	3	21,488.25	21,488.25	-
WELDING TRUCK - FORD F550 (OLD # 1578)	1-Sep-99	STL	3	61,998.88	61,998.88	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 (FORMER UNIT # 2361)	1-Oct-99	STL	3	23,388.92	23,388.92	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 CREWCAB 4X4 (OLD SF # 2856)	1-Jan-02	STL	3	25,988.15	25,988.15	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 (OLD # 2200)	1-Nov-01	STL	3	28,535.55	28,535.55	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 (OLD SF # 2372)	1-Feb-02	STL	3	22,348.32	22,348.32	-
CAT D10R TRACK DOZER (OLD 529)	1-Jan-02	STL	10	840,225.41	840,225.41	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 SUPERCAB (FORMER UNIT # 2378)	1-Jan-03	STL	4	24,663.52	24,663.52	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 4X4 CREW CAB	1-Mar-07	STL	4	25,738.26	25,738.26	-
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F350 4X4 CREW CAB (OLD SF # 2866)	1-Apr-07	STL	4	26,608.97	26,608.97	-
BRITTAIN INTERNATIONAL TRUCK W/SNOWPLOW ATTACHMENT	1-May-08	STL	5	188,733.22	188,733.22	-
BACKHOE/LOADER-CAT 420E	1-Oct-08	STL	10	73,617.00	55,212.76	18,404.24
MINE RESCUE VAN - CHEVROLET G3500	1-Nov-08	STL	5	24,394.00	24,394.00	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	1-Dec-08	STL	5	53,397.24	53,397.24	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	31-Dec-08	STL	5	53,397.24	53,397.24	-
DODGE RAM 3500 QUAD CAB 4X4	31-Dec-08	STL	5	53,396.94	53,396.94	-
FORKLIFT-HYSTER H40FT (E-LOT	31-Jan-09	STL	5	24,201.87	24,201.87	-
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jan-09	STL	4	6,374.00	6,374.00	-
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jul-09	STL	3	6,029.62	6,029.62	-
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jul-09	STL	3	10,720.38	10,720.38	-

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jul-09	STL	3	7,631.78	7,631.78	-
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jul-09	STL	3	7,495.88	7,495.88	-
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jul-09	STL	3	9,327.38	9,327.38	-
CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER	31-Jul-09	STL	3	10,074.84	10,074.84	-
TRACK HOE-CAT 330D	11-Jan-10	STL	7	295,412.98	263,761.56	31,651.42
FORD F150 XLT SUPERCAB PICKUP	11-Jan-10	STL	4	30,317.13	30,317.13	-
FORD F150 XLT SUPERCAB PICKUP	11-Jan-10	STL	4	31,284.30	31,284.30	-
FORD F150 XLT SUPERCAB PICKUP	11-Jan-10	STL	4	38,649.44	38,649.44	-
FIFTH-WHEEL ATTACHMENT	2-Aug-10	STL	8	15,067.50	10,672.76	4,394.74
NORTH WING CONVEYOR LIGHTING	6-Feb-12	STL	15	59,812.06	9,616.04	50,196.02
SPORTS UTILITY VEHICLE - FORD EXPLORER	15-Sep-12	STL	4	30,745.67	27,542.89	3,202.78
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4 (DIESEL)	28-Sep-12	STL	4	41,163.32	36,875.49	4,287.83
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4 (DIESEL)	8-Oct-12	STL	4	41,163.32	36,017.92	5,145.40
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4 (DIESEL)	10/82012	STL	4	41,163.32	36,017.92	5,145.40
OVERLAND CONVEYOR #2 - LIGHTING (ELEVATED WALKWAY)	3-Dec-12	STL	12.01	73,825.59	23,070.44	50,755.15
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	29-May-13	STL	4	25,587.70	18,695.05	6,892.65
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	29-May-13	STL	4	25,587.70	18,695.05	6,892.65
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 REGULAR CAB 4X4	29-May-13	STL	4	25,587.71	18,695.06	6,892.65
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	5-Jun-13	STL	4	29,213.97	20,730.14	8,483.83
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F250 CREW CAB 4X4	5-Jun-13	STL	4	29,213.97	20,730.14	8,483.83
SKID STEER LOADER - CLARK BOBCAT T650	26-Jul-13	STL	5	69,115.05	38,013.30	31,101.75
BOOM LIFT - GEHL DL12-40	22-Oct-13	STL	5	149,288.46	74,576.41	74,712.05
TRUCK VAULT/TOOX BOX (MOUNTED ON UNIT 230183)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	4,997.90	2,498.95	2,498.95
TRUCK VAULT/TOOX BOX (MOUNTED ON UNIT 230185)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	4,997.90	2,498.95	2,498.95
TRUCK VAULT/TOOX BOX (MOUNTED ON UNIT 230186)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	4,997.90	2,498.95	2,498.95
TRUCK VAULT/TOOX BOX (MOUNTED ON UNIT 230187)	1-Oct-13	STL	5	4,997.90	2,498.95	2,498.95
TRACK DOZER - CAT D-11T	28-May-15	STL	10	2,245,859.10	205,870.39	2,039,988.71
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 SUPER CREW CAB 4X4 XLT	28-Jan-16	STL	4-0	41,264.35	2,414.40	38,849.95
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 SUPER CREW CAB 4X4 XLT	28-Jan-16	STL	4-0	41,264.35	2,414.40	38,849.95
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 SUPER CREW CAB 4X4 XLT	28-Jan-16	STL	4-0	41,264.35	2,414.40	38,849.95
PICKUP TRUCK - FORD F150 SUPER CREW CAB 4X4 XLT	28-Jan-16	STL	4-0	41,264.35	2,414.40	38,849.95
OFFICE FURNITURE & EQUIPMEN	1-Jan-09	STL	10	62,875.12	45,439.08	17,436.04
SECURITY-DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDER (WAREHOUSE)	30-Apr-09	STL	5	1,570.73	1,570.73	-
OFFICE FURNITURE - ENGINEERING	17-Jul-13	STL	10	11,182.28	3,075.15	8,107.13
DESK-72"X66" WITH LEFT RETURN	2-Jan-14	STL	10	1,817.62	408.97	1,408.65
DESK - MODULAR SINGLE LEFT PEDESTAL WITH WALNUT TOP	12-Mar-14	STL	10	3,739.68	779.08	2,960.60
CREDENZA - KNEEHOLE WITH WALNUT TOP	2-Apr-14	STL	10	1,460.68	292.12	1,168.56
BATHHOUSE LOCKERS - VENTILATED 15 X 18 X 78 (ONE-TIER)	22-Apr-14	STL	10.6	22,695.66	4,322.93	18,372.73
PRINTER, HP COLOR LASERJET (2)	1-Nov-04	STL	5	7,261.80	7,261.80	-
PRINTER, HP LASERJET	1-Nov-04	STL	5	2,343.60	2,343.60	-
IT SERVICES UG OFFICES	1-Nov-05	STL	19.02	166,761.73	94,314.68	72,447.05
HP COLOR LASER JET PRINTER	1-May-05	STL	3	3,458.00	3,458.00	-
IT EQUIPMENT	1-Aug-05	STL	3	30,377.00	30,377.00	-
ENGINEERING WORKSTATION	1-Jan-06	STL	5	11,672.26	11,672.26	-
NOTEBOOK COMPUTER	1-Nov-05	STL	5	3,497.99	3,497.99	-
UG 8150N PRINTER	1-Jul-06	STL	5	2,342.09	2,342.09	-
LAPTOP	1-Jan-07	STL	5	1,806.50	1,806.50	-
AUTO DESK INVENTOR SOFTWARE	1-Jan-07	STL	5	6,862.00	6,862.00	-
3 FIBERDYNE ETHERNET CHASSIS-UG WAREHOUSE	31-Oct-09	STL	5	2,229.80	2,229.80	-
3 FIBERDYNE ETHERNET CHASSIS-UG ADMIN OFFICE	31-Oct-09	STL	5	2,229.80	2,229.80	-
TOUGHBOOK COMPUTER	1-Mar-10	STL	5	3,523.44	3,523.44	-
CONVEYOR BELT ANALYST SOFTWARE-PRO SUITE	3-Jan-11	STL	5	10,500.00	10,500.00	-
PRINTER (PLOTTER) HP DESIGNJET T-2300	27-Dec-10	STL	5	9,405.90	9,405.90	-
TOUGH BOOK COMPUTER	19-Dec-12	STL	5	4,824.75	3,216.46	1,608.29
SOFTWARE LICENSE - AUTOCAD SLM ACE (TWO LICENSES)	1-Nov-12	STL	2	9,597.00	9,597.00	-
SOFTWARE LICENSE - CARLSON SURVEY #1	31-Dec-12	STL	2	1,678.85	1,678.85	-
SOFTWARE LICENSE - CARLSON SURVEY #2	31-Dec-12	STL	2	1,678.84	1,678.84	-
SOFTWARE LICENSE - GENTLY WATERCAD 4257	6-Aug-13	STL	5	1,609.08	858.17	750.91
iFIX SOFTWARE LICENSING	2-Jan-15	STL	5	30,845.34	7,711.33	23,134.01
SOFTWARE - GE INTEGRATOR	15-Oct-15	STL	5-0	5,652.45	565.25	5,087.20
SURVEYING EQUIPMENT-LEICA TCR403 TOTAL STATION	1-Aug-04	STL	8	11,134.47	11,134.47	-
UG MINE MONITOR/COMMUN NETWORK FY06	1-Apr-06	STL	16	348,508.61	235,577.27	112,931.34
UG MINE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	1-Apr-05	STL	8	54,669.77	54,669.77	-
MINE RESCUE TEAM EQUIPMENT	1-Apr-06	STL	8	125,798.65	125,798.65	-
UG MINE MONITOR/COMMUN NETWORK SY06	1-Feb-07	STL	18	319,831.10	181,180.93	138,650.17
MAIN WATER SUPPLY PUMP HOUSE AND TANKS	1-Apr-07	STL	18	1,383,190.89	724,438.60	658,752.29
SURFACE EMULSION SYSTEM	1-Apr-07	STL	18	804,719.37	421,241.53	383,477.84
MINE RESCUE SAFETY EQUIPMENT	1-Apr-07	STL	5	82,378.20	82,378.20	-
1,000# (ONE EACH) & 4,000# (EACH) AIR WINCHES-MORCON SPECIALTY	29-Feb-08	STL	3	25,016.00	25,016.00	-
UG SPECIALIZED SHOP EQUIPMENT	1-May-08	STL	5	127,248.16	127,248.16	-
SAFETY EQUIPMENT (SCSR'S / GAS MONITORS)	1-Dec-08	STL	5	139,471.53	139,471.53	-
MINE MONITORING-2008	1-Jan-09	STL	8	295,026.13	267,074.20	27,951.93
HP PUMP SYSTEM-SUPPLEMENTAL	1-Feb-09	STL	15	299,022.11	151,086.14	147,935.97
METAL STORAGE CABINETS (FOR	1-Feb-09	STL	10	12,680.12	9,087.41	3,592.71
DATA COLLECTOR (UG SURVEY)	1-Feb-09	STL	5	4,473.20	4,473.20	-
FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (ON UNATTENDED ELECTRICAL	1-May-09	STL	5	161,576.13	161,576.13	-
UG SURVEY-GPS BACKPACK	1-Dec-09	STL	5	25,013.35	25,013.35	-
UG SURVEY-GPS BACKPACK	1-Dec-09	STL	5	25,013.35	25,013.35	-
SCADA SERVER (HP Z800 WORKSTATION W/MONITORS)	3-May-10	STL	3	7,780.40	7,780.40	-
TRANSMISSION IN-LINE FLUID EXCHANGER	1-Oct-10	STL	5	4,641.33	4,641.33	-
PLASMA CUTTER (SURFACE MAINT. SHOP)	15-Nov-10	STL	5	1,961.05	1,961.05	-
WELDER (SURFACE MAINT. SHOP)	15-Nov-10	STL	5	6,274.58	6,274.58	-
SAFETY EQUIPMENT - 2010 (SCSR'S, DUST MONITORS, GAS DETECTORS, NOISE D	3-Jan-11	STL	5	134,567.64	134,567.64	-
FLOOR CLEANER - TENNANT T5	23-Nov-10	STL	5	13,789.43	13,789.43	-
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM-UNDERGROUND WAREHOUSE	1-Dec-10	STL	3	15,067.22	15,067.22	-

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM-EMPLOYEE PARKING LOT & FUEL DUMI	18-Mar-11	STL	3	18,323.00	18,323.00	-
SELF CONTAINED SELF RESCUER	23-Mar-11	STL	5	146,790.00	146,790.00	-
TWO-WAY UNDERGROUND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM	1-Mar-11	STL	5	1,695,798.59	1,695,798.59	-
THERMAL IMAGING CAMERA	1-Jun-11	STL	3	8,225.59	8,225.59	-
SAFETY EQUIPMENT - 2011	1-Dec-11	STL	5	172,199.96	149,239.95	22,960.01
SAFETY EQUIPMENT - 2011 (SURFACE USE)	1-Dec-11	STL	5	26,095.36	22,615.93	3,479.43
SELF CONTAINED SELF RESCUERS	5-Jan-12	STL	5	119,568.00	101,632.80	17,935.20
SECTION EXTENSION - TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM EXPANSION	2-Jul-12	STL	5	133,751.63	100,313.69	33,437.94
SELF CONTAINED SELF RESCUER - OCENCO M-20	11-Jul-12	STL	10	125,882.87	47,206.02	78,676.85
SELF CONTAINED SELF RESCUER - OCENCO M-20 TRAINING UNIT	11-Jul-12	STL	10	4,506.29	1,689.82	2,816.47
NARROW BAND RADIO SYSTEM	25-Sep-12	STL	10	158,929.23	56,949.64	101,979.59
DIGITAL VENTILATION BAROMETER - DPI 650 IS	26-Oct-12	STL	10	9,419.11	3,296.67	6,122.44
DIGITAL VENTILATION BAROMETER - PAROSCIENTIFIC MET4A	11-Nov-12	STL	10	7,864.50	2,687.04	5,177.46
DIAGNOSTIC TOOL - wiTECH	26-Mar-13	STL	3	7,371.00	7,371.00	-
SELF CONTAINED SELF RESCUER - OCENCO EBA 6.5	24-Jun-13	STL	10.2	876,808.04	244,212.25	632,595.79
GAS MONITOR CALIBRATION EQUIPMENT - DRAEGER X-DOCK 6600	21-Jun-13	STL	10	53,917.55	15,276.60	38,640.95
ENGINE FILTER CRUSHER - HEAVY EQUIPMENT	13-Aug-13	STL	5	6,269.90	3,343.95	2,925.95
GAS CHROMATOGRAPH - PERKIN ELMER	7-Mar-14	STL	5	117,064.72	48,776.96	68,287.76
AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATORS - LIFEPAK CR PLUS	17-Mar-14	STL	9	6,305.52	1,459.55	4,845.97
MAINLINE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM EXPANSION	1-May-14	STL	4.4	23,485.42	10,003.16	13,482.26
COMMUNICATION ROOM WIRELESS BOOSTER (TECH TRAILER)	14-Feb-14	STL	3	4,186.43	3,023.52	1,162.91
VEHICLE LIFT - SURFACE SHOP	22-Jul-14	STL	10	40,065.67	7,011.48	33,054.19
TRANSCEIVER 1000BASE-ZX SFP	14-Oct-14	STL	5	4,401.08	1,320.31	3,080.77
IFIX SOFTWARE LICENSE UPGRADE	2-Jan-15	STL	8.7	36,705.68	5,345.49	31,360.19
IFIX MONITORING-CONTROL ELECTRICAL	2-Jan-15	STL	8.7	130,273.44	18,971.85	111,301.59
IFIX HARDWARE & SOFTWARE	2-Jan-15	STL	5	87,202.45	21,800.60	65,401.85
IFIX HVAC	2-Jan-15	STL	8.7	25,978.94	3,783.30	22,195.64
IFIX BACK-UP GENERATOR	2-Jan-15	STL	8.7	27,005.65	3,932.85	23,072.80
PORTABLE EVAPORATIVE COOLER - PORTACOOL PACZK482S	3-Aug-15	STL	3	4,099.88	911.09	3,188.79
SCADA WIRELESS REDUNDANCY (SHOP - EMULSION BUILDING)	10-Dec-15	STL	5-0	19,791.92	1,521.85	18,270.07
iFIX FAIL-OVER AND DISASTER RECOVERY SYSTEM	1-Jan-16	STL	5-0	128,811.07	7,649.53	121,161.54
ANADARKO BONUS LEASE	1-Feb-05	U OF P		7,061,213.35	3,315,080.37	3,746,132.98
FEDERAL LEASE RIGHTS	31-Dec-05	U OF P		6,964,410.17	1,738,643.18	5,225,766.99
FEDERAL COAL LEASE (BLM) SECTION 34	2-Mar-15	UOFP	#######	390,346.97	21,894.64	368,452.33
		STL		-	-	-
				308,481,986.27	179,867,437.81	128,614,548.46
				308,481,986.27	179,867,437.81	
				-	-	

LAND (ACTUAL DPIS 1/1/73)	31-Oct-04	STL	60	6,211.00	-	6,211.00
MINE DEVELOPMENT 1994	1-Jan-95	STL	43	470,487.88	278,437.70	192,050.18
MINE DEVELOPMENT GEOTECH	1-Jan-99	STL	15	104,874.67	104,874.67	-
MINE DEVOLPMENT ARCHLGY STDY	1-Jan-99	STL	15	180,525.98	180,525.98	-
MINE DEVELOPMENT JULY 1974	1-Jan-75	STL	63	1,750,250.97	1,448,579.94	301,671.03
MINE DEVELOPMENT PRE 1993	1-Jan-92	STL	46	11,369,700.00	7,170,667.56	4,199,032.44
MINE DEVELOPMENT 1993	1-Jan-94	STL	44	1,639,948.00	1,002,409.63	637,538.37
MINE DEVELOPMENT OCT 1980	10-Oct-80	STL	10	1,163,750.23	1,163,750.23	-
SURFACE WAREHOUSE MEZZANINE	1-Oct-76	STL	48.03	14,409.82	14,309.80	100.02
AREA, WHSE LAYDOWN	1-Dec-76	STL	48.01	26,724.18	23,186.15	3,538.03
MAIN OFFICE (BLDG & GRNDS)	1-Dec-82	STL	42.01	3,517,840.94	2,937,827.82	580,013.12
SYSTEM, IMPRVMNTS WATER	1-Nov-81	STL	10	43,153.22	43,153.22	-
AREA, FENCING WHSE LYDOWN	1-Jul-80	STL	10	8,947.79	8,947.79	-
FACILITY, EXPANSION	1-Jan-84	STL	41	91,426.85	76,279.89	15,146.96
ELECTRICAL FACILITY RENOVATION (LOCATED AT THE E-LOT	1-Jan-85	STL	40	81,602.29	66,769.66	14,832.63
OFFICE REMODELING	1-Feb-86	STL	38.11	33,716.46	27,172.90	6,543.56
BLDG, WAREHOUSE STORAGE - WEST WAREHOUSE BARN	1-Aug-86	STL	10	31,234.26	31,234.26	-
SANITARY FACILITIES	1-Aug-90	STL	10	35,278.80	35,278.80	-
AMBULANCE/FIRE TRUCK GARAGE	1-Apr-90	STL	34.09	129,704.93	99,774.75	29,930.18
WAREHOUSE LAYDOWN AREA	1-Nov-91	STL	33.02	45,867.00	33,969.30	11,897.70
ROM AREA FENCE	1-Nov-91	STL	10	30,257.50	30,257.50	-
DIESEL SPILL CLEAN UP TRAILER	1-Jul-94	STL	5	65,289.46	65,289.46	-
FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM	31-Jan-97	STL	27.11	15,286.64	287.35	14,999.29
SECURITY GATE	1-Sep-97	STL	5	27,375.00	27,375.00	-
ROOF REPAIRS ADMIN/MAINT	1-Nov-98	STL	26	104,492.11	46,465.62	58,026.49
RESURFACE EMPLOYEE PARKING LOT	1-Nov-03	STL	21.02	22,891.31	8,319.05	14,572.26
FENCE, MINE PERIMETER (SOUTH)	1-May-03	STL	21.07	77,315.90	28,807.64	48,508.26
FENCE, MINE PERIMETER (SOUTH)	1-Oct-04	STL	20.03	43,612.29	15,083.80	28,528.49
AREA LIGHTING - PARKING LOT (ADJACENT TO OFFICE FACILITY	31-Dec-07	STL	35	57,357.81	15,888.57	41,469.24
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM (MAIN OFFICE)	1-May-09	STL	5	6,642.04	6,642.00	0.04
SECURITY ACCESS-ID READER - MAIN OFFICE	03-May-10	STL	5	610.97	610.89	0.08
SECURITY ACCESS-ID CARD READER-SURFACE WAREHOUSE	03-May-10	STL	5	10,419.73	10,419.73	-
SECURITY ACCESS CONTROL-MAIN OFFICE	1-Dec-10	STL	4	2,098.22	2,098.12	0.10
SECURITY CAMERAS - MAIN OFFICE	1-Dec-10	STL	5	4,905.20	4,905.20	-
WAREHOUSE LUBE LAY-DOWN AREA	12-Jul-11	STL	26.5	37,960.89	6,804.21	31,156.68
SECURITY CAMERAS - MAIN PARKING LOT	1-Nov-11	STL	5	924.19	816.36	107.83
ENVIRONMENTAL SENSOR-MONITORING SYSTEM - ROOM ALERT 12ER	20-May-14	STL	5	639.75	245.21	394.54
TRANSMISSION LINES	1-Jun-74	STL	50.07	39,257.69	34,610.84	4,646.85
TRANSFORMERS	1-Nov-82	STL	42.02	17,476.49	14,730.07	2,746.42
MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS	1-Nov-82	STL	42.02	6,510.55	5,487.36	1,023.19
POWERLINE, TIE	1-May-83	STL	41.08	17,389.39	14,557.93	2,831.46
POWERLINE, EXTENSION	1-Oct-80	STL	44.03	7,476.31	6,478.35	997.96
POWERLINE, EXTENSION	1-Jan-80	STL	45	39,360.11	36,819.56	2,540.55
CLEANER, HOTSY STEAM - INSIDE GAS SHOP	1-Jan-84	STL	5	12,020.00	12,020.00	-

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
LATERAL HIGHLINE TAPS	31-Jul-96	STL	28.06	42,263.06	20,112.94	22,150.12
SWITCH YARD MODIFICATIONS	31-Jan-97	STL	27.11	320,779.50	150,609.86	170,169.64
POWERLINE FEED TO MAIN OFFICE AREA	1-Apr-04	STL	20.09	40,113.91	14,262.73	25,851.18
CLEANER, HOTSY STEAM	1-Aug-06	STL	5	6,360.00	6,360.00	-
SHELVING, WAREHOUSE	1-Mar-75	STL	10	14,784.60	14,784.60	-
FURNITURE, OFFICE & WRHS	1-Dec-76	STL	10	56,173.04	56,173.04	-
FURNITURE, OFFICE	1-Oct-76	STL	10	3,495.51	3,495.51	-
MISC OFFICE & WHSE PURCH	1-Mar-79	STL	10	24,556.21	24,556.21	-
OFFICE ENG & WHSE PURCH	1-Dec-79	STL	10	32,385.44	32,385.44	-
FURNITURE, OFFICE	1-Sep-80	STL	10	33,284.03	33,284.03	-
FURNISHINGS	1-Nov-82	STL	10	123,576.44	123,576.44	-
CABINETS, STORAGE	1-Jul-82	STL	10	3,376.72	3,376.72	-
CABINETS, FILE	1-May-83	STL	5	2,875.84	2,875.84	-
CREDENZA	1-Sep-83	STL	10	1,462.00	1,462.00	-
OAK DESK	1-Mar-92	STL	10	589.00	589.00	-
DESK (ACCOUNTING)	31-Jul-09	STL	10	2,712.31	1,830.78	881.53
DESK	1-Jan-10	STL	10	745.71	466.00	279.71
DESKS	01-Jun-10	STL	5	2,991.26	2,991.26	-
CREDENZA	01-Jun-10	STL	5	1,234.74	1,234.74	-
STORAGE CABINETS	01-Jun-10	STL	5	1,110.80	1,110.80	-
ARM CHAIRS	01-Jun-10	STL	5	1,059.74	1,059.74	-
DESK	01-Jun-10	STL	5	744.23	744.23	-
DESK-SINGLE RIGHT PEDESTAL 29 1/2" H X 66"W X 30" D	1-Apr-11	STL	10	3,311.28	1,655.59	1,655.69
FILE CABINET-LATERIAL FOUR-DRAWER 53 1/4" X 42"w X 19 1/4'	1-Apr-11	STL	10	4,463.55	2,231.76	2,231.79
CREDENZA 29 1/2" H X 60" W x 24" D	1-Apr-11	STL	10	1,197.00	598.51	598.49
DESK-SINGLE RIGHT PEDESTAL 72" X 36"	1-Apr-11	STL	10	757.89	378.92	378.97
WATER DISPENSER	7-Apr-11	STL	5	2,650.00	2,650.00	-
CREDENZA 29 1/2" H X 60" W X 24" D	7-Jul-11	STL	10	604.20	287.01	317.19
WATER DISPENSER	27-Oct-11	STL	5	2,073.41	967.59	1,105.82
WATER DISPENSER	27-Oct-11	STL	5	2,650.00	2,385.01	264.99
OFFICE FURNITURE (3-DESKS/2-RETURNS)	1-Dec-15	STL	10	2,989.57	99.64	2,889.93
PROJECTOR, U4-136 W/CARRYING CASE	1-Dec-03	STL	5	2,405.40	2,405.40	-
PRINTER, HP LASERJET 8150N	1-Nov-03	STL	5	4,825.57	4,825.57	-
PRINTER, HP LASERJET 5500N	1-Dec-03	STL	5	3,484.67	3,484.67	-
Oracle Training Computers	30-Nov-07	STL	5	9,780.84	9,780.84	-
ORACLE APPLICATION UPGRADE	30-Nov-07	STL	10	1,792,736.77	1,474,213.05	318,523.72
IT-TAPE DRIVES (2) HP MSL 6000 UL TRIUM 460 DRIVE	1-Feb-09	STL	5	8,081.44	8,081.44	-
SAP - HR/PAYROLL	31-Mar-09	STL	10	103,328.10	73,190.77	30,137.33
3 FIBERDYNE ETHERNET CHASSIS-MAIN OFFICE IT ROOM	31-Oct-09	STL	5	2,226.46	2,226.46	-
LAPTOP COMPUTER (6 EACH)	2-Nov-09	STL	5	7,658.20	7,658.20	-
ENGINEERING WORKSTATION (2 EACH)	2-Nov-09	STL	5	7,796.72	7,796.72	-
PRINTER #1	2-Nov-09	STL	5	2,048.58	2,048.58	-
PRINTER #2	2-Nov-09	STL	5	2,058.58	2,058.58	-
PRINTER #3	2-Nov-09	STL	5	2,038.57	2,038.57	-
LAPTOP COMPUTER - HP ELITE	1-Feb-10	STL	5	8,303.87	8,303.87	-
LASERJET PRINTER - HP 9040	1-Feb-10	STL	5	3,520.61	3,520.61	-
I/T BACKUP GENERATOR	1-Mar-10	STL	5	78,326.00	78,326.00	-
FIBER OPTIC CABLE (ADMIN. COMPUTER ROOM TO EAST SIDE WIRING CLOSET)	1-Dec-10	STL	5	4,923.44	4,923.44	-
DESKTOP PERSONAL COMPUTER-2011	15-Mar-11	STL	3	981.75	981.75	-
DESKTOP PERSONAL COMPUTER-2011	15-Mar-11	STL	3	981.75	981.75	-
NOTEBOOK COMPUTER #1	15-Mar-11	STL	5	1,187.09	1,187.09	-
NOTEBOOK COMPUTER	15-Mar-11	STL	3	1,187.09	1,187.09	-
NOTEBOOK COMPUTER	15-Mar-11	STL	3	1,035.89	1,035.89	-
DISK DRIVE - HP ULTRA 320 411098-B22	9-Aug-11	STL	5	691.04	644.94	46.10
DISK DRIVE - HP ULTRA 320 411098-B22	9-Aug-11	STL	5	691.04	644.94	46.10
DISK DRIVE - HP ULTRA 320 411098-B22	9-Aug-11	STL	5	691.04	644.94	46.10
DISK DRIVE - HP ULTRA 320 411098-B22	9-Aug-11	STL	5	691.04	644.94	46.10
DISK DRIVE - HP ULTRA 320 411098-B22	9-Aug-11	STL	5	691.04	644.94	46.10
DISK DRIVE - HP ULTRA 320 411098-B22	9-Aug-11	STL	5	691.05	644.98	46.07
CARLSON MINE PLANNING SOFTWARE - FULL SUITE	3-Jan-12	STL	5	9,841.04	8,364.86	1,476.18
TAPE LIBRARY	3-Jan-12	STL	5	9,738.22	8,277.46	1,460.76
PC WORK STATION - HP Z800	15-Mar-12	STL	5	3,853.50	3,147.04	706.46
PC WORK STATION - HP Z800	15-Mar-12	STL	5	3,853.50	3,147.04	706.46
PC WORK STATION - HP Z800	15-Mar-12	STL	5	3,853.50	3,147.04	706.46
PC WORK STATION - HP Z800	15-Mar-12	STL	5	3,853.50	3,147.04	706.46
CALCULATION MODULE - HISTORIAN SERVER	12-Jun-12	STL	5	4,163.25	3,191.83	971.42
SERVER (PROFICY SCADA SYSTEM)	12-Jun-12	STL	5	7,745.87	5,938.49	1,807.38
SERVER (PROFICY SCADA SYSTEM)	12-Jun-12	STL	5	7,745.87	5,938.49	1,807.38
SERVER (PROFICY SCADA SYSTEM)	12-Jun-12	STL	5	7,745.87	5,938.49	1,807.38
SOFTWARE LICENSE - AUTOCAD LT 2013	20-Jul-12	STL	2	1,008.30	1,008.30	-
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
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PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51

DESCRIPTION	IN-SERV DATE	DEPR METHOD	SERVICE LIFE	ACQUISITION COST	ACCUM DEPR	NET BOOK VALUE
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005 (TWO UNITS)	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,310.86	873.90	436.96
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.43	436.92	218.51
PC WORKSTATION - HP 6005	19-Dec-12	STL	5	655.42	436.92	218.50
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.51	832.33	416.18
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.52	832.33	416.19
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.52	832.33	416.19
NOTEBOOK - INTEL I3-2330M	19-Dec-12	STL	5	1,248.52	832.33	416.19
SERVER LICENSE-MISCROSOFT WINDOWS R2 STANDARD EDITION	19-Nov-12	STL	7	758.10	370.04	388.06
SERVER LICENSE-MISCROSOFT WINDOWS R2 STANDARD EDITION	19-Nov-12	STL	7	758.10	370.04	388.06
SERVER LICENSE-MISCROSOFT WINDOWS R2 STANDARD EDITION	19-Nov-12	STL	7	758.10	370.04	388.06
ORACLE UPGRADE-R12	26-Mar-13	STL	5	918,954.94	566,688.92	352,266.02
HP SERVER - DL380	26-Mar-13	STL	5	99,801.26	61,544.09	38,257.17
HP SERVER - DL380 (PHYSICALLY LOCATED AT NTO)	26-Mar-13	STL	5	99,801.27	61,544.09	38,257.18
DISASTER RECOVERY SERVER - DL 380-G8	31-Dec-12	STL	5	7,510.65	5,007.14	2,503.51
DISASTER RECOVERY SERVER - DL 380-G8	31-Dec-12	STL	5	7,510.65	5,007.14	2,503.51
WIDE AREA NETWORK ACCELERATOR - EXA-00760	17-Mar-13	STL	5	10,468.29	6,455.42	4,012.87
TOUGH-BOOK COMPUTER - BELT TECHNICIAN	1-Aug-13	STL	5	18,259.56	9,738.44	8,521.12
PC WORKSTATION - HP 820 (ENGINEERING)	28-Jun-13	STL	5	3,814.68	2,161.64	1,653.04
SOFTWARE LICENSE-BACKUP SYSTEM - CA ARC B/U 16.5 PRO	1-Aug-13	STL	5	15,741.00	8,395.20	7,345.80
VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT SERVER - HP DL360PRO8	7-Nov-13	STL	5	10,808.82	5,224.26	5,584.56
VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT SOFTWARE - VMWARE VSPHERE	7-Nov-13	STL	5	7,632.00	3,688.80	3,943.20
PRINTER - ULTRA MAGICARD RIO PRO SINGLE SIDE	2-Jan-14	STL	5	1,745.62	785.51	960.11
WORKSTATION - HP 6300 MICRO TOWER (FOUR-EACH)	1-Apr-14	STL	5	2,183.60	873.43	1,310.17
WORKSTATON - HP 6300 PRO (TWENTY-FOUR EACH)	1-Apr-14	STL	5	12,944.72	5,177.89	7,766.83
NOTEBOOK WORKSTATION - HP 6470b (ELEVEN EACH)	1-Apr-14	STL	5	12,254.66	4,901.84	7,352.82
WORKSTATION - HP Z820 (SIX EACH)	1-Apr-14	STL	5	15,740.55	6,296.21	9,444.34
SOFTWARE LICENSE - SECURECHECK 8 UPGRADE	19-Jun-14	STL	3	3,193.70	1,951.66	1,242.04
SOFTWARE LICENSE - SEDCAD	27-Jul-14	STL	3	2,067.00	1,195.88	871.12
SOFTWARE LICENSE - AUTODESK AUTOCAD	28-Jul-14	STL	5	3,307.20	1,157.52	2,149.68
SOFTWARE LICENSE - SERVERS	19-Sep-14	STL	7	4,319.50	977.01	3,342.49
DATA CENTER UPGRADE - 2014	6-Dec-14	STL	5	40,121.79	10,699.15	29,422.64
PRINTER / PLOTTER - HP DESIGN JET T1200 HD	17-Nov-14	STL	5	16,584.50	4,698.94	11,885.56
SOFTWARE - LENEL SWG-1360, LENEL-SUPPORT FOR REMOTE DESKTOP PROTOC	29-Nov-15	STL	5-0	7,294.92	607.90	6,687.02
HP DL360P SERVER & ACCESORIES	4-Jan-16	STL	5-0	20,798.10	1,039.92	19,758.18
SYSTEM, SHAFT ALIGNMENT	1-Aug-87	STL	5	10,234.00	10,234.00	-
BULLARD BORING MACHINE	1-Jan-92	STL	10	41,437.50	41,437.50	-
SAFETY STORAGE CABINETS	1-Dec-93	STL	10	2,600.00	2,600.00	-
RIEGL LASER RTF SURVEY EQ	1-Jan-96	STL	7	16,422.00	16,422.00	-
MATERIALS HANDLING EQUIP	30-Sep-96	STL	28.04	18,226.65	8,635.53	9,591.12
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS (WIRING & INSTALLATION ONLY)	31-Jan-08	STL	3	46,332.05	46,332.05	-
INTERNET PROTOCOL TELEPHONE SYSTEM	26-May-09	STL	5	249,086.85	249,086.85	-
EMERGENCY EXTRICATION SYSTEM	14-Dec-10	STL	10	21,724.50	11,586.40	10,138.10
LASER SCANNING SYSTEM - LEICA SCAN STATION C-10	4-Jan-11	STL	7	107,692.20	80,769.15	26,923.05
SELF CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS-SPERIAN	24-Jan-11	STL	5	63,840.00	63,840.00	-
SPHYGMOMANOMETER (BLOOD PRESSURE GAUGE)	3-Jun-11	STL	5	603.70	583.57	20.13
DIGITAL PROJECTOR	1-Jun-11	STL	3	1,081.73	1,081.73	-
DIGITAL PROJECTOR	1-Jun-11	STL	3	1,081.73	1,081.73	-
RESCUE EQUIPMENT-IMMOBILIZATION BOARD - LSP HALBACK L71	12-Jun-13	STL	10	1,156.61	327.72	828.89
FIBER OPTIC COMMUNICATION LINE (REDUNDANT)	2-Jan-14	STL	8.1	95,757.21	24,390.98	71,366.23
AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATOR - LIFEPAK 1000	17-Mar-14	STL	12	2,817.70	489.21	2,328.49
AUTOMATED EXTERNAL DEFIBRILLATOR - LIFEPAK CR PLUS	17-Mar-14	STL	12	9,368.28	1,626.47	7,741.81
SIMULATOR - QUICK COMBO 3 LEAD PATIENT	17-Mar-14	STL	12	827.86	143.73	684.13
FIBER OPTIC LINK TO JB PLANT WIDE AREA NETWORK	2-Jan-15	STL	10	29,765.83	3,720.73	26,045.10
RESPIRE-ABLE DUST SAMPLING SYSTEM - ESCROT 805563	2-Mar-15	STL	3	8,188.60	2,956.99	5,231.61
				26,355,147.54	18,773,549.50	7,581,598.04
				26,355,147.54	18,773,549.50	
				-	-	
				501,485,145.80	309,197,477.23	192,287,668.57
				501,485,145.80	309,197,477.23	
				-	-	

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 217

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 217 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 218

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 218 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 219

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 219 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 220

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 220 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 221

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 221 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 222

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Staff/222
Kaufman/1-3

Exhibit 222 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 223

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 223 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 224

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 28, 2016
OPUC Data Request 61

OPUC Data Request 61

Please provide the amended contract rate for Bridger Coal Company coal in each month from January 2006 to present.

Response to OPUC Data Request 61

The Company objects to this request as overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Company responds as follows:

The amended contract rate is not relevant in this docket as it is only applicable to the Idaho Power share of Bridger Coal Company costs.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 225

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 28, 2016
OPUC Data Request 62

OPUC Data Request 62

Please refer to the Bridger Coal Company supply contract regarding coal price. Please provide the monthly contract price based on the escalators and base values identified in the contract. Please include all supporting calculations as an electronic workbook.

Response to OPUC Data Request 62

Please refer to the response to OPUC 61.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 226

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 16, 2016
OPUC Data Request 36

OPUC Data Request 36

Please refer to PAC/200, Ralston/16 at lines 10-12.

(a) Please provide all analysis and work papers used to determine that Bridger Coal Company is a cost effective source of supply for the Jim Bridger plant.

(b) At what market price is Bridger Coal Company not an effective source of supply for the Jim Bridger plant?

Response to OPUC Data Request 36

(a) Please refer to the Company's response to OPUC Data Request 27.

(b) The Bridger Coal Company (BCC) mine would no longer be an effective source of supply for the Jim Bridger plant when the Bridger mine delivered costs exceed the sum of the following:

- Market price for third-party coal, plus
- Transportation cost to ship the coal to the coal stockpile, plus
- Capital costs required to allow coal unloading of a sufficient number of rail cars at the plant, plus
- Capital costs required to allow boilers and coal handling facilities to handle market coal, plus
- Incremental costs incurred for dealing with coal quality differences, plus
- Remaining net book value of Bridger mine assets, plus
- Cost of reclamation that would be accelerated as a result of a shortened mine life, plus
- Costs of mine closure, relating to equipment, inventory, personnel, permitting, insurance, royalties, taxes, etc.

Please also refer to the Company's response to OPUC Data Request 32.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 227

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 227 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 228

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UI 189

STOEL RIVES LLP

ATTORNEYS

STANDARD INSURANCE CENTER
900 SW FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 2600
PORTLAND, OREGON 97204-1268
Phone (503) 224-3380 *Fax* (503) 220-2480
TDD (503) 221-1045
Internet: www.stoel.com

January 25, 2000

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JAN 2 9 2001

Public Utility Commission of Oregon
Administrative Hearings Division

JAMES C. PAINE
Direct Dial
(503) 294-9246
email jcpaine@stoel.com

BY OVERNIGHT MAIL

Administrative Hearings Division
Oregon Public Utility Commission
550 Capitol Street NE, Suite 215
Salem, OR 97301-2551

Re: Application of PacifiCorp for Approval of Coal Supply Agreement with Bridger Coal Company

Enclosed please find an original and five copies of PacifiCorp's application in this matter.

Very truly yours,

James C. Paine

James C. Paine

JCP:jlf
Enclosures

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF OREGON**

Docket No. UI 189

In the Matter of the Application of PACIFICORP for Approval of Coal Supply Agreement with Bridger Coal Company	**APPLICATION**

PacifiCorp (or the "Company") files this Application pursuant to the provisions of ORS §§ 757.490 and 757.495, and OAR 860-027-0035. PacifiCorp seeks a Commission Order finding that the Company's coal supply agreement with Bridger Coal Company, Inc. ("Bridger Coal") has previously been considered and approved in prior PacifiCorp general rate cases. Alternatively, PacifiCorp seeks a Commission Order approving the PacifiCorp-Bridger Coal agreement.

The Oregon Public Utility Commission ("Commission") has considered the merits of the coal supply agreement governing the fuel supply for the Jim Bridger generating plant in previous general rate cases. In Order No. 79-754, the Commission first implemented a policy of limiting these fuel supply costs to prudently incurred expenses plus a reasonable return on PacifiCorp's coal property investment. This policy was reaffirmed in Order Nos. 82-606 and 84-898. PacifiCorp therefore contends that the Commission has previously considered and approved the PacifiCorp-Bridger Coal affiliate relationship and seeks a Commission Order finding that the coal supply agreement has been approved. Alternatively, and in an effort to eliminate any questions of compliance with Oregon statutory requirements governing affiliate transactions, PacifiCorp seeks a Commission Order approving the coal supply agreement pursuant to the statutes and regulations cited above.

In support of its application, PacifiCorp states the following:

1. Address

The Applicant's exact name and business address are:

PacifiCorp
Lloyd Center Tower
825 NE Multnomah
Portland, OR 97232

2. **Communications and Notices**

All notices and communications in respect to this application should be addressed to:

Matthew R. Wright
Vice President, Regulation
PacifiCorp
Suite 2000
825 NE Multnomah
Portland, OR 97232
Tel. (503) 813-6015
Fax. (503) 813-6060

with copies to:

James C. Paine
Stoel Rives, LLP
Suite 2600
900 SW Fifth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204-1268
Tel. (503) 294-9246
Fax. (503) 220-2480

3. **Relationship**

PacifiCorp owns a two-thirds interest in the Jim Bridger coal-fired steam electric generating plant located in Wyoming. The Jim Bridger generating plant obtains a substantial majority of its needed coal supply from Bridger Coal, a joint venture owned one-third by an Idaho Power Company subsidiary and two-thirds by Pacific Minerals, Inc., an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of PacifiCorp. The joint venture owns significant leases covering coal deposits located near the Jim Bridger generating plant. An affiliated interest relationship exists between PacifiCorp and Bridger Coal Company, as well as Pacific Minerals, Inc., under ORS 757.015.

4. **Common Officers and Directors**

Mr. Bruce N. Williams is Treasurer of both PacifiCorp and Pacific Minerals, Inc. There are no other common officers or board members.

5. Costs of the Goods Provided

Attached as Application Exhibit No. 1 are copies of the Third Restated and Amended Coal Sales Agreement (January 1, 1996) ("Third Restated Agreement") and the First Amendment thereto (January 1999) (together referred to hereafter as the "Coal Supply Agreement"). These contracts establish the terms and conditions under which coal is supplied by Bridger Coal to PacifiCorp and Idaho Power for use at the Jim Bridger generation plant.

The coal supply agreement with Bridger Coal establishes annual base tonnages for coal purchases. The annual base tonnage for both 2000 and 2001 is 5,232,600 tons. Section 2.01, Third Restated Agreement. PacifiCorp and Idaho Power have the right to supplement these base tonnages. Id., Section 2.02.

Coal price is determined through establishment of component base prices[1] as adjusted pursuant to the price change provisions in Section 6 of the Third Restated Agreement.

The Company's Oregon retail electric prices, however, reflect a limitation on the coal supply prices paid by PacifiCorp. In Order No. 79-754, the Commission made the following findings regarding PacifiCorp's coal purchases from Bridger Coal:

> "PP&L does purchase the fuel required to operate its Jim Bridger plant from Bridger Coal. Because of its affiliated relationship and the volume of its purchases, PP&L does enjoy a position of dominance with regard to Bridger Coal which renders a comparison of prices of non-affiliated market transactions inadequate as a measure of reasonableness of PP&L's payments to Bridger Coal. The Commissioner should therefore disallow operating expenses which cause a greater return to Bridger Coal than that allowed PP&L.
>
> "PP&L may finance Bridger operations as it chooses. However, for ratemaking purposes, the Commissioner will limit the return to PP&L on its Bridger investment to that level allowed on other PP&L operations." Order No. 79-754, pp. 19-20.

[1] Components include Labor, Salaries & Related Costs (§ 6.02), Materials & Supplies (§ 6.03), Electric Power (§ 6.04), Inflation & Deflation (§ 6.05), Ad Valorem, Severance, Property & License Taxes (§ 6.06), Costs Based Upon Extraction (§ 6.07), Other New, Increased Taxes (§ 6.08), Additional Costs (§ 6.09), Transfer Taxes (§ 6.10), Black Lung (§ 6.11), Federal Reclamation Fee (§ 6.12), and Final Reclamation (§ 6.13) of the Third Restated Agreement.

In the 1979 Order, the Commission determined that "PP&L secured a long-term fuel supply at a price below the then-prevailing market price." Order No. 79-754, p. 19. Therefore, the imposition of the standard limiting coal costs to prudent expenses and utility return further reduced, for ratemaking purposes, a contract price that was below the market coal price. This ratemaking methodology thus reflects a "lower of cost or market" price standard on PacifiCorp's Bridger coal costs.

The 1979 decision was reaffirmed in Orders No. 82-606 and 84-898 and has been followed in rate cases and semi-annual reports since issuance of Order No. 79-754.

The same Coal Supply Agreement has also been approved by the Commission in an Idaho Power Company affiliated interest application. In analyzing the Coal Supply Agreement, the Commission determined that there was no danger of cross-subsidization between Idaho Power and its coal supply affiliate. The Commission also found that no payments in excess of market value would occur under the Coal Supply Agreement. *In Re Idaho Power Company*, Order No. 91-567 (April 25, 1991).

Attached hereto and identified as Application Exhibit 2 is a depiction of Coal Supply Agreement costs compared to the average market price of Southern Wyoming coal delivered to the Jim Bridger generation plant for recent years (1990-1999). The exhibit shows that the average cost of coal provided by the Coal Supply Agreement ranges from $3 to $9 per ton less than the average market price of Southern Wyoming coal delivered to the plant.

PacifiCorp seeks a Commission Order finding that the Commission has previously approved the coal supply agreement through consideration and treatment in the general rate cases cited above. Should the Commission choose not to issue such an Order, PacifiCorp seeks Commission approval of the Coal Supply Agreement and the ratemaking methodology described herein. The Coal Supply Agreement provides PacifiCorp a reliable, long-term source of low-cost coal for operation of the Jim Bridger generation plant. Since PacifiCorp is limited, for ratemaking purposes, to prudently-incurred coal expenses plus a reasonable return on the Company's coal investment, PacifiCorp specifically asks the Commission to determine that the Coal Supply Agreement is in the public interest under the provisions of ORS §§ 757.490 and 757.495.

6. Annual Bridger Coal Costs and Recording of Costs

The coal supply agreement determines the annual Bridger coal costs as described in Application Section 5 above. Expenditures and coal investments are charged to accounts in the manner directed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulations and the Commission's rules.

7. Reasons for Procuring Coal from Bridger Coal Company

In 1969, PacifiCorp's predecessor (Pacific Power & Light Company) and Idaho Power Company agreed to construct and operate the Jim Bridger generation plant. The utilities possessed joint ownership of certain leases covering coal deposits acquired from the Union Pacific Railroad, the United States Government and the State of Wyoming located near the generation plant site. The obvious advantage of construction of a generating plant near the plant's fuel source is that fuel transportation and handling costs would be minimized. In addition, Bridger Coal Company coal is of high quality, with BTU content typically ranging from 9200 to 9400 BTU per pound. This is a high BTU content for Wyoming coal. The generation plant facilities were designed to burn the type and quality of coal from these locations. Approximately 70 percent of the Jim Bridger generation plant's coal requirement is obtained from the adjacent mine owned and operated by the Bridger Coal Company.[2]

PacifiCorp's decision to execute the coal supply agreement was tied inextricably to the Company's decision to take advantage of construction of a generating plant near a source of quality fuel.

---

[2] Most of the remaining generation plant coal needs are purchased from the Black Butte Coal Company. The Black Butte Mine is located approximately 17 miles from the Jim Bridger generation plant and operates in the same coal seam that is being mined by the Bridger Coal Company. Thus, the two coal supplies are of comparable quality.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, PacifiCorp respectfully requests that the Commission issue an Order finding that the coal supply agreement has previously been considered and approved in prior PacifiCorp general rate cases. Alternatively, PacifiCorp seeks a Commission Order approving the PacifiCorp-Bridger Coal agreement, with amendments thereto, and the transfer pricing methodology specified in Order Nos 79-754, 82-606 and 84-898, as described herein, pursuant to the provisions of ORS §§ 757.490 and 757.495 and OAR 860-027-040.

DATED: January 25, 2001.

Respectfully submitted,

James C. Paine
Stoel Rives, LLP
900 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 2600
Portland, OR 97204-1268
Of Attorneys for PacifiCorp
Tel (503) 294-9246
Fax (503) 220-2480

APPLICATION

EXHIBIT NO. 1

THIRD RESTATED AND AMENDED COAL SALES AGREEMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

THIRD RESTATED AND AMENDED COAL SALES AGREEMENT AMONG BRIDGER COAL COMPANY AND PACIFICORP, dba PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY AND IDAHO POWER COMPANY

AGREEMENT, dated as of the 1st day of January, 1996, between and among BRIDGER COAL COMPANY ("Bridger Coal" or "Seller"), a Joint Venture between Pacific Minerals, Inc ("PMI"), a Wyoming corporation, and Idaho Energy Resources Co, a Wyoming corporation, PACIFICORP, an Oregon corporation, dba Pacific Power & Light Company, with its principal office in Portland, Oregon ("Pacific"), and IDAHO POWER COMPANY, an Idaho corporation with its principal office in Boise, Idaho ("Idaho"). Pacific and Idaho are collectively referred to as "Buyers", Bridger Coal, Pacific and Idaho may be collectively referred to as the "Parties".

BACKGROUND

On September 22, 1969, Pacific and Idaho entered into Agreements for the Ownership, Construction and Operation of the Jim Bridger Project located in Sweetwater County, Wyoming, a 1,500 megawatt coal-fired electric power plant consisting of three 500 megawatt units ("Jim Bridger Plant" or "Plant"). The Ownership Agreement provided for, among other things, the joint ownership of certain leases covering coal deposits acquired from the Union Pacific Railroad, the United States Government and the State of Wyoming located near the Jim Bridger Plant. The Operation Agreement contemplated joint operation of these coal properties.

By Amendment to the Ownership and Operation Agreements dated

February 1, 1974, Pacific and Idaho agreed that the coal properties rather than being jointly owned and operated by Pacific and Idaho, would be owned and operated by the Joint Venture, Bridger Coal.

By Agreement dated February 1, 1974, Pacific and Idaho entered into a Coal Sales Agreement ("Coal Sales Agreement") wherein Pacific and Idaho agreed to purchase and Bridger Coal agreed to deliver and sell coal from coal properties located near the Jim Bridger Plant for use in Units 1, 2 and 3 of the Jim Bridger Plant.

Pursuant to Amendment No 1 to the Agreements for Construction, Ownership and Operation of the Jim Bridger Project dated as of December 14, 1973, Pacific and Idaho agreed to the construction of a fourth 500 megawatt unit at the Jim Bridger Plant. As of the date of this Third Restated and Amended Agreement, the Jim Bridger Plant is a 2,080 megawatt coal-fired electric power plant consisting of four 520 megawatt units.

By Agreement dated as of September 1, 1979, the Coal Sales Agreement was Restated and Amended ("Restated and Amended Agreement"). The Restated and Amended Agreement has since been amended several times.

By Agreement dated as of March 7, 1988, the Restated and Amended Agreement was Restated and Amended ("Second Restated and Amended Agreement"). The Second Restated and Amended Agreement has since been amended several times.

The Parties have now agreed to restate and amend the Second Restated and Amended Agreement. This restated and amended agreement shall be referred to as the Third Restated and Amended Agreement and it is the intent of the Parties that said Agreement shall, consistent with the provisions regarding effective date in Section 1.02 herein, supersede and replace all previous agreements and amendments and modifications thereof regarding the sale of coal by Bridger Coal to Pacific and Idaho for use at the Jim Bridger Plant, except those Supplemental Coal Agreements between Pacific and Bridger Coal and Idaho and Bridger Coal.

AGREEMENT

Seller agrees to sell and deliver from its mine located near Rock Springs, Wyoming (the "Mine"), and Buyers agree to accept and pay for coal of the quantity and quality hereinafter stated, upon the following terms and conditions. Prior to Seller obtaining federal, state or private mining leases in addition to those listed in the Ownership Agreement dated September 22, 1969, and as the term Bridger Coalfield is defined in the Joint Venture Agreement dated February 1, 1974, for delivery under this Agreement, Seller shall obtain Buyers' written approval of such leases for said delivery under this Agreement. For purposes of this Agreement, those leases listed in the Ownership Agreement and those making up the Bridger Coalfield, as defined in the Joint Venture Agreement shall be referred to as the "Bridger Coalfield".

ARTICLE I - TERM AND EFFECTIVE DATE

SECTION 1.01 - TERM

The coal to be purchased hereunder shall be delivered during fifty-one (51) calendar years, commencing in 1974 and terminating on December 31, 2024 ("Term").

SECTION 1.02 - EFFECTIVE DATE

All the terms and conditions of this Third Restated and Amended Agreement shall be effective January 1, 1996.

ARTICLE II - ANNUAL TONNAGE

SECTION 2.01 - BASE ANNUAL TONNAGE

During each of the calendar years of the Term, Buyers shall purchase and accept delivery of, and Seller shall sell and deliver, quantities of coal as set forth below (the "Annual Tonnage"), except as said Annual Tonnage may be reduced pursuant to the carryover provision in Section 4.02 and the force majeure provisions in Article VIII herein.

Year	Annual Tonnage
1974	735,349
1975	1,862,125
1976	3,429,065
1977	4,931,128
1978	4,540,292
1979	5,065,417
1980	5,835,198
1981	6,449,721
1982	6,025,129
1983	4,317,880
1984	4,338,421
1985	7,159,068
1986	6,480,450
1987	6,600,573
1988	6,412,384
1989	6,023,607
1990	5,839,442
1991	5,738,545
1992	6,052,165
1993	6,406,149
1994	7,046,900
1995	5,232,600
1996	5,232,600
1997	5,232,600

Year	Annual Tonnage
1998	5,232,600
1999	5,232,600
2000	5,232,600
2001	5,232,600
2002	5,232,600
2003	5,232,600
2004	5,232,600
2005	5,232,600
2006	5,232,600
2007	5,232,600
2008	5,232,600
2009	5,232,600
2010	5,232,600
2011	5,232,600
2012	5,232,600
2013	5,232,600
2014	5,232,600
2015	5,232,600
2016	5,232,600
2017	5,232,600
2018	5,232,600
2019	5,155,650
2020	3,942,149
2021	2,154,600
2022	1,308,150
2023	1,308,150
2024	1,231,200

SECTION 2.02 - SUPPLEMENTAL TONNAGE

Upon Buyers' written request, Seller shall quote a price on supplemental coal which can be produced and delivered from the Mine during any particular year or time period of the Term of this Agreement. Except for price and other terms expressly agreed upon, purchases of such additional coal shall be under the same terms and conditions as purchases under this Agreement. Buyers and Seller will then seek to negotiate the price and quantity of the supplemental coal.

ARTICLE III - QUALITY

SECTION 3.01 - GENERAL QUALITY, TESTING AND WARRANTIES

Buyers represent that they have inspected all tests and reports with respect to the Bridger Coalfield, and that they assume the risk of quality variations of all coal to be delivered hereunder, including variations in ash, sulfur and moisture content. Seller warrants only that all coal delivered hereunder shall, upon delivery to the Plant as provided herein, be run-of-mine, unwashed and crushed to a nominal 6" minus size (unless coal is being delivered hereunder by truck, in which case such coal shall be uncrushed); provided that Seller will use reasonable care to deliver coal substantially free of tramp metal, mine debris and overburden; and provided further that in the event other impurities are identified in coal delivered hereunder, Seller will use its best efforts to minimize the adverse effects of such impurities on the efficient operation of the Plant. Notwithstanding the above, such coal shall have, when delivered, an average heat content of not less than 9,000 BTU's per pound, calculated daily. Such average will be computed on a 200,000 ton moving average (i.e., the most recent 200,000 tons delivered shall be the coal considered in computing the average).

Buyers may, at their cost, conduct a coal sampling and analysis program to establish its heating value and other quality parameters. The sampling and analysis shall be performed in accordance with methods approved by the American Society for

Testing and Materials or such other methods as may be agreed upon by the Parties in writing. Seller shall have the right to have a representative present at any and all times to observe the sampling and may analyze the coal of such samples. Buyers shall furnish Seller promptly with a copy of the report of each analysis.

Buyers shall divide all samples into not less than three (3) approximately equal parts and put them in suitable airtight containers, the second and third containers in each case to be held available by Buyers for a period of sixty (60) days after the end of the calendar month in which such sample was taken. One part of each sample shall be for Buyers' analysis; one part shall be available to Seller upon request; and the third part shall be retained in one of the aforesaid containers, properly sealed and labeled, to be analyzed if a dispute arises due to a difference between Buyers' and Seller's analyses. Each party hereto assumes the cost of analysis of its sample. If Seller does not take exception to Buyers' analysis within sixty days after the end of the calendar month in which the sample was taken, Buyers' analysis shall be conclusive.

The analysis of the third part of each sample, should its analysis be found necessary, shall be made by a mutually agreeable commercial testing laboratory, and the results of such commercial laboratory shall be controlling. The cost of the analysis made by such commercial laboratory shall be shared one-half by Buyers and one-half by Seller.

SELLER MAKES NO WARRANTIES AS TO THE QUALITY OF THE COAL IT WILL DELIVER, OTHER THAN ITS BTU CONTENT. THERE ARE NO OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

SECTION 3.02 - QUALITY PENALTY

In the event the average BTU quality of the most recent 200,000 tons delivered is less than 8,800 BTU's per pound, Buyers, at their option, may reject such coal.

In the event the average BTU quality of the most recent 200,000 tons delivered is less than 9,000 BTU's per pound, Buyers, at their option, may require Seller to rectify such quality deficiency by one of the procedures specified below in Section 3.02(1) or (2); provided that Seller, at its sole discretion, shall determine which procedure is to be used to make up any deficiency.

(1) Seller may, at its option, make up any quality deficiency by supplying, free of charge, additional quantities of coal with a heat content of 9,000 BTU's per pound or more to Buyers, such that the total number of BTU's delivered in the 200,000 tons averaging less than 9,000 BTU's per pound and such additional penalty shipment would be equal to the number of BTU's that would have been delivered if the quality of the 200,000 tons averaging less than 9,000 BTU's per pound had been 9,000 BTU's per pound. If this option is exercised, the quality deficiency must be made up within sixty (60) days of notice of such quality deficiency.

(2) Seller may, at its option, make up any quality deficiencies by raising the quality of the coal in subsequent shipments such that the weighted average BTU per pound of the 200,000 tons averaging less than 9,000 BTU's per pound and the subsequent shipments is equal to or greater than 9,000 BTU's per pound. If this option is selected by Seller, all such quality deficiencies must be fully made up within sixty (60) days of notice of such quality deficiency, or utilization of the option specified in paragraph (1) becomes mandatory, in which event Seller will have an additional thirty (30) days to make up any remaining quality deficiency.

Buyers must notify Seller, in writing, within sixty (60) days of the occurrence of a quality deficiency, the extent of such deficiency and the requirement that Seller shall make up the deficiency. If written notice of a quality deficiency is not received within sixty (60) days of its occurrence, Seller shall not be obligated to make up such quality deficiency.

Shipments made by Seller in satisfaction of the obligations of this Section 3.02 shall not be considered in subsequent calculations of average BTU quality based on 200,000 ton moving averages.

In addition to the provisions of this Section 3.02 set forth above, the Parties agree to use their best efforts to take whatever other steps may be appropriate to effect such other alternative solutions to problems arising as a result of the average BTU quality of the coal delivered being less than 9,000 BTU's per pound as may be mutually acceptable to the Parties.

SECTION 3.03 - DAMAGE TO OVERLAND CONVEYOR, PRIMARY CRUSHER

Buyers and Seller agree to cooperate with each other and use their best efforts to avoid excessive starting and stopping of the Mine's overland conveyor system. Buyers hereby agree to reimburse Seller for any damage to the overland conveyor system caused by negligence of Buyers, their employees, agents or contractors.

In the event of an extended shutdown of the Mine's overland conveyor system, Seller shall use its best efforts to deliver coal under this Agreement by truck. If deliveries are being made hereunder, either by truck or by overland conveyor, then, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3.01, in the event tramp metal, mine debris or overburden damages and makes inoperative the Plant's primary crushing equipment or the Plant's equipment in the Plant interface building, then, if requested by Buyers, Seller will supply additional quantities of coal up to an amount equal to that required to replace coal removed by Buyers from their permanent storage pile during the period the equipment is inoperative. Pacific, as operator, will diligently repair the equipment at its expense, provided, however, that if damages are caused by the negligence of Seller, its employees, agents or contractors, Seller will reimburse Buyers for expenses incurred in repairing the equipment.

ARTICLE IV - SCHEDULING AND SHIPMENTS

SECTION 4.01 - TRANSFER OF TITLE

Except as provided in this Section 4.01, all coal purchased hereunder shall be delivered by Seller to the main conveyor head chute located on the concrete floor of the Plant interface building. Title thereto and possession thereof, including risk of loss, shall pass to Buyers when such coal passes through said concrete floor. Notwithstanding the previous sentence, all coal purchased hereunder which Seller delivers by truck shall be delivered by Seller to the run-of-mine coal hopper adjacent to the Plant. Title thereto and possession thereof, including risk of loss, shall pass to Buyers upon deposit on the run-of-mine grizzly.

SECTION 4.02 - MONTHLY TONNAGES

Seller and Pacific, as Plant Operator, shall, to the extent reasonably feasible, cooperate in scheduling daily, weekly and monthly coal deliveries in order to accommodate the Plant's changing fuel requirements. Seller and Pacific, as Plant Operator, shall also cooperate in the same manner in notifying each other in advance of scheduled outages in order to avoid unnecessary inconvenience and delay and to facilitate efficient use of said outages by each party and to the extent reasonably possible to assure the Plant of an opportunity to increase its stockpile of coal for use during downtime of Seller.

Monthly quantities to be delivered by Seller and purchased by Buyers for each calendar year during the Term of the Agreement shall be derived by dividing the Annual Tonnage for the calendar year by twelve ("Monthly Tonnage") except to the extent the Parties agree to modify the Monthly Tonnage amounts. However, in recognition of the need for a delivery variance due to certain unpredictable fluctuations in the level of normal operations ("Mine" or "Plant") the Monthly Tonnage amounts may vary by plus or minus two and one-half percent (2 1/2%) (hereinafter referred to as the "Monthly Variance").

In the event the total deliveries for the calendar year exceed the Annual Tonnage for said calendar year, plus two and one-half percent (2 1/2%) of the Monthly Tonnage for December of said calendar year, plus any make-up coal deliveries excused by force majeure pursuant to Section 8.05, Seller may carry over into the subsequent calendar year up to 25,000 tons which tons shall constitute an automatic decrease of the Annual Tonnage requirement for said subsequent calendar year. Any tons in excess of 25,000 tons shall be free of charge to Buyers. Buyers have the right to request that the Annual Tonnage for such subsequent calendar year not be decreased or that it be decreased by some amount less than such carryover tonnage. The request must be made in writing on or before January 31 of the subsequent calendar year and if such request is not received the Annual Tonnage, as set forth in Article II, shall be automatically decreased as the result of the carryover provisions of this Section 4.02. In any event the Monthly Tonnage for January of the subsequent calendar year shall be one-twelfth (1/12) of the Annual Tonnage for said calendar year before any decrease of the Annual Tonnage resulting from the carryover provisions of this Section 4.02. In the event the Annual Tonnage for the subsequent calendar year is decreased the Monthly Tonnage for the remaining eleven (11) months shall be decreased equally unless the Parties agree to allocate the decrease in a different manner. The Term of this Agreement shall not be extended to deliver carryover tonnage.

In the event the total deliveries for the calendar year are less than the

Annual Tonnage for said calendar year minus two and one-half percent (2 1/2%) of the Monthly Tonnage for December of said calendar year and any tonnage reduction resulting from an event of force majeure, Seller shall, at Buyers' option, deliver said underdeliveries during the subsequent calendar year at times and rates agreed upon between the Parties and at the then Current Price. Buyers must exercise this option in writing on or before January 31 of the subsequent calendar year. In the event Buyers do not exercise the option, Seller shall not deliver the underdeliveries to Buyers. Billings for all deliveries pursuant to this Section 4.02 shall be made pursuant to Article VII.

SECTION 4.03 - SCHEDULING

The Parties understand that this Agreement contemplates a normal operation of three shifts per day, five days per week, for Seller ("Scheduled Delivery Days"). Seller will provide Buyers with a schedule of deliveries by shift or partial shift for each month during the calendar year. Said schedule shall be provided to Buyers at least fifteen (15) days prior to the beginning of the month in which the deliveries are to be made. Anticipated changes shall be provided to Buyers as soon as practicable. In the event Seller is delivering coal under this Agreement by truck, the Buyers agree to integrate (accommodate) truck deliveries by Seller with other suppliers deliveries to the Plant, all as scheduled by Buyers. These truck deliveries will be made at the same truck dump hopper (run-of-mine grizzly) which Buyers use to receive deliveries by truck under other coal supply agreements. The Parties recognize that cooperation will be necessary to receive and weigh truck delivered coal from more than one source at a time.

SECTION 4.04 - UNDERDELIVERY PENALTY

(1) In any month in which (a) Seller does not deliver the Monthly Tonnage less the Monthly Variance allowed it, and (b) Buyers have sufficient capacity to accept delivery of such undelivered amount, and (c) Seller would not have been required to exceed the daily limitations of Section 4.06 because of Buyers' inability to accept delivery of coal in order to deliver the amount in (a) above, and (d) Article VIII, Force Majeure, is not applicable (an event of force majeure has not occurred), and (e) if Buyers, at their option, elect to use coal from their permanent storage pile as the result of said underdeliveries, Buyers shall, at Seller's expense, extract coal from the permanent storage pile and deliver such coal to the Plant and later (at the earliest possible time after Seller has made its required monthly deliveries), after Seller has delivered the underdeliveries to Buyers, return such undelivered coal to the permanent storage pile in order to replace the coal which was taken from the permanent storage pile under the conditions of this paragraph; provided, however, that Seller shall only be responsible for the extraction, delivery and replacement costs incurred pursuant to this paragraph and not for the cost of coal taken from, or put back in, the permanent storage pile and shall receive for such coal the then Current Price.

(2) Paragraph (1) notwithstanding, if (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of paragraph (1) occur, and if Seller does not provide coal from third parties to meet its delivery obligations and Buyers are required to purchase an amount of coal from a third party to offset all or part of Seller's deficient deliveries, Seller shall bear the cost of such third party purchases in excess of the Current Price under this Agreement, if any,

inclusive of transportation costs related to such purchases (such excess to be computed on a basis of cents per million BTU's). Buyers shall use their best efforts to purchase coal from third parties at the lowest delivered price available consistent with delivery, quality and heat content requirements. The cost of such third party purchases shall be substantiated by a statement by Buyers. Any such amounts owed by Seller shall be paid by Seller within thirty (30) days after it has been billed for such amount.

SECTION 4.05 - MONTHLY QUANTITY SHORTFALL PENALTY

At Seller's option, in any month in which Buyers request reduction or curtailment of the Monthly Tonnage, by providing Seller written notice of the request at least 14 days in advance of such month, and Article VIII herein is not applicable (an event of force majeure has not occurred) or otherwise fails to accept delivery for reasons not excused by force majeure, then Buyers shall pay Seller a monthly Quantity Shortfall Penalty for tons not taken. For the purposes of this Section 4.05, the Shortfall Penalty will be an amount per ton equal to the sum of the Section 6.02 and 6.05 price components for such month as calculated pursuant to Article VI.

In determining the quantity upon which to apply the Shortfall Penalty, the difference between the Monthly Tonnage and the tons actually delivered will be decreased by the sum of (a) the monthly variable third party sales described in Section 4.07(1), and (b) any amounts purchased from third parties in such month by Buyers under Section 4.04(2).

SECTION 4.06 - DELIVERY LIMITATIONS

Unless Buyers and Seller otherwise agree, daily quantities to be delivered by Seller in any month shall not exceed the Mine's capacity to deliver coal to the Plant per day as of January 1, 1996.

SECTION 4.07 - THIRD PARTY SALES

(1) In the event Seller contracts with a third party or parties for the sale of coal from the Bridger Coalfield and said contract or contracts allow for the delivery of variable amounts at the discretion of Seller, such variable amounts in excess of any base tonnages required to be delivered to such third party or parties as are delivered in any month (but which are not in excess of the difference between the Monthly Tonnage less the Monthly Variance and the amount actually delivered in such month to Buyers) shall be taken into consideration in calculating the amounts due under Section 4.05. Seller shall notify Buyers, on a monthly basis, upon request, as to expected and actual variable third party sales.

(2) In the event the circumstances of Section 4.05 apply, Seller will use its best efforts to effect third party coal sales, provided such sales are on terms economically beneficial to Seller, in order to ameliorate the effect of the Quantity Shortfall Penalty.

(3) Buyers shall have a right of first refusal, under the conditions set forth below, to purchase coal from Seller if Seller proposes to contract with a third-party (other than Buyers) for the sale of coal from the Bridger Coalfield. Seller shall notify

Buyers of all of the terms and conditions of each proposed third-party contract which Seller intends to accept, except where the third-party contract has been sought by Seller in response to Buyers' force majeure. Buyers shall have ten (10) days from receipt of such notice to offer to purchase coal under the same terms and conditions as would be available to the third-party. If within ten (10) days, Buyers agree to purchase all of such coal, Seller shall sell and Buyers shall purchase, based upon their percentage of Plant ownership, such coal on the terms and conditions set forth in the third-party contract and Seller shall not enter into the third-party contract. If, within ten (10) days, Buyers agree to purchase all of such coal included in the third-party offer, but at a lesser annual delivery rate, then Seller shall sell and Buyers shall purchase, based on their percentage of Plant ownership, such coal on the same terms and conditions set forth in the third-party offer except that the term of the third-party offer shall be extended until the total tonnage included in the third-party offer would be delivered to Buyers at the lesser delivery rate and Seller shall not enter into the third-party contract. The extended term and lesser delivery rate shall be based upon the Plant's total annual tonnage requirements less any minimum annual tonnage commitments in place at the time of exercising this right of first refusal. The price of the third-party offer shall escalate based on the average escalation included in Section 6.02 through Section 6.05, for the period beyond the term of the third-party offer with the intent of preserving for Seller the economic value of the third-party offer. If Buyers fail to notify Seller within ten (10) days that it will purchase such coal, Seller shall be free to enter into the contract with the third-party on terms no more favorable than those communicated to Buyers under this

Section 4.07(3).

ARTICLE V - MEASUREMENT OF COAL QUANTITY

Seller shall weigh all coal shipped under this Agreement and, except as otherwise provided herein, such weight shall be the basis of billing to Buyers. Such weights shall be determined by belt scales located on each of the dump station discharge conveyors at the Mine. Such scales are to be calibrated by Seller at least monthly, using such methods as are agreed to by the Parties, and the results of such calibrations are to be submitted promptly to the Parties. Buyers shall have the right to have a representative present to observe any testing and calibration of the scales and during the time the coal is being delivered to observe the weighing operation. Seller will provide adequate prior notice to Buyers of all scheduled scale calibrations. If at any time Buyers question the accuracy of the weighing apparatus or the weights thus determined, Seller will be notified and Seller will test the belt scales. If such test shows that the belt scales do not test within an accuracy of ± 0.5%, they shall be adjusted to an accurate condition; provided, however, that if Seller and Buyers are unable to agree upon the results of such tests and adjustments, then tests and adjustments shall be made by an outside person or entity mutually satisfactory to Seller and Buyers, with the cost of such outside services to be borne 50% by Buyers and 50% by Seller. If at any time Seller determines that the scales are inoperative or inaccurate, it shall immediately notify Buyers, verbally and in writing. If the belt scales do not test within an accuracy of ± 0.5%, then fifty percent (50%) of all coal scaled and delivered over the inaccurate scale(s) during the period since the last preceding test (or during such lesser period of time that such error is determined to have actually existed) shall be adjusted by one hundred percent (100%) of the amount of such error.

Seller shall maintain the belt scales at the Mine at its expense and, in the event the belt scales become inoperative or inaccurate, Seller shall diligently repair and adjust the belt scales at its expense. In the event the belt scales located on the dump station discharge conveyors are inoperative or unavailable, Seller shall use truck count, survey or other reasonable basis of measurement as shall be determined by Seller and agreed to by Buyers, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld. Seller shall notify Buyers verbally and in writing of methods to be used during these periods, and Buyers shall have a representative present during these periods unless this right is waived verbally and in writing. Seller shall provide Buyers with a report showing the calculation used in determining the weight of coal so delivered. Seller shall be responsible for the loss of all coal due to accidents which occur after weight has been determined by the belt scales but prior to title passing to Buyers and will adjust receipts accordingly.

In the event Seller is delivering coal under this Agreement by truck, weighing will be performed by Buyers on the 01 conveyor scale at the Plant; such scale is to be calibrated by Buyers at least monthly, using such methods as are agreed to by the Parties, and the results of such calibrations are to be submitted promptly to the Parties. Seller shall have the right to have a representative present to observe any testing and calibration of the scale and during the time the coal is being delivered to observe the weighing operation. Buyers will provide adequate prior notice to Seller of all scheduled scale calibrations. If at any time Seller questions the accuracy of the weighing apparatus or the weights thus determined, Buyers will be notified and Buyers will test the 01 conveyor scale. If such test shows that the 01 conveyor scale does not test within an accuracy of ± 0.5%, it shall be adjusted to an accurate condition; provided, however, that if Seller and Buyers are unable to agree upon the results of such tests and adjustments, then tests and adjustments shall be made by an outside person or entity mutually satisfactory to Seller and Buyers, with the cost of such outside services to be borne 50% by Buyers and 50% by Seller. If at any time Buyers determine that the scale is inoperative or inaccurate, they shall immediately notify Seller, verbally and in writing. If the 01 conveyor scale does not test within an accuracy of ± 0.5%, then fifty percent (50%) of all Seller's coal scaled and delivered over the 01 conveyor scale during the period since the last preceding test (or during such lesser period of time that such error is determined to have actually existed) shall be adjusted by one hundred percent (100%) of the amount of such error. Buyers shall maintain the 01 conveyor scale at the Plant at their expense and, in the event the 01 conveyor scale becomes inoperative or inaccurate, Buyers shall diligently repair and adjust the 01 conveyor scale at their expense. During any period in which Seller is delivering coal hereunder by truck and the Plant's weighing facilities are not in operation or unavailable, Seller shall use truck count, survey or other reasonable basis of measurement as shall be determined by Seller and agreed to by Buyers, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld. Seller shall notify Buyers verbally and in writing of methods to be used during these periods, and Buyers shall have a representative present during these periods, unless this right is waived verbally and in writing. Seller shall provide Buyers with a report showing the calculation used in determining the weight of coal so delivered.

Coal weights shall be adjusted, for payment purposes, by an amount determined using a quantifiable and mutually agreeable method, for any dust suppression agent which has been added prior to weighing by the Mine or Plant scales, as the case may be.

ARTICLE VI - PRICE COMPONENTS AND PRICE ADJUSTMENTS

SECTION 6.01 - CURRENT PRICE

The Current Price per ton of coal (2,000 pounds, avoirdupois) to be paid by Buyers to Seller for each ton of coal delivered and accepted under this Agreement shall be the sum of the Price components per ton adjusted in accordance with Section 6.02 through Section 6.13. Schedule A is a sample billing invoice indicating how the price adjustment provisions in Section 6.02 through Section 6.13 of the Agreement are intended to operate.

SECTION 6.02 - LABOR COSTS

The Current Price per ton of coal shall include a labor component derived by multiplying $4.351 per ton, by a fraction, the numerator of which is the value of the corresponding Average Hourly Earnings Index for Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining as published in the U. S. Department of Labor's montly publication "Employment and Earnings" (Table B15, SIC Code 122) for the third preceeding month and the denominator of which is the corresponding Average Hourly Earnings Index value for Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining for September 1995.

Average Hourly Earnings Index	Base 1/1/96 Component $/Ton	Base Date Index Value September 1995
Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining	$4.351	$18.71

SECTION 6.03 - MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES

The Current Price per ton of coal shall include Materials and Supplies components derived by multiplying each amount included in the Base Price Components below, by a fraction, the numerator of which is the corresponding Materials and Supplies Index for the second preceding month and the denominator of which is the corresponding Materials and Supplies Index for October 1995.

Materials and Supply Index	Base 1/1/96 Components $/Ton	Base Date Index Value October 1995	Bureau of Labor Statistics Commodity Code
Construction Machinery and Equipment	$0.999	137.3	112
#2 Diesel Fuel: Direct Sales to End Users	$0.390	73.1	2911.4132
Tires: Truck/Bus Tires Including Off Highway	$0.070	93.1	0712.0105
Explosives	$0.907	145.2	0679.02
Producer Price Index: All Commodities	$0.999	125.0	N/A

SECTION 6.04 - ELECTRIC POWER

The Current Price per ton of coal shall include an amount for Electric Power determined by multiplying $0.402 per ton, by a fraction, the denominator of which is 3.476 cents per kilowatt hour (the computed average cost of Electric Power at the Mine is 3.476 cents per kilowatt hour based on the applicable rate for electric service on January 1, 1996, assuming a short interval demand of 21,000 kilowatts and a 40 percent load factor), and the numerator of which is the new cost per kilowatt hour, using the same demand and load factor.

SECTION 6.05 - INFLATION & DEFLATION

To compensate either party for the increase or decrease in the purchasing power of the dollar, the Current Price per ton of coal shall include an amount derived by multiplying each amount included in the Base Price Components below, by a fraction, the numerator of which is the corresponding Inflation/Deflation Index for the second preceding month or quarter as applicable and the denominator of which is the corresponding Inflation/Deflation Index for October 1995, or third quarter 1995 in the case of the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator.

Inflation/Deflation Index	Base 1/1/96 Components $/ton	Base Date Index Value October 1995 or Third Quarter 1995	Bureau of Labor Statistics Commodity Code
Scrapers, Graders, Rollers, Off-Hwy Trucks/Haulers, and Attach. for Mounting	$1.525	145.2	3531.8
Producer Price Index: Industrial Commodities	$1.525	125.5	NA
Gross Domestic Product-Implicit Price Deflator	$4.718	128.1	NA

SECTION 6.06 - AD VALOREM, SEVERANCE, PROPERTY AND LICENSE TAXES

The Current Price includes $2.278 per ton of coal for ad valorem, severance, mining, license and excise (other than income) taxes. The Current Price per ton of coal shall include an amount determined by Seller representing its best estimate for such taxes for the current year.

The Current Price per ton of coal delivered in any year shall be adjusted upward or downward retroactively to reflect actual taxes (as described in the preceding paragraph) applicable or allocated, as appropriate, to production for such year. Any such retroactive adjustment shall be made and billed as the actual tax amounts are finally determined.

Buyers are given the right to contest, require Seller to contest, or participate in the contest of the validity of, or increase in, any tax which is ultimately passed onto them, and Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyers concerning any other controversy or litigation. In the event of such contest Buyers agree to indemnify and hold Seller harmless from any and all liability and costs incurred directly or indirectly by Seller as a result of such contest.

SECTION 6.07 - COSTS BASED UPON EXTRACTION

The Current Price includes $2.663 per ton of coal for any payments made by Seller (excluding taxes), such as royalty payments, which are directly based upon the number of tons extracted from the Mine, including payments under any plan on behalf of labor, such as a pension plan, provided such payments are made to owners of economic interests (other than payments made on behalf of employees included under Section 6.02) exclusively for the privilege of mining reserves owned by them and included in the Mine, and under lease to Seller. The Current Price per ton of coal shall include an amount determined by Seller representing its best estimates for costs based upon extraction for the current month.

The Current Price per ton of coal delivered in any year shall be adjusted upward or downward retroactively to reflect costs based upon extraction (as described in the preceding paragraph) applicable to production for such year. Any such retroactive adjustment shall be made and billed as the actual amounts for costs based upon extraction are finally determined.

SECTION 6.08 - OTHER NEW, INCREASED TAXES

The Current Price per ton of coal delivered hereunder shall be increased or decreased from the Base Price in the same amount that the cost per ton of mining coal at the Mine is increased or decreased by new, additional or reduced taxes (or changes in the rates of said taxes) of any kind whatsoever, enacted or effective after December 31, 1994. This provision shall not apply to costs relating to (1) state or federal taxes on net income; (2) taxes referred to in Section 6.06; (3) transfer taxes provided for in Section 6.10. In determining the cost per ton of such taxes, the costs shall be divided by the actual total number of tons shipped by Seller for the particular calendar year; provided, however, that such new taxes and the changes therein shall be included in the Current Price per ton of coal in the same manner as set forth in Section 6.06.

SECTION 6.09 - ADDITIONAL COST IMPOSED BY LEGISLATION OR REGULATION

The Current Price per ton of coal shall be increased or decreased in the same amount that the cost per ton of mining coal at the Mine is increased or decreased by any investment or operating expense required to be made or incurred by Seller to comply with any new or revised law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation, or any new or revised interpretation of any existing law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation (other than with respect to taxes referred to in Sections 6.06, 6.08 and 6.10) enacted, promulgated or otherwise made effective or applicable after December 31, 1994; which pertain to such matters as, without limitation, mining practices, health and safety (other than compensation to employees for injuries or death), surface subsidence (other than damages therefor), waste disposal, or environmental matters not included as reclamation related expenses under Section 6.13.

The Current Price per ton of coal delivered in any month shall be adjusted for any such changed operating expense. Additionally, the Current Price per ton of coal to be delivered subsequent to the date of such additional operating expense and/or capital investment by Seller shall be increased or decreased, from and after the month in which the investment is made, the changed expense occurs, or the additional expense is incurred, in an amount sufficient to recover such investment or expense and the capital costs incident thereto over the economic life as determined by Seller of such investment by adding a per ton cost to the number of tons delivered to Buyers subsequent to such investment. Such per ton cost shall be derived in each applicable year by dividing the annual capital and related costs incident to such investment by the projected number of tons to be delivered in said year subject to a retroactive annual adjustment based on actual deliveries. Capital and related costs shall include total lease costs to be borne by Seller in the event Seller leases such required equipment. The calculation of capital costs shall provide Seller with a 15% after tax return on its equity investment, or, in the event of leasing, 100% of (1) annual operating lease charges and/or (2) annual interest and amortization charges related to capital leases.

Consistent with prudent mining practices, Seller agrees to use its best efforts to minimize the adverse effects of any new or revised law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation, or any new or revised interpretation of any existing law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation, the application of which results in an increase or decrease in the cost per ton of coal. Further, Seller shall promptly notify Buyers in writing of any new requirement which Seller becomes aware of and which is reasonably likely to result in a price increase or decrease under this Section 6.09.

SECTION 6.10 - TRANSFER TAXES

Buyers shall be liable for any and all applicable transfer taxes, such as sales and use taxes imposed by any governmental authority, upon the purchase or use of coal by Buyers. Buyers agree to reimburse to Seller within twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of billing, any such transfer tax imposed upon Seller.

For the purpose of this Section, a transfer tax is deemed to include tax imposed by any governmental authority upon the transfer of property from Seller to Buyers, or the consumption of property received from Seller by Buyers.

SECTION 6.11 - BLACK LUNG PAYMENTS

The Current Price per ton of coal includes an amount of $0.012 per ton to cover the presently estimated costs of compliance with the black lung provision of the Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 as amended ("Black

Lung Costs"). Such amount represents the currently estimated costs of insurance coverage as described in Schedule B. The Current Price per ton shall include an amount determined by Seller representing its best estimate for black lung costs for the current year as provided for in the following paragraph. The Current Price further includes an amount of $0.550 per ton of coal for the Federal Black Lung Tax. As the actual tax increases or decreases, the Current Price per ton of coal will increase or decrease accordingly.

The Parties agree that Black Lung Costs will be determined by Seller based upon actuarial studies prepared by independent third parties and that such Black Lung Costs will be adjusted from time to time as such actuarial studies reflect changed costs. The Parties agree that such adjusted Black Lung Costs will be computed annually in a manner designed to levelize such costs over the expected life of the Mine. It is the intent of the Parties that each ton of coal mined in any year from the Mine shall bear a pro rata share of the then adjusted levelized Black Lung Costs attributable to such year. In the event that Seller decides to satisfy this obligation by use or partial use of a trust, the prescribed payments made to the trust shall be included in the cost per ton. In the event Seller decides to satisfy this obligation by acquiring insurance, related insurance premiums shall be included in the cost per ton. In the event Seller decides to satisfy this obligation or any part thereof by establishing a reserve on its books, the amounts credited to such reserve for such obligation shall be included in the cost per ton.

In any event, whichever method Seller selects to satisfy its Black Lung obligation, Seller shall satisfy Buyers that said method results in Black Lung Costs which, when compared with rates which could be achieved under the other methods reasonably available to Seller, results in the lowest cost considering the circumstances at the time and consistent with industry standards.

SECTION 6.12 - RECLAMATION FEE

The Current Price per ton of coal includes an amount of $0.350 per ton for the Federal Orphan Lands Tax assessed to all surface coal mines. As the actual tax increases or decreases, the Current Price per ton of coal will increase or decrease accordingly.

SECTION 6.13 - FINAL RECLAMATION

The Current Price per ton of coal will include an amount for Final Mine Reclamation. The Current Price per ton of coal may be changed from time-to-time as requirements for final reclamation are revised either by a change in any law, governmental order, permit, rule, or regulation, or any new or revised interpretation of any existing law, governmental order, permit, rule, or regulation.

For purposes of this provision, final reclamation related expenses shall include all operating expenses and investments (including final reclamation accruals) required to be made or incurred by Seller to comply with any new or revised law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation, or any new or revised interpretation of any existing law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation enacted, promulgated or otherwise made effective or applicable after December 31, 1994, which pertain to final reclamation or other aspects of environmental quality including but not limited to those activities on Schedule C.

Consistent with prudent mining practices, Seller agrees to use its best efforts to minimize the effects of any new or revised law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation, or any new or revised interpretation of any existing law, governmental order, permit, rule or regulation, the application of which results in an increase in the final reclamation cost per ton of coal.

SECTION 6.14 - TIME OF MAKING ADJUSTMENTS

(A) Adjustments, including retroactive adjustments, under Article VII, shall be calculated and applied as the circumstance giving rise to the change occurs. Adjustments under Article VI, shall be calculated and applied monthly, in the case of Producer Price Indexes, or quarterly in the case of the Gross Domestic Product-Implicit Price Deflator, using the index values of September and October 1995, or the third quarter 1995, as appropriate, as a base and the index value for the second or third month or quarter, as the case may be, preceding the month of shipment as the current index.

Producer Price Index values to be used shall be those available by approximately the third week of the month of shipment as published in the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics publications, Producer Price Indexes and Employment and Earnings. The Industrial Commodities Index value used in calculating the percent change in Exhibit F-1 is preliminary, but for the purpose of this contract shall be considered final. The Gross Domestic Product-Implicit Price Deflator to be used shall be that which is available at the time of shipment as published quarterly in the monthly publication Survey of Current Business from the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. When first published, this Index value is preliminary, but for the purpose of this contract shall be considered final.

(B) The Seller shall furnish to the Buyers a computation showing the calculation of any price changes made pursuant to the provisions of this Article VI. Except to the extent inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement, all computations or determinations of amounts or portions thereof to be paid under the terms of this Agreement shall be made in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied. In the event that the Buyers are not satisfied with the computations or determination of the adjustments, the Buyers shall promptly notify the Seller in writing of those portions of the computations with which it is not in agreement, including calculation of differences. The Parties shall meet within ten (10) days of such notification in an effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory computation. If the meeting of the Parties does not resolve the matter, they shall immediately refer same to an independent public accounting firm and/or engineering mining consultant, as appropriate, selected by mutual agreement of the Parties, for the purpose of arriving at the correct computation. The Seller and Buyers agree to provide the independent public accounting firm and/or engineering mining consultant with all necessary information it requests to enable it to arrive at its computation. The findings made by the independent public accounting firm and/or engineering mining consultant shall be final and binding on the Parties. If the

Parties are unable to agree on such expert(s), the matter will be referred to the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming for the appointment of such expert(s).

(C) In the event the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics or the United States Department of Commerce change the basis of any of the indexes referred to herein, the Parties shall attempt to agree to a method of utilizing the revised indexes. Should the Department of Labor or the Department of Commerce discontinue issuing any of said indexes, the Parties shall attempt to agree upon a new basis for adjusting the applicable subcomponent. If the Parties are unable to agree upon a new basis to be followed, or to a means of utilizing the revised index, within thirty (30) days after the discontinuance or change, the unresolved matter shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to Article X. The revised index or new basis determined pursuant to this paragraph shall be used in lieu of the index or basis which it replaces for all applicable purposes of this Agreement.

(D) During the period of any dispute relating to computations, the Seller shall continue to deliver hereunder and Buyers shall continue to make payments in accordance with Article VII, including payments on disputed amounts or computations; provided, however, that when the matter is finally determined, if Buyers prevail in the dispute, Seller shall pay to Buyers the disputed amount plus interest calculated pursuant to Section 7.02. The fees and other charges of the independent public accounting firm and/or engineering mining consultant shall be paid by the party whose contention as to the proper amount of the adjustment is farthest from the amount determined to be proper by such expert(s); and in the event there is no such party, the fees shall be shared equally by both Parties.

SECTION 6.15 - PRICE REVIEW

The Parties recognize and agree that the purpose of this Article VI is to reflect in the price of coal delivered hereunder actual changes in the cost of items described in Article VI and to protect the Parties against uncontrollable changes in costs per ton of coal; the Parties also recognize that revisions made under Article VI may become inadequate or excessive in a subsequent year or years due to a change in the relationship of mining cost to the escalators used, the electricity demand or load factors, or to other factors. Therefore, effective on January 1 for the following years: 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020 and 2023, the Parties shall review the Current Price relative to current costs of production, estimated future prices and future production costs and mine plans for the then current cost of coal study, and the adequacy of Article VI. If it is mutually agreed by the Parties that Article VI has not properly reflected increases or decreases in the cost of producing coal delivered hereunder, then the Price shall be revised and the price adjustments set forth in Article VI shall be revised as mutually agreeable to the Parties. Future prices shall be determined by levelizing the applicable estimated annual production costs for each year of the then current cost of coal study. Such annual costs shall be derived from annual mine plans consistent with Seller's most current five year mine plans, permits and life of mine plan.

Notwithstanding the price review provisions in this Section 6.15, and the right to arbitrate under Article X of this Agreement, the Parties agree that this Agreement may not be reopened based on a claim of unreasonable economic hardship experienced by the Parties as a result of the Current Price and price adjustment provisions regardless of whether Seller is failing to receive a reasonable profit or Buyers are paying a delivered price substantially in excess of prices for the purchase of other coal or alternative fuels available to Buyers or other users.

ARTICLE VII - BILLING AND PAYMENT

SECTION 7.01 - BUYERS' OBLIGATION

Seller recognizes that the scheduled monthly shipments of the Annual Tonnage in Article II as provided for in Section 4.02 (Monthly Tonnage) will, unless otherwise notified, be for the account of both Idaho and Pacific. Idaho shall accept and pay for one-third (1/3) of the Annual Tonnage, and Pacific shall accept and pay for two-thirds (2/3) of the Annual Tonnage. Seller agrees that Buyers shall be severally and not jointly liable for coal delivered on their behalf.

SECTION 7.02 - BILLING AND PAYMENT

Seller shall bill Pacific and Idaho as of the 5th of each month for the coal delivered during the preceding monthly period. Billings pursuant to Sections 4.05 or 8.02 shall be invoiced five (5) days after the end of the period to which they are applicable. Invoices will be sent by overnight mail service. Payment of all invoices shall be made within 14 days of the date on which they are sent. In the event payments are not made within the 14-day period, interest at the rate of 1% above the Morgan Guaranty Bank of New York prime rate during the period commencing with the end of the 14-day period through the date of actual payment shall be due and owing.

All payments will be made by wire transfer or an equivalent funds transfer method and shall be deemed made when received by Seller. Such payments shall be made to the following account: First National Bank of Chicago, credit to Bridger Coal Company and Receipt Account Number 071000013. Disbursement or receipt of funds shall not constitute a waiver of any rights one party may have against the other.

ARTICLE VIII - FORCE MAJEURE

SECTION 8.01 - FORCE MAJEURE

If, because of an event of force majeure which could not reasonably have been avoided or which cannot reasonably be overcome by the exercise of due diligence by the party claiming force majeure, and either Buyers or Seller, wholly or in part, is reasonably prevented from performing any of its obligations under this Agreement, and if the party experiencing force majeure gives the other party written notice of the existence of an event of force majeure, then the rights and obligations of the Buyers and Seller under this Agreement shall be suspended or reduced to the extent made reasonably necessary by the existence of the event of force majeure. Any party notifying the other of the existence of an event of force majeure shall make all reasonable efforts to remove the cause of such force majeure and resume its performance hereunder with all reasonable dispatch.

The term "force majeure," as used herein, shall mean an act of God, lightning, storms, fire, flood, slide, explosion, mining casualty, strike, lockout, labor dispute (including slowdown) or other industrial disturbance, riot, insurrection, act of the public enemy, sabotage, embargo, blockade, war, interruption or slowdown due to the act or process of unionization of either party's labor force, breakdown of, or damage to, Plant, Mine, equipment or facilities related thereto (including emergency outages of equipment or facilities for the purpose of making repairs to avoid breakdown thereof or damage thereto other than regularly scheduled repairs or regular maintenance) diminution or exhaustion of coal reserves due to major unforeseen adverse geologic conditions, interruptions or breakdowns of the electrical power system serving Buyers' or Seller's facilities, unavailability of equipment and/or materials from others, and orders or acts of military or civil authority, and any other cause, whether or not of the same class or kind specifically enumerated above, or otherwise, which is not reasonably within the control of the party claiming force majeure. Acts of civil authority, as that term is herein used, shall include any act or order of any court possessing jurisdiction and any act or failure or refusal to act of any governmental agency or officer charged with the enforcement and/or administration of any applicable law, rule or regulation, which act or failure or refusal effectively prohibits the legal operation of or effectively denies to either party any permit, lease, license or approval necessary for the legal operation of either party's Mine, Plant, equipment or facilities related thereto.

Should an event of force majeure be remedied in a period of time less than

14 consecutive days (336 consecutive hours not including the hour in which the event commenced) deliveries suspended during such period of time shall be made up at delivery rates agreed upon among the Parties. Should an event of force majeure extend beyond 14 consecutive days, the remedies set forth in this Article VIII shall apply.

The requirement that any event of force majeure shall be remedied with all reasonable dispatch shall not require the settlement of strikes, lockout or other labor difficulty by the party involved contrary to its wishes. The manner in which all such difficulties shall be handled shall be entirely within the discretion of the party concerned. The Term of this Agreement shall not be extended by reason of an event(s) of force majeure.

SECTION 8.02 NOTICE OF FORCE MAJEURE

Notice of the commencement of an event of force majeure shall be given by the party claiming it as soon as practicable under the circumstances. Oral notification shall be confirmed by written notice postmarked within five (5) days following commencement of an event of force majeure, and shall specify the nature of the event, the hour, day, month and year in which it commenced and include a good faith estimate of the period of time for which and the degree to which performance under this Agreement will be affected. The party claiming force majeure shall provide the other party with all necessary information requested by it to evaluate and verify the claim of force majeure. When the party claiming force majeure has removed the cause of such force majeure and is ready to resume performance of its rights and obligations under this

Agreement, such party shall notify the other party as soon as practicable under the circumstances with oral notification, confirmed in writing within five (5) days following removal of the event of force majeure.

Despite the existence of an event of force majeure, Buyers severally agree to pay monthly, during a period of force majeure based on the percentage of Plant ownership, an amount equal to the sum of (1) the difference between (a) 201,000 tons times the applicable Shortfall Price per ton (as determined under Section 4.05), and (b) the numbers of tons actually delivered during such month times $2.61 per ton, and (2) the costs of complying with laws, regulations, or other matters set forth in Section 6.09, to the extent not previously included in the price of coal under that Section, which monthly payments shall continue during the period of force majeure but not to exceed two years from the commencement of such force majeure. All payments made pursuant to this paragraph shall be treated by Seller as partial payments for coal to be delivered under this Agreement. Such payments, with interest as calculated pursuant to Section 7.02 herein, shall be credited against actual amounts due for coal deliveries, provided that Seller shall not be obligated to credit against any amount due at any time more than 20% of that amount due on account of any prior prepayments.

SECTION 8.03 - REMEDIES IN CASE OF SELLER FORCE MAJEURE

To the extent that an event of force majeure prevents the Seller either wholly or in part from producing, processing or delivering coal as provided for in this Agreement, either partially or completely, the Seller shall be excused from making deliveries hereunder. Upon conclusion of the event of force majeure, the obligation of the Seller to deliver coal to the Buyers shall resume. Deficiencies in shipments resulting from the force majeure may, at the Buyers' option, be added to subsequent shipments at the prevailing Current Price when shipped and at delivery rates agreed upon between Buyers and Seller.

SECTION 8.04 - REMEDIES IN CASE OF BUYERS' FORCE MAJEURE

To the extent that an event of force majeure prevents the Buyers, from accepting or utilizing the coal to be delivered as provided for in this Agreement, either partially or completely, the Buyers shall be excused from making coal purchases hereunder. Upon conclusion of the event of force majeure, the obligation of Buyers to purchase coal from the Seller shall resume. In addition to Buyers' obligation to prorate and make up coal deliveries excused by force majeure, as provided in Section 8.05 below, deficiencies in shipments resulting from the force majeure may, at Buyers' option be added to subsequent shipments at the prevailing Current Price when shipped and at delivery rates agreed upon between Buyers and Seller.

SECTION 8.05 - ALLOCATION OF FORCE MAJEURE AMONG VARIOUS CONTRACTS

Delivery deficiencies resulting from Buyers' force majeure claims under this Agreement applicable to all other coal purchase agreements under which Buyers purchase coal for use at the Plant shall be applied pro rata between or among all such agreements, including this Agreement, on the basis of the quantity of coal scheduled to be delivered under each agreement during each month of the period of force majeure. If, during the calendar year of the force majeure event or the next succeeding calendar year, the Buyers' coal requirements at the Plant exceed the total quantities which Buyers are obligated to purchase under all coal supply agreements in effect on the date the force majeure event began, Buyers may satisfy such excess requirements by purchasing coal from any coal supplier whether currently under contract to provide coal to the Plant or not. Schedule D, Example 1, sets forth how this pro ration shall operate.

Delivery deficiencies resulting from Buyers' force majeure claims under this Agreement applicable to some, but not all, of the other coal purchase agreements under which Buyers purchase coal for use at the Plant shall be applied pro rata to those agreements to which the force majeure is applicable on the basis of the quantity of coal scheduled to be delivered under each agreement during each month of the period of force majeure. If, during the calendar year of the force majeure event or the next succeeding calendar year, Buyers' coal requirements at the Plant exceed the total quantities which Buyers are obligated to purchase under all coal supply agreements in effect on the date the force majeure event began, Buyers shall first satisfy such excess requirements by purchasing coal under this Agreement at the then-prevailing Current Price until the quantities of coal not delivered under this Agreement by reason of the force majeure event have been made up. Schedule D, Example 2, sets forth how this pro ration and requirement to purchase excess requirements under this Agreement first shall operate.

ARTICLE IX - NOTICES

All notices required or permitted to be given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be deemed properly given when delivered in person to the party to be notified, when mailed by registered or certified United States mail, postage prepaid, or when telexed or telecopied to the party to be notified, at its address set forth below, or such other address within the continental United States of America as the other party to be notified may have designated prior thereto by written notice to the other:

As to Bridger Coal:

Vice President
Pacific Minerals, Inc
201 South Main, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84140-0020
Telecopy Number (801) 220-4725

As to Pacific:

Vice President
PacifiCorp
201 South Main, Suite 2300
Salt Lake City, UT 84140-0023
Telecopy Number (801) 220-4725

As to Idaho:

Vice President - Bulk Power
Idaho Power Company
1221 Idaho Street
Boise, ID 83721
Telecopy Number (208) 388-6903

ARTICLE X - ARBITRATION

In the event that the Parties are unable to mutually agree on any matter (except where this Agreement specifically otherwise provides a method for resolving controversies), the unresolved matter shall be resolved by arbitration if a request for arbitration, as provided herein, is given. Arbitration may be requested by notice being given by Seller to Buyers or by Buyers to Seller. Within fifteen (15) days after receipt of such notice, Buyers and Seller shall each designate a person to act as arbiter, with the two persons selected designating a third party to act as the third arbiter, said third selection to be made within fifteen (15) days after the appointment of the first two arbiters. In the event the party upon whom the original arbitration request was served shall fail to designate its arbiter within the fifteen (15) day period, the arbiter designated by the party requesting arbitration shall act as the sole arbiter and shall be deemed to be the single, mutually approved arbiter to resolve the controversy. The arbitration shall be conducted subject to, and in accordance with, the laws of the State of Wyoming, and subject to, and in accordance with, the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The decision and award of the majority of the arbiters or of such sole arbiter shall be made and reported to the Parties as soon as possible, but, in any event, no later than 180 days after the date of selection of the final arbiter, shall be binding upon all the Parties, and shall be enforceable in accordance with the then applicable laws of the State of Wyoming.

ARTICLE XI - WAIVERS

Failure of any of the Parties to insist upon strict performance of any of the terms and conditions hereof, or failure or delay to exercise any right or remedies provided herein, or by law, or to properly notify any party in the event of breach or acceptance of payment for any goods hereunder, shall not release any party from any of the warranties or obligations of this Agreement, and shall not be deemed a waiver of any right by any party to insist upon strict performance hereof, or any of its rights or remedies as to any such goods regardless when shipped, received or accepted, or as to any prior or subsequent default hereunder, nor shall any purported oral modification operate as a waiver of any of the Agreement terms.

ARTICLE XII - INTERPRETATION AND ASSIGNMENT

SECTION 12.01 - GOVERNING LAW

This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Wyoming.

SECTION 12.02 - ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

Seller shall maintain its books of account and other accounting records in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied and all financial computations made pursuant to this Agreement shall be performed in accordance with such principles. All accounting terms not specifically defined in this Agreement shall be construed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

SECTION 12.03 - ASSIGNMENT

This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns; provided, however, this Agreement may not be assigned or otherwise transferred by Buyers or Seller without the written consent of the other without which such assignment shall be void, except that such consent shall not be required for assignment or transfer by a party to its wholly-owned subsidiary, or by virtue of statutory merger, consolidation or reorganization or to a mortgagee, corporate trustee, bank, insurance company or other financial institution.

If, in accordance with the foregoing provision hereof, Seller assigns any of its interests hereunder to a mortgagee, corporate trustee, bank, insurance company or other financial institution, Buyers shall provide their written consent to such assignment if requested.

In the event of assignment hereof by Buyers or Seller, the assignee shall assume all of the obligations hereunder of the assigning party except if the assignee is a mortgagee, corporate trust bank, insurance or other financial institution; however, the assigning party shall not thereby (nor by the consent to such assignment) be relieved of any of their obligations hereunder, it being understood that Buyers or Seller shall in all respects remain fully obligated and responsible for the performance of their obligations under this Agreement unless and until expressly released therefrom in writing by the other.

ARTICLE XIII - RECORDS AND AUDITS

SECTION 13.01 - AUDITS

Seller shall, upon Buyers' request, no more often than once per year, make all books of account and other records covering the preceding fiscal year, and relating to the determination of the Current Price available for inspection and audit by a nationally recognized firm of certified public accountants or other independent experts to be selected by the Buyers and acceptable to Seller whose fees and expenses shall be paid by Buyers. The firm conducting the audit shall agree not to disclose, to any party other than the Buyers and shall treat as confidential, any and all proprietary information of Seller which is furnished to or examined by such firm in connection with the audit. The audit report prepared and certified by such firm shall relate to the Current Price of coal delivered to the Buyers and shall be directed toward verifying the correctness of the Current Price, and quantities delivered under this Agreement.

SECTION 13.02 - GENERAL AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

Seller shall keep accurate records and books of account showing all data relating to the determination of the Current Price. Records relating to determination of pass-through charges and changes thereto shall be permanently maintained by Seller. Seller shall not unreasonably withhold their approval of any auditing firm or other expert proposed by the Buyers to perform any audit under this Article XIII. Copies of all audit reports shall be made available to the Buyers and Seller simultaneously.

SECTION 13.03 - ADJUSTMENTS AND PAYMENTS

If any such audit discloses that an overpayment or an underpayment has been made, the amount of such overpayment or underpayment shall promptly be paid to the party to whom it is owed by the other party plus interest at the rate provided in Section 7.02 above.

ARTICLE XIV - NONDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

PMI is an Equal Opportunity Employer, and in the performance of this Agreement shall not engage in any conduct or practice which violates any applicable law, order or regulation prohibiting discrimination against any person by reason of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age.

A copy of the Equal Opportunity and Nondiscrimination Provisions of Section 202 of Executive Order 11246 and a copy of the certification of Nonsegregated Facilities are set forth in Schedule E attached hereto and incorporated hereby by this reference.

ARTICLE XV - IMMIGRATION LAW PROVISION

During the term of the Agreement, PMI agrees to comply with the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 as set forth in Public Law 99-603, 8 *USCS §1324a* (hereinafter "Act"), and any amendments and revisions thereto which shall be enacted by Congress during the term of this Agreement. PMI further agrees that in the event it employs any illegal aliens in contravention of the above referenced Act, then PMI agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless Buyers and their directors, officers, agents and employees from and against all claims, losses, expenses, sanctions and/or penalties, including attorney's fees arising out of, or resulting from, any violation by PMI. Furthermore, PMI agrees to provide Buyers with access to the I-9 forms, which forms are provided for in the above referenced Act and which PMI is obligated to fill out to evidence compliance with the above cited Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have amended and restated this Agreement in its entirety as of the 1st day of January, 1996.

PACIFICORP

By ____________________

Title Vice President

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY
By PACIFIC MINERALS, INC.

By ____________________

Title Vice President

IDAHO POWER COMPANY

By ____________________

Title General Manager, Power Supply

By IDAHO ENERGY RESOURCES CO.

By ____________________

Title Vice President

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY
SCHEDULE A
SAMPLE OF BILLING AND PRICE ESCALATION

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
THIRD RESTATED AND AMENDED CONTRACT OF JANUARY 1, 1996
SALES PRICE PER TON

Current Price Components with Adjustments	CONTRACT SECTION	BASE PRICE AMOUNT	REFERENCE	ADJUSTMENT	JANUARY 1996
Labor, Salaries & Related Costs	6.02	$ 4.351	Exhibit A	$ (0.012)	$ 4.339
Materials & Supplies	6.03	3.365	Exhibit B	(0.013)	3.352
Electric Power	6.04	0.402	Exhibit C	0.000	0.402
Inflation & Deflation	6.05	7.768	Exhibit D	0.007	7.775
Ad Valorem, Severance, Property & License Taxes	6.06	2.278	Exhibit E	(0.010)	2.268
Costs Based Upon Extraction	6.07	2.663	Exhibit F	0.018	2.681
Other New, Increased Taxes	6.08	0.000	Exhibit G	0.000	0.000
Additional Costs	6.09	0.000	Exhibit H	0.000	0.000
Transfer Taxes	6.10	0.000	Exhibit I	0.000	0.000
Black Lung	6.11	0.562	Exhibit J	0.000	0.562
Federal Reclamation Fee	6.12	0.350	Exhibit K	0.000	0.350
Final Reclamation	6.13	0.513	Exhibit L	0.000	0.513
Current Coal Price Per Ton		$ 22.252		$ (0.010)	$ 22.242

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.02
LABOR COST ADJUSTMENT

AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS INDEX	BLS INDEX (1)	BASE DATE PRICE SUBCOMPONENT VALUE	BASE DATE INDEX VALUE SEPTEMBER 1995	CURRENT INDEX VALUE OCTOBER 1995	INDEX CHANGE	PERCENT INCREASE	CURRENT VALUE OF PRICE SUBCOMPONENT (2)
Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining	Table B15, SIC Code 122	$ 4.351	$ 18.71	$ 18.66	(0.05)	-0.27%	$ 4.339

(1) Monthly U.S. Department of Labor publication "Employment and Earnings" (Table B15, SIC Code 122)
(2) Current Value of the Price Subcomponent = Base Date Price Subcomponent Value x Current Index Value/Base Date Index Value

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BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.03
MATERIALS & SUPPLIES

PRODUCER PRICE INDEX	BLS REFERENCE TABLE AND INDUSTRY/ PRODUCT CODE	BASE DATE PRICE SUBCOMPONENT VALUE	BASE DATE INDEX VALUE OCTOBER 1995	CURRENT INDEX VALUE NOVEMBER 1995	INDEX CHANGE	PERCENT INCREASE	CURRENT VALUE OF PRICE SUBCOMPONENT (1)
Construction Machinery and Equipment	Table 6, Code 112	$ 0.999	137.3	137.4	0.1	0.07%	$ 1.000
#2 Diesel Fuel : Direct Sales to End Users	Table 5, Code 2911.4132	0.390	73.1	74.1	1.0	1.37%	0.395
Tires : Truck/Bus Tires Including Off Highway	Table 6, Code 0712.0105	0.070	93.1	93.4	0.3	0.32%	0.070
Explosives	Table 6, Code 0679.02	0.907	145.2	141.8	(3.4)	-2.34%	0.886
PPI : All Commodities	Table 6	0.999	125.0	125.3	0.3	0.24%	1.001
Total Materials & Supplies ($/Ton)		$ 3.365				-0.39%	$ 3.352

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(1) Current Value of the Price Subcomponent = Base Date Price Subcomponent Value x Current Index Value/Base Date Index Value

EXHIBIT C

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.04
ELECTRIC POWER

	JANUARY 1996
I. Electric Power - Percent Increase/Decrease From Base Date	
A. Current Electric Power Costs (cents/kwh)	3.4760
Base Date Electric Power Costs (cents/kwh)	3.4760
B. Increase	0.0000
C. Percent Increase	0.00%
II. Current Price Per Ton (dollars/ton)	
A. \$0.402 x (Current Electric Power Costs/Base Date Electric Power Costs) = Current Value Per ton of the Electric Power Price Subcomponent	\$ 0.402

EXHIBIT D

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.05
INFLATION/DEFLATION

PRODUCER PRICE INDEX	BLS/BEA REFERENCE TABLE AND INDUSTRY/ PRODUCT CODE	BASE DATE PRICE SUBCOMPONENT VALUE	BASE DATE INDEX VALUE OCTOBER 1995	CURRENT INDEX VALUE NOVEMBER 1995	INDEX CHANGE	PERCENT INCREASE	CURRENT VALUE OF PRICE SUBCOMPONENT (1)
Scrapers, Graders, Rollers, Off-Hwy Trucks/ Haulers, and Attach. for Mounting	Table 5, Code 3531.6	$ 1.525	145.2	145.4	0.2	0.14%	$ 1.527
PPI: Industrial Commodities	Table 6	1.525	125.5	125.3	(0.2)	-0.16%	1.523
GDP-IPD	NA	4.718	128.1	128.3	0.2	0.16%	4.725
Total Inflation/Deflation ($/Ton)		$ 7.768				0.09%	$ 7.775

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(1) Current Value of the Price Subcomponent = Base Date Price Subcomponent Value x Current Index Value/Base Date Index Value

EXHIBIT E

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.06
AD VALOREM, SEVERANCE, PROPERTY AND LICENSE TAXES

	For the Period:	JANUARY 1996
Estimated Wyoming Production Tax Valuation:		$ 14.874
I. Severance Tax (1)		1.041
Extraction Tax (2)		1.041
Personal Property Tax (3)		0.186
	Total ($/Ton)	$ 2.268

(1) Tax Rate: 7.0% x Estimated Wyoming Production Tax Valuation
(2) Tax Rate: 7.0% x Estimated Wyoming Production Tax Valuation
(3) Estimated 1996 Property Tax Prorated Over 1996 Production

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.07
COSTS BASED UPON EXTRACTION

	For the Period:	January 1996
I. Computation of Royalty Payments		
A. Tons Delivered:		
BLM Leases:		
BLM Percentage Lease:		280,186
UPRR Lease: ($2.50/ton)		328,914
UPRR Lease: ($2.25/ton)		0
	Total Tons	609,100
B. Production Royalties:		
BLM ($0.20/ton)		$ -
UPRR ($2.50 esc/ton) (1)		992,991.37
Override BLM ($0.08/ton)		22,414.88
Override UPRR ($0.12/ton)		39,469.68
	Total Royalties	1,054,875.93
C. Production Percentage Royalties:		
BLM		577,883.63
	Total Royalties	$ 1,632,759.55
II. Current Price/Ton		
A. Royalties		$ 2.681
B. Base Contract Price		2.663
	Price Increase/(Decrease)	$ 0.018

(1) Refer to Exhibit F-1

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EXHIBIT F-1

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.07
UNION PACIFIC ROYALTY RATE

I. PPI, Industrial Commodities - Percent Increase/Decrease Base Index: 1982 = 100

	For the Period:	January 1996
A.	Current Index as of 20th of January (1)	125.7
B.	December 1985	104.1
C.	Percent Increase	20.75%

II. Current Price Per Ton ($/Ton)

A.	Current Price Per Ton = $2.500 x Current Index Value/DEC 1985 Index Value	$ 3.019

(1) Estimated December 1995 Producer Price Industrial Commodities Index

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.08
OTHER NEW, INCREASED TAXES

	DOLLARS	$/TON
I. Other New, Increased Taxes		
	NOT APPLICABLE AT THIS TIME	
Total Other Taxes		
Total Tons Delivered		

EXHIBIT H

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.09
ADDITIONAL COST IMPOSED BY LEGISLATION OR REGULATION

	DOLLARS	$/TON
I. Non-Reclamation Related Additional Costs:		
	NOT APPLICABLE AT THIS TIME	
Total Additional Costs	____________	____________
Total Tons Delivered		____________

EXHIBIT I

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.10
TRANSFER TAXES

	DOLLARS	$/TON
I. Transfer Taxes		
	NOT APPLICABLE AT THIS TIME	
Total Transfer Taxes	________	________
Total Tons Delivered		________

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BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.11
BLACK LUNG PAYMENTS

	JANUARY 1996	
	$	$/TON
I. Funding for Pacific Minerals Inc. Black Lung Insurance Premium		
A. $86,284/12 =	$ 7,190	
B. Total Tons Delivered :	609,100	
Cost Per Ton		$ 0.012
II. Federal Black Lung Tax		
Actual Tax Rate is The Lesser of $0.55/Ton Or 4.4% of Sales Price		$ 0.55
III. Total Price/Ton		
A. Current Price/Ton		$ 0.562
B. Base Contract Price		0.562
Price Increase/(Decrease)		$ -

EXHIBIT K

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.12
FEDERAL RECLAMATION TAX

	For the Period:	JANUARY 1996
I. Federal Reclamation Tax Actual Rate/Ton For October 1977 and Following Months		$ 0.350
	Total Price Per Ton	$ 0.350

SAMPLE ONLY

BRIDGER COAL COMPANY/BRIDGER POWER PLANT
SECTION 6.13
FINAL RECLAMATION

	JANUARY 1996	
	$	$/TON
I. Final Reclamation	$ 238,545	$ 0.513
Base Tons Delivered	465,000	

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SCHEDULE B

Cost of Complying with Title IV
Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of 1969

Estimated 1996 Insurance Premium	$ 86,284	
Estimated 1996 Deliveries	7,032,600	tons
Black Lung Costs Per Ton	$ 0.012	

SCHEDULE C

Final Mine Closure, Reclamation, and Other Environmental Related Activities

1. Final Pit Closure - All costs associated with bringing the final mining pit to the elevation shown on the approved post-reclamation surface contour map.

2. Ramp Closure - All costs associated with bringing the ramp areas to the elevation shown on the approved post-reclamation surface contour map. Typically, drainages are routed through ramps.

3. Soil Removal - All costs associated with removal of soil associated with final closure.

4. Soil Application - All costs associated with soil application associated with final closure.

5. Facility Decommissioning - All costs associated with demolition and disposal of office, shop and support buildings, and removal and disposal of fences, pavement, power poles, tanks and other miscellaneous structures.

6. Revegetation - All costs associated with Revegetation during closure, including seed, seeding, mulching and fertilization.

7. Post-mining Monitoring - All costs associated with monitoring activities during and after closure activities. This includes monitoring of air, soils, vegetation, hydrology, wildlife, overburden, and groundwater.

8. Supervisory, General, and Administrative costs.

9. Bonding costs.

ALLOCATION OF FORCE MAJEURE AMONG VARIOUS CONTRACTS

SCHEDULE D

Example #1

PacifiCorp and Idaho Power Company
Example of Pro Ration of Buyers Force Majeure
Among All Coal Purchase Agreements Under Which
Buyers Purchase Coal for use at the Jim Bridger Plant

For example, if during a month 33, 000 tons were scheduled to be delivered under contract A, 125,000 tons were scheduled to be delivered under contract B and 436,000 tons were scheduled for delivery under contract C, and there was a force majeure event for the entire month which affected 10,000 tons of coal, then 600 tons would be applied to contract A, 2,100 tons to contract B and 7,300 tons to contract C. By way of further example, assuming that contract A, contract B and contract C provided for the delivery of the quantities set forth in the preceding example for three successive months, and there was a force majeure event which began July 27 and continued through the following September 10 (a period of 46 days) which affected 20,000 tons of coal, the force majeure quantity would be allocated among the three contracts as set forth below. The number of tons affected by the force majeure event would be applied equally to each day in the period, and the result in this example would be 434.78 tons per day. The daily quantity would then be multiplied by the number of days in each month in the force majeure period to calculate the monthly force majeure quantity:

Month	Number of Days	Daily Quantity (Tons)	Monthly Force Majeure Quantity (Tons)
July	5	434.78	2,174
August	31	434.78	13,478
September	10	434.78	4,348
	46		20,000

The monthly force majeure quantity shall then be allocated among the various contracts on the basis of the quantify of the coal scheduled to be delivered during each month:

Contract	Scheduled July Quantity (Tons)	Percent of Total	Allocation of Monthly Force Majeure Quantity to Each Contract (Tons)
A	33,000	6	130
B	125,000	21	457
C	436,000	73	1,587
	594,000	100	2,174

Contract	Scheduled August Quantity (Tons)	Percent of Total	Allocation of Monthly Force Majeure Quantity to Each Contract (Tons)
A	33,000	6	809
B	125,000	21	2,830
C	436,000	73	9,839
	594,000	100	13,478

Contract	Scheduled September Quantity (Tons)	Percent of Total	Allocation of Monthly Force Majeure Quantity to Each Contract (Tons)
A	33,000	6	261
B	125,000	21	913
C	436,000	73	3,174
	594,000	100	4,348
			20,000

SCHEDULE D
2 OF 6

SCHEDULE D

Example #2

Example Concerning Buyers' Force Majeure Claim(s) Under This Agreement Applicable to Some But Not All of the Other Coal Purchase Agreements Under Which Buyers Purchase Coal for Use at the Plant Illustrating Pro Ration of Buyers Force Majeure Among Contracts the Force Majeure Claim(s) is Applicable to and Buyers' Requirement to Purchase Coal Under this Agreement First Should Buyers Need to Purchase Tons in Excess of Annual Orders as Reduced by the Force Majeure

The purpose of this example is to demonstrate the effect of a Buyers' force majeure claim under this Agreement which is applicable to some but not all of the other coal purchase agreements under which Buyers purchase coal for use at the Plant, and to illustrate by example, pro ration of Buyers' claim for force majeure among those contracts said force majeure is applicable to and the requirement that Buyers first purchase coal under this Agreement in the event Buyers' coal requirements at the Plant exceed the total annual orders which Buyers are obligated to purchase under all coal supply agreements in effect on the date the force majeure event began.

For example, if a force majeure was declared under this Agreement on November 27, 1996, and resolved on February 7, 1997, the length of force majeure would be 35 days in 1996 and 38 days in 1997, for a total of 73 days. The following table shows the delivery schedules that were submitted by Buyers in the annual orders prior to the force majeure for the years 1996 and 1997:

	1996	1997
Bridger Coal Agreement (Contract Minimums)	5,232,600	5,232,600
"X" Agreement (Contract Minimums)	400,000	400,000
Contract A (Annual Order)	300,000	200,000
Contract B (Annual Order)	200,000	100,000
Contract C - Pacific (Annual Order)	150,000	200,000
Contract D - Idaho (Annual Order)	50,000	0
TOTAL ORDER	6,332,600	6,132,600

The force majeure declared under this Agreement also qualified as a force majeure under the "X" Agreement and Contract D, but not for Contracts A, B or C.

The delivery quantity deferred during the force majeure period is 1,000,000 tons and would be allocated as follows:

Months	Number of Days	Weighted Daily Quantity	Monthly Force Majeure Tons
November 1996	4	13,698.63	54,794
December 1996	31	13,698.63	424,658
January 1997	31	13,698.63	424,658
February 1997	7	13,698.63	95,890
TOTAL	73		1,000,000

Contracts Affected	Nov 1996	% of Total	Nov 1996 Allocated Force Majeure
Bridger Coal	436,050	92%	50,410
"X"	33,333	7%	3,836
Contract D	4,167	1%	548
TOTAL	473,550	100%	54,794

Contracts Affected	Dec 1996	% of Total	Dec 1996 Allocated Force Majeure
Bridger Coal	436,050	92%	390,685
"X"	33,333	7%	29,726
Contract D	4,167	1%	4,247
TOTAL	473,550	100%	424,658

Contracts Affected	Jan 1997	% of Total	Jan 1997 Allocated Force Majeure
Bridger Coal	436,050	93%	394,932
"X"	33,333	7%	29,726
Contract D	0	0%	0
TOTAL	469,383	100%	424,658

SCHEDULE D
4 OF 6

Contracts Affected	Feb 1997	% of Total	Feb 1997 Allocated Force Majeure
Bridger Coal	436,050	93%	89,178
"X"	33,333	7%	6,712
Contract D	0	0%	0
TOTAL	469,383	100%	95,890

Contracts Affected	Total Allocated Force Majeure
Bridger Coal	925,205
"X"	70,000
Contract D	4,795
TOTAL	1,000,000

If the Buyers annual orders for Plant usage for 1997 total 6,132,600 tons, as depicted by contract in the table set forth below as reduced by the force majeure and Buyers' coal requirements for 1997 are 6,800,000 tons, the additional amount of coal needed by the Plant (the difference between the obligation 6,132,600 tons as reduced by the force majeure and the need for 6,800,000 tons) will be delivered under this Agreement first before ordering additional coal from any other coal supply agreement at the Plant.

	1997 Annual Order	1997 Need	Make-Up Amounts	1997 Allocated
Bridger Coal Agrmt (Contract Minimums)	5,232,600	5,232,600	441,095	5,673,695
"X" Agreement (Contract Minimums)	400,000	400,000		400,000
Contract A (Annual Order)	200,000	200,000		200,000
Contract B (Annual Order)	100,000	100,000		100,000
Contract C - Pacific (Annual Order)	200,000	200,000		200,000
Contract D - Idaho (Annual Order)	0	0		0
Other Coal	0	667,400	226,305	226,305
TOTAL ORDER	6,132,600	6,800,000	667,400	6,800,000

This reflects that the 925,205 force majeure make-up delivered under this Agreement is made in 1997. Since the force majeure deficiency occurring in 1997 is made-up in 1997, the 1996 deficiency of 441,095 can also be made-up in 1997. Once the force majeure delivery deficiencies under this Agreement of 925,205 are made-up, the remaining 38,357 from Contracts X and D of the remaining 1996 force majeure delivery deficiency can be made-up (if required) by taking above the annual orders or contract minimums from other coal supply agreements at the Plant. As in this Agreement, the force majeure deficiency occurring in 1997 is made-up in 1997. The 38,357 deficiency can be made-up (if required) from the 226,305 remaining tons needed to fuel the Plant in 1997.

SCHEDULE D
6 OF 6

SCHEDULE E
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT AND CERTIFICATION

A. AGREEMENTS

PMI, as the employer at the mine, agrees as follows:

1. Equal Opportunity Clause

The following provisions set forth in Section 60-14 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, requires PMI, unless exempt, to comply with said provisions in all Contracts or Purchase Orders for $10,000 or more.

a) The PMI will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin. The PMI will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, religion, color, sex, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; lay-off or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The PMI agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the Contracting Officer, setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.

b) The PMI will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed by or on behalf of PMI state that all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, religion, color, sex, or national origin.

c) The PMI will send to each labor union or representative of workers with which he has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a notice, to be provided by the agency Contracting Officer, advising the labor union or workers' representative of PMI's commitments under Section 202 of Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, and shall post copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment.

d) The PMI will comply with all provisions of Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, and the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor.

e) The PMI will furnish all information and reports required by Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, and by the rules, regulations, and order of the Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto, and will permit access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the Secretary of Labor for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations and orders.

f) In the event of PMI's noncompliance with the nondiscrimination clauses of this Agreement or with any of such rules, regulations, or orders, this Agreement may be cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in part or the PMI may be declared ineligible for further Government contracts in accordance with procedures authorized in Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, and such other sanctions may be imposed and remedies invoked as provided in Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, or by rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary of Labor, or as otherwise provided by law.

g) The PMI will include the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (7) in every subcontract or purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to Section 204 of Executive Order No 11246 of September 24, 1965, so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The PMI will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as the contracting agency may direct as a means of enforcing such provisions including sanctions for noncompliance; provided, however, that in the event the PMI may request the United States to enter into such litigation to protect the interest of the United States.

2. <u>Employment of Veterans - Listing of Employment Openings</u>

The following provisions set forth in Section 60-250.4 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Executive Order No 11701 and the Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Act of 1974, requires PMI to comply with said provisions in all Contracts or Purchase Orders for $10,000 or more.

a) The PMI will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because he or she is a disabled veteran or veteran of the Vietnam Era in regard to any position for which the employee or applicant for employment is qualified. The PMI agrees to take affirmative action to employ, advance in employment and otherwise treat qualified disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam Era without discrimination based upon their disability or veterans status in all employment practices such as the following: employment upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment, advertising, lay-off or termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation, and selection for training, including apprenticeship.

b) The PMI agrees that all suitable employment openings of PMI which exist at the time of the execution of this Agreement and those which occur during the performance of this Agreement, including those occurring at an establishment of the PMI other than the one wherein the Agreement is being performed but excluding those of independently operated corporate affiliates, shall be listed at an appropriate local office of the State employment service system wherein the opening occurs. The PMI further agrees to provide such reports to such local office regarding employment openings and hires as may be required.

State and local government agencies holding Federal contracts of $10,000 or more shall also list all their suitable openings with the appropriate office of the State employment service, but are not required to provide those reports set forth in paragraphs (d) and (e).

c) Listing of employment openings with the employment service system pursuant to this clause shall be made at least concurrently with the use of any other recruitment source or effort and shall involve the normal obligations which attach to the placing of a bona fide job order, including the acceptance of referrals of veterans and non-veterans. The listing of employment openings does not require the hiring of any particular job applicant or from any particular group of job applicants, and nothing herein is intended to relieve the PMI regulations regarding nondiscrimination in employment.

d) The reports required by paragraph (b) of this clause shall include, but not be limited to, periodic reports which shall be filed at least quarterly with the appropriate local office or, where the PMI has more than one hiring location in a State, with the central office of that State employment service. Such reports shall indicate for each hiring location, (1) the number of individuals hired during the reporting period, (2) the number of nondisabled veterans of the Vietnam Era hired, (3) the number of disabled veterans of the Vietnam Era hired, and (4) the total number of disabled veterans hired. The reports should include covered veteran hired for on-the-job training under 38 USC 1787. The PMI shall submit a report within thirty (30) days after the end of each reporting period wherein any performance is made on this Contract identifying data for each hiring location. The PMI shall maintain at each hiring location copies of the reports submitted until the expiration of one (1) year after final payment under the Agreement, during which time these reports and related documentation shall be made available, upon request, for examination by any authorized representatives of the Contracting Officer or the Secretary of Labor. Documentation would include personnel records respecting job openings, recruitment and placement.

e) Whenever the PMI becomes contractually bound to the listing provisions of this clause, it shall advise the employment service system in each State where it has establishments of the name and location of each hiring location in the State. As long as the PMI is contractually bound to these provisions and has so advised the State system, there is no need to advise the State system of subsequent contracts. The PMI may advise the State system when it is no longer bound by this clause.

f) This clause does not apply to the listing of employment openings which occur and are filled outside of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

g) The provisions of paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this clause do not apply to openings which the PMI proposes to fill from within his own organization or to fill pursuant to a customary and traditional employer union hiring arrangement. These provisions do not apply to a particular opening once an employer decides to consider applicants outside of his own organization or employer-union arrangement for that opening.

h) As used in this clause: (1) "all suitable employment openings" include, but is not limited to, openings which occur in the following job categories: production and non-production; plant and office; laborers and mechanics; supervisory and non-supervisory; technical; and executive, administrative, and professional openings as are compensated on a salary basis of less than $25,000 per year. This term includes full time employment, temporary employment of more than three (3) days duration, and part-time employment. It does not include openings which the PMI proposes to fill from within his own organization or to fill pursuant to a customary and traditional employer-union hiring arrangement nor openings in an educational institution which are restricted to students of that institution. Under the most compelling circumstances an employment opening may not be suitable for listing, including such situations where the needs of the Government cannot reasonably be otherwise supplied, where listing would be contrary to national security, or where the requirement of listing would otherwise not be for the best interest of the Government.

1 - "Appropriate office of the State employment service system" means the local office of the Federal State national system of public employment offices with assigned responsibility for serving the area where the employment opening is to be filled, including the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

2 - "Openings which the PMI proposes to fill from within his own organization" means employment openings for which no consideration will be given to persons outside the PMI's organization (including any affiliates, subsidiaries, and the parent companies) and includes any openings which the PMI proposes to fill from regularly established "recall" lists.

3 - "Openings which the PMI proposes to fill pursuant to a customary and traditional employer-union hiring arrangement" means employment openings which the

PMI proposes to fill from union halls, which is part of the customary and traditional hiring relationship which exists between the PMI and representatives of his employees.

i) The PMI agrees to comply with the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to the Act.

j) In the event of the PMI's noncompliance with the requirements of this clause, actions for noncompliance may be taken in accordance with the rules, regulations relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to the Act.

k) The PMI agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices in a form to be prescribed by the Director, provided by or through the Contracting Officer. Such notice shall state the PMI's obligation under the law to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam Era for employment, and the rights of applicants and employees.

l) The PMI will notify each labor union or representative of workers with which it has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract understanding that the PMI is bound by the terms of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act, and is committed to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified disabled veterans and veterans of the Vietnam War.

m) The PMI will include the provisions of this clause in every subcontract or purchase order of $10,000 or more unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary issued pursuant to the Act, so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The PMI will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs may direct to enforce such provisions, including action for noncompliance.

3. Employment of the Handicapped

The following provisions set forth in Section 741.4, Part 60-741 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Executive Order No 11758 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires PMI to comply with said provisions in all Contracts or Purchase Orders for $2,500 or more.

a) The PMI will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of physical or mental handicap in regard to any position for which the employee or applicant for employment is qualified. The PMI agrees to take affirmative action to employ, advance in employment and otherwise treat qualified handicapped individuals without discrimination based upon their physical or mental handicap in all employment practices such as the following: employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment, advertising, lay-off or termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation, and selection for training, including apprenticeship.

b) The PMI agrees to comply with the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to the Act.

c) In the event of the PMI's noncompliance with the requirements of this clause, actions for noncompliance may be taken in accordance with the rules, regulations and relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to the Act.

d) The PMI agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices in a form to be prescribed by the Director, provided by or through the Contracting Officer. Such notices shall state the PMI's obligation under the law to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped employees and applicants for employment, and the rights of applicants and employees.

e) The PMI will notify each labor union or representative of workers with which it has a collective bargaining agreement or other **contract** understanding, that the PMI is bound by the terms of Section **503 of the** Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and is committed to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment physically and mentally handicapped individuals.

f) The PMI will include the provisions of this clause in every subcontract or purchase order of $2,500 or more unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary issued pursuant to Section 503 of the Act, so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The PMI will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs may direct to enforce such provisions, including action for noncompliance.

4. Utilization of Minority Business Enterprises

(Part A)

The following provisions set forth in Section 1-1310.2 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to Executive Order No 11625 requires PMI to comply with said provisions in all Contracts or Purchase Orders for $5,000 or more, except (1) Contracts which, including all subcontracts thereunder, are to be performed entirely outside the United States, its possessions and Puerto Rico, and (2) Contracts for services which are personal in nature:

a) It is the policy of the Government that minority business enterprises shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of Government contracts.

b) The PMI agrees to use his best efforts to carry out this policy in the award of his subcontracts to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient performance of this Contract. As used in this Agreement, the term "minority business enterprise" means a business, at least 50 percent of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of publicly owned businesses, at least 51 percent of the stock of which is owned by minority group members are Negroes, Spanish-speaking American persons, American-Orientals, American-Indians, American-Eskimos, and American-Aleuts. PMI may rely on written representations by subcontractors regarding their status as minority business enterprises in lieu of an independent investigation.

(Part B)

The following provisions set forth in Section 1-1.1310-2 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires the PMI to comply with said provisions 117 in all Contracts or Purchase Orders in excess of $500,000 and which in the opinion of the procuring activity offer substantial subcontracting possibilities:

a) The PMI agrees to establish and conduct a program which will enable minority business enterprises (as defined in the clause entitled "Utilization of Minority Business Enterprises") to be considered fairly as subcontractors and suppliers under this Contract. In this connection, the PMI shall:

1 - Designate a liaison officer who will administer the PMI's minority business enterprises program.

2 - Provide adequate and timely consideration of the potentialities of known minority business enterprises in all "make-or-buy" decisions.

3 - Assure that known minority business enterprises will have an equitable opportunity to compete for subcontracts, particularly by arranging solicitations, time for the preparation of bids, quantities, specifications, and delivery schedules, so as to facilitate the participation of minority business enterprises.

4 - Maintain records showing (i) procedures which have been adopted to comply with the policies set forth in this clause, including the establishment of a source list of minority business enterprises, (ii) awards to minority business enterprises on the source

list, and (iii) specific efforts to identify and award contracts to minority business enterprises.

5 - Include the Utilization of Minority Business Enterprises clause in subcontracts which offer substantial minority business enterprises subcontracting opportunities.

6 - Cooperate with the Contracting Officer in any studies and surveys of the PMI's minority business enterprises procedures and practices that the Contracting Officer may from time to time conduct.

7 - Submit periodic reports of subcontracting to known minority business enterprises which respect to the records referred to in subparagraph (4), above, in such form and manner and at such time (not more than quarterly) as the Contracting Officer may prescribe.

b) The PMI further agrees to insert, in any subcontract hereunder which may exceed $500,000 provisions which shall conform substantially to the language of this clause, including this paragraph (b), and to notify the Contracting Officer of the names of such subcontractors.

B. CERTIFICATION

PMI certifies as follows:

1. a Nonsegregated Facilities

PMI certifies that it does not maintain or provide for its employees any segregated facilities at any of its establishments, and that it does not permit his employees to perform their services at any location, under its control, where segregated facilities are maintained. PMI certifies further that it will not maintain or provide for its employees any segregated facilities at any of its establishments, and that it will not permit its employees to perform their services at any location, under its control, where segregated facilities are maintained. The PMI agrees that a breach of this certificate is a violation of the Equal Opportunity clause in this contract. As used in this certificate, the term 'segregated facilities' means any waiting rooms, work areas, rest rooms and wash rooms, restaurants and other eating areas, time clocks, locker rooms and other storage or dressing areas, parking lots, drinking fountains, recreation or entertainment areas, transportation, and housing facilities provided for employees which are segregated by explicit directive or are in fact segregated on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, because of habit, local custom or otherwise. PMI further agrees that (except where it has obtained identical certifications from proposed subcontractors for specific time periods) it will obtain identical certifications from proposed subcontractors prior to the award of subcontracts exceeding $10,000 which are not exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportunity clause; that it will retain such certifications in its files; and that it will forward the following notice to such proposed subcontractors (except where the proposed subcontractors have submitted identical certifications for specific time periods):

I.b Notice to Prospective Subcontractors of Requirement
for Certificate of Nonsegregated Facilities

A Certificate of Nonsegregated Facilities, as required by the May 9, 1967, order on Elimination of Segregated Facilities, by the Secretary of Labor (32 Fed. Reg. 7439, May 10, 1967), must be submitted prior to the award of a subcontract exceeding $10,000 which is not exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportunity clause. The certification may be submitted either for each subcontract or for all subcontracts during a period (i.e., quarterly, semiannually, or annually).

2. Employer Information Report

The undersigned represents that it has filed an annual Employer Information Report EEO-1, Standard Form 100, and further represents that it has filed or will file such other reports as may be required by the Contracting Compliance Agency pursuant to Section

60-1.7 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

3. Written Affirmative Action Compliance Program

If PMI has 50 or more employees and the contracts are in an amount of $50,000 or more, PMI may be required under Section 60-1.40 of Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations to develop a written Affirmative Action Compliance Program for each of its establishments. If PMI is so required, it agrees to do so no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the effectiveness of the first of the contracts of sale and maintain such program until such time as it is no longer required by law or regulation.

AGREED:

PACIFIC MINERALS, INC.

Pacific Minerals, Inc.
PMI

Dee W. Jense
Printed Name of Authorized Representative

Authorized Signature

Vice President
Title

January 16, 1996
Date

NOTE: THE PENALTY FOR MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS IS SET FORTH IN I8 USC 1001.

FIRST AMENDMENT
to the THIRD RESTATED AND AMENDED COAL SALES AGREEMENT

This Amendment to the Third Restated and Amended Coal Sales Agreement ("Third Agreement") is entered into as of January 1, 1999 by and between Bridger Coal Company ("Seller"), a joint venture between Pacific Minerals, Inc., a Wyoming corporation, and Idaho Energy Resources Co., a Wyoming corporation, and PacifiCorp, an Oregon corporation, and Idaho Power Company, an Idaho corporation (collectively "Buyers").

Whereas, the parties made changes to the Second Restated and Amended Coal Sales Agreement ("Second Agreement") which resulted in the Third Agreement. Changes from the Second Agreement to the Third Agreement included the contract term, base tonnage requirements, a provision for delivery of supplemental coal, changes in Article 6 (Price Components and Price Adjustments), billing changes and the inclusion of prior contract amendments to the Second Agreement.

Whereas, Article 6, Section 6.02 (Labor Costs) of the Second Agreement, was specifically amended to effect labor component adjustments based on changes in an Average Hourly Earnings Index as published by the U.S. Department of Labor instead of a weighted average hourly rate for labor at Bridger Coal Company. The weighted average hourly wage rate was inclusive of actual wages, salaries and overheads. This change in the labor cost component calculation was intended to simplify price change calculations but not to limit the pass-through of legitimate labor costs to the Buyers.

Now, therefore, the parties agree that (1) benefits attributable to the 1998 Enhanced Retirement Program exceed the immediate costs of implementing the program, (2) costs associated with the program would have been a direct pass-through in Section 6.02 of the Second Agreement and (3) the benefits resulting from the program will pass-through to the Buyers.

As such, the Seller is requesting compensation from the Buyers for costs associated with the 1998 Enhanced Retirement Program. Please acknowledge your consent and approval by signing below:

APPROVED BY:

Bridger Coal Company **By Pacific Minerals, Inc.**	**Idaho Power Company**
By *[signature]*	By *Karl E. Bokenkamp*
Title *Vice Pres.*	Title *Mgr. Thermal Production*
Date *1/11/99*	Date *1/12/99*

PacifiCorp

By ____________________

Title Vice Pres.

Date 1/11/99

APPLICATION

EXHIBIT NO. 2

Southern Wyoming Historical Coal Prices
1990 - 1999



	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Southern Wyoming Market (FOB Mine)	$20.32	$20.65	$20.15	$19.35	$19.24	$19.38	$19.00	$18.15	$15.25	$14.96
Bridger Coal Company (FOB Plant)			$16.83	$16.25	$15.65	$14.96	$14.72	$15.76	$16.34	$15.35
So. Wyo. Market Plus Transportation & Handling	$24.32	$24.65	$24.15	$23.35	$23.24	$23.38	$23.00	$22.15	$19.25	$18.96

So. Wyo. Market based upon information taken from Hill and Associates, Western Bituminous Coal Supply and Demand 1998 - 2010.
Est. Transportation and Handling Rate - $4.00/ton
So. Wyo. Avg Btu/lb - 10400
Bridger Coal Company Avg. Btu/lb - 9400

EXHIBIT 2

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 229

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
May 25, 2016
ICNU 2nd Set Data Request 0012

ICNU Data Request 0012

Please state the actual volumes produced from the Bridger Coal Company on a monthly basis over the period 2011 through 2015 (inclusive). Please provide the data in a manner consistent with how the volumes are reported in Mr. Ralston's workpaper "01 OpsCostSchedules.xlsx."

Response to ICNU Data Request 0012

Please refer to Attachment ICNU 0012 for the actual volumes of coal delivered from Bridger Coal Company (100% share) to the Jim Bridger plant for the period requested. This presentation is consistent with the Ralston workpaper ("01 OpsCostSchedules.xlsx") referenced in the request, which presents volumes on a delivered basis not a produced basis.

Oregon TAM - Docket UE 307
Attachment ICNU 0012

Tons shown are 100% share. PacifiCorp portion is two-thirds of amounts shown.

	2015												
	Jan. Act.	Feb. Act.	Mar. Act.	Apr. Act.	May Act.	Jun. Act.	Jul. Act.	Aug. Act.	Sep. Act.	Oct. Act.	Nov. Act.	Dec. Act.	Total
Total Tons Delivered	**341,406**	**259,374**	**369,139**	**522,427**	**499,518**	**568,698**	**531,291**	**376,823**	**571,998**	**426,555**	**361,129**	**436,779**	**5,265,137**
Surface Tons Delivered	107,982	152,510	204,820	221,830	67,809	191,555	232,745	232,299	257,639	137,518	142,632	197,457	**2,146,796**
Underground Tons Delivered	233,424	106,864	164,319	300,597	431,709	377,143	298,546	144,524	314,359	289,037	218,497	239,322	**3,118,341**

	2014												
	Jan. Act.	Feb. Act.	Mar. Act.	Apr. Act.	May Act.	Jun. Act.	Jul. Act.	Aug. Act.	Sep. Act.	Oct. Act.	Nov. Act.	Dec. Act.	Total
Total Tons Delivered	**501,505**	**74,352**	**305,718**	**371,561**	**338,206**	**205,519**	**633,436**	**455,508**	**485,845**	**503,440**	**407,360**	**512,675**	**4,795,125**
Surface Tons Delivered	232,644	39,352	91,607	148,939	49,949	106,094	278,346	132,760	163,049	236,747	326,889	128,453	**1,934,829**
Underground Tons Delivered	268,861	35,000	214,111	222,622	288,257	99,425	355,090	322,748	322,796	266,693	80,471	384,222	**2,860,296**

	2013												
	Jan. Act.	Feb. Act.	Mar. Act.	Apr. Act.	May Act.	Jun. Act.	Jul. Act.	Aug. Act.	Sep. Act.	Oct. Act.	Nov. Act.	Dec. Act.	Total
Total Tons Delivered	**534,232**	**458,614**	**385,001**	**355,318**	**345,379**	**426,956**	**459,001**	**544,933**	**349,942**	**500,595**	**462,834**	**564,725**	**5,387,530**
Surface Tons Delivered	22,521	14,507	-	-	39,581	115,022	184,457	299,483	35,938	3,628	14,334	56,197	**785,668**
Underground Tons Delivered	511,711	444,107	385,001	355,318	305,798	311,934	274,544	245,450	314,004	496,967	448,500	508,528	**4,601,862**

	2012												
	Jan. Act.	Feb. Act.	Mar. Act.	Apr. Act.	May Act.	Jun. Act.	Jul. Act.	Aug. Act.	Sep. Act.	Oct. Act.	Nov. Act.	Dec. Act.	Total
Total Tons Delivered	**490,949**	**617,045**	**450,155**	**107,073**	**287,761**	**321,990**	**516,379**	**543,830**	**460,125**	**591,628**	**590,168**	**588,750**	**5,565,853**
Surface Tons Delivered	105,575	111,205	66,311	-	47,440	6,416	-	-	-	210,225	185,061	132,338	**864,571**
Underground Tons Delivered	385,374	505,840	383,844	107,073	240,321	315,574	516,379	543,830	460,125	381,403	405,107	456,412	**4,701,282**

	2011												
	Jan. Act.	Feb. Act.	Mar. Act.	Apr. Act.	May Act.	Jun. Act.	Jul. Act.	Aug. Act.	Sep. Act.	Oct. Act.	Nov. Act.	Dec. Act.	Total
Total Tons Delivered	**454,290**	**264,047**	**400,908**	**312,057**	**256,108**	**251,137**	**262,944**	**381,202**	**317,860**	**313,727**	**355,981**	**542,827**	**4,113,088**
Surface Tons Delivered	137,907	148,093	292,452	14,232	-	30,672	186,205	314,101	161,735	203,778	133,018	78,457	**1,700,650**
Underground Tons Delivered	316,383	115,954	108,456	297,825	256,108	220,465	76,739	67,101	156,125	109,949	222,963	464,370	**2,412,438**

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 230

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 230 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 231

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 231 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 232

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

U.S. Energy Information Administration

Staff/232
Kaufman/1

Today in Energy

August 17, 2012

Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost of operation



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Note: The dispatch curve above is for a hypothetical collection of generators and does not represent an actual electric power system or model results. The capacity mix (of available generators) differs across the country; for example, the Pacific Northwest has significant hydroelectric capacity, and the Northeast has low levels of coal capacity.

The variable operating cost of electric power generators is a key factor in determining which units a power system operates (or "dispatches") to meet the demand for electricity. Other things being equal, plants with the lowest variable operating costs are generally dispatched first, and plants with higher variable operating costs are brought on line sequentially as electricity demand increases. This sequence can be seen in an electricity supply curve—also referred to as a dispatch curve—that represents the order in which units are dispatched to meet the demand.

Electric system operators strive to have sufficient generating capacity available to meet the expected demand for electricity, plus a "reserve margin" to account for unexpected events (such as abnormally hot weather). The order in which these units are brought on line is primarily a function of variable cost. The two vertical lines on the chart represent different electricity demand situations; generators falling to the left of the line for each situation would supply electricity at that time.

Baseload generating units, which generally operate 24 hours per day year-round baring maintenance outages, appear on the left side of the supply curve. Toward the right side of the supply curve are peaking generators, which mainly operate when hourly loads are at their highest. Intermediate generating units (also known as cycling units), which operate between base load and peaking generators, typically vary their output to adapt as demand for electricity changes over the course of the day and year.

The exact order of dispatch varies across the United States, depending on such factors as fuel costs, availability of renewable energy resources, and the characteristics of local generating units. The type of generators with the lowest variable costs are nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewable power (wind and solar). For economic and technical reasons, nuclear plants in the United States are almost invariably operated as baseload units at maximum output. While wind and solar plants have very low operating costs, their availability is limited by the availability of the resource (i.e., whether the wind is blowing or the sun is shining). Some electric power systems dispatch these variable resources, others do not, and wind generators are sometimes curtailed to keep electric supply in balance with demand.

Although hydroelectric plants also have very low variable costs, their dispatch patterns are influenced by many factors, including: current and projected reservoir levels, environmental factors, timing output to maximize revenues, and the need in some locations to balance variable wind and solar output. For these reasons hydroelectric dispatch patterns can be complex.

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Kaufman/2

The variable cost of generating electricity from fossil-fueled units is primarily a function of the fuel price and the efficiency of the plant's conversion of the fuel into electricity. Historically coal plants have operated as baseload units while natural gas-fired plants in many regional power markets have have met intermediate and peak load needs. This was a function of the low cost of coal fuel compared to natural gas. This fuel cost advantage was sufficient to overcome the efficiency advantage of the new vintage of gas-fired generators built beginning in the 1990s. However, more recently gas prices have declined, and these efficient gas-burning combined cycle plants have begun to displace coal as baseload generation.

Peaking generators typically have the highest variable operating costs, appearing on the far right of the supply curve, and are dispatched during the hours when demand for electricity is highest. Peaking unit technology includes diesel generators and, most commonly, combustion turbines (CTs) fueled by natural gas. Combustion turbines have been used for many years, and older units are inefficient. However, the newest units have greatly improved efficiency, to the point that, with the advantage of low gas prices, the newer CTs have begun to back-out some coal generation. This dispatch pattern has only been seen in recent years.

Since petroleum is significantly more expensive than natural gas, it is used less frequently in the electric power sector.

While variable operating costs are the primary driver of the dispatch decisions made by an electric power system operator, other factors can lead to deviations from the hypothetical economic dispatch curve presented above. Power plant startup times and ramp rates; air permit requirements; electric transmission system constraints that require non-economic dispatch of generating units for system reliability purposes; and the preference of operators to avoid cycling nuclear units are several other factors that play a role in dispatch decisions.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 233

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF

December 2014

Technical Assessment of the Operation of Coal & Gas Fired Plants

DECC

286861A

Technical Assessment of the Operation of Coal & Gas Fired Plants

286861A

Prepared for
DECC

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Report Status	:	**Final**
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Prepared by	David Lunn	**Checked by** *(technical)*	David Roberts
Approved by	David Roberts	**Checked by** *(quality assurance)*	Lauren Harper

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Version	**Date**	**Pages affected**	**Comments**
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CONTENTS

CONTENTS OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCGT	Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
CEM	Continuous Emissions Monitoring
CO	Carbon Monoxide
DECC	Department of Energy & Climate Change
IED	Industrial Emissions Directive
FGD	Flue Gas Desulphurisation
FSNL	Full speed no load
HRSG	Heat Recovery Steam Generator
GW	Giga Watt
GWh	Giga Watt Hour
LCPD	Large Combustion Plant Directive
MEL	Maximum Export Limit
MSG	Minimum Stable Generation
MW	Megawatt
NGT	National Grid Transco
NOx	Oxides of Nitrogen
OCGT	Open Cycle Gas Turbine
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
PSSR	Pressure Systems Safety Regulations
SEL	Stable Export Limit
SOP	Stable Operating Point
STOR	Short Term Operational Reserve
TEC	Technical Export Capability
UK	United Kingdom
VIGV	Variable Inlet Guide Vane

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This report describes the capability of four types of generating technologies to provide reserve generation which can be delivered at short notice to balance any shortfalls in grid capacity:-

- Coal fired (500MW and 660MW)
- Combined cycle gas turbine (160MW – 300MW)
- Open cycle gas turbine – large scale industrial (125MW – 180MW)
- Open cycle gas turbine – aero derivative (60MW – 100MW)

The ability to provide reserve generation capacity is a function of the start times for each type of plant technology

Start Up Times

The indicative time for start-up is made up of two phases namely:-

- notice to deviate from zero and
- synchronisation to full load.

The Notice to Deviate from Zero (NDZ) time is a term used by the grid operator which covers the prior notice that a power plant requires, to be able to start up the plant to the point of synchronisation. This comprises preparation of the unit for starting by adjusting the boiler drum water level, purging the furnace of any explosive gases, lighting up the burners to commence raising pressure, pressure raising, temperature matching, blowdown of wet steam to drains and running the turbine to speed. This activity is the same for both coal and gas fired power plant

The time from synchronisation up to full load is a function of the design of the plant; for example unit size, the initial material conditions and its ability to ramp these to the final conditions as the generator is loaded. The table below show a summary of the technology indicative start up times.

Table 1 – Indicative start up times

	Technology	Notice to Synch (mins)	Synch to Full Load (mins)
Hot start	Coal	80-90	50-100
	Existing Gas CCGT	15	40-80
	Modern Gas CCGT	15	25
	Gas Large OCGT	2-5	15-30
Warm start	Coal	300	85+
	Gas CCGT	15	80+
	Gas Large OCGT	2-5	15-30
Cold start	Coal	360-420	80-250
	Gas CCGT	15	190-240
	Gas Large OCGT	2-5	15-30
All Starts	Gas (Aero) OCGT	2-5	4-8

The start-up rates shown above show a clear correlation, with the fastest start up times being achieved by the smallest units. This means in priority order the aero derivative OCGTs (~60 MW) are capable of the fastest start up times followed by the CCGTs (300 MW) and the coal fired units (500 MW). The times have been derived from our knowledge of the plant technologies and evidence seen in the UK power trading market. To that extent, the indicative duration shown reflects both the technical parameters and the commercial offer of the plant and these can differ as the plant optimises its market position from day to day. However in a competitive market it is likely that the durations will align.

Mothballing/Preservation

In the context of a power station the words mothballing or preservation applies to those techniques which could be applied to the plant in order to prevent or reduce deterioration when out of service.

There are two options for preservation, namely short term and long term preservation. The techniques used for each option differ significantly, together with the timescales required to successfully mothball and reinstate the plant back to an operational condition. These returns to service timescales can also vary considerably between technologies (Coal, CCGT or OCGT).

No allowance has been included in Long Term for re-recruitment of staff and training or for major overhaul (if required) prior to return to service. These additional durations have been included in Section 6.4 of this report and should be added (where applicable) to the plant reinstatement duration.

The table below shows a summary of the durations to mothball/reinstate for a technology type.

Table 2 – Indicative mothball / reinstatement times

		Activity	Duration (days)
Short Term	Coal	Mothball/Reinstate	4
	Gas CCGT	Mothball/Reinstate	2
	Gas OCGT	Mothball/Reinstate	1
Long term	Coal	Mothball/Reinstate	42*
	Gas CCGT	Mothball/Reinstate	30*
	Gas OCGT	Mothball/Reinstate	5

* The durations specified above include time required to mothball and reinstate the plant back into service only.

Within this report no indicative costs have been included for two shift operation or plant mothballing/reinstatement. These costs are outside the scope of work for this report but will need to be considered at a future time in order to establish the optimum technical/commercial fit when deciding on which strategy should be adopted to provide reserve generation which can be delivered at short notice to balance any shortfalls in grid capacity.

1 INTRODUCTION

Parsons Brinckerhoff has been asked by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to undertake work in relation to gas and coal power plant technology and the associated modelling assumptions. This report considers specifically the achievable start up times which could be applied to existing coal and gas fired power plants and expected new CCGT and OCGT designs in order to provide reserve generation which can be delivered at short notice to balance any shortfalls in grid capacity.

1.1 Structure of the Report

Section 2 describes the power market arrangements and parameters applicable to generators providing reserve generation capability.

Section 3 of this report describes the physical limitations in starting up a power plant to provide a repeatable and reliable return to service without causing any long term damage and premature ageing.

Section 4 describes the start-up times and factors that affect the flexibility of a coal fired power station.

Section 5 describes the start-up times and factors that affect the flexibility of a CCGT and Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT).

Section 6 describes the mothballing process and gives indicative times to place the plant into a state of preservation and to return the plant back into service.

1.2 Scope of work

The aim of this report is to describe the capability of the three types of generating technologies to provide reserve generation which can be delivered at short notice to balance any shortfalls in grid capacity.

The indicative time for start-up is made up of two phases namely:-

- notice to deviate from zero and
- synchronisation to full load.

This report does not include consideration of the costs associated with:

- Retaining the generating unit to be made available as requested (to include the range of fixed costs e.g. staffing, maintenance, insurance, use of system charges and rates).
- Holding the generating units in a state of readiness to be able to respond (to include the range of fixed costs above and fuel required to keep the plant in a state where it could move to synchronisation quickly.
- Operating the synchronised unit at low load in order that it can increase output immediately (to include the range of fixed costs above and fuel required to keep the unit generating above Minimum Stable Generation).

2 POWER MARKET ARRANGEMENTS AND PARAMETERS

2.1 Balancing Market

The UK has moved away from the pooling and central despatch arrangement that was set up on privatisation and implemented a system based on bi-lateral trading between generators, suppliers, traders and customers. The parties contract with each other for power based on a rolling half hour basis with generators then despatching their plant themselves. Any imbalance between the parties' contractual positions and the actual physical flows are determined and the volume settled at the system buy or system sell prices.

National Grid is responsible for balancing the system in real time, maintaining frequency by matching supply and demand. The Balancing Mechanism has been established by which parties can submit:

- Offers - to increase generation / decrease demand.
- Bids - to decrease generation / increase demand.

Generators are required to submit their availability and plant parameters and are rewarded for their activities in the balancing market by the prevailing system prices.

2.2 Synchronisation

The UK electricity grid system's target frequency is set at 50 Hz with small variations around that level depending on the balance of supply and demand. All machines connected to the grid are held at the system frequency and National Grid balances the system frequency by calling for generators to increase or decrease the power supplied in response to fluctuating demand.

Synchronisation is taken to be the point at which the individual generating unit is connected to the national grid system. At the time the switch is closed and connection made, the frequency of the generator has to be synchronous to that of the grid.

2.3 Ramp Rates

The ramp rates define the rate (in MW per minute) at which units can be brought up and down the load range once they are synchronised to the system. The individual generating units can have varying characteristics which require different operating techniques and therefore different plant parameters. Each generator discloses its ramp rates to assist the system operator in determining which generating units can be called to respond to an impending imbalance on the system.

In addition generators can use the plant parameters to manage their plant's exposure to the market and submit attractive or prohibitive rates accordingly. This allows them to protect plant which they would not wish to run in the short market unless it was amply rewarded for the risk.

2.3.1 Ramp Up

The Run-Up Rate Export shows the rate(s) of **increase** in active power production for a particular unit which is exporting power within a particular range. There can be up to three rates for any unit allowing the generator to give a profile of production over the run up period including two "elbow" points where the rate can be changed. This is to enable a unit that is starting up to match its technical requirements with that of the grid operator.

2.3.2 Ramp Down

The Run-Down Rate Export expresses the rate(s) of **decrease** in active power production for a particular unit which is exporting power within a particular range. There can be up to three rates for any unit allowing the generator to give a profile of production over the run down period including two "elbow" points where the rate can be changed. This is to enable a unit that is shutting down, to match its technical requirements with that of the grid operator.

2.4 Operating Regimes

2.4.1 Base load

All the 500 MW Coal plant currently operating was designed and built in the 1960s and 70s to provide base and near full load, operation 24 hours a day across the year.

Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plants constructed since the 1990s were similarly designed and built to provide a base load regime, e.g. 7,980 operating hours with a small number of annual starts, typically <15 (5 hot starts, 4 warm starts, 3 cold starts, and 2 trips).

Plant adopting this base load regime not only provides the highest generated output, but is also able to run at the higher levels of efficiency and to manage the plant damage caused by variations in temperature and pressures associated with starts and changes in loading.

2.4.2 Two Shifting

Plants which come off load overnight on a regular basis as demand falls are said to "two-shift". They are required to come on load around 05:00hours for the morning peak, stay synchronised on the system (often at part load) during the day and are ready to respond to the higher evening peak before coming off load around 22:00hrs.

For CCGT plant two shift operation is around 3,875 operating hours with a high number of annual starts, typically, 200-250 (200 hot starts, 0 warm starts, 50 cold starts, and 4 trips.

2.4.3 Coal Fired

Until recently and since the world price of coal has fallen relative to gas, most coal plants had been operating flexibly and with some incurring circa 200 starts per annum as they came off load overnight and across the weekends in response to the demand profile.

In the past the smaller generators below 500 MW had offered themselves to the market with double two-shift capability, looking to take advantage of higher prices across the peaks, coming off load during the day. This regime has been undertaken by some 500 MW units in the past but operators generally have looked to avoid the potential plant damage associated with frequent variations in metal temperatures.

2.4.4 Gas Fired - CCGT

As gas turbine technology has developed in the last 25 years, efficiency has improved markedly from circa 49 per cent in 1990 (e.g. Killingholme A) to circa 57 per cent of more recent projects (e.g. Carrington). Consequently those plants with lower efficiencies have been less able to compete and moved away from base load, through two shifting and, in the face of recent low coal prices, had to consider running intermittently to cover peaks only. Certain plants subsequently have been positioned to work in the Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR) capacity market or have been taken into mothballing for short or longer periods until their market position improves (e.g. Keadby in 12 month storage).

2.4.5 Gas Fired - OCGT

With much lower efficiency and burning light fuel oil or natural gas these plants would not compete in the power market for long duration runs. However their responsiveness gives them an advantage over other technologies and they can be brought on and off load very quickly for short, infrequent periods in the year to address system imbalances at a national or local level (e.g. Indian Queens).

3 PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS OF START TIMES

3.1 Thermal Fatigue/Rate of Temperature Rise

Whilst the time taken to start a unit on a conventional power station is made up of multiple operational activities and plant limitations, the most time critical activity is the plant limitation caused by thermal fatigue.

In the context of a power station, thermal fatigue is defined as the gradual deterioration of a material by alternate heating and cooling. This type of thermal fatigue may also be classified as low cycle fatigue due to the low frequency of cycles, typically one or two per day. Thermal fatigue cracks can usually start to initiate in less than 200,000 cycles.

At the design stage of a power station, detailed attention is given to the selection of material properties and wall thickness of high temperature components, to optimise temperature ramp rates during start up. Typical thick walled components such as boiler/Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) drums and headers, main steam pipework and steam turbine, valves, steam chests and cylinders are limited by the material yield point. Prior to the yield point the material will deform elastically and will return to its original shape when the applied stress is removed. Once the yield point is passed (which can be achieved by overheating the component using excessive rapid ramp rates), some fraction of the deformation will be permanent and non-reversible. It is therefore essential not to exceed the design rate of temperature rise, in order to prevent the premature onset of thermal fatigue cracking and to achieve the required component design life.

Modern control systems are designed to prevent critical “thick walled” components from being heated too quickly by setting limits on rates of temperature rise and maximum temperature allowed. There are also limits on the rate of loading on the electrical generators, since excessive electrical loading can generate high thermal temperatures in the copper core of the rotor and stator.

3.2 Coal Fired Plant

Designed in the 1960’s and 70’s, the materials used in large coal fired power plants can be classed as “basic” by today’s standards. The methods used to increase the power output from the earlier 120 MW units to the existing 500 MW units was to “scale up” the design. This involved increasing the thickness of some critical boiler and steam turbine components, thus increasing the start-up time.

3.3 Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT)

The majority of the first generation CCGT plants were designed in the late 1990s or early 2000’s. Based on aero derivative turbines (similar to aircraft engines) the materials used in the gas turbines of CCGTs are highly developed alloys with significantly thinner cross-sections than used in a steam turbine. The average size of a class F gas turbine is typically 300 MW; this discharges hot gas through a HRSG, producing steam for a nominal 150 MW steam turbine. The component size of the HRSG and steam turbine is therefore smaller having been based on 150 MW capacity. An improvement in materials over the last 30 years has allowed some boiler and steam turbine components to be designed with reduced wall thickness.

3.4 Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT)

Traditionally OCGTs have been used to provide a black start capability (with some grid/frequency response) and were typically sized <40 MW. Based on aero derivatives the gas turbine components are highly developed alloys of thin section, being capable of rapid start up. Since there is no HRSG or steam turbine installed in an OCGT, the total start up time is dependent only upon the gas turbine.

4 GUIDE TO COAL PLANT FLEXIBILITY

4.1 Types of Coal Plant

Coal fired power plant in the UK now comprises a range of 500 MW and 660MW units designed and built predominantly in the 1960s and 1970's for a nominal 25 years design life, equivalent to 250,000 operating hours. The original specification for these large generating sets anticipated predominantly base load operation with few starts or requirements for flexible loading while in service. As the power market has developed, there has been an increasing need for coal fired generating units to operate more flexibly in response to competitive pressures from alternative fuels and renewables and in order to target periods of higher prices.

The flexible generation profile has placed more demands on the operators and stresses on the plant itself. The original operating life assumed to be 25-30 years has been extended by a programme of continuing engineering assessments and substantial repair and replacement of life expired components.

A number of coal plant units have "opted out" of the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) which required improved emissions controls. These units have either closed already, converted to other fuels such as biomass or are scheduled to close before 31 December 2015. In addition, the implementation of the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) in January 2016 will require the remaining plants to meet new more stringent emission limits with respect to

- oxides of nitrogen (<200mg/m^3),
- sulphur dioxide (<200mg/m^3)
- particulates (<20mg/m^3)

In order to meet the new IED limits, owners must consider major plant upgrade investments or conversion to biomass or contemplate opting out of the new regime. This latter option will allow them to generate only for a further 17,500 hours across all units (based on usage of the plant stack(s)) before closing by the end of 2023 at the latest.

It is not known at this stage how many coal fired plants will ultimately elect to comply with the emissions requirements and therefore how many will be in existence in the mid-2020s. The following table shows the plants that are understood to remain in operation using coal after January 2016 and therefore will possibly be available post 2023:

Table 3 – UK Coal fired power stations post 2016

Plant	Units No.	Capacity MW
Aberthaw	3	1 665
Cottam	4	2 000
Drax	4	2 580
Eggborough	4	1 960
Ferrybridge	2	1 000
Fiddlers Ferry	4	1 987
Longannet	4	2 304
Ratcliffe	4	2 000
Rugeley	2	1 026
West Burton	4	2 000
TOTAL	35	18 522

Note Drax comprises 660 MW and Longannet 600 MW units

4.2 Start-up - Process

4.2.1 Operating a 500 MW generating unit is a large scale industrial process. The unit comprises a boiler circa 50 metres tall producing high pressure steam delivered to rotate a 30 metre long turbine train of some 200 tonnes at 3000 revolutions per minute. In addition there is a wide range of auxiliary equipment required to deliver pulverised coal to the boiler for combustion, to supply water for use in the boiler or the cooling systems and to transport electrical power to and from the unit.

Therefore the 500 MW generating sets use an established and relatively generic start up sequence which must be followed. This is designed to protect plant integrity but primarily to ensure safety from the inherent risks associated with a process which entails combustion of significant volumes of explosive substances and plant operating at high pressures and temperatures.

4.2.2 The duration of a start-up is dependent on the physical state of the unit and in particular the existing energy stored in the plant in terms of the temperature and pressures. Plant which has more recently been in operation will contain more energy and can be returned to service more quickly. Starts are therefore categorised as “hot”, “warm” and “cold” and defined in Section 4.3.

4.2.3 Start-up times comprise two phases namely:

- Pre-synchronisation

The pre-synchronisation phase duration varies depending on whether the unit is being brought into service from a “hot” or “cold” start (see definition in Section 4.3) but in all cases the unit start-up consumes large quantities of energy (gas and electricity) before the plant is able to generate power and export from the site.

- Post synchronisation

Generating sets are brought on (synchronised) to the national grid system at 50 Hz and at the point where the steam turbine rotor is spinning at 3000 revolutions per minute. At this point the turbine is at the Fast Speed No Load (FSNL) point and whilst energy is being applied to rotate the turbine (no load heat requirement), there is no generation of electrical power.

Once synchronised, additional energy in the form of steam is applied to the turbine and the plant begins its ramp from zero MWh to full load.

4.2.4 A typical "hot" start up process for a 500 MW generating set requires the following steps:

Table 4 - Typical "Hot" start Process for Coal Fired Unit

Task
Adjust drum water level, bring Induced Draft (ID) and Forced Draft (FD) fans into service in order to purge the furnace of any potentially flammable gas which could otherwise result in explosion on ignition.
Ignite oil burners to start warming through the furnace, establish circulation and provide stability since coal will not ignite on its own.
Start the first coal mill and deliver pulverised fuel to the boiler for ignition and to begin the process of raising steam.
Blow down steam to drains, until desired degree of superheat is reached to match the steam pipework and turbine inlet conditions. Open boiler stop bypass valves to commence warming steam pipework, with pipework drains open. When steam pipework is up to temperature commence opening the turbine valves to raise temperature with drains open. Finally steam is admitted into the turbine for running the machine. This then progressively increases temperature and pressure and thereby avoids potentially damaging differentials.
The first mill is used to provide the steam required to move the turbine rotors to 3000 revolutions per minute prior to synchronising on to the Grid system. This point before any electrical load is produced is known as FSNL.
The second and third coal mills are brought into service as the output from the turbine is increased to over 200 MW.
As the mills are established the oil burners become less necessary to support combustion and can be progressively shutdown. In addition, the steam feed pumps and direct contact heaters are brought fully into service. The steam feed pumps are powered from the boiler and take over from electric pumps (fed from the station supply) used at start up.
When the furnace is considered stable enough, then the last oil burner is taken out, allowing coal to support combustion. This requires a minimum number of mills in service before stabilising oil can be shut off (generally 3 for a 5 mill station and 4 for a 6 mill station).
Minimum Stable Generation (MSG) is typically around 280 MW and will be reached when the boiler combustion is stabilised, the main boiler feed pump is established and the oil can be shut off.
Once the oil burners are no longer required, combustion will remain steady as long as load remains above MSG. The boiler output can then be increased and decreased within an allowable range by varying the quantity of fuel delivered by the full range of up to six mills.

Once the boiler is fully heated after approximately one hour of further operation, the minimum "stable operating point" (SOP) may at some sites be lower than the original MSG from the start-up sequence (see discussion of shut-down below).

4.2.5 FGD Plant

For boilers with flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) in place, the FGD equipment is initially kept offline during start-up, to avoid damage to the absorber linings and oil contamination of the gypsum by-product. At a point at or close to MSG the FGD dampers operate to route the flue gases through the FGD. This point is specified in operational guidance, as it is important that time is allowed for the FGD process to stabilise at a lower load before progressing to full load. The exact point of damper operation may vary from start to start, depending on operational factors.

4.2.6 "Cold" starts after the unit has been out of service for a longer period require a prolonged start up process with steps of the "hot and warm start" processes extended to safeguard the integrity of the plant and mitigate potential plant damage from mechanical processes such as creep and fatigue (see later).

Whereas a hot start may require oil burners in service for only 1-2 hours, a completely cold start, e.g. after returning from an outage, may require the boiler to be running on oil burners alone for pressure raising for several hours.

4.2.7 Shut down process for the unit is based on the following steps:

Table 5 - Typical Shut-down Process for Coal Fired Unit

Task
Individual mills are shut down and the turbine output allowed to reduce as the boiler pressure falls. In conjunction some oil burners may be commissioned to maintain safe and stable combustion.
Fuel input from the last 3-4 mills is reduced and the unit output falls below SOP.
Mill coal feeders are tripped and mills allowed to mill off the coal they contain. As the mills run short of coal, combustion becomes erratic and the oil burners are essential to keep the furnace alight.
Once the coal has milled off the oil burners are left in for a few minutes to ensure that no explosive coal mixtures are present and then the oil burners are shut down.
Reduce load on steam turbine to zero and desynchronise for the grid.
Check rundown of steam turbine to slow speed machine barring to allow for cooling.
Open all steam turbine and non-boiler main steam pipework drains.
Finally the FD and then the ID fans are shut down and the boiler boxed in by closing dampers to prevent the chimney suction drawing air through the boiler and cooling it.

The above actions particularly below the SOP are carried out quickly to ensure the large section components are not unnecessarily cooled so as to retain energy.

When the unit output falls below SOP the boiler is usually committed to shut-down. SOP is generally equivalent to the value of minimum "Stable Export Limit" (SEL) which is declared to the grid operator from time to time. However SEL may be varied relatively frequently, due to commercial considerations; it is more appropriate to specify SOP separately, although the values will usually be close or identical.

4.3 Start-up - Types, Timings and Cost

The definition of hot, warm and cold starts can vary between manufacturers, but basically refer to the metal temperature of the steam turbine. The table below shows the correlation between shutdown period and steam turbine metal temperature used to define each start up type.

Table 6 - Coal Plant Start Types

Start	Shutdown Period (hours)	ST Metal temperature (^{O}C)
Hot	< 8	> 400
Warm	8 to 48	250-400
Cold	> 48 Long term	<205

4.3.1 **Hot** starts are typically defined as those undertaken within 8 hours of coming off load and are generally seen during a period of two shifting. Some plants do extend the duration to 12 hours thereby enhancing their flexibility to respond to market demand) Most of the 500 MW units have seen much of this regime during the last 15 years where plant is called for the weekday morning peaks (05:00hrs) after having come off load in the previous late evening (22:00hours).

With this type of start the equipment has retained much of its metal temperatures and the steam condition can be returned to that required for synchronisation in a relatively short period. Typically the unit can be returned to fast speed no load (FSNL) and synchronisation on to the grid within 60-90 minutes.

4.3.2 **Warm** starts are typically defined as those undertaken within 8 to 48 hours of coming off load. With these durations it is not possible to maintain the plant near to operating conditions and the time and cost required to return the unit service is increased.

With this type of start the equipment has lost more of its heat and process temperatures and steam conditions have degraded significantly. The unit cannot be returned to service without significant input of heat and over a longer period. Typically the unit can be returned to FSNL and synchronisation on to the grid within 120 - 300 minutes depending on the interval since coming off load.

4.3.3 **Cold** starts are typically defined as those undertaken after 48 hours of coming off load. This may be after a short planned outage or plant breakdown and in some instances the boiler will have remained full. Although the plant will have lost much of its heat it is likely that the unit can be returned to service relatively quickly as the boiler is full of water and fuel ready. In such instances the unit can be returned to FSNL and synchronisation within 300 - 420 minutes.

If the unit has been on a longer term outage and the boiler has been drained, then the boiler has to be prepared and the range of auxiliary plant brought back in to service. On these occasions it can take much longer to return the plant to service.

4.3.4 Typically once a hot coal unit is synchronised, a block load of an immediate ~50 MW is applied to the machine and, on hot starts, followed by a loading rate of around 10 MW per minute thereafter. In the case of warm and cold starts a more conservative ramp rate is applied with no block load depending on turbine metal temperatures. This would entail ramping at circa 1-1.5 MW per minute up to around 130 MW with a subsequent increase to circa 5 MW per minute up to full load.

The following table summarises starts by type and shows indicative durations to synchronisation and then to full load:

Table 7 - Coal Indicative Start up Times

Start	Shutdown Period (hours)	Notice to Synch (minutes)	Synch to Full Load (minutes)
Hot	< 8	60-90	50
Warm	8 to 48	120-300	85
Cold	> 48	360-420	90
	Long term	420+	200

4.3.5 Start Cost

UK plants undertook a number of exercises to identify and evaluate the component costs of starts and synchronisation in their efforts to remain flexible and viable in the face of an increasingly competitive market. Costs include:

- Fuel for oil burners.
- Coal burnt to attain boiler stable operating point.
- Electricity used to drive auxiliary plant.

In addition operators assessed the associated non-energy costs including plant degradation/damage resulting from each additional start.

Appendix 1 shows the ramp rates submitted on a weekday in late January 2014 and demonstrates that once synchronised coal plant on a hot start can move from zero to full load 500 MW and above within one hour. It is also noted that certain units are restrained in their offer, providing slower ramp rates and deferred full load times. This may be to cater for specific plant conditions, reflecting the duration that the unit has been off-load or simply owners positioning their plant in the market in order to optimise their returns.

Shutdown of the coal fired units is typically much faster than starts. This is due to the absence of the technical limitations present during the start. The downturn rate is generally given by the ability of the operator to reduce the load to the system. Appendix 4 shows the ramp down rates for some coal fired units in the UK.

5 GUIDE TO GAS PLANT FLEXIBILITY

5.1 Types of Gas Plant

5.1.1 Pre-Existing CCGT

CCGT technology was introduced into the UK market in the early 1990s and some of the plant is therefore nearing the end, or in a few cases is already beyond, its original design life. At the time these power stations, such as Deeside and Little Barford,provided the latest technology for operators and there were close relationships with the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) which brought further enhancements. There has been subsequent investment in new gas plants in the UK since privatisation and more are nearing completion or cleared through planning ready for start on site when owners commit. The plant is significantly smaller in scale per MW capacity than a coal plant and the staffing levels required to operate and maintain the plant are much lower.

The "combined" technology utilises a HRSG which raises steam using the heat of the exhaust gases of the gas turbine. The steam is then used to drive a conventional steam turbine and generate electricity. This approach increases the efficiency of the process from below 40 per cent in a simple gas turbine to nearer 60 per cent in modern CCGTs.

The gas turbine rotor is rotating at a very early stage in the start-up process and able to synchronise to the Grid within 15 minutes of ignition. However the steam turbine takes longer as time is required to develop the right steam conditions in the HRSG and to "heat soak" the steam turbine before it is brought through to full load. In general, the unit is synchronised, generating and exporting power to the grid much sooner after ignition than a coal fired plant, taking shorter than a coal unit to reach full load from the point of synchronisation.

5.1.2 The definition of hot, warm and cold starts can vary between manufacturers, but basically refers to the metal temperature of the steam turbine. The table below shows the correlation between shutdown period and steam turbine metal temperature used to define each start up type.

Table 8 - CCGT Start Types

Start	Shutdown Period (hours)	ST Metal temperature (^{O}C)
Hot	< 8	>371
Warm	8 to 36/48	204 to 371
Cold	> 36/48	<205
	Long term	-

Table 9 - Existing CCGT Indicative Start up Times

Start	Shutdown Period (hours)	Notice to Synch (minutes)	Synch to Full Load (minutes)
Hot	<8	15	35-80
Warm	8 - 48	15	80+
Cold	48 - 120+	15	190-240

5.1.3 Modern CCGT

CCGT manufacturers have improved the efficiency of the CCGT process during the last 20 years and new proposals, seen at Marchwood and Pembroke for example, offer efficiency approaching 60 per cent. However in response to changes in power markets which have seen base load plants move to become mid merit/intermediate load, the OEMs are developing machines that offer improved flexibility:

- Fast start up and shut down.
- Fast load changes and load ramps.
- Start-up reliability and load predictability.
- Grid system support (frequency control and ancillary services).

This requirement had initially emerged in the UK with requests for more frequent starts and then for faster starts but is becoming more widespread across Europe particularly in the face of increasing and/or fluctuating renewable supplies. Improved flexibility will allow the owner to respond to the market, both coming to synchronisation, and ramping up through the range, more quickly and more often.

OEMs have sought to improve flexibility without compromising efficiency or plant life. They have modified the design of newer plants looking to retain temperature and pressures during short shutdowns by use of stack dampers and auxiliary steam feeds. In addition the high pressure drum used in previous CCGTs has been removed. This had been a critical high pressure component exposed to wide variations in temperature and which had to be managed during start up and shutdown to avoid the effects of thermal stress. In addition the OEMs have optimised the start-up procedures particularly in relation to the steam turbine. In the past the operator had to keep the machines during run up at specified hold points while steam conditions were managed for the steam turbine. Increasingly the hold points have been minimised or eliminated and for hot starts, steam turbines can be started up in parallel to the gas turbine using the first steam which becomes available after the hot start.

These CCGTs hot start up times improve from 95 (15 minutes from Notice to Synch plus 80 minutes from Synch to full load) to 40 minutes for a latest model 430 MW machine (15 minutes from Notice to synch plus 25 minutes from Synch to full load). Improvements have also been reported for warm and cold starts.

Table 10 - Modern CGGT Indicative Start up Times

Start	Shutdown Period (hours)	Notice to Synch (minutes)	Synch to Full Load (minutes)
Hot	<8	15	25
Warm	8 - 48	15	-
Cold	48 - 120+	15	190

It is noted that manufacturers allow operators a number of options with respect to starts, having automated the process to give "normal" and also "fast" and "cost-effective". The "fast" option can be selected by the operator but will bring forward the maintenance interval as it incurs additional factored / equivalent hours which reflect the stresses on the machine. The operator can make the commercial decision based on the cost of maintenance versus the benefits earned at prevailing power market prices. The "cost effective" option allows a more measured start and, although fast relative to normal, does not incur the maintenance penalty.

Appendix 2 shows the ramp rates submitted on a weekday in late January 2014. This demonstrates that CCGT plant generates quickly from synchronisation using the gas turbine only but that, particularly in the event of cold starts, there is a prolonged hold point while the plant specific steam turbine operating conditions are met.

Shutdown of the machines is typically much faster than starts. This is due to the absence of the technical limitations present during the start such as temperature of the materials. The downturn rate is generally given by the ability of the operator to reduce the load to the system. Appendix 5 shows the ramp down rates for CCGT plants.

It is also noted that certain units are restrained in their offer, providing slower ramp rates and deferred full load times. This is likely to be to cater for specific plant conditions, reflecting the duration that the unit has been off-load or simply owners positioning their plant in the market in order to optimise their returns.

5.1.4 Future Large Frame OCGT

OCGT use only the gas turbine component, there being no HRSG to capture the heat from the exhaust gases. As the plant comprises gas turbine only, they can be synchronised quickly and do not have to consider loading a steam turbine. These large scale industrial gas turbines are taken to be in the range of 100MW to 180MW and include General Electric's 9E, Siemens SGT5-2000E and Alstom's 13E2 machines.

Start times for large frame gas turbines are by nature longer than for aero-derivative gas turbines, due to management of expansion and thermal stresses in the heavier casings and components. Aero engines (see later) are much lighter in construction and more suited to rapid temperature changes during the start cycle.

Typically, heavy frame gas turbines undergo an inspection and blade replacement cycle based on the number of "normal" starts incurred. However when the plant has undertaken normal starts with subsequent fast loading the starts factor can double. In exceptional circumstances where there is both a fast start and fast loading, the starts factor can be increased by 10 – 20 thereby bringing forward the manufacturer's recommended inspection outage and associated costs.

This category of plant is taken to cover those units above 100 MW and have been utilised in the UK on a limited scale such as Indian Queens in Cornwall. Given the size of the plant and its poor efficiency relative to the combined cycle plant, it is likely that "new build" would be contemplated only where there is a requirement for system support or where a capacity agreement can be put in place.

One approach being considered is to operate existing CCGT plants in open cycle mode. Most CCGT plants in the UK are not capable since they cannot remove the exhaust gases from the gas turbine without passing them through the HRSG. Only those CCGT plants with a by-pass stack can divert the exhaust gases out of the process cycle by use of a damper plate.

It is understood that operators of older and less efficient CCGTs are considering the installation of a by-pass stack in order to offer short term capability. This modification can only be undertaken where there is sufficient space between the gas turbine and the HRSG and is not practicable on many of the more compact sites.

Table 11 - Future Large Frame OCGT Indicative Start up Times

Start	Notice to Synch (minutes)	Synch to Full Load (minutes)
Start	2.5	15-30

5.1.5 Future Small Frame OCGT

This type of plant, generally between 25 MW and 100 MW, has been in operation in the UK and modern engines can provide around 38 per cent efficiency in open cycle mode.

Table 12 - Small Frame OCGT Indicative Start up Times

Start	Notice to Synch (minutes)	Synch to Full Load (minutes)
Start	2.5	10-15

5.1.6 Aero-derivative OCGT

These machines, similar to aircraft turbines have been used for many years in the UK and often deployed on existing thermal and nuclear sites, primarily to provide black start capability. The units are typically in the range 60MW to 100MW and include Rolls Royce's Trent 60 and General Electric's LMS 100. Stand-alone sites also exist and new installations are being considered and developed to provide a short term flexible response for both grid support and power output. Owners are seeking capacity contracts in order to support the funding required and also looking to operate on a variety of fuels including gas, diesel and liquid biomass.

Table 13 - Aero Derivative Indicative Start up Times

Start	Notice to Synch (minutes)	Synch to Full Load (minutes)
Start	2-5	4-8

This is the time to go from a Grid call (if selected) by National Grid Transco (NGT) to low frequency then the start commences immediately.

Since OCGTs comprise a gas turbine only; there is only one type of start and does not require the hot, warm and cold start classifications used on coal and combined cycle units. In general since these machines are suited to more able to cope with rapid temperature changes there is no starts related maintenance penalty and outages are predicated largely on accumulated running hours.

In appendix 3 it is shown the start-up time for different OCGTs in the UK. The shutdown time for these units is given in Appendix 6.

5.2 CCGT Start-up - Process

A typical start sequence for the first gas turbine in a combined cycle plant is detailed below with hot, warm and cold all progressing through the same steps but of differing durations. A combined-cycle start-up procedure is separated into three primary phases:

- Purging of the HRSG.
- Gas turbine (GT) speed-up, synchronisation, and loading.
- Steam turbine (ST) speed-up, synchronisation, and loading.

Table 14 - Typical "Hot" start Process for CCGT Unit

Task
Establish cooling water systems and auxiliary boiler in service where applicable.
Ensure GT and ST's auxiliary systems are operational and release criteria are satisfied.
Confirm the HRSG is ready for start and gas path is clear.
GT is accelerated using the generator in motor mode with a static frequency converter (SFC) or with a separate starter cranking motor and the combustion system is purged by maintaining a low GT speed for a fixed period.
GT load held at, typically 25% load until HRSG pressure rises to the minimum operating pressure and drum levels are stabilised. The ST condenser vacuum raising sequence starts if there is no auxiliary boiler.
GT target load is raised to circa 50% after the minimum operating pressure has been reached. GT NOx steam or water injection system (where fitted) is warmed and put into service.
Once required steam parameters are met the ST run up sequence commences.
With the GT load held at circa 50% the ST reaches full speed and is synchronised.
For cold starts the ST can only be loaded at a low rate (discussed in next section) and will require several hours before all available steam is routed through the steam turbine and the ST bypasses are closed. For NOx steam or water injected GT units, this defines the Stable Export Limit.
Dry low NOx GTs has loaded to this point using diffusion burners for combustion stability. At (typically) 50-60% GTs load these units gradually change to premix operation. Once completed and stable operation (including the steam turbine) is achieved, this is the Stable Export Limit. This mode changeover point is firing temperature initiated with a "dead band" set between rising and falling temperature (load). This, together with the time lag between changing load and resultant changing temperatures, can result in significantly different loads for changeover to occur for start-up and shut down (dependant on the rate of loading or deloading). Also the firing temperature that is used to initiate the change is affected by ambient conditions.
SEL is achieved when a unit is operating within its design range, with stable combustion and operational NOx control measures. Stable readings are obtained from the continuous emissions monitoring (CEM) exhaust measurements, which confirm the low NOx operation.

The duration of the start-up sequence for gas turbines operating in open cycle mode can be shortened as the sequence of steps associated with the HRSG and steam turbine operations may not be applicable.

Stable Export Limit and Gas Turbine load control

The Stable Export Limit (SEL) is achieved when a unit is operating within its design range, with stable combustion and operational NOx control measures. Stable readings are obtained from the CEM exhaust measurements, which confirm the low NOx operation.

As Gas Turbines are available in a number of designs (both aero engine derivatives and industrial turbines) and can be operated in open cycle or as part of a combined cycle, there are a number of factors that can influence the durations of the above sequence steps. For example, the loading and control of the Gas Turbine will vary with combustor design and burner configuration.

Common types of combustor include annular, can-annular and silo style combustion chambers. For some designs, all of the burners fire continuously with the gas supply being modulated, for others the burners fire in groups that are turned on and off to control the load; some designs combine the two firing patterns. Sequential combustion is also available in which two combustion chambers are separated by a turbine section.

The burners may also have different modes of operation. In diffusion mode the gas to air ratio is high which produces a fuel rich flame which is more stable and is commonly used for start-up and low loads. In premix mode the gas to air ration is lower which results in a weaker flame but with lower emissions. Due to the weaker flame, operating in premix mode can only be used for higher loads. Steam or water injection can also be used to control NOx.

For more recent combustor configurations, the flame and acoustic pulsations will need to be continually monitored. Lean premix combustion relies on firing at a low flame temperature in order to achieve low NOx. In certain Dry Low NOx systems this increases the likelihood of combustion instability - resulting in an increased level of combustion dynamics (acoustic pulsations) with a significant risk of serious damage to the combustor. In addition to maintaining low emissions, the control system needs to navigate through operating windows that are prone to high dynamics.

Turbine exit temperature and spread are carefully monitored during run up and, at higher loads, the calculated firing temperature is usually the controlling factor. Turbine exit temperature may be used to trigger changes in burner modes or groups.

The number of Variable Inlet Guide Vane (VIGV) stages and their control varies with design. On some machines VIGVs are gradually opened as the load increases to match the increase in fuel. For other machines the VIGV only have two positions and open at a set firing temperature.

The Stable Export Limit is only reached once the Gas Turbine is loaded, has minimal exhaust temperature spread, using the optimal burner mode (i.e. premix, steam injection) and required steam properties and full Steam Turbine operation with no steam bypasses operating.

The limiting factor during turn-down is often elevated concentrations of carbon monoxide (CO) rather than increasing NOx. The combustion air flow is initially throttled back, in line with the reducing fuel flow, using variable inlet guide vanes at the compressor inlet or by bleeding off Compressor Discharge Air. However, below about 70 per cent load, the air-fuel ratio increases and the flame temperature falls. When combined with the higher design air-fuel ratio of lean-premix systems, these factors cause a rapid increase in CO that marks the end of normal operation. This is more severe for twin-spool aero-derivate designs.

Shut Down

The shutdown sequence will vary from site to site. An example for a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine is as follows:

- Reduce load to Stable Export Limit.
- Both Gas Turbine and Steam Turbine unit shut down sequences are initiated at the same time. As the output drops below the Stable Export Limit, this is considered to be the commencement of the shutdown period.
- The Steam Turbine rapidly de-loads and follows a controlled shut-down sequence.
- During the Gas Turbine de-load sequence the combustion system reverts to start-up mode with an associated short term increase in NOx and CO emissions.

6 MOTHBALLING/PRESERVATION

In the context of a power station the words mothballing or preservation apply to those techniques which could be applied to the plant in order to prevent or reduce deterioration when out of service.

When market economics are not favourable, the option to mothball the plant can be applied, but at this time it may not be known for how long the plant may be required to remain in the preserved state. Basically there are two categories or options for preservation, namely short term preservation and long term preservation. The techniques used for each option can vary significantly, together with the timescales required to successfully mothball the plant and reinstate the plant back to operational condition. These returns to service timescales can also vary significantly between technologies (Coal, CCGT or OCGT).

Basically the protection of plant from condensation, corrosion and seizure due to lack of intended use, is primarily a matter of good engineering practice and good housekeeping.

The most frequently used methods of preservation and plant protection are:

- The establishment of clean dry conditions - This is the most satisfactory practice since it allows the plant to be recommissioned with the minimum of delay. Normally the plant will be drained and fully dried out with the installation of dehumidifiers
- Cleaning, flushing and drying – This method can be applied when storage under dry air is not possible. Generally the system will require opening up, to enable the necessary work to be carried out correctly. This is the least satisfactory method to be applied to plant that requires long-term storage. It is however the only practical option available when shutting down plant for major maintenance activities.
- Plant can be stored wet when filled with suitably dosed demineralised water.
- The use of a protective gas – When it is not possible to achieve dry conditions, protection can be achieved by filling the system with nitrogen gas. Nitrogen blanketing is an effective method of plant storage. However unless the plant is absolutely gas tight, it is very difficult to achieve in reality.
- The use of inhibitors – For systems that cannot be drained, cleaned or blanketed etc, dosing the waterside of plant systems with corrosion inhibitors may be used as an alternative.
- Intermittent running of the plant – Auxiliary systems which contain non aggressive fluids such as lubricating oils can be run on a regular but intermittent basis to prevent corrosion and ensure filtration.
- Protection of essential live systems – For systems which need to remain available, but may be subject to damage through freezing, i.e. fire systems, applying insulation or trace heating may be an option.
- Removal of plant items – small high-risk items can be removed for storage in clean dry conditions.

6.1 Short Term Preservation

Short term preservation can be classed as a period of 3 -12 months and typically the boilers/HRSGs are retained full of de-oxygenated water. The access doors on the steam turbine and condensers are removed to allow dehumidifiers to be installed which circulate dry air through the airspaces to prevent corrosion.

Station staff are normally retained and are given alternative duties principally relating to plant preservation. The plant being out of service also provides the opportunity to carry out more routine or planned maintenance that would otherwise requires an individual unit or station outage.

Due to the short term nature of the plant preservation, emphasis is required at all times on the ability for a rapid return to service of the plant, in order to capitalise on changes in market economics.

The ability to achieve a successful and rapid return to service relies on the station having a detailed recommissioning plan which includes the cancellation of safety documentation, proof testing of safety systems and running of essential lubrication systems to allow hand turning or machine barring.

6.2 Long Term Preservation

Long term preservation techniques (>12 months) are far more detailed than short term preservation techniques and require the boilers/HRSGs to be fully drained and dried out. Main generators are to be stored under dehumidified air and large electrical motors are to be kept dry using in built heaters where installed. Small high risk components should be removed and stored under clean dry conditions. Live water systems will require protecting against freezing by applying insulation or trace heating. External surfaces normally covered by insulation where rainwater, condensation or leakage could lead to concealed corrosion occurring.

Where advanced information on the long term preservation (>1year) is available, it is common to reduce the number of site staff down to a minimum level. These staff are then given preservation inspection and maintenance duties. One major disadvantage of this approach is the timescales required to recruit and train new operations staff, when the plant is required to return to service.

6.3 Miscellaneous Preservation Costs

Even when the plant is fully mothballed, there are a number of costs which will still continue, in order for the unit to be capable of return to service. These can be summarised as:

- Minimum staffing cost.
- Maintenance costs of: Fire systems, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), building structures etc.
- Pressure Systems Safety Regulations (PSSR) Inspections.
- Transmission Entry Capacity payment (TEC).
- Insurance.
- Water Fees.

The decision to mothball the plant may have been taken to avoid or defer the expense of a major overhaul. In this case a major overhaul would be required before the plant is returned to service.

6.4 Timescales

The timescales to mothball the plant in the first instance and then for return to service will depend upon a number of factors, the main two being the method of preservation (short or long term) and technology type (Coal, CCGT and OCGT). Typical periods that a plant would need to be taken out of the market to justify the costs of long-term mothballing and reinstatement would be > 12 months. While the option for long term mothballing is available to both coal and gas fired plant, the cost of mothballing is significantly higher for coal fired plant, due to the physical size and additional equipment.
Coal Plant

With the typical UK coal fired unit being sized at 500 MW, the time taken to fully mothball a unit of this size would be longer than for a significantly smaller gas fired unit. Typical durations for the mothballing activities are as follows:

Table 15 - Coal Plant Preservation Timescales

Period	Activity	Duration (days)
Short Term	Mothball	4
	Reinstate	4
Long Term	Mothball	30-42
	Reinstate	30-42
	Staff Recruitment & Training	90
	Major outage Duration (if required)	84

Based on the common “F” Class gas turbine technology of nominal 300 MW size, the time taken to fully mothball a unit of this size would be significantly shorter than a coal fired unit, but longer than for an OCGT Unit. Typical durations for the mothballing activities are as follows:

Table 16 - CCGT Preservation Timescales

Period	Activity	Duration (days)
Short Term	Mothball	2
	Reinstate	2
Long Term	Mothball	15-30
	Reinstate	15-30
	Staff Recruitment & Training	90
	Major outage Duration (if required)	42-56

With the majority of existing UK OCGT units being of a smaller size than the coal and CCGT units, typically <40 MWe, typical durations for the mothballing activities are as follows:

Table 17 - OCGT Preservation Timescales

Period	Activity	Duration (days)
Short Term	Mothball	1
	Reinstate	1
Long Term	Mothball	5
	Reinstate	5
	Staff Recruitment & Training*	-
	Major Outage Duration (if required)**	10

* Due to the minimal staff employed on OCGT sites it is unlikely that there would be any significant manpower reductions.

** Duration based on 5 days to install and remove an exchange engine.

APPENDIX

REPORT APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Tables and Graphs Showing Coal Fired – Declared Hot & Cold Start Times (from synchronising to Full Load)

Power plant	Start	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Aberthaw	Cold	1	50	1	100	5	230
Cottam	Cold	2	214	0	220	6	184
Drax	Cold	1	1	0.8	120	5	258
Ferrybridge	Cold	15	15	0.2	46	5	247
Fiddlers Ferry	Cold	40	80	4	200	6	82
Longannet	Cold	5	220	0.5	250	5	174
Rugeley	Cold	3	90	3	245	10	107
Ratcliffe On Soar	Cold	0.5	50	5	230	5	190

Power plant	Start	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Aberthaw	Hot	5	100	5	190	5	100
Cottam	Hot	10	214	0	220	7	91
Drax	Hot	60	60	10	300	10	61
Ferrybridge	Hot	50	100	5	130	5	82
Fiddlers Ferry	Hot	50	100	9			46
Longannet	Hot	5	220	0.5	250	5	174
Rugeley	Hot	25	90	8	245	10	48
Ratcliffe On Soar	Hot	5	243	0.2	250	10	109

Source of information: Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BMRS), http://www.bmreports.com/


Aberthaw
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
250
Time (minutes)
Cold Star
Hot Start


Cottam
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
Time (minutes)
Cold Star
Hot Start


Drax
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Time (minutes)
Cold Star
Hot Start


Ferrybridge
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Time (minutes)
Cold Star
Hot Start


Fiddlers Ferry
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Time (minutes)
Cold Star
Hot Start


Longannet
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
Time (minutes)
Cold Star
Hot Start


Rugeley
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Time (minutes)
Cold Start
Hot Start


Ratcliffe
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
Time (min)
Warm Start
Hot start

Appendix 2

Tables and Graphs Showing CCGT - Declared Hot & Cold Start Times (from synchronising to Full Load)

Power plant	Start	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Connahs Quay	Cold	10	35	0.7	110	4.5	160
Didcot B	Cold	1.3	210	4.5	420	20	221
Killingholme	Cold	7	40	0.2	68	10	205
Staythorpe	Cold	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	233
Pembroke	Cold	0.3	43	4	191	17.5	192
Deeside	Cold	8	49	0.2	58	2.6	240
Marchwood	Cold	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	327
Little Barford	Cold	5	110	0.3	140	20	149

Power plant	Start	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Connahs Quay	Hot	10	25	1.8	115	12	70
Didcot B	Hot	3.8	305	30	710	5	88
Killingholme	Hot	7	60	0.2	62	10	79
Staythorpe	Hot	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	80
Pembroke	Hot	11	178	0.3	191	17.5	71
Deeside	Hot	24	360	30	475	5	34
Marchwood	Hot	10	10	10	10	10	70
Little Barford	Hot	10	60	20	240	20	37

Source of information: Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BMRS), http://www.bmreports.com/






Killingholme
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
250
Time (minutes)
Cold Start
Hot Start


Staythorpe
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
250
Time (minutes)
Cold start
Hot start


Pembroke
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
250
Time (minutes)
Cold start
Hot start


Deeside
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
Time (minutes)
Cold start
Hot start


Marchwood
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
100
200
300
400
Time (minutes)
Cold Start
Hot start


Little Barford
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Power (MW)
0
50
100
150
200
Time (minutes)
Cold start
Hot start

Appendix 3

Table and Graphs Showing OCGT - Start Times (from synchronising to Full Load)

Power plant	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Didcot A	0.5	2	23	0	0	5
Indian Queens	50	130	50	140	50	2.8
West Burton	10	10	10	20	1	12
Drax	12.8	0	0	0	0	2.5

Source of information: Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BMRS), http://www.bmreports.com/







Appendix 4

Table and Graphs Showing Coal Fired – Declared Run-Down Rate Export

Power plant	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Aberthaw	5	240	4	180	45	71
Cottam	10	250	5	200	10	55
Drax	10	300	10	200	99	48
Ferrybridge	15	490	15	280	15	33
Fiddlers Ferry	6	240	20			55
Longannet	7					86
Rugeley	10	245	10	200	25	38
Ratcliffe On Soar	10	230	10	80	40	44

Source of information: Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BMRS), http://www.bmreports.com/








Fiddlers Ferry
Power (MW)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time (minutes)


Longannet
Power (MW)
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
Time (minutes)
Hot Start


Rugeley
Power (MW)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Time (minutes)


Ratcliffe
Power (MW)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
Time (min)

Appendix 5

Table and Graphs Showing CCGT - Declared Run-Down Rate Export

Power plant	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Connahs Quay	10	35	0.7	110	4.5	33
Didcot B	16	200	12	120	7	54
Killingholme	30					22
Staythorpe	17.5	174	43	85	18	21
Pembroke	17.5	213	14	160	22	22
Deeside	9	260	53	100	20	40
Marchwood	27.5	390	13.6	200	12	49
Little Barford	20	65	10	2	2	38

Source of information: Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BMRS), http://www.bmreports.com/








Pembroke
Power (MW)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
Time (minutes)


Deeside
Power (MW)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Time (minutes)


Marchwood
Power (MW)
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Time (minutes)


Little Barford
Power (MW)
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Time (minutes)

Appendix 6

Table and Graphs Showing OCGT - Declared Run-Down Rate Export

Power plant	Rate1	Elbow2	Rate2	Elbow3	Rate3	TOTAL
Didcot A	40					1
Indian Queens	10	2	10	1	10	14
West Burton	5					6
Drax	32					1

Source of information: Balancing Mechanism Reporting System website (BMRS), http://www.bmreports.com/









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The Impact of Wind Power Generation on the Electricity Price in Germany

Janina C. Ketterer

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Abstract

This paper provides insight into the relationship between intermittent wind power generation and electricity price behaviour in Germany. Using a GARCH model, the effect of wind electricity in-feed on level and volatility of the electricity price can be evaluated in an integrated approach. The results show that variable wind power reduces the price level but increases its volatility. With a low and volatile wholesale price, the profitability of electricity plants, conventional or renewable, is more uncertain. Consequently, the construction of new plants is at risk, which has major implications for the energy market and the security of supply. These challenges, related to the integration of renewables, require adjustments to the regulatory and the policy framework of the electricity market. This paper's results suggest that regulatory change is able to stabilise the wholesale price. It is found that the electricity price volatility has decreased in Germany after the marketing mechanism of renewable electricity was modified. This gives confidence that further adjustments to regulation and policy may foster a better integration of renewables into the power system.

JEL Code: Q42, Q48, C22.
Keywords: Renewable energy sources, intermittency, electricity price.

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1 Introduction

Renewable electricity has come to dominate the debate over and the development of the European electricity market. Among European countries, most wind turbines and solar panels are installed in Germany where renewable electricity has become even more important since the March 2011 decision regarding the nuclear phase-out. Figure 1 shows that Germany's wind capacity reached 29 gigawatt (GW) in 2011. Its solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity soared in the last two years: overall installed solar PV capacity reached almost 25 GW in 2011 (BMU, 2012). In 2011, wind electricity accounted for 8 per cent of gross electricity production in Germany, solar PV for 3 per cent. All renewable sources combined made up 20 per cent of gross electricity production in 2011 and are Germany's second most important source of electricity generation after lignite (BDEW, 2011). The German government plans to raise this share to 35 per cent by 2020 and to 50 per cent by 2030 (BMU and BMWi, 2011). Onshore and offshore wind will play an important role in this expansion of renewable electricity capacity.

System and market operators face two main challenges as more renewable power generation is added. First, electricity generated by wind turbines and photovoltaic panels is intermittent and hardly adjustable to electricity demand.[1] Therefore, variable electricity generation is not a perfect substitute for conventional energy sources. Figure 2 shows the variability of wind electricity generation. The horizontal line, the so-called capacity credit, gives an impression how much conventional capacity can be replaced by the existing wind power capacity, given the current power plant fleet and maintaining the security of supply (IEA, 2011).[2] The graph illustrates that the wind power generation is subject to strong variation and that only a fraction of installed wind capacity, depicted by the capacity credit line, is expected to contribute to the power mix with certainty. Second, Germany's renewable energy pol-

[1] By contrast, electricity generation from hydro or biomass sources can be managed more easily. The following conclusions hold for sources like wind and solar PV where intermittency is particularly pronounced.

[2] In line with calculations from Hulle (2009), IEA (2011), and Schaber et al. (2012), the capacity credit is assumed to be 6%. A wind installation of 29075 MW in 2011 was used in the calculation for this capacity credit line (BMU, 2012).

Figure 1: Installed capacity and generated electricity in Germany



Source: BMU (2012).

icy grants priority dispatch and fixed feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity generation. Renewable electricity can be fed into the grid whenever it is produced, regardless of energy demand, and in-feed can be switched off only if grid stability is at risk (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011).[3] As storage is not yet a viable option, high levels of variable renewable electricity production can be balanced only by adjusting output from traditional power plants or by exporting excess electricity. Similarly, when too little wind or sunshine is available during times of peak demand, reserve capacity has to be dispatched at higher costs.

Grid operators are obliged to feed-in renewable electricity independent of the market price. However, the spot electricity price is not independent from renewable electricity. On the one hand, variable renewable power production is negatively correlated with the electricity price. Whenever large

[3]The operator continues to receive feed-in tariff payments even if the installation is disconnected from the grid due to capacity constraints of transmission cables.

Figure 2: Hourly wind in-feed



Note: Hourly wind in-feed in MW. The horizontal line illustrates how much electricity German wind installations (29075 MW in 2011) are expected to reliably generate during peak demand. This measure is referred to as capacity credit. In line with calculations from IEA (2011), Schaber et al. (2012) and Hulle (2009) the capacity credit is assumed to be 6%. Source: www.eeg-kwk.de.

volumes of intermittent renewable electricity are fed into the power grid, the electricity price tends to decline. As renewable installations are very capital-intensive but have almost zero operational generation cost, they are certainly dispatched to meet demand. More expensive conventional power plants are crowded out, and the electricity price declines. This dampening of the wholesale electricity price is called merit-order effect. Various assessments uncover this effect for wind electricity generation (Neubarth et al., 2006; Nicolosi, 2010; Ray et al., 2010). Due to increasing production levels, the merit-order effect can also be observed for solar PV electricity (Milstein and Tishler, 2011). On the other hand, intermittent renewable power not only influences price level, but also price volatility (Klinge Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010; Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011). This is confirmed by Jónsson et al. (2010) and Woo et al. (2011) who show that wind generation tends to lower the spot price but increase its variance. The aim of this chapter is to further investigate the effects of intermittent wind power generation on the electricity price development in Germany.

The literature shows that wind power generation has a dampening effect on the electricity price but does not explicitly model the impact of wind power on the volatility of the electricity price nor elaborate on the development of this relationship over time. The present analysis introduces daily levels of German wind power generation as explanatory variable in the mean and the variance equation of a GARCH model of the German day-ahead electricity price.[4] This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it explores the effect of wind power generation on the level and volatility of the electricity price in an integrated approach. In Germany, where renewables prospered exceptionally from feed-in tariffs, the effect on the electricity market should be particularly pronounced. Second, it investigates a regulatory change in the German marketing mechanism of renewable electricity and its impact on the relationship between wind power and the electricity price.

This study's findings suggest that wind power generation decreased the wholesale electricity price in Germany in the period from 2006 to 2011 but increased the price volatility. These results are particularly important given European and German aspirations to usher an energy system dominated by renewables. A low and volatile electricity price might alter or delay investment decisions in new capacity, renewable and conventional, required for the transformation of the energy system. To advance the energy transformation, it should therefore be in the interest of policy makers to secure a reliable and predictable electricity price. The present analysis shows that adjusting the electricity market design can stabilise the development of the electricity price to some extent. Price volatility reduced in Germany after a modification to the renewable electricity regulation.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the relevant literature on the interaction of wind power generation and the electricity price. Section 3.3 describes the data, Section 3.4 the employed methods. The results are presented and discussed in Section 3.5.

[4]The wind in-feed is estimated in megawatt hours (MWh) per day. Data on solar PV in-feed are only available a much shorter period from 2010 onwards. Due to data restrictions, the impact of solar PV electricity is not explicitly estimated in this chapter. It would be interesting to evaluate this issue at a later point in time.

Section 3.6 gives some policy recommendations and Section 3.7 concludes.

2 Literature Overview

It is widely argued that electricity from variable renewable energy sources – wind and solar PV – is hard to incorporate in the generation mix. Although the interruptive effect of variable wind electricity can already be observed today, little empirical research evaluates its current influence on the wholesale electricity price.

Most studies employ power system models to simulate the effect of increased var-RE production on the level of electricity price. In the short term, the so-called merit-order effect is quantified as the difference between a simulated electricity price with and without the renewable in-feed.[5] For Germany, Bode and Groscurth (2006) and Sensfuß (2011) find that renewable power generation lowers the electricity price. Despite being very capital-intensive, renewable installations have almost zero marginal generation cost and thus are certainly dispatched to meet demand. More expensive conventional power plants are crowded out, and the electricity price declines. This dampening of the wholesale electricity price is also shown for Denmark (Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008) and Spain (Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008). A recent literature overview of the merit-order effect in the European context is provided by Ray et al. (2010). Taking a more long-term perspective, Green and Vasilakos (2010) and Pöyry (2011) simulate the effects of fluctuating renewable electricity for the next two decades. Green and Vasilakos (2010) find that the British electricity price level will be significantly affected by variable wind power generation in 2020. Pöyry (2011) reports a strong merit-order effect by 2030 that decreases the wholesale electricity price. The consumer price is expected to rise due to soaring costs for subsidies to renewable electricity. Both studies conclude that the volatility of electricity price will increase remarkably in the next 10 to 20 years.

Very few papers investigate the importance of intermittent renewable

[5]The merit-order effect can be observed for the wholesale price but not for the end-use price which also reflects the increasing costs for renewables support and for investments in the electricity grid. The end-use price does therefore not necessarily decrease.

power production for the electricity price using current market data. Neubarth et al. (2006) evaluate the relationship between wind and price for Germany using an OLS regression model. Woo et al. (2011) estimate an AR(1) model for high-frequency power data from Texas, controlling for the gas price, nuclear generation and seasonal effects. Jónsson et al. (2010) analyse hourly Danish electricity data in a non-parametric regression model, assessing the effects of wind power forecasts on the average electricity price and its distributional properties in western Denmark. Both studies conclude that wind power in-feed has a significant effect on the level and volatility of the electricity price. The present analysis builds on these findings but takes a different methodological approach. It explicitly models the influence of intermittent renewable electricity generation on the price level and volatility in Germany by using a GARCH model. The aim is to track the development of both components over time and discover whether a regulatory change in the German electricity market had an impact on the relationship between wind power in-feed and the wholesale price.

3 Data

This chapter introduces daily data for wind electricity generation in the mean and variance equation of a GARCH model to better explain the unsteady behaviour of the electricity price. Figure 3 illustrates the negative correlation of daily wind in-feed and the spot electricity price. Whenever high wind speeds allow above-average electricity generation, one can observe a price dip. An in-depth study will reveal more insights into this relationship as well as the development of price volatility.

In the following analysis, I use the day-ahead spot electricity price, Phelix Day Base, from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) as dependent variable.[6] Electricity is traded on the day-ahead spot market for physical delivery on the next day. Separate contracts for every hour of the next day are available. Prices and volumes for all 24 contracts are determined in a single auction at noon. The Phelix Day Base is then calculated as the av-

[6]The time series is downloaded from Datastream.

Figure 3: Forecasted wind in-feed and day-ahead electricity price



Note: Daily wind electricity generation in MWh per day (blue line) and spot electricity price Phelix Day Base (red line). Source: European Energy Exchange (EEX).

erage, weighted price over these hourly contracts. Generally, the German electricity wholesale market is dominated by over-the-counter trading, and the contracts are mostly of a long-term nature (Bundesnetzagentur, 2010). However, trading volumes on the spot market are increasing and the Phelix is an important benchmark for all other electricity market transactions (Nicolosi, 2010; Monopolkommission, 2011).[7]

The development of the electricity price, Phelix Day Base, is illustrated in Figure 4. This study covers the period from January 2006 to January 2012. As illustrated in Figure 1, the wind installation already exceeded 20 GW during this period and played an important role in the German electricity mix. Table 1 reports extreme kurtosis and skewness for the electricity price which can either arise from extreme values or autocorrelation (Bierbrauer et al., 2007). Therefore, outliers are detected before conducting the empirical analysis. In line with the literature, I filter values that exceed three times the standard deviation of the original price series (Mugele et al., 2005; Gianfreda,

[7]The volume on the EEX spot market increased from 203 TWh in 2009 to 279 TWh in 2010. For comparison, the German gross electricity production was 628 TWh in 2010 (AG Energiebilanzen, 2011). Electricity is also traded on the intraday market, but this market is less liquid and mainly used to address electricity market imbalances in the short-run.

Figure 4: Electricity price development



Source: Datastream and EEX.

2010).[8] The outliers are replaced with the value of three times the standard deviation for the respective weekday.[9]

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Median	Max	Min	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis
Original Price	48.06	46.07	301.54	-35.57	18.80	2.31	22.94
Deseasonalized	48.06	45.80	114.52	1.96	15.18	0.85	4.11
Log Deseasonalized	3.82	3.82	4.74	0.67	0.32	-0.70	8.09

After smoothing outliers, the seasonal cycle is removed from the time series. Given that $p_t{=}y_t{+}s_t$, the observed price p_t comprises a stochastic part y_t and a seasonal component s_t. Figure 5 shows that the average electricity price varies across the week because of changes in the electricity demand. Similarly, the price follows a yearly pattern as the different seasons influence the energy demand. Weekly and yearly seasonality is addressed by using

[8]The standard deviation is calculated individually for all seven weekdays to compare like with like. For example, a Monday is compared with the mean and the standard deviation of all Mondays in the sample (Bierbrauer et al., 2007).

[9]The outlier detection is repeated after the first round of outliers have been replaced, but no additional outliers are found. In an alternative run, the median is used to replace outliers. This does not lead to significant differences in the regression results.

Figure 5: Electricity price variation within the week



Note: Average electricity price on different weekdays over the sample period.

constant step functions which consist of dummies for each seasonal cycle (Trück and Weron, 2004). Dummies for week days d_i and months m_j are included in the following function to capture seasonality:[10]

$$s_t = c + \sum_{i=1}^{7} \xi_i d_i + \sum_{j=1}^{12} \nu m_j. \tag{1}$$

The results for the deseasonalisation are shown in Table 2. The coefficients for weekday dummies in Table 2 follow the same pattern as shown in Figure 5: the price remains high at the beginning of the week, declines from Friday onward, and reaches its minimum on Sundays. The dummies for months are not all significant, but a relevant electricity price reduction is observed in March, April, May, and August. In October and November, the price is significantly higher than in January. Finally, the seasonal component is deducted from the original price series, and the mean of both series is aligned.

Finally, the logarithmic electricity price is calculated and employed in the

[10]Seasonal effects could also be addressed by trigonometric components (Lucia and Schwartz, 2002; Bierbrauer et al., 2007). However, such sinusoidal trends cannot be detected in the German electricity data from 2006 to 2012.

Table 2: Removing seasonality

	Coefficient	p-value
c	51.89	(<0.0001)
Tue	2.76	(0.0226)
Wed	2.59	(0.0321)
Thu	2.04	(0.0912)
Fri	-0.85	(0.4784)
Sat	-9.47	(<0.0001)
Sun	-17.49	(<0.0001)
Feb	1.07	(0.4934)
Mar	-3.80	(0.0126)
Apr	-4.54	(0.0032)
May	-6.90	(<0.0001)
Jun	-2.82	(0.0670)
Jul	-0.56	(0.7100)
Aug	-5.66	(0.0002)
Sep	2.00	(0.1913)
Oct	6.27	(<0.0001)
Nov	3.73	(0.0152)
Dec	-2.39	(0.1170)

Note: OLS regression with the Phelix Day Base, corrected for outliers, as dependent variable. Monday and January are used as reference variables. p-values in parentheses.

following analysis.[11] Figure 6 illustrates the original and the deseasonalised electricity price series. The descriptive statistics of both series can be found in Table 1.

The main explanatory variable is the wind electricity generation in Germany. An illustration how the in-feed of variable renewable electricity affects the existing power system can be found in Annex B, Figure 13. To match the day-ahead horizon of the dependent variable, I use the predictions for daily wind power generation. These short-term forecasts are accurate and, more importantly, reflect the information available to participants in the day-ahead market. The forecasts are made and published by the four German transmission system operators (TSO). The TSOs then sell the predicted

[11]Estimating the logarithmic price series has the advantage that the coefficients have a straight forward interpretation. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic is -3.57274 whereas the 1% critical value is -3.4331. The null hypothesis of a unit root is therefore rejected. The same holds for the Phillips-Perron test, employed by Knittel and Roberts (2005), with a test statistic of -17.37986 and a 1% critical value of -3.4330. Hence, it is not necessary to estimate the differences or returns.

Figure 6: Deseasonalised electricity price



Note: The upper panel shows the wholesale electricity price after outliers have been filtered and seasonal trends removed. The lower panel shows the log level of this series.

amount of renewable electricity on the day-ahead electricity market.[12] The wind volumes are normally placed as price-independent bids to assure that they are certainly sold in the day-ahead auction. When the price falls below -150 € in the daily auction, the energy exchange calls a second auction, in which the wind volumes can be auctioned with a price limit between -350 € and -150 € (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). This rule was first introduced by the regulator in 2010 and revised in 2011 to avoid extreme negative prices as experienced during 2009. It was only necessary once, on 5. January 2012, to call a second auction.[13] The daily schedule of forecasting and selling wind is schematically illustrated in Figure 7. The TSOs should have no incentive to systematically mispredict the expected renewable electricity generation: if the TSOs sell too much or too little renewable electricity on the day-ahead market, they have to balance it on the intraday market the following day (von Roon, 2011). The wind electricity generation depends on the weather development and installed capacity but is independent from the electricity price.[14]

Of course, electricity price is not solely determined by wind electricity generation. Several papers indicate that the total electricity load, which reflects the demand profile, plays an important role in price behaviour. In fact, research shows that the combination of both factors is particularly important in this regard. Jónsson et al. (2010) show that the ratio between wind and conventional power production affects the electricity price most. They use the ratio between wind and load which is termed *wind penetration*. Similarly, Nicolosi and Fürsch (2009) find that the residual load, the electricity demand that needs to be met by conventional power, is a crucial parameter.

[12]The data can be downloaded from the homepages of Tennet, Amprion, EnBW and 50Hertz. For a shorter period they are also available from www.eeg-kwk.de and the EEX Transparency Platform, www.transparency.eex.com. The data are available in hourly and 15-minute format. For this study, 15-minute MW data are averaged for each hour and then summarised to MWh per day.

[13]Personal communication with Thomas Drescher, Head of Market Operations EPEX Leipzig, in May 2012.

[14]How much renewable capacity is installed depends greatly on subsidies, namely, the German feed-in tariff (FIT) system. The FIT does not influence the wholesale electricity price traded on the energy exchange, but it influences the end-use price because the FIT costs are socialised among almost all electricity users.

Figure 7: Stylised scheduling in the day-ahead electricity market



Note: ATC stands for Available Transfer Capacity, EMCC for European Market Coupling Company. Information regarding the daily operations is obtained from www.marketcoupling.de and www.epexspot.com.

The share of wind shows how much wind power contributes to meeting total electricity demand and illustrates its relative importance. The same amount of wind electricity will have a different impact on the price during a phase of high electricity demand than it will during low demand. Load data which reflect the demand for electricity should be used in the estimations in order to put the wind data into context.[15]

ENTSO-E, the association of European transmission operators, publishes data on the vertical load and the total load in Germany. The vertical load reflects the net flows from the transmission to the distribution grid and therefore only a fraction of total electricity demand.[16] Therefore, a better proxy for the demand profile on a given day is the total load which also includes electricity from small and renewable sources in the distribution grid (ENTSO-E, 2012).[17] ENTSO-E does not yet provide forecasts for the total load. In line with Jónsson et al. (2010), the predicted load is constructed according to the

[15]The demand for electricity should be independent from the variable wind in-feed and should therefore be an appropriate variable choice to avoid endogeneity problems.

[16]As the wind electricity is fed into the distribution grid, it is not included in the vertical load data. However, the vertical load data are most accurate as this can be measured directly by the TSO.

[17]However, care should be taken with the quality of the total load data. TSOs can only estimate the total load, as they do not directly observe all flows in subordinated distribution grids.

following relationship:

$$L_t = \hat{L}_t + e_t, \tag{2}$$

where L_t is the actual load, $\hat{L}_t$ is the predicted load, and $e_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ a residual. By adding noise to the actual load, a load forecast is simulated. The standard deviation of the error is chosen, in line with Jónsson et al. (2010), as 2 per cent of the average load in the sample. According to Jónsson et al. (2010) and Weber (2010), this is consistent with the errors that modern forecasting models produce.[18] The advantage of Jónsson et al.'s (2010) method is that the error of the simulated load forecast and the wind forecast are independent. Otherwise, both errors would be influenced by the weather forecast.[19] When the wind forecast is put in perspective with electricity demand $\hat{L}_t$, its relative importance for the power system becomes clear. Figure 8 shows that the share of wind fluctuates between 0 and 40 per cent. The discussed explanatory variables, wind and load, will be included in an extended GARCH model of the electricity price. The methodology is elaborated in the next section.

4 Model

The liberalisation of power markets turned electricity into a tradable commodity and engendered a great deal of interest in understanding and modelling its price performance. Deng (2000), Huisman and Mahieu (2003), Lucia and Schwartz (2002), and Knittel and Roberts (2005) pioneered this research area. These studies emphasise that distinct features of the electricity price should be included in an empirical price model. Electricity, for example, is not storable: supply and demand have to be matched instantly to avoid temporary imbalances. This can lead to extreme prices that usually revert quickly once supply and demand reconciled. Hence, mean reversion

[18]ENTSO-E publishes forecasts and actual values for the vertical load for 2010 and 2011. The error has a standard deviation of 1.1 per cent of the average load in this period. However, the vertical load data are more accurate and easier to predict than the total load. Therefore, 2 per cent seems a reasonable assumption.

[19]The load forecast is simulated several times to test whether the regression results depend on the randomly generated noise process. This is not the case.

Figure 8: Share of wind power generation



Note: The share is calculated as MWh of wind in-feed per MWh electricity load per day. Source: EEX and ENTSO-E.

is common in electricity markets and should be included in a price model (Deng, 2000; Huisman and Mahieu, 2003). Another important characteristic of electricity, reflected in its price, is seasonality. Demand varies throughout the day and during the week, as well as across the year. Therefore, models of electricity price should incorporate seasonality, as exemplified by Knittel and Roberts (2005) or Lucia and Schwartz (2002).

Given the pronounced volatility in the liberalised markets, conditional heteroscedasticity models lend themselves well to correctly explain price performance (Higgs and Worthington, 2010). These so-called GARCH models date back to Bollerslev (1986). As they appropriately capture the fluctuation and clustering of volatility, GARCH models are a widely employed method in financial and commodity markets. Knittel and Roberts (2005) were among the first to apply a GARCH model to the electricity price. They use an asymmetric GARCH model to capture price responses to positive and negative shocks and do indeed detect an inverse leverage effect. Other GARCH applications that have a bearing on this study are Solibakke (2002) and Mugele et al. (2005). Furthermore, Escribano et al. (2011) contribute to the literature by combining jumps and GARCH to explicitly control for price spikes. They show that taking into account mean reversion, seasonality, and jumps improves the GARCH model.

To better understand the performance of the electricity price, market fundamentals should be reflected in the calculations (Janczura and Weron, 2010). Mount et al. (2006) and Karakatsani and Bunn (2010) emphasise that variables for demand and reserve margins should be included to better understand price movements. Huisman (2008) also recognises the need to enrich the price model with fundamentals and uses temperature variables to detect changes in price behaviour. Similarly, Hadsell and Marathe (2006) and Gianfreda (2010) estimate an asymmetric GARCH model and include traded electricity volume in the variance equation. They find that the trading volume has an effect on price volatility, which is in line with findings from stock markets, see for example Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999) or Le and Zurbruegg (2010). Hadsell (2007) and Petrella and Sapio (2010) touch on another decisive factor for the electricity price and use a GARCH model to test whether changes in market design have an effect on price volatility.

Using a GARCH model allows to explicitly test the effect of the wind power generation on the mean and volatility of the electricity price in an integrated approach. Moreover, a GARCH model seems most appropriate to mimic the volatility behaviour of the electricity price. Figure 6 illustrates that volatility clustering is present which is typical in financial markets. This feature hints at autocorrelation in the data, which is emphasised by the Q-statistic for the squared and the absolute returns (Zivot, 2009).[20] Furthermore, Engle's (1982) test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals confirms that ARCH effects are present.[21]

As electricity is not storable, the price tends to spike and then revert as soon as the divergence of supply and demand is resolved (Bierbrauer et al., 2007; Escribano et al., 2011). This mean reverting characteristic of the electricity price motivates the specification of the GARCH mean equation. To capture mean reversion, the electricity price can be described by an Ornstein-

[20]From an auxiliary OLS regression with the log price, autoregression is detected in the squared returns. This suggests the estimation of a GARCH model.

[21]The null hypothesis of no ARCH effects in the residuals is rejected with a highly significant test statistic of 54.720 (<0.0001) when including two significant lags of ϵ^2.

Uhlenbeck process (Vasiček, 1977),

$$dp_t = \kappa(\mu - p_t)dt + \sigma dw_t. \tag{3}$$

Here, p_t is the electricity price and w_t a standard Wiener process. After deviating from the mean, $\mu - p_t$, the price is corrected back to its mean. The speed of the reversion is given by κ. According to Bierbrauer et al. (2007), Equation 3 can be rewritten for the deseasonalised log price in discrete time as Gaussian AR(1) process: $y_t = c + \phi y_{t-1} + \eta_t$, where $c = \alpha \cdot \mu$, $\phi = 1 - \kappa$ and $\eta \sim iidN(0, \sigma^2)$.[22] Hence, the speed of the mean reversion can be calculated from the coefficient for the autoregressive parameter. Mean reversion models have often been employed in the literature (Clewlow and Strickland, 2000; Lucia and Schwartz, 2002), but a plain mean-reverting process is found to overestimate the variance and the mean reversion driven by volatile periods (Huisman and Mahieu, 2003). Similar to Knittel and Roberts (2005), this motivates the estimation of an AR-GARCH model, including a mean reversion parameter, in the following specification:

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^{l} \phi_i y_{t-i} + \epsilon_t \tag{4}$$

$$h_t = \omega + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \alpha_i \epsilon_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{j=1}^{q} \beta_j h_{t-j}, \tag{5}$$

where y_t is the log electricity price and h_t is its conditional variance. $\epsilon_t = \sqrt{h_t} z_t$ and $z_t \sim NID(0, 1)$. ω is the long-run variance. For the model to be stationary, $\alpha_i + \beta_j < 1$ and $\alpha_i, \beta_j > 0$.

The daily data for wind generation, w_t, are included in the mean and the variance equation of this model. Given this extension, the specification for

[22] For the deseasonalised log price, Equation 3 can be written in discrete time as $\triangle y_t = \kappa(\mu - y_t)\triangle t + sigma \triangle w_t$. Given $\triangle y_t = y_{t+1} - y_t$, the formula becomes $y_t = \kappa\mu + (1 - \kappa)y_{t-1} + \eta_t$. Check for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a more detailed description of the transformation from continuous to discrete time.

the ARX-GARCHX model becomes:

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^{l} \phi_i y_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \theta_j w_{t-j} + \epsilon_t \tag{6}$$

$$h_t = \omega + \sum_{i=1}^{q} \alpha_i \epsilon_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{j=1}^{p} \beta_j h_{t-j} + \sum_{k=1}^{s} \gamma_k w_{t-k}. \tag{7}$$

In the normal GARCH model, the coefficients in the variance equation, including the additional coefficients for γ, should be positive to ensure that the variance is always positive (Gallo and Pacini, 1998; Zivot, 2009). When a coefficient in the GARCH variance equation is negative, one can inspect the conditional variance and check whether it is always positive. In case of a negative coefficient, the variance stability of the GARCH is linked to the specific sample.[23] The empirical strategy of this paper is to first estimate the GARCH model with Equation 7 for the German day-ahead electricity price, extended by covariates for the wind power forecast. All specifications are first estimated including one AR(1) parameter as derived from the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. To capture serial correlation present in the price series, I then include the number of autoregressive lags which minimise the Bayesian information criterion (Escribano et al., 2011). I will report both specifications to show that the coefficients vary only slightly.

The aim of this study is not only to investigate the impact of wind power generation on the electricity price, but also the regulatory modification to wind electricity marketing. The German regulator amended the rules applicable to marketing of renewable electricity in the so-called *Ausgleichsmechanismusverordnung* in January 2010. In line with Antoniou and Foster (1992), Holmes and Antoniou (1995), Bomfim (2003), and Hadsell (2007), a dummy variable is introduced to capture this regulatory change. The dummy takes the value of 1 after the change. This gives a first impression as to whether change can be observed in the volatility of the electricity price after the regulation was amended.

[23] As the aim of this study is not to forecast the price, checking that the actual conditional variance is positive assures stability.

5 Estimation Results

5.1 Impact of Wind Power

The results for the GARCH(1,1) estimations can be found in Table 3.[24] All standard errors are calculated using the Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) method which assured that the test statistics are robust to non-normality of the residual. The first column (A) shows the GARCH benchmark specification for the log level of the electricity price. All coefficients are highly significant, the variance parameters are all positive, and their sum is smaller than one. The size of the GARCH term β with 0.56 indicates that the autoregressive persistence β is not particularly strong for the electricity price. The GARCH term α reflects the impact of new shocks the conditional variance h_t, transmitted though the error term ϵ_t from Equation 4. The AR term depicts a specificity of the power market. The coefficient of 0.88 in (A) shows that the price reverts back to its long-run mean. But the speed of reversion, given by $1 - \phi_1$, is low.

The Ljung-Box Q-statistic suggests that serial correlation is not well approximated by a single autoregressive term. Therefore, a more dynamic specification is estimated and further autoregressive parameters added. By minimising the Bayesian information criterion, seven lags are included in the specification (A*) in Table 4. The significant seventh lag mirrors the weekly seasonal component and is in line with Escribano et al. (2011). The GARCH coefficients remain fairly stable with an increase in β and, vice versa, a reduction of α. Their sum, however, stays below 1. This shows that the conditional variance is mean-reverting, and shocks only have a temporary effect on h_t (Hadsell, 2007).[25]

In column (B) and (B*) the logarithms of wind and load are included in the mean as well as the variance equation of the GARCH(1,1).[26] The negative coefficient for the wind variable shows that the day-ahead price decreases

[24] The ARCH LM test confirms that the volatility clustering is well captured for all further specifications. Hence, no ARCH effects remain.

[25] The half-live of shocks can be calculated by $\ln(0.5)/\ln(\alpha+\beta)$, and the conditional variance reverts back to its mean after 5.91 days (Zivot, 2009).

[26] Both variables added in logarithms to normalise the size and fluctuation of the series.

when high wind electricity generation is forecasted. This confirms findings by Jónsson et al. (2010) as well as Woo et al. (2011) and underlines the merit-order effect. In the present specification (B) and (B*), the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. When the wind electricity in-feed (MWh per day) increases by 1 per cent, the price decreases between 0.09 and 0.10 per cent. In the variance equation, the wind variable is significantly different from zero and positive. Hence, the fluctuating wind in-feed increases the volatility of the electricity price. To make sure that these results are not driven by the outliers that remain in the log electricity price, an outlier dummy is included in all mean equations.[27] The coefficient for the load variable is only significant in specification (B*) in Table 4, and illustrates that the price increases with higher electricity demand. The variance, however, is reduced in times of high demand, which might arise from higher liquidity of the electricity market.

A similar picture arises in column (C) and (C*) when the share of wind is included in the GARCH model. The wind variable reflects the share of wind relative to total electricity load. The coefficient for this wind penetration measure turns out as expected: a strong wind in-feed lowers the electricity price but increases its variance. When the share of wind rises by one percentage point, the electricity price decreases by 1.32 or 1.46 per cent in specification (C) and (C*). The coefficient is higher than before because the wind variable is now expressed as a share of total load. For the wind share to rise by one percentage point, the wind electricity production needs to gain quite substantially.[28] When the wind variables are added in (B) and (C), respectively (B*) and (C*), the coefficient for the GARCH term α increases slightly, accompanied by a downward adjustment of β. This suggests that a omitted variable bias skewed their coefficients in the previous specification (A*). Generally, the fit of the model, measured by the information criteria, improves when more autoregressive parameters are included in specifications

[27]The dummy captures the 1.1.2007, 1.1.2008, 4.10.2009, and 25.12.2009. When AR terms are included in the regression, the respective number of lagged dummies is included as well.

[28]This can be illustrated as follows. The mean wind forecast is 111 GWh per day, the mean load reaches 1.332 GWh. The average share therefore is 8 per cent. To reach 9 per cent, wind has to rise a substantial 13 MWh or 12 per cent.

(B) and (C), respectively (B*) and (C*).

Figure 9: Rolling regressions for specification (C) with a three year window



Note: The regressions have been estimated for a moving window of three years. The first window starts on 1.1.2006 and ends on 31.12.2008. The dates in the legend indicate the end of each three-year window. The lines show the development of the coefficients for each consecutive regression.

To arrive at a first impression of how wind power's influence on the electricity price evolved over time, rolling regressions are calculated for specification (C).[29] Figure 9 shows how the coefficients evolve, using a three-year window. The rolling regressions illustrate, on the one hand, that the wind coefficient from the variance equation remains fairly constant. On the other hand, the coefficient for the wind share in the mean equation, depicted by the orange line, becomes less negative over time. The wind in-feed can no longer decrease the price level as much. Stated differently, the merit-order effect lessens over time. Sensfuß (2011) find the same effect for Germany. A plausible explanation for the weaker merit-order effect is the increasing share of solar PV in-feed. Already, a merit-order effect from wind power can be observed for solar PV in Germany (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). As Figure

[29]Rolling regressions with a 2 year window have been calculated as well and give a broadly similar picture. However, a longer window is preferred for the coefficients to be significant. Moreover, the picture for specification (B), including log levels for wind and load separately, looks very much the same.

Table 3: Results AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) models with additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable: log electricity price
Sample: 1.1.2006 31.1.2012

	(A)		(B)log(Wind) log(Load)		(C)Wind/Load		(D)Wind/Load Regulation dummy	
Mean equation								
Constant	3.838	(<0.0001)	5.351	(<0.0001)	3.952	(<0.0001)	3.934	(<0.0001)
ϕ_1	0.881	(<0.0001)	0.899	(<0.0001)	0.901	(<0.0001)	0.874	(<0.0001)
log(Wind)			-0.089	(<0.0001)				
log(Load)			-0.035	(0.1945)				
Wind/Load					-1.315	(<0.0001)	-1.249	(<0.0001)
A dummy for outliers in the log price and its first lag are included in all mean equations.								
Variance equation								
ω	0.007	(<0.0001)	0.324	(<0.0001)	0.003	(0.0076)	0.011	(<0.0001)
α_1	0.243	(<0.0001)	0.273	(<0.0001)	0.267	(<0.0001)	0.250	(<0.0001)
β_1	0.557	(<0.0001)	0.541	(<0.0001)	0.555	(<0.0001)	0.300	(<0.0001)
log(Wind)			0.002	(0.0059)				
log(Load)			-0.024	(<0.0001)				
Wind/Load					0.031	(0.0155)	0.052	(<0.0001)
Regulation dummy							-0.010	(<0.0001)
Adj. R^2	0.686		0.726		0.739		0.742	
Log likelihood	829.291		1083.401		1075.098		1150.745	
AIC	-0.741		-0.966		-0.961		-1.028	
BIC	-0.723		-0.938		-0.937		-1.002	

Note: AIC stands for Akaike information criterion, BIC for Bayesian information criterion. p-values are in parentheses.

Table 4: Results AR(7)-GARCH(1,1) models with additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable: log electricity price
Sample: 1.1.2006 1.31.2012

	(A*)		(B*)log(Wind) log(Load)		(C*)Wind/Load		(*D)Wind/Load Regulation dummy	
Mean equation								
Constant	3.862	(<0.0001)	3.862	(<0.0001)	4.042	(<0.0001)	3.970	(<0.0001)
ϕ_1	0.652	(<0.0001)	0.581	(<0.0001)	0.589	(<0.0001)	0.597	(<0.0001)
ϕ_2	-0.035	(0.2539)	-0.005	(0.8668)	-0.040	(0.1968)	-0.010	(0.7238)
ϕ_3	0.096	(0.0010)	0.083	(0.0036)	0.097	(<0.0001)	0.060	(0.0313)
ϕ_4	0.008	(0.7707)	0.029	(0.3343)	-0.003	(0.9116)	-0.009	(0.7283)
ϕ_5	0.036	(0.2199)	0.024	(0.4522)	0.028	(0.3483)	0.049	(0.1744)
ϕ_6	0.104	(0.0010)	0.113	(<0.0001)	0.130	(<0.0001)	0.121	(<0.0001)
ϕ_7	0.093	(<0.0001)	0.136	(<0.0001)	0.165	(<0.0001)	0.149	(<0.0001)
log(Wind)			-0.098	(<0.0001)				
log(Load)			0.081	(0.0185)				
Wind/Load					-1.489	(<0.0001)	-1.414	(<0.0001)
A dummy for outliers in the log price and seven lags are included in all mean equations.								
Variance equation								
ω	0.003	(<0.0001)	0.281	(0.0004)	0.002	(0.0310)	0.009	(<0.0001)
α_1	0.164	(<0.0001)	0.250	(<0.0001)	0.227	(<0.0001)	0.253	(<0.0001)
β_1	0.725	(<0.0001)	0.563	(<0.0001)	0.638	(<0.0001)	0.313	(<0.0001)
log(Wind)			0.002	(0.0470)				
log(Load)			-0.021	(0.0003)				
Wind/Load					0.020	(0.0631)	0.045	(<0.0001)
Regulation dummy							-0.008	(<0.0001)
Adj. R^2	0.720		0.772		0.784		0.783	
Log likelihood	948.598		1253.431		1264.987		1333.351	
AIC	-0.842		-1.115		-1.127		-1.188	
BIC	-0.792		-1.055		-1.072		-1.131	

Note: An asterisk * labels the specifications that include seven autoregressive lags of the price. AIC stands for Akaike information criterion, BIC for Bayesian information criterion. p-values are in parentheses.

10 shows, electricity generation from solar PV depresses mainly peak power prices. Lower peak power prices reduce the daily average wholesale price used in this study. When the average price is lower on days with little wind, the calculated merit-order effect for wind will be smaller. This also explains the dip during winter 2010 when solar PV was not able to lower peak prices. Investigating this interaction in an analysis with hourly prices would be interesting but is left for further research. Another reason for the weakening merit-order effect could be the stronger electivity trade within Europe. The possibility to export excess wind electricity generation smoothes the price development (Hulle, 2009). This effect is further explained at the end of this section.

Figure 10: Solar PV in-feed and peak prices



Note: The solid lines denote the 7-day moving average. The transparent lines the daily values. The difference between peak and off-peak prices shows that solar PV mainly depresses peak hour prices. In summer 2011 the off-peak price was even above the peak price on three days. Source: Bundesnetzagentur (2012).

After April 2011, the impact of wind on the electricity price diminishes even further. This is most likely related to the nuclear phase-out in Germany. Shutting down nuclear power plants shifts the merit-order curve as illustrated by Figure 11. The price decrease, induced by wind, is less strong when the nuclear capacity is removed. This results are confirmed by findings of

Thoenes (2011).

Figure 11: Stylised merit-order curve before and after the nuclear phase-out



Note: Simplified merit order curve in line with von Roon and Huck (2010) and Gruet (2011). The blue line illustrates marginal costs for electricity from wind, yellow stands for nuclear, brown for lignite, black for hard coal, orange for gas, and purple for oil. The dotted line illustrates the case without nuclear.

5.2 Impact of Regulatory Change

The empirical framework is used to evaluate modifications to the power market design and the renewables regulation. The German regulator amended the marketing of renewable electricity in the so-called *Ausgleichsmechanismusverordnung* in January 2010. All TSOs are now required to forecast the renewable power production one day in advance and to sell the total predicted amount on the day-ahead market. TSOs then receive the revenues from selling the renewable power volumes at the wholesale market price (see Figure 12). However, these funds are most likely insufficient to remunerate the producers of renewable electricity according to the feed-in tariff rates. Therefore, TSOs also receive the so-called EEG levy which is after all raised from the electricity users.[30] The EEG levy covers payments for feed-in tar-

[30]EEG stands for *Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz*. The EEG levy is payed by the energy suppliers who then pass the costs to consumers and industry. Some electricity users are exempt from the levy.

iffs as well as costs from forecasting, balancing, and marketing of renewable electricity.

Figure 12: Marketing mechanism after the regulatory change in 2010



Note: Illustration adapted from Buchmüller and Schnutenhaus (2009). Blue arrows show the flows of renewable electricity from the installations to the final electricity users. Orange arrows indicate monetary flows that finally remunerate the operators of renewable electricity installations. More detailed information is available at: www.bundesnetzagentur.de

The previous marketing mechanism was more complicated. TSOs had to predict the renewable electricity production a month in advance. These forecasts were quite inaccurate as the wind and solar PV power production is highly dependent on meteorological factors.[31] Energy suppliers and TSOs then agreed on a fixed schedule for renewable electricity delivery on each day of the following month (Buchmüller and Schnutenhaus, 2009). These volumes had to be physically delivered from a TSO to the energy supplier (see Annex B, Figure 14 for an illustration). As the final wind in-feed was uncertain, the physical delivery of renewable electricity via the TSOs to the energy companies was an inefficient mechanism (Monopolkommission, 2009). When wind power generation was lower than expected, the missing electricity volumes had to be bought by the TSOs on the day-ahead or intrady

[31] Other renewable electricity generation, for example biomass, is less problematic in this respect.

market. A surplus of renewable electricity, on the contrary, had to be sold on the market (Erdmann, 2008). More sudden shortfalls had to be fixed on the balancing market. This mechanism led to substantial balancing costs for adjustments in the spot markets. In 2008, they reached 595 million Euro for all TSOs (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). With the new regulation, the forecasting uncertainty and interventions on the spot markets could be reduced. The related costs shrank substantially to 127 Mio in 2010, and the electricity users were disburdened (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012).[32] Under the old regulation, the expenses for spot and balancing market interventions were hidden in the network charge (Buchmüller and Schnutenhaus, 2009). Since 2010, these costs are added to the EEG levy. This increases the transparency for electricity users who get a clearer picture of the renewable subsidy and system costs.

Transparency also increases with regard to the marketed renewable energy volumes as they have to be sold on the day-ahead market. The additional wind volumes increase liquidity of the day-ahead and the intraday market significantly (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). This is expected to reduce price volatility as smoother prices can generally be observed in a more liquid market (Figlewski, 1981; Weber, 2010). Moreover, TSOs had no incentive under the old regulation to optimise activities on the day-ahead and the intraday market because they could socialise these expenses via the network charge (UoSC) to electricity users (Buchmüller and Schnutenhaus, 2009). According to Klessmann et al. (2008), integration of renewable electricity in Germany was opaque and inefficient before 2010. Under the new regulation, the interventions on the day-ahead market become obsolete and related disturbances are expected to reduce.

To test for the effect of the regulatory change on the price volatility, a dummy variable is included in the variance regression. This procedure follows Antoniou and Foster (1992), Holmes and Antoniou (1995), Bomfim (2003), and Hadsell (2007). The dummy variable captures the effect on the variance after the regulatory change in 1. January 2010. The dummy is not

[32] The overall EEG levy still continues to rise due to high liabilities from feed-in tariff payments, just the burden from the balancing costs is reduced.

included in the mean equation as the new regulatory design only alters the way renewable electricity volumes are absorbed from the market. The overall electricity supply – whether it be generated from renewable or conventional power plants – remains unaffected by the regulation. Therefore, the price level should not be affected from the regulatory change, and the focus lies on the price variance.[33]

The results from specification (D) and (D*) can be found in Table 3 and Table 4. In both cases, the negative and significant coefficient for the dummy variable indicates a reduction of the conditional variance after the regulatory change. The effects of wind and load, discussed earlier, remain robust. Despite the negative coefficient for the dummy, the conditional variance does not become negative for the given sample. Therefore, the specification remains valid.

5.3 Impact of Market Coupling

The German market is not isolated, and electricity flows to neighbouring countries are important, especially for the integration of intermittent renewable electricity. A good example is the wind power from northern Germany which can often not be transmitted to the southern parts of the country due to capacity constraints in grid. High wind energy generation results in exports to neighbour countries, although the electricity could be used in southern Germany. To make sure that the reduction in the variance from 2010 onwards is not simply a result of the better integrated electricity market, I control for cross-border trade in the European electricity market.

The integration of the European electricity market has gained considerable importance from the creation of the European Market Coupling Company (EMCC). Since November 2009, Germany and Denmark pursuit day-ahead volume coupling on the two interconnectors between Germany and Denmark. In May 2010, the Baltic cable between Germany and Sweden joined. On 10. November 2010, the countries of the CWE region (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the so-called

[33]This assumption was double-checked by adding the dummy variable to the mean equation. It stays insignificant and the results for the variance equation are not affected.

Table 5: Results AR-GARCH models with additional explanatory variables

Dependent variable: log electricity price
Sample: 1.1.2006 31.1.2012

	(E) Wind/Load Regulation EMCC capacity		(E*) Wind/Load Regulation EMCC capacity	
Mean equation				
Constant	3.863	(<0.0001)	3.775	(<0.0001)
ϕ_1	0.873	(<0.0001)	0.593	(<0.0001)
ϕ_2			0.005	(0.8501)
ϕ_3			0.058	(0.0351)
ϕ_4			-0.01	(0.6912)
ϕ_5			0.050	(0.1745)
ϕ_6			0.124	(<0.0001)
ϕ_7			0.147	(<0.0001)
Wind/Load	-1.243	(<0.0001)	-1.402	(<0.0001)
log(EMCC capacity)	0.007	(0.6425)	0.018	(0.1713)
Variance equation				
ω	-0.017	(0.0391)	0.015	(0.6472)
α_1	0.249	(<0.0001)	0.260	(<0.0001)
β_1	0.296	(0.0001)	0.279	(<0.0002)
Wind/Load	0.051	(0.0002)	0.045	(0.0001)
Regulation dummy	-0.010	(<0.0001)	-0.008	(<0.0001)
log(EMCC capacity)	-0.001	(0.4515)	-0.001	(0.5029)
Adj. R^2	0.742		0.784	
Log likelihood	1152.265		1334.536	
AIC	-1.026		-1.187	
BIC	-0.996		-1.125	

Note: An asterisk * labels the specifications that include seven autoregressive lags of the price. EMCC capacity is the day-ahead available transfer capacity from Germany to Sweden and Denmark. AIC stands for Akaike information criterion, BIC for Bayesian information criterion. p-values are in parentheses.A dummy for outliers in the log price and its lags are included in all mean equations.

Northern region (Denmark, Sweden and Norway) coupled their electricity markets.[34] The electricity flows of these countries are now jointly optimised, and electricity is exported from low-price to high-price areas, as a matter of efficiency. The necessary congestion management is carried out by the EMCC in a so-called interim tight volume coupling (Monopolkommission, 2009).[35] For this study, I use the interconnector capacities that can be used to export excess wind production.[36] The capacities are reported to the EMCC before the price setting on the day-ahead market and are therefore exogenous from the dependent variable.[37] For reasons of data availability, I use data for the interconnectors between Germany and the Northern region only (Baltic Cable, DK West and DK East).

The "north-bound" interconnector capacity is included in specification (E) and (E*) in Table 5. The coefficients of the EMCC capacity do not turn out significant. However, the conclusions regarding the regulatory change and the wind in-feed remain valid. Therefore, previous specifications that omit the interconnector capacity seem not to be misspecified.

[34] CWE stands for Central Western Europe. Countries connected in the CWE and the Nordic region account for approximately 55% of the European electricity generation (Böttcher, 2011).

[35] The TSOs from the participating countries report the interconnector capacities one day in advance to the EMCC (see Figure 7). In addition, the EMCC receives the anonymised order books from the participating electricity exchanges after the day-ahead spot market closed at 12am. The buying and selling orders, including the volumes of renewable electricity and the interconnector capacity, are optimised by the EMCC. The algorithm determines the price-independent volumes that have to be sold additionally on those markets that had too high prices. The EMCC only calculates the additional electricity quantities that are needed to equalise the price amongst participating countries. The auctioning and price setting remains in the hands of the local exchanges (Böttcher, 2011).

[36] The so-called Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) is included in the regressions. ATC is the physical interconnector capacity which is not yet allocated and is free to use. This export potential reflects the technical and physical restrictions in the neighbour country.

[37] The electricity trade flows are an outcome variable as they are determined together with the price on the day-ahead markets. The data on the electricity trade are therefore not included in this study.

6 Policy Implications

This chapter shows that intermittent renewable generation already transmits volatility to the electricity price. The question is how to integrate electricity from variable sources more smoothly.

First, better geographical integration is important. Building renewable installations throughout Germany would even out the regional fluctuation and assure that wind and sunshine are captured at different sites (Klinge Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010). However, optimal sites for renewable installations are limited within one country. It seems more efficient to connect renewable installations throughout Europe. Schaber et al. (2012) project that improved interconnection within Europe will reduce market effects of variable renewable electricity substantially. Hulle (2009) also emphasise that grid extensions lead to steadier wind generation levels. Better grid connection can be fostered by new cables but also by using existing capacity more efficiently. Experience in Europe has shown that modifying the market coupling regime is helpful in this regard (Hulle, 2009; Monopolkommission, 2011).

Second, flexible conventional power plants as well as electricity storage help balancing fluctuations of renewable energy. In times of high renewables in-feed, storage can collect and save excess electricity. Flexible generation units are power plants with low ramping costs, for example gas turbines. These plants operate at high variable but low fixed costs and can therefore be switched on and off to equalise low renewable power in-feed. The main difficulty of both options, storage and flexible generation capacity, is their investment cost. Providing responsive generation capacity needs to be profitable. With more and more renewables in the power system, conventional plants will mainly balance renewable fluctuation and therefore operate fewer full-load hours. Recovering the investment costs for flexible conventional units during these load hours will become more difficult (Klessmann et al., 2008; Klinge Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010; Steggals et al., 2011). Periods with peak prices, which allow plant operators to generate revenues, become less certain and predictable due to the high variability of renewable electricity generation. The increased refinancing risk questions the viability of investments in flexible conventional capacity, and the market mechanisms might fail to give sufficiently strong investment signals. The literature discusses various policy options, such as capacity markets, capacity payments, or reliability options, to support the construction and availability of flexible capacity. All these policy models are subject of some controversial debate (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011). It is not clear that introducing such new policy instruments is beneficial and necessary. For the time being, ifo and FfE (2012) rather suggest using the existing structure of the balancing market to auction more long-term capacity.

Finally, this study emphasises that regulatory changes can encourage a better integration of intermittent renewable electricity in the power system. Going forward, the regulatory and the policy framework should be further adjusted to the challenges arising from the decarbonisation of the electricity market. Regarding the regulatory setting, on the one hand, intermittent renewables could be better integrated if gate closure on day-ahead and intraday markets would be later (Hiroux and Saguan, 2010). A later gate closure would reduce uncertainty on the spot markets and balancing costs because a shorter forecasting horizon makes actual wind generation more predictable.[38] Another small step towards a better integration of renewables is to offer different products on the spot markets. Since December 2011, the German intraday market offers not only hourly, but 15 minute electricity blocks (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). Given the stochastic generation profile of wind and solar PV, this product increases flexibility for market participants. Such smaller products should probably be introduced to the day-ahead market as well. With respect to the policy framework, on the other hand, renewable support schemes should be revisited. Currently, renewable energy is not exposed to any market risk in Germany due to guaranteed feed-in tariffs. A more market-based system would give incentives to realign renewable electricity supply with demand. Support schemes that depend on the wholesale electricity price make generation most attractive during peak load. Germany already offers renewable electricity producers to choose between fixed

[38]The implementation may not be straight forward as all action needs to be coordinated among European states.

feed-in tariffs and price-dependent feed-in premiums. Since the beginning of 2012, renewable electricity producers are given a third option: they can sell their renewable electricity directly on the market without using TSO services. They forego the feed-in tariff but currently receive a similar payment to make this option attractive. This so-called *Direktvermarktung* does not yet reduce subsidy payments but creates another market-based channel to integrate renewable power. Together with a transition to feed-in premiums, this approach should be rigorously pursued. Simultaneously, balancing costs should be partly shifted to the operators of renewable installations. In Germany, these integration costs are currently passed on to energy users, in other countries, for example Spain or the UK, the operator of renewable installations has to bear these costs partly (Klessmann et al., 2008). When exposing renewables to more market risk, the maturity of the technology and the functionality of the market need to be taken into account. Surely, intermittent installations have a limited ability to respond to price signals and should not be exposed to full risk (Klessmann et al., 2008). But renewable electricity generation now plays an important role in the German power system and should therefore assume more responsibility. A completely protected environment can hardly be sustained when planning to increase the renewables share to 35 per cent of gross electricity production in 2020. Market-based support could give positive long-run incentives to exploit portfolio effects, to choose optimal installation sites, and to improve the generation forecasts (Hiroux and Saguan, 2010).

7 Conclusions

With the aim of reducing carbon emissions and increasing energy security, renewable electricity generation is strongly supported by politicians and interest groups. This has led, especially during the last decade, to a rapid increase of renewable electricity generation in many parts of the world. In Germany, renewables now make up 20 per cent of the country's gross electricity production. The share of intermittent electricity generation from wind and solar PV has grown particularly quickly. Large amounts of stochastic wind electricity pose new challenges for the power system. Assuring a stable electricity supply and price becomes increasingly difficult. Given that Germany strives for an electricity mix with 35 per cent renewables in 2020 and 50 per cent in 2030, resilient integration of intermittent renewable electricity becomes absolutely crucial.

The presented results show that intermittent wind power generation does not only decrease the wholesale electricity price in Germany but also increases its volatility. This conclusion holds across various specifications underlining the robustness of the results. The disruptive effect of variable renewables on the wholesale price is relevant for the entire energy system. A lower and more volatile electricity price probably provides insufficient incentives to investment in new generation capacity, both in renewable as well as conventional capacity. The higher price volatility introduces uncertainty which, according to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), might lead to a delay of investments. After all, flexible generation plants become more important to back-up an increasing share of intermittent renewable electricity, but more difficult to finance. It is of the utmost importance that the electricity price continues to induce investments – in carbon-free renewables capacity and in back-up capacity needed to maintain security of supply.

This study finds evidence that a more reliable price signal can be achieved. The volatility of the German electricity price decreased after a regulatory change in 2010. Hence, the market design can to some extent smoothen the volatility of the electricity price and stabilise its level. Going from here, renewable electricity regulation should be developed further, towards a more market-orientated structure that remunerates renewable electricity during phases of high electricity prices. In Germany, the transformation of the energy system brings along many challenges. A framework that sets appropriate incentives for new investments and stabilises the wholesale price is prerequisite to meet these requirements. An efficient and more market-based integration of variable renewable electricity would unburden the consumers who currently pay most of the energy transition. This, in turn, could strengthen public support for the necessary transformations.

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A Renewables and the Power System

Figure 13: Variable renewable electricity and the power system



Source: Illustration adapted from Neubarth (2011).

This figure shows how variable renewable electricity influences the power system. First, the variable renewable electricity in-feed poses challenges to the grid which has to absorb the electricity at any point in time. Currently, the German transmission grid does not have enough capacity to transport the renewable electricity in-feed southwards. This problem is particularly apparent for wind power which is mainly generated in northern Germany but is needed in the south. This implies the need for massive investment in additional transmission cables. Until these cables are in place, any electricity that exceeds the demand in northern Germany is exported to neighbouring countries. Second, the impact on the level and volatility of the electricity price is studied in Chapter 3. Finally, renewable installations affect the existing power plants which need to balance the intermittent renewable electricity in-feed. Gas and coal plants in Germany have to satisfy electricity demand not met by renewables generation but have to be switched off when enough renewable electricity is generated.

B Marketing Mechanism Before 2010

Figure 14: Marketing mechanism before 2010



Note: Illustration adapted from Buchmüller and Schnutenhaus (2009). Blue arrows show the flows of renewable electricity from the installations to the final electricity users. Orange arrows indicate monetary flows that finally remunerate the operators of renewable electricity installations. Source: Illustration adapted from Buchmüller and Schnutenhaus (2009).

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STAFF EXHIBIT 235

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

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5HE &CONOMIC #ENEFITS OF A 1ERCEN FOR $LEAN &NERGY (ENERATION BY

JUNE 29, 2016 AT 8:00 AM ET BY JASON FURMAN, BRIAN DEESE

4UMMARY " NEW TARGET FOR PERCENT CLEAN ENERGY GENERATION "MERICA WILL HELP THE ENVIRONMENT FOSTER GROWING INDUSTRIES OF THOUSANDS OF JOBS

At the North America Leader's Summit President Obama will be joining the Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau and the President of Mexico Enrique Peña Nieto in laying out a historic continental goal of 50 percent clean power generation by 2025. Meeting the goal will involve clean energy development and deployment (including renewable, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage technologies), clean energy innovation (through the Mission Innovation initiative), and improved energy efficiency. To support the goal of 50 percent clean power generation, the three countries plan a range of initiatives, including cutting power waste by aligning ten appliance efficiency standards or test procedures by 2019, 5,000 megawatts of cross-border transmission projects to facilitate deployment of clean power, a joint study of the opportunities and impacts of adding more renewables to the electric grid on a continental basis, and the greening of government operations to 100 percent clean energy by 2025.

This work complements another set of initiatives on reducing methane and black carbon emissions, and further advancing clean transportation. Notably, all three countries are also taking important cross-cuttings steps, including aligning methods for estimating the social cost of carbon and completing comprehensive Midcentury Strategies for driving down greenhouse gas emissions.

These efforts will not only reduce the impacts of climate change and help all three countries meet their commitments under the Paris agreement, but they will also provide important benefits for the economy as a whole and support hundreds of thousands of jobs.

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3EAL &CONOMIC #ENEFITS FROM THE 1ERCENT $LEAN &NE 5ARGET

A starting point for thinking about the economic benefits is to consider what would happen if we do not take action to reduce carbon emissions.

The White House Council of Economic Advisers has estimated that if a delay in cutting carbon emissions causes the mean global temperature to stabilize at 3 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels instead of 2 degrees, that delay will induce annual additional economic damages of approximately 0.9 percent of global output and impose dangerous economic and security risks that are hard to fully quantify. Now, 0.9 percent of output in the United States *alone* in 2015 was over $160 billion. And these costs would not just happen once—they would be faced year after year.

But looking at the costs of inaction is only the beginning of considering the benefits. A quickly growing clean energy sector will bring additional benefits by spurring innovation and growing employment in these industries.

In fact, we project that jobs supported by the clean energy (hydro and non-hydro renewables and nuclear), energy efficiency, and new transmission sectors of the economy will continue to rapidly grow: **from under 700,000 today to over one million jobs supported on average through 2025.**

Projected Jobs Supported by Clean Energy Generation, Energy Efficiency & New Transmission



Notes: Clean energy jobs include direct and indirect jobs from hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, nuclear, waste energy technologies, energy efficiency, and new transmission build.
Sources: The Solar Foundation, AWEA, IRENA, ACORE, National Hydropower Association, BLS, LBNL, Seneca et al., CEQ, and CEA Calcuations.

3ELEVANT 5RENDS IN $LEAN &NERGY .AKING THE 5ARGET 1O

A dramatic transformation of our energy system is underway, which will help all three countries meet the new clean energy target. **Deployment of clean energy is growing at an unprecedented pace and the cost of new technologies is plummeting**. The share of the share of non-hydropower renewables has increased from roughly 3 percent in 2008

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Kaufman/3

to 7.3 percent in 2015. Wind and solar energy alone currently make up over 5 percent of generation and were less than 1.5 percent in 2008. This growth is expected to continue apace, with the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projecting wind and solar generation to nearly double by 2025 under business as usual.



Note: Dotted line is a smoothed trend, shown to dampen the strong seasonal patterns (the share of non-hydro renewables drops during the winter and summer-both seasons of high power generation demand).
Source: Energy Information Administration.

But wind and solar are only part of the story. With nuclear and hydro and non-hydro renewable energy, clean energy is already providing roughly 35 percent of electricity generation, and by 2025 EIA projects 43 percent clean power generation under their reference case. Energy efficiency is growing as well, reducing our demand for energy. Since 2008, utility spending on energy efficiency, which saves households money by cutting energy use, has grown from just over $5 billion to over $8 billion in 2015. **Reducing energy demand will make it easier for clean energy to provide a larger share of our energy needs.**

These large increases in deployment come amid notable cost declines. Since 2008 the cost of onshore wind has declined over 30 percent and solar over 70 percent. LED lighting has seen a nearly 90 percent decrease in cost per kilo lumen since 2008. The cost of Li-ion battery packs for electric vehicles have fallen from above $1,000/kWh in 2007 to under $410/kWh in 2014, with some estimates coming in as low as $300/kWh. A recent report by the White House Council of Economic Advisers has shown that innovations in energy storage—and smart markets that allow for electricity demand to respond to energy prices—provide an opportunity to ease the integration onto the electric grid of increasing quantities of renewable energy resources. These innovations can complement greater transmission interconnection to provide a more resilient grid that can incorporate geographically dispersed clean energy generation across North America.

This all means that we are on a road towards a cleaner energy future, driven in part by

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Kaufman/4

initiatives already underway. Cooperation across North America will further accelerate this trend. If we project the current trends to reach the 50 percent North American target, we will see American clean energy growing to nearly 1,900 billion kWh of generation by 2025. Moreover, energy efficiency is also projected to grow, reducing the total generation demanded and contributing to reaching the 50 percent target across the three countries.



Source: Energy Information Administration, CEA Calculations.

The 50 percent clean energy target across North America will bring us closer to our neighbors, help reduce the harmful impacts of climate change, and have clear economic benefits for American households.



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Follow @CEAChair



#RIAN %EESE
4ENIOR "DVISOR

Follow @Deese44

Staff/235
Kaufman/5



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CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
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STAFF EXHIBIT 236

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Energy Prices: Industrial: Electricity

Region: United States

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

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 237

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 28, 2016
OPUC Data Request 54

OPUC Data Request 54

Were any costs or rate base related to Bridger Coal Company included in PacifiCorp's revenue requirement for UE 263?

Response to OPUC Data Request 54

Please refer to the Company's response to ICNU Data Request 0013 in the current docket for total rate base included in PacifiCorp's revenue requirement for UE 263. No other costs related to Bridger Coal Company were directly included.

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STAFF EXHIBIT 238

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ICNU Data Request 0013

Please state the amount of rate base, on a total-Company and Oregon-allocated basis, included in rates in relation to the Bridger Coal Company.

Response to ICNU Data Request 0013

Please refer to Attachment ICNU 0013 for total rate base in Oregon rates related to Bridger Coal Company (BCC).

UE - 307 2017 OR TAM

Bridger Coal Company total rate base balances
in Oregon rates
(Whole dollars)

Description	Total Company Pro Forma	Oregon Allocated Pro Forma
Rate Base Additions:		
Gross Plant		
FERC 399 - Coal Mine Other Tangible Property[1]	172,440,236	42,569,860
Adjustmnet 8.3 in UE-263		
Rate Base Deductions:		
Bridger Coal Co ADIT Balance	(33,842,403)	(8,354,583)
Total Rate Base	138,597,833	34,215,277

[1] Docket UE-263 had a December 2014 Test Period with forecasted plant to December 2013 consistent with the methodology used in UE-210, UE-217, UE-246 (prior rate cases)

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UE 307 / PacifiCorp
June 28, 2016
OPUC Data Request 56

OPUC Data Request 56

Please refer to Ralston Workpaper "14 Depr Exp 10YP.xlsx."

a. Please identify each asset in this workbook that has related costs included in the projected 2017 Bridger Coal Company coal costs.
b. For each asset identified in part a. above, please identify each asset that has been subject to a prudence review by the OPUC, and identify the proceeding in which the prudence review took place.
c. Please identify each asset identified in response to part a. that includes capitalized labor.

Response to OPUC Data Request 56

a. PacifiCorp owns a two-thirds interest in the Bridger Coal Company (BCC), which supplies coal to the Jim Bridger generating plant. The Company's investment in BCC is recorded on the books of Pacific Minerals, Inc. (PMI), a wholly-owned subsidiary of PacifiCorp. For ratemaking purposes, the pricing provisions of the coal supply agreement between the Company and Bridger Coal Company no longer apply, and cost-of-service based pricing is utilized. The BCC assets are reflected as a component of rate base in regulatory filings, as stipulated and approved by the Public Utility Commission of Oregon in docket UE 111, and have been included in all subsequent filings. Consequently, the depreciation / depletion / amortization of all Bridger Coal Company assets are included in the projected 2017 coal costs.

b. All Bridger Coal Company assets are subject to prudence reviews in general rate cases (GRC). In the most recent GRC (Oregon Docket UE 263), Bridger Coal Company assets were reflected as a component of rate base, in Exhibit PAC/1002, page 8.3 – Bridger Mine Rate Base adjustment.

   Labor costs are generally included in major construction projects as well as in the installation of underground mainline support systems; including coal haulage conveyors, electrical power supply, high-pressure water and dewatering pipelines and other miscellaneous support systems as mandated.

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STAFF EXHIBIT 240

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UE 307 / PacifiCorp
July 1, 2016
OPUC Data Request 178

OPUC Data Request 178

Please identify each coal source which offers or has offered coal on a spot market basis that is also located in any state where PacifiCorp owns coal generation resources.

Response to OPUC Data Request 178

The Company objects to this request as overly broad and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Company responds as follows:

The Company purchases coal from the Powder River Basin (PRB) (Northeast Wyoming), Green River (Southwest Wyoming), the Uinta Basin/Central Rockies (Utah and Colorado), and San Juan/Four Corners (New Mexico). Publications of coal market pricing are only available for certain of these coal basins, such as the PRB and Uinta Basin. The PRB coal market is generally considered to be the only liquid coal market in the western United States. The number of buyers and sellers in the other coal markets in which the Company procures coal is very limited.

PacifiCorp's coal generation resources are sited adjacent to and nearby coal reserves in geographically isolated locations throughout the Company's service territory. Many of the captive mining operations that once served the plants have since closed and the plants are now being fueled from other local coal suppliers located nearby the plants under long-term requirements contracts. These long term contracts provide coal which meets the required coal quality specifications for each plant. Several plants have no rail access to western coal markets due to the lack of rail unloading coal facilities. Other plants have limited access to western coal markets due to limited rail infrastructure. One exception is the Dave Johnston plant located in Glenrock, Wyoming. This plant has full access to the Powder River Basin (PRB) coal region and is supplied with coal from different Wyoming PRB mines under spot or short-term contracts. Plants with limited access to western coal markets include the Jim Bridger plant, located in Point of Rocks, Wyoming (limited access due to rail infrastructure), the Cholla plant in Joseph City, Arizona and the Craig and Hayden plants in Colorado.

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PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
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STAFF EXHIBIT 241

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 241 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
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STAFF EXHIBIT 242

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

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CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
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STAFF EXHIBIT 243

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

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U.S. Energy Information Administration

Coal
Coal Markets

Release date: July 5, 2016 | Next release date: July 11, 2016 Archive

Average weekly coal commodity spot prices
dollars per short ton

	Week ending					Week ago
	06/03/16	06/10/16	06/17/16	06/24/16	07/01/16	change
Central Appalachia 12,500 Btu, 1.2 SO_2	$40.50	$40.50	$40.50	$40.50	$41.10	$0.60
Northern Appalachia 13,000 Btu, < 3.0 SO_2	$42.10	$42.10	$42.10	$42.10	$43.35	$1.25
Illinois Basin 11,800 Btu, 5.0 SO_2	$31.70	$31.70	$31.70	$31.70	$32.00	$0.30
Powder River Basin 8,800 Btu, 0.8 SO_2	$8.80	$8.80	$8.80	$8.80	$8.70	$-0.10
Uinta Basin 11,700 Btu, 0.8 SO_2	$37.50	$37.50	$37.50	$37.50	$39.40	$1.90

Source: With permission, SNL Energy
Note: Coal prices shown reflect those of relatively high-Btu coal selected in each region for delivery in the "prompt quarter." The prompt quarter is the quarter that follows the current quarter. For example, the 2nd quarter is the prompt quarter of a period between January to the end of March. For a period between April to the end of June, the 3rd quarter (July through September) is the prompt quarter. In the row headings, the Btu value represents heat value per pound, and the SO2 value reflects its percentage of total coal weight. The historical spot price data are proprietary and cannot be released by EIA; see SNL Energy. See SNL Energy.

Average weekly coal commodity spot prices
dollars per mmbtu

	Week ending					Week ago
	06/03/16	06/10/16	06/17/16	06/24/16	07/01/16	change
Central Appalachia 12,500 Btu, 1.2 SO_2	$1.62	$1.62	$1.62	$1.62	$1.64	$0.02
Northern Appalachia 13,000 Btu, < 3.0 SO_2	$1.62	$1.62	$1.62	$1.62	$1.67	$0.05
Illinois Basin 11,800 Btu, 5.0 SO_2	$1.34	$1.34	$1.34	$1.34	$1.36	$0.02
Powder River Basin 8,800 Btu, 0.8 SO_2	$0.50	$0.50	$0.50	$0.50	$0.49	$-0.01
Uinta Basin	$1.60	$1.60	$1.60	$1.60	$1.68	$0.08

11,700 Btu, 0.8 SO_2

Source: With permission, SNL Energy

Note: Coal prices shown reflect those of relatively high-Btu coal selected in each region for delivery in the "prompt quarter." The prompt quarter is the quarter that follows the current quarter. For example, the 2nd quarter is the prompt quarter of a period between January to the end of March. For a period between April to the end of June, the 3rd quarter (July through September) is the prompt quarter. In the row headings, the Btu value represents heat value per pound, and the SO2 value reflects its percentage of total coal weight. The historical spot price data are proprietary and cannot be released by EIA; see SNL Energy. See SNL Energy.

NYMEX coal futures

NYMEX coal futures near-month contract final settlement price



Source: The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Daily Energy Bulletin.

Monthly coal exports



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

Monthly coke exports



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 244

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

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CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 245

Exhibits in Support Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

ALL-INCLUSIVE INDEX LESS FUEL WITH FORECAST ERROR ADJUSTMENT 4Q/2012 = 100.0

Date	All-LF	Forecast Error Adjustment	All-LF With Forecast Error Adj.	Date	All-LF	Forecast Error Adjustment	All-LF With Error Adj.
1998Q1	64.3	0.0	64.3	2008Q1	84.5	-0.2	84.3
1998Q2	64.3	0.1	64.4	2008Q2	85.2	-0.2	85.0
1998Q3	65.0	-0.1	64.9	2008Q3	86.4	0.2	86.6
1998Q4	65.0	0.0	65.0	2008Q4	90.6	0.5	91.1
1999Q1	65.1	-0.1	65.0	2009Q1	90.9	0.8	91.7
1999Q2	65.0	-0.1	64.9	2009Q2	89.5	-1.7	87.8
1999Q3	65.5	-0.1	65.4	2009Q3	90.3	-1.6	88.7
1999Q4	65.2	0.0	65.2	2009Q4	90.0	-0.3	89.7
2000Q1	66.9	0.1	67.0	2010Q1	92.2	0.4	92.6
2000Q2	66.9	0.1	67.0	2010Q2	93.0	0.3	93.3
2000Q3	67.5	-0.2	67.3	2010Q3	93.6	0.3	93.9
2000Q4	67.4	0.0	67.4	2010Q4	94.3	-0.2	94.1
2001Q1	68.7	-0.2	68.5	2011Q1	96.4	-1.0	95.4
2001Q2	69.0	-0.1	68.9	2011Q2	97.0	0.4	97.4
2001Q3	69.3	0.0	69.3	2011Q3	98.6	0.4	99.0
2001Q4	69.0	-0.2	68.8	2011Q4	97.7	0.4	98.1
2002Q1	70.0	-0.1	69.9	2012Q1	97.8	-0.4	97.4
2002Q2	69.4	-0.1	69.3	2012Q2	99.4	-0.5	98.9
2002Q3	69.4	-0.6	68.8	2012Q3	100.6	0.4	101.0
2002Q4	70.8	0.0	70.8	2012Q4	100.0	0.0	100.0
2003Q1	71.2	0.0	71.2	2013Q1	99.9	-0.6	99.3
2003Q2	71.4	0.0	71.4	2013Q2	99.6	0.0	99.6
2003Q3	72.0	0.0	72.0	2013Q3	100.6	0.3	100.9
2003Q4	72.8	0.0	72.8	2013Q4	99.7	-0.1	99.6
2004Q1	72.7	-0.1	72.6	2014Q1	99.7	-0.1	99.6
2004Q2	73.0	0.1	73.1	2014Q2	100.7	0.0	100.7
2004Q3	74.5	0.4	74.9	2014Q3	101.4	0.2	101.6
2004Q4	75.7	0.7	76.4	2014Q4	100.8	-0.2	100.6
2005Q1	76.4	0.0	76.4	2015Q1	102.5	0.0	102.5
2005Q2	77.5	0.0	77.5	2015Q2	102.0	-0.1	101.9
2005Q3	78.0	0.4	78.4	2015Q3	101.9	-0.3	101.6
2005Q4	77.4	-0.4	77.0	2015Q4	102.3	0.1	102.4
2006Q1	79.2	-0.4	78.8	2016Q1	103.7	0.4	104.1
2006Q2	79.1	0.2	79.3	2016Q2	103.6	-0.1	103.5
2006Q3	79.8	-0.4	79.4	2016Q3	103.5	0.0	103.5
2006Q4	80.6	0.3	80.9				
2007Q1	81.0	0.0	81.0				
2007Q2	81.8	-0.4	81.4				
2007Q3	82.2	0.3	82.5				
2007Q4	83.8	0.0	83.8				

This index was released beginning 2013Q1. Earlier quarters were restated for comparison purposes. Revised annual report data caused the basing factor to change beginning 2014, and differences caused by the revision are accounted for in the forecast error adjustments for 2014.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
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STAFF EXHIBIT 246

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Exhibit 246 contains Confidential Information and is subject to

Protective Order No. 16-128.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 247

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

Docket No. UE ___
Exhibit PAC/201
Witness: Cindy A. Crane

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

OF OREGON

PACIFICORP

Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Cindy A. Crane

PacifiCorp Compliance Proposal for Periodic Fuel Supply Plans for PacifiCorp's Affiliate Mines

April 2014

PACIFICORP COMPLIANCE PROPOSAL—ORDER NO. 13-387
PERIODIC FUEL SUPPLY PLANS FOR PACIFICORP'S AFFILIATE MINES

A. Background

PacifiCorp is a co-owner of the Jim Bridger plant in Wyoming. The Jim Bridger plant obtains coal supply from the Bridger Coal Company (BCC), which is co-owned by PacifiCorp.[1] PacifiCorp owns the Huntington and Hunter plants in Utah. These plants obtain coal supply from the Deer Creek Mine, owned by Energy West Mining Company (EWMC). EWMC is a wholly owned subsidiary of PacifiCorp. Collectively, BCC and EWMC are referred to as "captive coal" mines. For regulatory purposes, PacifiCorp's captive coal mines are consolidated for reporting and ratemaking on PacifiCorp's books.[2] The Commission has approved the coal supply agreements between PacifiCorp and BCC and PacifiCorp and EWMC under the Commission's transfer pricing rule, OAR 860-027-0048.[3] The Commission conditioned this approval upon the right to review the coal supply agreements for reasonableness in subsequent rate proceedings and the requirement that the Company notify the Commission of any substantive changes to the coal supply agreements, including material changes in cost.

In Order No. 13-387 in PacifiCorp's 2014 Transition Adjustment Mechanism (TAM), the Commission resolved a challenge to Jim Bridger's fuel supply costs by adopting a proposal to facilitate implementing prudence and affiliated interest standards for PacifiCorp's captive mines in future rate cases.[4] The proposal, which was endorsed by PacifiCorp, Staff, and CUB, contemplates PacifiCorp's preparation of periodic fuel supply plans that compare affiliate fuel supply to alternative fuel supply options, including market alternatives. PacifiCorp has prepared this compliance proposal in response to Order No. 13-387.

B. Long-Term Fuel Supply Plans

1. **Purpose of Long-Term Fuel Supply Plans**. The purpose of the long-term fuel supply plan for plants fueled by coal from captive coal mines is to demonstrate that the fuel supplies are "fair, just, and reasonable,"[5] and satisfy the Commission's prudence and affiliate interest standards. The long-term fuel supply plans recognize

---

[1] The Bridger Coal Company and the Jim Bridger Plant are jointly owned and fuel supply and/or mining operations decisions must be made jointly.
[2] *In the Matter of Pacific Power & Light Company*, Docket No. UE 21, Order No. 84-898 (Nov. 14, 1984); *In the Matter of Idaho Power Company*, Docket No. UI 107, Order No. 91-567 at 4 (Apr. 29, 1991).
[3] *In the Matter of PacifiCorp*, Docket No. UI 189, Order No. 01-472 at 2 (June 12, 2001); *In the Matter of Idaho Power Company*, Docket No. UI 107, Order No. 91-567 at 4 (Apr. 29, 1991); *In the Matter of the Application of Pacific Power & Light Company for an Order Authorizing It to Enter into Agreements with Energy West Company*, Docket No. UI 105, Order No. 91-513 (Apr. 12, 1991).
[4] *In the Matter of PacifiCorp d/b/a Pacific Power 2014 Transition Adjustment Mechanism*, Docket No. UE 264, Order No. 13-387 at 6-7 (Oct. 28, 2013).
[5] *Id*. at 6.

that, given the nature of coal mining operations, a multi-year assessment of coal supply costs is more appropriate than an annual review.[6]

2. **Contents of Long-Term Fuel Supply Plans.** PacifiCorp will prepare long-term fuel supply plans to address the economics of continued coal supply from BCC for the Jim Bridger plant and from EWMC to the Huntington and Hunter plants. The form and content of the fuel supply plans may vary from year to year, but the plans will always retain the objective of determining the least-cost, least-risk coal supply. The long-term fuel supply plans will:

    - Use best available data to determine the least-cost, least-risk coal supplies for the plants;
    - Review fueling options for the plants and prepare least-cost mine plans for the key options;
    - Review data on market costs for alternative coal supplies and transportation and the costs associated with plant modifications necessary for alternative fuel supplies; and
    - Review and compare fuel supply options with sensitivities.

3. **Initial Fuel Supply Plans for Jim Bridger, Huntington and Hunter.** PacifiCorp will file the first long-term fuel supply plans for the Jim Bridger, Huntington and Hunter plants in 2015 in a separate docket subject to the Commission's Open Meetings decision-making process (similar to other utility planning dockets).

4. **Future Fuel Supply Plans.** PacifiCorp will update its long-term fuel supply plans once every five years. PacifiCorp will update the plans more often as necessary to address major milestones in coal supply cycles, such as the expiration of third party-coal supply arrangements, major capital investments in the affiliate coal mines, or potential acquisition of new reserves.

5. **Confidential Material.** The long-term fuel supply plans will contain significant confidential information and will require confidential handling. PacifiCorp will request entry of an ongoing protective order for its long-term fuel supply plan dockets, similar to that applicable to TAM proceedings under Order No. 10-069 in docket UE 216.[7]

---

[6] *Id*. at 15 (Commissioner Savage, concurring).
[7] *In the Matter of PacifiCorp, dba Pacific Power 2011 Transition Adjustment Mechanism*, Docket No. UE 216, Order No. 10-069 (Feb. 25, 2010).

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 248

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

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Index of Railroad Fuel Prices

Excel

Monthly data, not seasonally adjusted



Index of Railroad Fuel Prices	Sep-14	Sep-15
Railroad Fuel Prices (Index: July 15, 1990 = 100)	570.3	318.6
Percent change from same month previous year	- 9.2%	- 44.1%

NOTE: The current value is compared to the value from the same period in the previous year to account for seasonality.

SOURCE: Association of American Railroads, Monthly Railroad Fuel Price Indexes, available at http://www.aar.org/ as of December 2015.

‹ Domestic Airline Jet Fuel Prices up End-User Prices ›

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R) • U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT)
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE • Washington, DC 20590 • 800.853.1351 • E-mail OST-R

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 249

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016


Where Powder River Basin coal goes
Notes:
Routes shown are schematic. Only rail-originated coal is shown. Some coal (e.g., Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan) moves partially by river or Great Lakes vessels.
Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 1998
45 = 45 million tons
POWDER RIVER BASIN
326,000,000 tons
WASHINGTON 2
1 OREGON
2 IDAHO
MONTANA
NORTH DAKOTA
MINNESOTA 18
2 SOUTH DAKOTA
WISCONSIN 23
12 WYOMING
NEVADA
UTAH
CALIFORNIA
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
COLORADO 8
12 NEBRASKA
KANSAS 14
IOWA 19
38 MISSOURI
OKLAHOMA 19
45 TEXAS
13 ARKANSAS
10 LOUISIANA
MICHIGAN 22
OHIO 2
23 ILLINOIS
17 INDIANA
N.Y.
PENN.
WEST VIRGINIA
VIRGINIA
KENTUCKY
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
4 TENNESSEE
ALABAMA 6
GEORGIA 6
3 MISSISSIPPI
1 FLORIDA
© 2001, Kalmbach Publishing Co., TRAINS: Robert Wegner

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 250

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

AAR Rail Cost Index		
	All Inclusive	Scale
Quarter	Less Fuel	
2011Q1	96.4	
2011Q2	97.0	1.01
2011Q3	98.6	1.02
2011Q4	97.7	0.99
2012Q1	97.8	1.00
2012Q2	99.4	1.02
2012Q3	100.6	1.01
2012Q4	100.0	0.99
2013Q1	99.9	1.00
2013Q2	99.6	1.00
2013Q3	100.6	1.01
2013Q4	99.7	0.99
2014Q1	99.7	1.00
2014Q2	100.7	1.01
2014Q3	101.4	1.01
2014Q4	100.8	0.99
2015Q1	102.5	1.02
2015Q2	102.0	1.00
2015Q3	101.9	1.00
2015Q4	102.3	1.00
2016Q1	103.7	1.01
2016Q2	103.6	1.00
2016Q3	103.5	1.00
Geometric Mean		
Quarterly Growth		0.003
Annual Growth Rate		0.013

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 251

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

UE 307 / PacifiCorp
July 1, 2016
OPUC Data Request 180

OPUC Data Request 180

Please provide the coal spot market price at the most granular level available for each potential PacifiCorp coal source listed in response to 178. Please provide such data beginning January 1, 2006 through to present.

Response to OPUC Data Request 180

The Company objects to this request as overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving these objections, the Company responds as follows:

Historic coal market information is available from a variety of industry publication sources. Please also refer to the response to OPUC 32.

CASE: UE 307
WITNESS: LANCE KAUFMAN

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
OF
OREGON

STAFF EXHIBIT 252

Exhibits in Support
Of Opening Testimony

July 8, 2016

POWDER RIVER BASIN COAL RESOURCE AND COST STUDY

Campbell, Converse and Sheridan Counties, Wyoming
Big Horn, Powder River, Rosebud and Treasure Counties, Montana

Prepared For

XCEL ENERGY

By

John T. Boyd Company

Mining and Geological Consultants

Denver, Colorado

Report No. 3155.001

SEPTEMBER 2011

John T. Boyd Company

Mining and Geological Consultants

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October 6, 2011
File: 3155.001

Mr. Mark W. Roberts
Manager, Fuel Supply Operations
Xcel Energy
1800 Larimer St., Suite 1000
Denver, CO 80202

Subject: Powder River Basin Coal Resource and Cost Study

Dear Mr. Roberts:

Presented herewith is John T. Boyd Company's (BOYD) draft report on the coal resources mining in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana. The report addresses the availability of resources, the cost of recovery of those resources and forecast FOB mine prices for the coal over the 30 year period from 2011 through 2040. The study is based on information available in the public domain, and on BOYD's extensive familiarity and experience with Powder River Basin operations.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN T. BOYD COMPANY
By:

John T. Boyd II
President and CEO

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Powder River Basin (PRB) of Wyoming and Montana is the largest coal producing region in the world, supplying over 40% of the coal consumed for power generation in the United States. Xcel Energy, which purchases substantial volumes of coal from the region retained John T. Boyd Company (BOYD), a worldwide mining and geological consultancy with extensive experience in the PRB, to develop an analysis of coal resource availability, future cost trends and prices. This summary presents the key findings of that analysis.

Coal Resources

BOYD's forecast of PRB demand indicates approximately 17 billion tons of recoverable coal resources will be required over the 30 year timeframe of this study. While no comprehensive basin-wide resource assessment is available, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has completed studies focusing on certain portions of the basin. These studies indicate a coal resource of over 140 billion tons in the areas that are of most interest for mining. In the Gillette Coalfield, which is the primary PRB production area, authoritative estimates by the USGS indicate approximately 77 billion tons of coal are potentially recoverable, with about 10 billion tons considered "reserves" (i.e., economically recoverable at the time of estimation). Based on information in the USGS study, BOYD estimates an additional 24 billion tons for a total of 34 billion would reasonably be expected to be economically viable over the study period. Thus, in the Gillette field alone, sufficient resources are available to satisfy nearly double the expected demand.

To further assess resource availability, BOYD reviewed the coal accessible to the operating mines and selected development projects in the PRB as of year-end 2010. Each mine or project was evaluated independently, with production requirements estimated, and available coal resources assessed in specific tracts logically mineable by the operation. The results of this mine-by-mine evaluation indicated that 20.5 billion tons of the 34 billion tons of economically viable resources are mineable from existing or planned operations, as summarized:

	Tons (Millions)
Resources Within Mine Permit Areas	5,773
Resources Recently Leased or Identified for Leasing	4,680
Resources Logically Mineable Within a Mine's Area of Interest	10,113
Total	20,566

This site specific analysis further demonstrates that sufficient resources are available to support planned mining over the 30 year period. Moreover, as indicated by the USGS study, extensive additional resources are available beyond the areas identified.

Cost Trends



Typically as a coal basin matures, mining proceeds from the most favorable to less favorable resources, a trend which puts upward pressure on costs. Generally speaking, this is the case in the PRB, particularly in the Gillette area where the mines are progressing from shallower, less expensive resources on the eastern edge of the basin to more deeply buried and thus more costly resources to the west. In addition, physical factors such as road relocations and coal haul distances will tend to increase costs. This increase will however, occur very slowly due to the nature of the deposit and scale of operations. BOYD's forecasts of average mining costs, shown on the nearby graph indicate a modest increase of ±1% per year in real terms from about $10/ ton (constant 2011 dollars) to about $15/ton in 2040.

Price Forecasts



Over the long term, prices in the PRB are primarily driven by costs – prices will experience upward pressure as production costs at marginal, higher cost mines increase. BOYD's forecast of prices for the three common "benchmark" grades of PRB coal are illustrated on the nearby graph.

As shown, we expect prices to increase modestly, averaging 1% to 2% per year. We would also note that the forecast is inherently conservative (high) insofar as it does not incorporate the impacts of potential technological or operational improvements. Generally we would expect such improvements to be modest.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

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1.0 GENERAL STATEMENT

Xcel Energy operates several electrical generating facilities that are fueled by coal produced in the Powder River Basin (PRB) of Wyoming and Montana (see Figure 1.1, Regional Location Map, following this chapter). The PRB is a major source of coal for utilities in the United States and the large surface mines in the PRB currently produce around 470 million tons per year, making the PRB the largest coal producing region in the world.

Recently, questions have been raised about the PRB's viability as a long term fuel source for electrical power generation. To provide an independent assessment of this issue, Xcel Energy retained the services of John T. Boyd Company (BOYD) to provide expert opinions as to:

- The quantity and economic viability of the coal resources remaining in the PRB.
- Probable trends in mining costs in the PRB.
- Forecast prices for PRB coal.

By assignment this study addresses a 30 year timeframe (through 2040), and we have also provided comments regarding industry trends during and beyond the 30 year period which could affect the PRB. This study is completed on a desktop basis based on publically available information and our extensive knowledge of the PRB mines and markets. Our review of the literature regarding the PRB also identified two key concepts which are important to understanding the long term future of the PRB:

- **Reserves and Resources**. The terms "reserves" and "resources" are often used interchangeably. However, in the industry, and more importantly for financial reporting purposes, the terms are not synonymous and are understood to reflect differing levels of assurance and economic viability. Under currently accepted definitions "resources" generally include all of the coal in a specific deposit which, in consideration of technical and legal constraints can reasonably be considered recoverable. "Reserves" are the portion of those resources that have been adequately explored and that can be mined and marketed economically at the time the estimate is made. Any "reserve" estimate is not a static value, rather it is essentially a "snapshot" subject to change over time. For purposes of this report, we have used the broader term "resources" to characterize the recoverable coal available in the PRB recognizing that the term "reserves" is not appropriate when assessing a 30 year timeframe.
- **Long Term Mining and Cost Trends**. When possible, mining companies generally produce the most economical coal first, deferring the more expensive resources for

the future. Thus, as a coal basin matures, and the more expensive resources are mined, overall costs increase. This is the case in the PRB, particularly in the Gillette area. In that coalfield the coal seams dip gradually to the west, thus increasing the depth at which the seams are buried. The mines, which were developed initially along the eastern edge of the coalfield, therefore experience increasing overburden depths as they progress to the west. Overburden removal is the major driver of costs, thus the increase in overburden depth puts upward pressure on costs throughout the basin.

Certain environmental interests have opposed coal development in the PRB, both politically and legally. While BOYD's view is that this opposition can generally be accommodated, that cannot be assured. This study is based on the assumption that the various laws and regulations governing coal leasing, mine permitting, health, safety and transportation, and the enforcement of those laws and regulations will effectively continue as they are today. Major changes in the legal/regulatory framework could affect our conclusions.

Primary sources of public information utilized in this study include the following:

- Mining Permit Applications (from the Office of Surface Mining).
- United States Geological Survey (USGS) publications.
- Bureau of Land Management maps and data.
- Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) data.
- Annual Reports and 10-K filings for producers and consumers of PRB coal.
- Coal Industry Periodicals including Argus Coal Daily, Argus Coal Weekly, Platts Coal Trader, Platts Coal Outlook, Platts Coal Trader International, International Longwall News, Coal Age, Coal Transporter, etc.
- Environmental Impact Statements associated with various proposed activities in the PRB region.

We have relied upon the information from these public sources as being accurate within the reasonable limits of the data available and depth of study. Our analysis is performed on a mine by mine basis and accumulated to define basin-wide trends. While site-specific mining conditions and/or operating practices may result in variations between a specific mine's actual performance versus the estimates shown herein, our methodology and assumptions provide a reasonable basis for estimates and forecasts for the PRB industry as a whole. Price forecasts address the three major product types of PRB coal, those being Wyoming 8,800 Btu/Lb, Wyoming 8,400 Btu/Lb, and Montana 8,600 Btu/Lb (Absaloka) coal. All price and cost forecasts are expressed in constant value 2011 dollars.

This report is prepared for the use of Xcel Energy to enhance the understanding of PRB coal resources, production costs and price trends. The findings and conclusions presented herein represent the independent professional opinions of BOYD based on our review of the available data. Although we believe the findings and conclusions are reasonable and consistent with accepted standards for such studies, we do not warrant this report in any manner, express or implied.

Following this page is Figure 1.1, Regional Location Map, Powder River Basin, Southeastern Montana & Northeastern Wyoming.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN T. BOYD COMPANY
By:

Lee A. Miller
Senior Mining Engineer

Richard L. Bate
Vice President

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

FIGURE 1.1

REGIONAL LOCATION MAP

POWDER RIVER BASIN

Southeastern Montana & Northeastern Wyoming

Prepared For

XCEL ENERGY

John T. Boyd Company

September 2011
Scale As Shown

K:\Projects\3155.001 Xcel Energy...\PLD\Figure 1.1.dwg

2.0 SUMMARIZED FINDINGS

The major findings and conclusions of BOYD's study are summarized in this chapter. These summary points are supported by and expanded upon in the text, tables and figures in the subsequent chapters of this report.

2.1 PRB Coal Resources

The Powder River Basin (PRB) is located in northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana, extending roughly 300 miles north-south by 100 miles east-west. The geology of the PRB is relatively simple with generally flat-lying, thick coal seams situated close to the surface so as to make production economically viable by high production surface mining methods. The coals are subbituminous in rank with low ash, low sulfur and thermal content in the range of 8,200 to 9,400 Btu/Lb.

2.1.1 Land Tenure

The United States is the dominant owner of coal rights in the PRB, and coal rights leased from the federal government are the core reserve holding of most mines. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) leases the coal competitively, primarily using a Lease by Application (LBA) process. BLM has historically leased coal at approximately the rate it is mined. This allows the operating mines to control resources to support between 10 and 20 years of operation, a sufficient amount to justify necessary investment and planning. Overall, the most important issue relative to obtaining the right to mine future resources is the availability of federal coal for leasing. Our review indicates that, for the 30 year study period of this report (and well beyond), and so long as the current BLM policy remains in-place, availability of federal coal leases in the PRB should be adequate to meet projected demand.

2.1.2 PRB Coal Resource Estimates

Numerous assessments have been conducted over the years to quantify the "Reserves" or "Resources" available in the PRB. In this study we have addressed PRB coal resources from the standpoint of the available supply of coal for use as fuel for electrical generation – coal which would be considered a "Resource", but not necessarily a "Reserve". For purposes of this report "viable resources" are defined as the recoverable coal tonnage that is or could reasonably be expected to become technically and legally mineable, and which is economic today or could reasonably be expected to become economic within the 30 year timeframe of this study.

Our review indicates that most PRB production within the timeframe of this study will come from existing mines, with a relatively small amount coming from new mine development. The existing mines will progress into new mining areas, and will experience gradually less favorable conditions and modestly increasing costs. Our assessment of the viable resources available to these mines focuses on three categories:

- Permitted Resources. Includes resources that are permitted and/or reported in financial filings. These resources are typically well explored, permitted for mining, and committed to a specific mine plan.
- LBA Resources. Includes resources that are controlled but are not permitted or reported in financial filings, and resources on identified tracts that have been applied for via the LBA process and are considered likely to be leased.
- Future Resources. Includes resources on lands that are within a particular mine's area of interest, are accessible from the existing operation, and which could logically be incorporated into future plans for the mine.

Our estimate of viable coal resources available for the PRB mines is summarized:

	Coal Resources (Millions of Tons)			
Mine	Permitted	LBAs	Future	Total
Antelope	252.0	406.6	479.0	1,137.6
North Antelope/Rochelle	723.0	1,179.0	1,535.0	3,437.0
School Creek	762.0	0.0	279.0	1,041.0
Black Thunder	1,256.4	1,988.4	1,944.6	5,189.4
Coal Creek	198.0	56.0	224.0	478.0
Cordero Rojo	190.1	776.7	701.5	1,668.3
Belle Ayr	155.0	0.0	745.0	900.0
Caballo	235.2	221.7	598.0	1,054.9
Wyodak	261.9	0.0	0.0	261.9
Dry Fork	110.9	0.0	0.0	110.9
Eagle Butte	425.0	0.0	398.0	823.0
Rawhide	329.7	0.0	1,448.0	1,777.7
Buckskin	280.7	52.0	1,202.0	1,534.7
Decker	12.0	0.0	0.0	12.0
Spring Creek	329.0	0.0	271.0	600.0
Absaloka	49.8	0.0	130.2	180.0
Rosebud	202.0	0.0	158.0	360.0
Totals	5,772.7	4,680.4	10,113.3	20,566.4

Coal Resource estimates are as of December 31, 2010.

As shown, the available viable resources total about 20.6 billion tons, an amount that is more than adequate to meet the anticipated coal demand over the 30 year period of this study. Extensive additional resources exist to support both new mine development and for mine life extension beyond the study period.

Throughout the history of the PRB, mine expansion and new mine development have been driven by market demand and accessibility to rail transportation. Availability of resources for mining has rarely, if ever, been a significant impediment. In BOYD's opinion, this will continue to be the case. The PRB has sufficient recoverable coal resources to meet even the most aggressive demand levels for the foreseeable future.

2.2 PRB Mines – Production and Costs

There are sixteen existing mines in the PRB – twelve in Wyoming and four in Montana. The majority of the large PRB coal mines, accounting for over 90% of production, are located in the Gillette Coalfield portion of the PRB. The Gillette-area producers are commonly divided into two groups based on coal quality; those in the southern portion of the coalfield producing an 8,800-Btu/Lb coal and the northern mines producing an 8,400-Btu/Lb coal.

2.2.1 Projected PRB Production

Production in the PRB is driven primarily by market demand, and to the extent the producers in the basin have not met that demand, it has been by a small margin and temporary. Past production and BOYD's projections of demand, and therefore production, in the PRB are illustrated below:



As shown, we expect that over the long term demand will continue to increase, but at a slower pace than has been the case historically. Our forecast has demand reaching approximately 685 million tons per year by 2040, with capacity in the range of 700 million tons.

The future production will come primarily from the existing mines with a relatively small component from new mines in the future years. Current and projected coal production from the existing and potential new mines is summarized below.

	Annual Coal Production (million tons)			
	2011	2020	2030	2040
Montana Mines:				
Rosebud	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0
Absaloka	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Spring Creek	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
Decker	3.0	-	-	-
Subtotal	41.0	38.0	38.0	38.0
Existing Wyoming “8,400 Btu/Lb” Mines:				
Buckskin	25.0	25.0	30.0	45.0
Rawhide	14.5	25.0	30.0	45.0
Eagle Butte	25.0	25.0	25.0	-
Dry Fork	5.5	5.5	5.5	-
Wyodak	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
Caballo	25.0	25.0	34.0	40.0
Belle Ayr	25.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
Cordero Rojo	40.0	40.0	40.0	50.0
Coal Creek	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Subtotal	181.0	186.5	205.5	221.0
Existing Wyoming “8,800 Btu/Lb” Mines:				
Black Thunder	122.0	125.0	135.0	165.0
North Antelope Rochelle	105.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Antelope	36.0	28.0	28.0	24.0
Subtotal	263.0	253.0	263.0	289.0
Undeveloped Properties:				
School Creek	-	30.0	30.0	35.0
Otter Creek	-	18.0	34.9	34.9
Youngs Creek	-	2.0	15.0	15.0
Others	-	-	4.3	52.6
Subtotal	-	50.0	84.2	137.5
Total PRB Production	485.0	524.4	590.7	685.5

2.2.2 Production Costs

Projected production costs for each existing and potential new mine were estimated considering the individual mine’s production levels, geologic conditions, mining methods, labor force productivities, coal haul distances, and coal ownership (federal, state, private). The total estimated production cost includes all mining costs, overheads, royalties, production taxes, property taxes and insurance, to arrive at a total cost loaded into the railcar.

Typically as a coal basin matures, mining proceeds from the most favorable to less favorable resources, a trend which puts upward pressure on costs. Generally speaking, this is the case in the PRB, particularly in the Gillette area where the mines are progressing from shallower, less expensive resources on the eastern edge of the basin to more deeply buried and thus more costly resources to the west. In addition, civil features (roads, railroads, etc.) and increasing coal haul distances will tend to increase costs. This increase will occur very slowly due to the nature of the deposit and scale of operations. BOYD's forecasts of average mining costs, shown on the nearby graph indicate a modest increase of ± 1% per year in real terms from about $10/ton (constant 2011 dollars) to about $15/ton in 2040.



2.3 PRB Markets and Prices

PRB coal is marketed across the United States due to its favorable quality characteristics – notably low sulfur – and relatively low price. PRB coal is the most widely consumed coal in the U.S., supplying approximately 43% of total U.S. production on a tonnage basis. Significant production began in the late 1970s, and since that time the PRB has become a large, reliable, competitive and relatively stable fuel supply source for electrical generation, and is the dominant player in coal markets across most of the United States. BOYD projects PRB coal demand to continue to increase over the timeframe of this study albeit at a slower rate than experienced historically, to around 685 million tons per year in 2040.

PRB coal prices are fundamentally driven by coal production cost. Market imbalances which might potentially lead to higher prices – such as a sharp increase in demand or a production shortfall – have occurred, but not frequently. There are occasions when PRB coal prices have "spiked" for a short period of time; usually due to a brief disruption in coal supply – e.g., railroad problems, pit flooding, or extreme weather events (snow).

Oftentimes these events are so short lived that there is little or no impact on coal prices, largely because a large portion of the coal is sold under multi-year contracts at set prices[1].

This study develops long term price forecasts for three different types of PRB coal – Gillette 8,400 and 8,800 Btu/Lb products, and a typical Montana product. The projected prices (FOB Mine in constant value 2011 dollars) for these coal types over the 30 year study period are:



The projected coal sales prices for the three coal products are summarized at five-year intervals in the table below.

Year	Projected Coal Sales Price ($/Ton) 8,400 Btu/Lb	8,800 Btu/Lb	Montana
2011	11.50	14.00	14.75
2015	11.75	14.20	15.00
2020	13.60	16.20	16.80
2025	14.20	16.90	17.50
2030	15.80	17.80	18.80
2035	16.60	19.00	19.40
2040	17.50	19.50	19.90

Projected coal sales prices are stated in constant value 2011 dollars.

[1] For purposes of this report "market prices" are defined as the price that would be negotiated, at the relevant time, between a knowledgeable buyer and reliable seller for substantial quantities of coal to be delivered over a multi-year future period. As used herein "price" is not necessarily the same as a spot price, a forward market price, or prices that would reflect a distressed situation on the part of either buyer or seller.

As shown, we project a relatively steady increase in prices throughout the forecast period albeit at a rate that is below historic norms. Note that our forecast is intended as a long term projection – there will almost certainly be variations from the forecast due to shorter term factors that could significantly impact prices.

Overall, our evaluation of future mine costs and projection of long term price trends indicates that while prices for PRB coal will increase in real terms, that increase will not be at the pace of the past decade, and buyers will not experience large price increases due to resource shortages within the timeframe of this study.

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3.0 POWDER RIVER BASIN COAL RESOURCES

3.1 Introduction

The Powder River Basin (PRB) of Wyoming and Montana is, in terms of production, the largest coal mining region in the world, and is widely viewed as holding sufficient resources to support production for the foreseeable future. Many estimates of PRB coal resources have been made since the first geological studies in the early 1900s. These estimates were developed for various purposes, often incorporated differing estimating parameters, and may or may not have been based on adequate geological data. As such, the resulting estimates of available coal resources varied considerably from study to study.

This chapter describes the geological setting of the PRB, provides background on land ownership issues, summarizes various studies of the quality and quantity of PRB resources, and provides estimates of identified resources within the logical mining advance areas of the existing and planned mines.

3.2 PRB Geology

The PRB extends roughly 300 miles north-south by 100 miles east-west, spanning large portions of northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana. The coal bearing rocks in the basin occur in the Cretaceous age Ft Union Formation which is over 2,000 ft thick, and contains aggregate coal thicknesses of nearly 400 ft in up to 12 seams.

The Wyoming portion of the basin is part of a broad asymmetrical syncline with relatively shallow dips along the eastern boundary, and steeply inclined strata adjacent to the Bighorn Mountains on the West. The coal seam of primary interest is the Wyodak-Anderson (or Roland) which is relatively thick (60 ft to 120 ft) and amenable to surface mining over large areas. The major mines are found in the Gillette Coalfield and account for over 90% of PRB production. In the Gillette area, mining began along the outcrop of the Wyodak-Anderson on the east, and has gradually progressed into deeper cover to the west.

The Gillette-area producers are loosely divided into “Southern” mines and “Northern” mines. This division is based on coal quality with the “Southern” mines nominally producing 8,800-Btu/Lb coal and the “Northern” mines producing 8,400-Btu/Lb coal. The “Southern” mines include the three southernmost operations in the PRB (Black Thunder, North Antelope/Rochelle, and Antelope). These mines alone currently produce around 60% of total PRB output, and are major players in PRB coal markets. It should also be noted that the actual quality at any one mine will likely vary from the 8,800-Btu/Lb and 8,400-Btu/Lb values, and other factors such as sulfur content are important from a market perspective.

In the Montana portion of the basin, the Fort Union Formation strata dip very gradually to the southeast, but are essentially flat lying over large areas. Some faulting is present although it tends to be fairly widely spaced and is not a major impediment to mining. The coal seams of interest mainly occur in the Tongue River Member, and while some are correlative with the Wyodak-Anderson Zone, the strata often split, resulting in multiple seams which, while still relatively thick, are not in the 100 ft range found near Gillette.

There are two primary producing areas in the Montana portion of the PRB, the Sheridan (or Decker) Coalfield and the Colstrip Field. Two mines are operating in the Sheridan Coalfield producing a higher heat value coal (± 9,300-Btu/Lb), while two other mines operate in the Colstrip Field producing an approximate 8,600-Btu/Lb product. A third area in Montana, the Ashland Field is in the early stages of development. Coal resources extend well beyond these areas, but have not been the focus of exploration or development efforts.

All coal currently produced in the PRB is classified as subbituminous. The most important quality parameters relate to thermal content (measured as Btu/Lb) and sulfur, with sodium as a concern in certain areas. Typically the thermal content is in the range of 8,200 to 9,400 Btu/Lb although some mines produce a lower or higher Btu product. PRB coals tend to be low in sulfur, typically in the 0.5% range and some of the coal produced from the area south of Gillette or available in the Ashland area is a very low sulfur product in the range of 0.3% sulfur. Sodium in ash (which can be problematic in utility boilers) is typically in the 1% – 2% range, but can exceed 5% in some of the Montana regions.

3.3 Land and Mineral Ownership

Mineral rights (including coal) ownership in much of the Powder River region is, as elsewhere in the western U.S., often severed from the surface ownership. The United States is the dominant mineral owner in the PRB, and those mineral rights can only be leased, not purchased. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) controls federal leasing activities and most of the resource availability in the PRB is dictated by BLM land management policy.

Federally owned coal rights in the PRB are leased competitively, primarily using a Lease by Application (LBA) process. With an LBA, a proponent (usually a coal producer) nominates a particular tract for leasing. The BLM evaluates the tract, perhaps modifying its boundaries, and determines whether it is suitable for leasing. Generally, some level of environmental assessment (EA or Environmental Impact Statement) with attendant public comment opportunities is required. If the tract is found suitable for leasing, BLM holds a sealed bid auction-type sale, allowing the original proponent, and any other interested, qualified party, to bid on the coal rights within that tract. Once the bids are received, BLM analyzes the high bid to assure that it meets “Fair Market Value”, and if so, the coal on that tract will be leased to the winning bidder. This process from nomination to leasing, can take five years (or more) to complete.

As a practical matter, most companies will attempt to define LBA tracts that, because of location or geometry, are of interest only to the nominating company. This minimizes competitive bidding on the tract, and may result in a lower cost lease. Where competition has existed for coal leases (mostly in the southern Gillette area but recently in the central portion of the coalfield) relatively high bonus bids in the range of $0.90 – $1.10/ton have resulted. BLM has, even in non-competitive cases, required “Fair Market Value” bids in this range, particularly in the Southern PRB. This is illustrated in the following summary of recently awarded coal leases:

Lease	Date	Tons (Millions)	Bonus Bid ($/Ton)
Wyoming			
NARO South	June 2004	297	0.92
NARO North	July 2004	325	0.92
Little Thunder	Sept. 2004	719	0.85
Hay Creek	Nov. 2004	143	0.30
West Antelope	Dec. 2004	195	0.75
West Roundup	Feb. 2005	327	0.97
Eagle Butte West	Feb. 2008	255	0.71
South Maysdorf	Apr. 2008	288	0.87
North Maysdorf	Jan. 2009	55	0.88
West Antelope II (N)	May 2011	350	0.85
West Antelope II (S)	June 2011	56	0.88
Belle Ayr North	July 2011	222	0.95
West Caballo	Aug. 2011	130	1.10
Montana			
Spring Creek Ext.	Apr. 2007	109	0.18

Portions of the Montana PRB coal deposits are located within the Crow and Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservations. These lands are also administered by the federal government (acting as trustee for the tribes), working in conjunction with Tribal authorities. The Absaloka Mine in Montana operates on Crow Tribal lands.

State owned land (mostly state school sections) and limited private lands are also interspersed among the federal ownership. Coal rights on these lands are leased, or purchased, separately, and lease terms may differ from the federal standard. While the federal government is the dominant owner of the coal rights, it is difficult but not impossible to assemble a logical mining unit without incorporating some federal or Indian lands. The proposed Youngs Creek Mine in the Sheridan Field is an example of a logical mining unit does not include federal coal rights.

Various environmental interests have recently threatened or filed lawsuits to force greater consideration of global climate issues and similar concerns in leasing decisions. While this has the potential to limit the resources available for leasing, there is strong bipartisan opposition, and it is considered more likely than not that leasing will continue more or less as at present into the foreseeable future.

Ownership of the surface rights in the PRB is primarily in private hands, although some state, federal or Indian surface occurs. Although the surface estate is usually severed from the minerals, the surface owner has, as a result of various laws and regulations governing coal mining, considerable influence over the mineral owner. For federal coal leasing purposes “surface owner consent” is required before the lease can be issued. Surface owners may also influence mine development activities via the permitting process. Often, but not always, operators have found it more effective to purchase the surface rights prior to undertaking leasing activities.

The BLM has historically pursued a practice of leasing coal at a rate approximately equal to the rate at which it is mined. Currently the BLM is considering leasing on at least nine tracts with an estimated four billion tons of coal resources:

LBA Property	Adjacent Mine	Application Date	Tons (Millions)
North Hilight Field	Black Thunder	Oct. 2005	325
South Hilight Field	Black Thunder	Oct. 2005	266
West Hilight Field	Black Thunder	Jan. 2006	440
West Coal Creek	Coal Creek	Feb. 2006	57
West Jacobs Ranch	Black Thunder	Mar. 2006	957
Hay Creek II	Buckskin	Mar 2006	52
Maysdorf II	Cordero Rojo	Aug. 2006	434
North & South Porcupine	North Antelope Rochelle	Sep. 2006	1,179
Belle Ayr West	Belle Ayr	Aug 2011	253
Total			3,963

It is likely that additional tracts are being evaluated by the various operating companies, but have not been nominated for leasing as yet. The leasing of the nine LBA properties identified above would allow the operating mines to control sufficient resources to support between 10 and 20 years of production, which is thought to be sufficient to justify necessary investment and planning. It is also important to consider that the PRB mining companies have limited incentive to control more than the 10 to 20 years of coal resources, for two primary reasons:

- Federal leases carry diligent development requirements such that if the lease is not combined into a “Logical Mining Unit” (LMU) or put into production within 10 years, the lease will be forfeited.
- The bonus bid is paid by the company “up-front” (actually over a 5 year period following lease issuance). The most recent bonus bids have now exceeded $1.00/ton, or in the most recent auction, over $140 million. It is financially challenging for even the largest mining companies to make such large up-front payments if the coal will not be mined for many years. Consequently, the companies must balance the need to control sufficient resources with the economic penalty of making the large up-front payment.

Overall, the most important issue relative to obtaining the right to mine future resources is the availability of federal coal leases. Our review indicates that, for reasonable planning horizons, and so long as the current BLM policy remains in-place, availability of federal leases in the PRB should be adequate for projected demand.

3.4 PRB Coal Resource Estimates

Estimates of resources in the PRB vary widely, and can be both conflicting and confusing. Two specific areas which are critical are technical/legal recoverability, and economic viability.

Several of the more broadly based estimates of coal resources are expressed as “in-place” tons without regard to technical or legal recoverability. In such cases the portion of the resource that is actually recoverable will be less, and sometimes only a small fraction of the in-place resource. Statements of in-place resources should be viewed as being indicative of the maximum potential tonnage that might be recoverable eventually, but not representative of the resources that could be recovered under current conditions using existing technologies.

As discussed previously, the terms “reserves” and “resources” are understood in the industry to reflect economic viability, although in many cases past studies used those terms more or less interchangeably. Over the last decade the difference between “reserves” and “resources” has become increasingly important, primarily due to financial reporting regulations. Under currently accepted definitions “resources” generally include all of the coal in a specific deposit which, in consideration of technical and legal constraints can reasonably be considered recoverable. “Reserves” are the portion of those resources that have been explored to the point that the estimated tonnages are “demonstrated” and that can be mined and marketed economically at the time the estimate is made, essentially resulting in a “snapshot” at that time. Because exploration is going on constantly, and market factors (primarily prices) change over time “reserve” tonnages may also change – coal that might not be considered “reserves” this year may qualify as “reserves” next year.

This study addresses the PRB resources from the standpoint of the available supply of coal for use as fuel for electrical generation. Because fuel planning is necessarily a long term issue, and most coal is purchased under term contracts at set prices, our focus is on the coal that is in known deposits, is legally and technically available, or likely to become available for mining, within reasonable limits of economic viability – i.e., “resources”. Some or all of those resources may or may not qualify as “reserves” at the present time. For that reason this report addresses “viable resources” defined as the recoverable (as opposed to in-place) coal tonnage that is, or could reasonably be expected to become technically and legally mineable, and which is economic today or could reasonably be expected to become economic within the 30 year timeframe of this study.

As discussed in Section 3.5, BOYD bases the assessment of available resources on site specific mine level analyses. However, it is helpful to view those estimates in the larger context of the total PRB resource. Basin-wide geological studies of the PRB have varied widely in estimates of coal resources, with some approaching 2 trillion tons and others arriving at substantially lower totals. Several recently published studies have provided important insights into these PRB coal resource estimates. The first of these, prepared in 1999 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) as part of its National Coal Resource Assessment (NCRA) effort, addressed coal resources within three specific planning areas which include the majority of coal lands in the PRB. Resources were defined as coal in seams greater than 2.5 ft in thickness, and less than 2,000 ft in depth. These estimated resources total over 500 billion in-place tons as summarized:

State/County	Resources (Tons-Millions)
Wyoming	
Campbell	280,000
Converse	15,000
Johnson	160,000
Sheridan	52,000
Subtotal	507,000
Montana	
Powder River	22,200
Rosebud	4,700
Big Horn	4,200
Treasure	1,300
Subtotal	32,400
Total Resources	539,400

The estimates above do not include coal occurring on non-federal acreage, or on Indian lands in Montana. Those additional resources are very loosely estimated to be in the range of 80 billion tons. Thus, one might impute an order of magnitude estimate of ± 620 billion in-place resource tons in the PRB.

A second study was published in late 2007 by the U.S. Departments of Energy, Agriculture and Interior. This study addressed the federally owned coal in the PRB, and attempted to determine the portion that would be available for leasing for coal development. This study found that only about 5% of the federally owned coal land was actually available for leasing. However, the bulk of the rest of the coal resources were considered unavailable because land use planning had not been completed (70%), or because surface owner consent had not been obtained (14%). Only about 10% was unleaseable due to environmental or legal restrictions. Extrapolating this to the 620 billion ton estimate, something on the order of 560 billion tons of resources could be legally available for mining pending land use evaluations and obtaining requisite surface and mineral rights.

An important implication of this study is that the vast majority of coal resource areas in the PRB have never been explored or evaluated for development (and thus had not been the subject of land use planning efforts), but are available for possible future mining.

Several more detailed studies have recently become available from the USGS that are focused on specific coal producing areas. These include:

- USGS Open-File Report 2008-1202 – *"Assessment of Coal Geology, Resources, and Reserves in the Gillette Coalfield, Powder River Basin, Wyoming"*
- USGS Professional Paper 1625-A – *"Ashland Coalfield: Powder River Basin, Montana: Geology, Coal Quality and Coal Resources"*
- USGS Professional Paper 1625-A – *"Colstrip Coalfield: Powder River Basin, Montana: Geology, Coal Quality and Coal Resources"*
- USGS Professional Paper 1625-A – *"Decker Coalfield: Powder River Basin, Montana: Geology, Coal Quality and Coal Resources"*

These reports have estimated a combined 141 billion tons of coal resources within the Gillette, Ashland, Colstrip and Decker coalfields. Although the PRB resources are much more extensive than just these four coalfields they are generally considered the most favorable mining regions in the PRB.

The entire 141 billion tons of coal resources would not be economically viable at today's prices for coal, but much of the total could reasonably be expected to become economically viable over the 30-year timeframe of this study.

To provide an indication of the magnitude of the viable resource that is available to supply utility coal markets we have estimated a subset of the 141 billion tons based on economic and recoverability criteria as follows:

PRB Region	Coal Resources (Million tons)	Viable Resources (Million tons)
Gillette Coalfield	77,000	33,878
Ashland Coalfield	6,000	1,921
Colstrip Coalfield	13,000	427
Decker Coalfield	45,000	6,937
Total	141,000	43,163

Gillette Coalfield coal resources were estimated by the USGS in 2008.

Ashland, Colstrip & Decker Coalfield coal resources were estimated by the USGS in 1999.

Viable Resources are defined as follows:

Gillette Coalfield - Produced at less than $20/ton.
Ashland and Decker Coalfields - measured and indicated resources, < 200 ft OB, >40 ft Coal
Colstrip Coalfield – measured and indicated resources, < 150 ft OB, >20 ft Coal, excludes coal within the mine areas.

The viable resources of 43.2 billion tons would be sufficient to supply the PRB coal market for 91 years at the current production rate of 470 million tons per year. At higher production rates (which are expected), the viable resources would be depleted sooner. However, even if the production rate increased well beyond any current forecast, these resources are still sufficient to provide fuel for the life of existing power plants and beyond.

The study addressing the Gillette Coalfield (USGS Open-File Report 2008-1202) is important not only because the Gillette Coalfield is the largest production source in the PRB, but because the study imposes specific operational and economic constraints on the resources to arrive at an estimate of the then (2007) economically recoverable reserves in the coalfield. The study estimated the original in-place coal resource in just the Gillette Field at over 200 billion tons, with the technically and legally recoverable portion of that in-place figure, as shown above totaling about 77 billion tons (maximum stripping ratio [2] of 10 BCY/ton and deducting mining and processing losses). Economic analyses, based on a coal price of $10.47/ton and an 8% after-tax return on investment, concluded that approximately 10 billion tons or about 6% of the original in-place

[2] Stripping Ratio is defined as the amount of overburden which must be removed, measured in bank cubic yards (BCY), to expose a ton of recoverable coal. Because overburden removal is the largest cost factor in surface mining, the ratio of overburden to coal is a key economic indicator.

resource would be economically recoverable as of 2007. BOYD, as noted above, estimates an additional 24 billion tons, for a total of 34 billion tons would reasonably be expected to be economically viable over the timeframe of this study.

While this USGS analysis, and the conclusion that only 6% of the original in-place resource is economically recoverable, has been widely quoted, it may wrongly give the impression that coal resources in the Gillette Field are more limited than is truly the case. Even by this relatively conservative analysis, the available economically recoverable reserve is still quite large, exceeding 20 years production at current rates. Furthermore, the USGS study recognizes that the reserve estimate is based on a single point in time and provides a “cost curve” to allow assessment of the economically recoverable reserve at various pricing levels. That curve is reproduced below:



As shown, as the price increases, the “reserve” total increases significantly. At $14/ton, approximately 18.5 billion tons are estimated to be economically viable, and at $20/ton approximately 38 billion tons would be viable. This compares to the 34 billion tons at $20/ton estimated by BOYD (above) as viable resources in the Gillette Field.

The important point of the USGS study and other evaluations is that in an overall context, the cost curve for the PRB is relatively “flat”, meaning that small changes in price (or costs) can have major impacts on the magnitude of the economically recoverable resource.

3.5 Coal Resources at Existing Mines

Reliable evaluation of available resources in the PRB requires analyzing each operating or potential mine individually to assess the resources that could logically be recovered by that mine. Over the 30 year timeframe of this study, most production will come from the existing PRB mines which can be expected to expand production capacity as demand for PRB coal increases. Thus risks associated with new mine development are minimal in the context of the overall supply. New supply sources will be developed, but only when they can compete economically with the existing mines, and when transportation infrastructure is extended into more remote parts of the PRB.

Several sources of information were used to evaluate the coal resources at the existing PRB mines, including:

- Mining Permit Application data
- Bureau of Land Management (BLM) information regarding federal coal leases and Lease By Application (LBA) tracts
- Annual Reports and 10-K Reports from the various mining companies
- Environmental Impact Statements
- USGS coal resource studies
- Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology studies

The resource estimates derived from these and other sources generally fall into three categories:

- <u>Permitted Resources</u>. Includes resources that are permitted and/or reported in financial filings. These resources are typically well explored, permitted for mining, and committed to a specific mine plan. Permitted resources must be controlled, typically via a federal lease, and the mining company must have the legal right to mine those tonnages. Resource tonnage estimates as reflected in permit documents and financial filings are considered very reliable.
- <u>LBA Resources</u>. Includes resources in two categories reflecting coal rights control:
    - Resources that are controlled (i.e., leased) by the operating company, but are not permitted or reported in financial filings and;
    - Resources in federally owned tracts that have been applied for via the LBA process and are considered likely to be leased.

  Estimates of resources in this category are relatively reliable because the LBA process requires adequate exploration and evaluation of the tract. However, resources in this category may not be controlled, and would typically not be permitted.

- Future Resources. Includes resources on lands that are generally within a particular mine's area of interest, and which could logically be incorporated into future plans for the mine. These resources are not controlled by the mining company, and estimates of resource quantities are typically less reliable than for permitted or LBA resources. However, the estimates are computed based on data from the USGS Open-File Report 2008-1202 which is comprehensive and considered adequately reliable. Future resources are evaluated in this study only to the extent necessary to sustain the mines through the 30 year study period – extensive additional "future resources" exist.

The estimated coal resources for the existing PRB mines based on the information discussed above are discussed in detail for each mine in Chapter 4 of this report. The estimates are summarized by category in the table below. The locations of these mines are shown on Exhibit 1, following this report.

	Coal Resources (Millions of Tons)			
Mine	Permitted	LBAs	Future	Total
Antelope	252.0	406.6	479.0	1,137.6
North Antelope/Rochelle	723.0	1,179.0	1,535.0	3,437.0
School Creek	762.0	0.0	279.0	1,041.0
Black Thunder	1,256.4	1,988.4	1,944.6	5,189.4
Coal Creek	198.0	56.0	224.0	478.0
Cordero Rojo	190.1	776.7	701.5	1,668.3
Belle Ayr	155.0	0.0	745.0	900.0
Caballo	235.2	221.7	598.0	1,054.9
Wyodak	261.9	0.0	0.0	261.9
Dry Fork	110.9	0.0	0.0	110.9
Eagle Butte	425.0	0.0	398.0	823.0
Rawhide	329.7	0.0	1,448.0	1,777.7
Buckskin	280.7	52.0	1,202.0	1,534.7
Decker	12.0	0.0	0.0	12.0
Spring Creek	329.0	0.0	271.0	600.0
Absaloka	49.8	0.0	130.2	180.0
Rosebud	202.0	0.0	158.0	360.0
Totals	5,772.7	4,680.4	10,113.3	20,566.4

Coal Resource estimates are as of December 31, 2010.

As shown, the existing mines effectively control about 10.5 billion tons of coal resources. The identified Future Resources total about 10.1 billion tons, bringing the total to about 20.6 billion tons. Of this, some 1.2 billion tons are in the Montana portion of the basin, with the balance – 19.4 billion tons being in the Gillette Coalfield. That resource is sufficient to allow the mines to meet projected demand over the 30 year study period addressed in this report. Note also that the 19.4 billion tons available in the Gillette Field approximates the resources shown on the USGS cost curve at approximately a $14/ton price – a level comparable with current prices.

It should be emphasized that throughout the PRB the available resources are much more extensive than is required to meet demand over the 30 year period of this study. As discussed above, the viable resources in the PRB could readily double the amount shown at reasonably foreseeable prices and without major additions to transportation infrastructure.

3.6 New Mine Development

Most of the PRB coal produced over the next 30 years will come from existing mines. New mines will be developed but only when they can compete economically with the existing mines and when transportation infrastructure is extended into more remote parts of the PRB. New mines that have good development potential include:

- Otter Creek. The Otter Creek property is located in the Ashland Field with coal occurring primarily in the Knobloch Seam. The coal is typical of PRB in terms of quality but is high in sodium. The property is controlled by Arch Coal Inc. via leases with the State of Montana and Great Northern Properties. Resources are reported to total 1.3 billion tons at stripping ratios in the range of 3 BCY/ton. Coal quality is in the range of 8,600 Btu/lb and 0.3% sulfur. Arch has announced its plans to develop the Otter Creek tracts to serve export markets.

  Development in the Otter Creek area will require construction of the Tongue River Railroad, which is permitted but not yet built. This railroad would likely provide access to additional resources in the same coal formations that exist south along the Tongue River as well as north and west onto the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation.

- Decker, Montana region. The existing Decker Mine is approaching depletion. As that mine tapers off, a new mine may be developed to fill that production void. Some of the more prominent new mine projects are the CX Ranch Mine which was delineated and designed more than 20 years ago, and the Youngs Creek Mine. The Youngs Creek Mine, a joint venture of Consol Energy and Chevron Mining is planned for production of up to 15 million tons per year, with quality in the range of 9,350 Btu/Lb and 0.5% sulfur. Early stage efforts to secure permits for the project have been underway for some time. There are also extensive coal resources on the Crow Indian Reservation in the Decker area that could be developed in one or more new mines.

- North of Gillette, Wyoming. The Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) Railway presently extends north of Gillette as far as the Buckskin Mine. The outcrop of the Wyodak-Anderson Seam; however, extends north and west of the Buckskin Mine for some distance. Potential coal leases have been identified in this area in the past, including the Calf Creek, Rock Pile and Wild Cat tracts. An incremental extension of the railroad extension would open these mines for development.

- Buffalo, Wyoming region. Very large, low cost coal resources exist in the vicinity of Lake DeSmet in Johnson County, Wyoming. These resources were delineated by Texaco in the early 1970s. The coal is poorer quality than elsewhere in the PRB

(±6,200 Btu/Lb, 23% ash and 0.55% sulfur) but would be ideal for a large coal-to-liquid (gasoline or diesel) facility. It is currently being studied for that application.

In the more distant future – beyond 2040 – other properties and areas of the PRB may be developed. Those areas may include the following:

- Between the Wyodak and Caballo mines. In this area the coal seams tend to split into multiple seams and the coal quality is poorer (lower Btu/Lb, higher ash and higher sulfur).
- Between the Black Thunder and Coal Creek mines. In the past, the Kintz Creek and Keeline federal coal properties were delineated but either were never leased (Kintz Creek) or the lease was relinquished (Keeline). The coal seams tend to split in this area resulting in somewhat higher mining costs.
- Western Flank of the PRB. The Glenrock Mine was located on the western flank of the PRB and had been the fuel source for the Dave Johnson power plant for many years. As the mine advanced into higher strip ratio areas, it became less economic and coal was purchased from mines in the Gillette area. Transportation infrastructure would have to be developed along the western flank of the basin to provide access to coal markets.
- Underground Coal Production. The USGS Study of the Gillette Coalfield estimated 77 billion tons of coal resources. The production costs corresponding to those resources ranged between $6/ton and $60/ton assuming the coal is produced by surface mining methods. It is common for surface mines to transition to underground mining methods when surface mining becomes more costly than underground mining the same deposit. At production costs around $30/ton, it would likely become more economic to produce coal by underground methods than surface methods. As a consequence, PRB production costs could effectively be capped around $30/ton regardless of increasing strip ratio. This production cost cap would exist not only in the Gillette Coalfield but throughout the PRB, and thus allow production from the many billions of tons of deeper coal resources throughout the PRB.

Throughout the history of the PRB new mine development has been driven by market demand and accessibility to rail transportation. Availability of resources for mining has rarely, if ever, been more than a temporary impediment. In BOYD's opinion this continues to be the case. The PRB has sufficient recoverable coal resources to meet even the most aggressive demand levels for the foreseeable future.

4.0 POWDER RIVER BASIN OPERATIONS AND COSTS

4.1 Introduction

There are 16 existing PRB mines which currently produce around 470 million tons per year. This chapter provides a description of each existing mine and potential new mines that may come on line over the next 30 years. The assessment of each mine describes the resources available to that mine, and develops estimates of future operating costs, emphasizing the key cost drivers that are specific to that mine.

Xcel also requested BOYD provide comments regarding future trends (beyond 2040) in the PRB. That assessment of long term future trends is provided in Section 4.6 of this chapter.

4.2 PRB Mine Cost Model

Production costs for existing and new PRB mines were estimated using BOYD's proprietary PRB surface mine cost model. The cost model provides estimates of the coal production costs through to loading coal in the railcar or in the case of Wyodak and Rosebud for delivery to nearby generating stations. The production costs estimated include all direct operating costs, royalties, taxes, overhead and non-cash costs such as depreciation, depletion and amortization.

The primary cost drivers in the model include the following:

- Annual coal production (tons per year)
- Strip ratio (Prime Bank Cubic Yards of waste per ton of coal produced)
- Average coal seam thickness (feet)
- Annual disturbance area (acres)
- Average topsoil depth (feet)
- Percent of overburden removed with draglines
- Estimated dragline rehandle (% of dragline overburden excluding cast blast benefit)
- Percent of overburden removed with trucks and shovels
- Percent of overburden cast blasted
- Cast blast powder factor (Lbs of explosives per BCY of overburden)
- Cast blast benefit (% to final placement)

- Percent of overburden fragmented with conventional blasting
- Conventional blasting powder factor (Lbs of explosives per BCY of overburden)
- Percent of overburden not blasted
- Coal blasting powder factor (Lbs of explosive per ton of coal)
- Coal truck haul distance (one-way distance in miles)
- Coal conveying distance (miles)
- Labor force productivity (measured in “equivalent mining units” – EMUs which are defined as BCY of overburden plus tons of coal per employee-hour)
- Federal coal production (% of total coal production)
- State coal production (% of total coal production)
- Private land (Fee coal) coal production (% of total production)

The major cost drivers focus on the key mining functions or processes within a surface mine which include the following:

- Topsoil salvage and replacement
- Overburden drilling and blasting
- Overburden removal (by dragline, truck/shovel)
- Coal drilling and blasting
- Coal loading and hauling
- Mine support operations
- Coal processing (crushing, handling, storage and loadout)
- Land reclamation

The key mining function or process costs are estimated by multiplying the various annual production quantities by their associated unit costs ($/BCY, $/ton, $/acre). General maintenance costs and General and Administrative costs are added to the functional costs. The cost model also includes a Mine Closing Accrual which amounts to a $/ton cost that is accrued over the life of the mine to cover the costs of reclaiming the final pit and removing the mine facilities and infrastructure.

Royalties, production taxes, and estimated property taxes and insurance are added to the mining cost as summarized below.

- Federal royalty – 12.5% of realization
- Montana state royalty – 12.5% of realization

- Wyoming state royalty – 8.0% of realization
- Private land royalties – 8.0% of realization
- Coal workers Pneumoconiosis (Black Lung) excise tax – 4.4% of realization up to maximum $0.55/ton
- Abandoned Mine Lands (AML) reclamation fee – $0.315/ton (2011 and 2012), $0.28/ton (2013 – 2021) and $0.35/ton (2022 and thereafter)
- Wyoming severance and gross proceeds taxes – 13.0% of realization (less royalties and processing costs)
- Montana gross proceeds tax – 5.0% of realization
- Montana severance taxes – 15.0% of realization (less Black lung tax less AML fee less royalties less gross proceeds tax plus $0.15/ton)
- Montana resource indemnity trust tax (RITT) – 0.4% of realization
- Property taxes – estimated at 1.0% of asset value per year
- Insurance – estimated at 0.5% of asset value per year

Initial, replacement and sustaining capital investment in the mines is recognized through addition of a $/ton depreciation cost. Federal bonus bid expenditures have been included as a $/ton depletion cost rather than as lump sum payments in the five years following award of the federal lease.

The individual costs described above are summed to a total mine production cost.

4.3 Mining Obstacles or Limitations

There are some obstacles to the normal progression of mining that are not directly calculated within the cost model. We have adjusted individual mine costs to account for the additional expenses related to mining around these obstacles. The obstacles and limitations and expenses involved are described below.

The Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and the Union Pacific (UP) railroads serve the mines in the PRB. The mines located south of the town of Gillette are served by both railroads via the Joint Line. All the mines located north of Gillette and into Montana are served only by the BNSF Railway. When the mines south of Gillette were initially developed, most of the mines were west of the Joint Line. A few of the mines including North Antelope/Rochelle, North Rochelle, Black Thunder, Jacobs Ranch and Coal Creek were developed east of the Joint Line. As these mines advance west from shallow to deeper resource areas, they will eventually encounter the Joint Line right-of-way. There are several options for addressing this situation with two that appear most viable. One is to relocate the Joint Line to the west and when mining progresses to that point, and once mining is complete relocate the line it back on to mined out ground. A second and more conservative solution is to develop new pits on the west side of the Joint Line without relocating the railroad.

For purposes of this study, we have made the conservative assumption and assumed the mines would develop new pits on the west side of the Joint Line. This cost is addressed by increasing the amount of overburden that must be moved in five years preceding the transition to the new pits, thus accounting for the development of the new box pits. The increase in overburden removal requirements results in increased production costs in those years.

Another obstacle as mines advance to the west is Highway 59 which is the main highway from Gillette to the south. Some of the mines are already within about one mile of Highway 59. We have addressed this obstacle by including costs to relocate Highway 59 to the west. This relocation would be similar to the relocation of Highway 14-16 that runs north out of Gillette. It has recently been relocated to the east of the Eagle Butte Mine to allow unhindered advance of the mine to the west.

While the towns of Gillette and Wright, Wyoming could be obstacles to mining, the existing operations will not mine near these towns over the 30-year timeframe of this study.

The haulage capacity of the BNSF and UP railroads may be viewed as a limitation on the production output of the PRB. However, the railroads will not be likely to have a long term limiting impact on PRB coal production. In the past the railroads have responded to increases in demonstrated demand for PRB coal by adding new capacity to their systems. This is apparent from the double, triple and quadruple trackage along certain sections of the railroads. It is reasonable to expect that the railroad companies will respond to increasing demand by adding new capacity as it is required.

4.4 Existing PRB Mines

The existing PRB mines are typically categorized by state (Montana or Wyoming) and the thermal content of the coal. There are 16 existing mines which currently produce around 470 million tons per year. The existing mines include the following operations:

Montana PRB mines:

- Rosebud
- Absaloka

- Spring Creek
- Decker

Wyoming PRB – 8,400 Btu/Lb Coal Mines:
- Buckskin
- Rawhide
- Eagle Butte
- Dry Fork
- Wyodak
- Caballo
- Belle Ayr
- Cordero Rojo
- Coal Creek

Wyoming PRB – 8,800 Btu/Lb Coal Mines:
- Black Thunder
- North Antelope/Rochelle (NARO)
- Antelope

Each of these mines is described in the following sections. Table 4.1, following this chapter, provides a summary of key data for each mine. Table 4.2, summarizes the projected annual production and production cost for all of the mines over the 2011 – 2040 timeframe. The locations of these mines are shown on Exhibit 1, at the end of this report.

4.4.1 Rosebud Mine
The Rosebud Mine is owned and operated by Western Energy Company (a subsidiary of Westmoreland Coal Company). The mine has been in operation since 1968, and primarily provides the fuel supply to the nearby Colstrip power plant. As coal resources near the plant are depleted, more distant resources have been leased or purchased. Over the last 10 years mine production has ranged between 10.0 and 13.4 Million tons per year (Mtpy) with the mine producing 12.2 million tons of coal of coal in 2010. We have assumed the mine will continue to operate over the 30-year study horizon and supply a steady 12.0 Mtpy to the Colstrip plant. At that projected production level, currently controlled coal resources of 202 Million tons (Mt) will be depleted in 2027. We have assumed additional more-distant coal resources, which are known to exist, will be acquired for the 2028 through 2040 period.

Four draglines – 3 Marion 8050 models and 1 Marion 8200 – and truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment. Key cost drivers for the Rosebud Mine include:

- Total coal thickness averages 30 feet in two seams (22-foot Rosebud Seam and 8-foot McKay Seam)
- 75% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 25% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 97 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below:

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	5.4	12.0	16.10
2015	5.6	12.0	16.47
2020	3.9	12.0	13.77
2025	7.0	12.0	20.36
2030	5.9	12.0	18.63
2035	6.2	12.0	19.27
2040	6.5	12.0	20.17

The Rosebud Mine currently has higher strip ratio than other mines in the PRB and associated higher production cost. The mine is adjacent to the power plant therefore the delivered cost of coal is generally less than if coal was purchased and delivered by railroad from other PRB mines. Although the mine has sold coal on the open market previously, it is not likely to be a significant influence on markets and prices since nearly all of the coal goes to the Colstrip power plant.

4.4.2 Absaloka Mine

The Absaloka Mine is owned and operated by Westmoreland Resources, Inc. (a subsidiary of Westmoreland Coal Company). The coal resources are leased from the Crow Indian Tribe. Over the last ten years, mine production has been in the 5.0 to 7.0 Mtpy. In 2010, the Absaloka Mine produced 5.5 million tons of coal.

A single dragline, BE-2570 (100 cy), and multiple truck/loader fleets are the primary mining equipment. The mine opened in 1974 and shallow coal resource areas were targeted that could be stripped almost entirely by dragline. Most of the shallow coal resources have been mined and future mining areas will require increasing amounts of pre-strip ahead of the dragline. The remaining coal resources within the Absaloka Mine plan (49.2 Mt) are sufficient to sustain the operation at 6.0 Mtpy production level through 2018. Considerable resources occur nearby on the Crow Reservation, and in currently leased areas north of the Reservation. We have assumed additional higher strip ratio resources will be obtained to support the operation through 2040.

Key cost drivers for the Absaloka Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 29 ft in two seams (12-ft Rosebud and 17-ft McKay seam)
- 80% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 20% of overburden removed by truck/loader fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 71 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	3.7	6.0	13.13
2015	3.7	6.0	13.10
2020	3.7	6.0	13.25
2025	3.9	6.0	13.83
2030	4.1	6.0	14.83
2035	4.3	6.0	15.56
2040	4.5	6.0	15.99

The Absaloka Mine produces an 8,600 Btu/Lb coal product. While this coal is not appreciably better than coal from the Gillette-area mines, Absaloka has a transportation advantage into power plants in the upper mid-west. We project the mine will continue to produce at current levels over the 30-year study horizon.

4.4.3 Spring Creek Mine

The Spring Creek Mine is owned by Cloud Peak Energy Resources LLC. Mine production has increased in recent years as production has declined at the nearby Decker Mine. In 2010, the Spring Creek Mine produced 19.3 million tons of coal which is its highest annual production since the mine opened in 1982. In addition to serving traditional US utility markets, Spring Creek coal has been exported through Canadian ports to Asian markets in limited but increasing quantities since 2008. This appears to be a growing trend and we project exports will increase as new port capacity is installed along the west coast. The current permitted capacity is 24 million tons per year.

Cloud Peak's 2010 10K report states total proven and probable reserves are 329.0 Mt. This is sufficient coal to sustain production through 2026 at a 20.0 Mtpy rate. There are extensive coal resources to the south and east of the operation though at increasing strip ratio. We have assumed these additional resources will be acquired to support mine operation through 2040.

Two draglines, BE-1570 (78 cy) and Page 757 (52 cy), and multiple truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment. Key cost drivers for the Spring Creek Mine include:

- Total coal thickness averages 80 ft (the Anderson and Dietz seams merge into one seam at Spring Creek)
- 63% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 37% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 121 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below:

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	2.5	20.0	10.15
2015	2.9	20.0	10.80
2020	3.3	20.0	11.51
2025	3.7	20.0	12.62
2030	4.0	20.0	13.56
2035	4.2	20.0	14.32
2040	4.5	20.0	14.99

The Spring Creek Mine produces a 9,350 Btu/Lb coal product which is favorable from a transportation perspective (cheaper to transport a higher Btu/Lb product on a $/mmBtu basis). High sodium content in the ash causes problems in some boilers. The coal is also considered desirable in the Asian markets as it can be blended with other lower sodium coals to achieve acceptable boiler performance.

4.4.4 Decker Mine

The Decker Mine is jointly-owned by Level 3 Communications and Cloud Peak Energy Resources LLC, and operated by Kiewit Mining Group Inc. Mine production has declined in recent years as long-term sales contracts have expired and economically viable coal resources have depleted. In 2010 the Decker Mine produced 3.0 million tons of coal, down from the high of 13.0 million tons per year in the late 1970s.

The Decker Mine contains extensive coal resources at higher strip ratios – around 5.0 to 6.0+ BCY/ton. Other mines in the PRB generally will not reach that strip ratio range for approximately 25 to 30 years, thus, we expect Decker will close in the near future, and not reopen within the time horizon of this study.

Two draglines and multiple truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment. Key cost drivers for the Decker Mine are:

- Total coal thickness averages 67 ft (in multiple seams)
- 50% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 50% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 47 EMUs/employee-hour (this may reflect a high level of reclamation activities)

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and estimated production costs are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	4.5	3.0	15.39
2015	-	-	-
2020	-	-	-
2025	-	-	-
2030	-	-	-
2035	-	-	-
2040	-	-	-

The Decker Mine produces a 9,500 Btu/Lb coal product which is favorable from a transportation perspective. There may be a few niche markets for this coal in the near term, but over the longer term we believe the Decker Mine will not be economically viable. We have projected the mine will be idled or closed around 2014.

4.4.5 Buckskin Mine

The Buckskin Mine is owned and operated by Kiewit Mining Properties, Inc. In 2010 the Buckskin Mine produced 25.5 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 27 Mtpy.

The Buckskin Mine permit includes 280.7 Mt of controlled coal resources. Kiewit has submitted an application to lease the Haystack II property which contains 52 million tons of coal, sufficient to extend the mining operation through about 2023. We have identified an additional 1.2 billion tons of future coal resources north and west of the current operations within the mine's area of influence [3]. The strip ratios associated with these coal resources gradually increase from around 3.0 to 5.0 BCY/ton. The combined coal resources within permitted areas, LBA and future mine areas total 1.53 billion tons.

The primary mining equipment at Buckskin is multiple large truck/shovel fleets. Key cost drivers at the Buckskin Mine are:

- Total coal thickness averages 104 ft
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 97 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and estimated production costs through 2040 are:

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	2.4	25.0	9.55
2015	2.4	25.0	9.59
2020	1.7	25.0	8.37
2025	3.6	30.0	13.41
2030	3.7	30.0	14.30
2035	4.0	38.5	15.00
2040	4.0	45.0	14.65

The Buckskin Mine appears to be in a favorable strip ratio position for several years to come, and consequently the mine can support increased annual coal production as demand dictates. While the Buckskin Mine is located among the group of mines producing 8,400 Btu/Lb coal, there have been occasions when Buckskin coal had lower thermal content (i.e., <8,400 Btu/Lb). In such instances there are typically price adjustments which result in an overall lower coal sales price.

4.4.6 Rawhide Mine

The Rawhide Mine is owned and operated by Caballo Coal Company, a subsidiary of Peabody Energy Corp. In 2010 the Rawhide Mine produced 11.2 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 24 Mtpy.

[3] The term "area of influence" as used in this study refers to the geographic area which is adjacent to and could be logically developed as an extension of the current operation. Future resources referred to herein generally occur within the mine's area of influence.

The Rawhide Mine has generally been operated to supplement production from Peabody's North Antelope/Rochelle and Caballo mines. Since the mine was opened in 1977, production has ranged widely between zero (the mine was idled in 2000 and 2001) and 18.4 Mtpy.

The Rawhide Mine permit area incorporates 329.7 million tons of coal resources, sufficient to sustain mine operation through 2024 at 24.0 Mtpy. No LBA tracts are being pursued at this time. An additional 1.14 billion tons of future coal resources lie west of the current mining operation within the mines area of influence. The strip ratio for these additional coal resources gradually increases from around 2.9 to 5.3 BCY/ton. The total combined coal resources within the Rawhide mine plan and area of interest are 1.47 billion tons.

The primary mining equipment at Rawhide is multiple large truck/shovel fleets. Key mining factors and cost drivers include:

- Total coal thickness averages 116 feet
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 74 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	1.6	14.5	8.44
2015	1.6	23.4	7.86
2020	1.9	25.0	8.44
2025	2.4	30.0	10.06
2030	2.6	30.0	11.49
2035	4.2	35.0	14.75
2040	4.2	45.0	15.47

The Rawhide Mine will enjoy a relatively low strip ratio for several years to come, and we have therefore projected its annual production to rise to meet anticipated demand. As with Buckskin, the Rawhide Mine is grouped with mines producing 8,400 Btu/Lb coal, although the coal does not always meet this specification. In such instances there are typically price adjustments which result in an overall lower coal sales price.

4.4.7 Eagle Butte Mine

The Eagle Butte Mine is owned and operated by Alpha Coal West, Inc., a subsidiary of Alpha Natural Resources. In 2010 the Eagle Butte Mine produced 23.2 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 35 Mtpy.

In May 2008 the previous owner of the Eagle Butte Mine successfully leased the Eagle Butte West LBA containing 255 Mt of coal. The bonus bid for property was $180.5 million, equivalent to $0.71/ton. The average strip ratio for the property is reported to be 2.9 BCY/ton. Alpha Coal West has since incorporated the Eagle Butte West LBA tract within their mine plan and permits. Highway 14-16 which runs north out of Gillette divided the Eagle Butte Mine from the Eagle Butte West LBA. The highway has already been rerouted to the east of the Eagle Butte Mine to allow an uninterrupted transition into the Eagle Butte West property.

The Eagle Butte Mine permit allows production of 425 million tons through 2027 (at a 25.0 Mtpy rate). The Eagle Butte West LBA has been incorporated into the mine plan and permits. Beyond 2027, additional coal resources will need to be acquired. We have identified 398.0 million tons of future coal resources situated west of the mine permit area. The strip ratios for these future resources range from 4.6 to 6.8 BCY/ton. The future expansion potential of the Eagle Butte Mine appears limited due to the rising topography (buttes and bluffs) approximately one to two miles west of the current mining area and the associated higher production costs. Excluding this area, the total coal resources within the mine permit and future area of interest are 823.0 million tons.

Multiple large truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment at Eagle Butte. Key cost drivers for the operation include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 123 ft
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 123 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and estimated production costs through 2038 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	2.6	25.0	9.83
2015	3.1	25.0	10.86
2020	3.3	25.0	11.72
2025	2.7	25.0	10.60
2030	4.9	25.0	16.32
2035	5.0	25.0	16.63
2040	-	-	-

The Eagle Butte Mine has a very favorable coal resource position with relatively low strip ratios in their current mining areas and the Eagle Butte West LBA. Beyond these areas the strip ratios increase rapidly. The mine is located near the Gillette airport and we have project mining around the airport (instead of relocating the airport). The topography west of the mine includes several buttes. Mining in those areas causes the strip ratio to increase into the 6.0+ BCY/ton range. Consequently, we would anticipate the mine will be idled or closed late in the study period.

4.4.8 Dry Fork Mine

The Dry Fork Mine is owned and operated by Western Fuels Association Inc. The coal is primarily sold to various electric Co-ops that rely upon Western Fuels for fuel supply services. In 2010 Dry Fork produced 5.4 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 15 Mtpa.

The Dry Fork Mine has a large coal resource base but has minimal opportunity to add resources to that base in the future. The mine is bordered by the Eagle Butte Mine to the west, Wyodak Mine and City of Gillette to the south, and the coal subcrop to the north and east. Total coal resources within the mine permit area are 110.9 million tons.

The primary mining equipment at Dry Fork are multiple truck/shovel/loader fleets. Key cost drivers for the Dry Fork Mine include:

- Total coal thickness averages 87 feet
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel/loader fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 82 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2030 are summarized below:

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	1.22	5.5	7.32
2015	1.15	5.5	7.27
2020	1.76	5.5	8.92
2025	2.70	5.5	11.55
2030	1.50	5.5	8.85
2035	-	-	-
2040	-	-	-

We have projected the Dry Fork Mine will continue to supply fuel to the various member Co-ops. Dry Fork will also be the fuel source for the newly commissioned Dry Fork power plant located adjacent to the mine. As currently projected, the mine will deplete the available resources in the 2030 time frame.

4.4.9 Wyodak Mine

The Wyodak Mine is predominantly a captive mine to the Wyodak and Wygen Power Plants located immediately east of Gillette, Wyoming. Relatively minor amounts of coal are sold on the open market to other utilities. The mine is operated by Wyodak Resources a subsidiary of Black Hills Power and Light. In 2010, Wyodak produced 5.9 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 12 Mtpy. The Wyodak Mine controls over 40 years of coal resources (261.9 million tons), so there are no current efforts to acquire additional coal properties.

The primary mining equipment at Wyodak includes trucks/shovels to remove the overburden and an in-pit crushing and conveying system and large front end loaders to mine and transport the coal. Key cost drivers for the Wyodak Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 90 feet
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 85 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	2.5	6.0	9.95
2015	2.5	6.0	10.17
2020	2.5	6.0	10.64
2025	2.5	6.0	10.97
2030	2.5	6.0	11.12
2035	3.0	6.0	12.39
2040	3.0	6.0	12.39

The Wyodak Mine will continue to be the primary fuel supply for the Wyodak power plant. We do not anticipate any appreciable increase in production from Wyodak, and we do not anticipate the Wyodak coal being sold on the open market in significant volumes.

4.4.10 Caballo Mine

The Caballo Mine is owned and operated by Caballo Coal Company, a subsidiary of Peabody Energy Corp. In 2010 the Caballo Mine produced 23.5 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 50 Mtpy.

In July 2004 a previous owner of the Belle Ayr Mine (immediately south of Caballo) applied for the Belle Ayr North LBA. This coal property was intended as a future mining area for Belle Ayr when current coal resources deplete around 2019. A lease sale was held in July 2011, and Peabody Energy Company outbid Alpha Coal West (Belle Ayr’s owner) with a bonus bid of $210 million for 221.7 million tons of coal ($0.95/ton).

In a subsequent lease sale in August 2011, Alpha Coal West outbid Peabody for the West Caballo LBA which lies in advance of the Caballo Mine. The winning bonus bid established a new high of $1.10/ton based on a bid of $143.4 million for 130.2 M tons (at 4.2 BCY/ton strip ratio).

These lease sales appear to leave Alpha Coal West in a difficult position in that the West Caballo LBA tract does not appear to be adjacent to the Belle Ayr Mine, and consequently the Belle Ayr pit cannot advance onto the West Caballo property. The West Caballo tract does not appear to be essential to the Caballo Mine operation as other coal properties are available. The natural solution would appear to be trading LBA properties, however, it is not assured that will happen.

The Caballo mining sequence emphasizes advancing to the west although there are extensive unmined coal properties on the eastern side of the Caballo Mine. These eastern areas had been included and scheduled in earlier mining permits, but are currently excluded. While the Caballo mining permit does not explain this change of course, it may be due to coal quality or other geologic issues.

The Caballo Mine permit includes 235.2 million tons of controlled coal resources. The Belle Ayr North LBA, with 221.7 million tons would bring the controlled total to 456.9 Mt. Future coal resources estimated at 598.0 million tons are situated immediately west of the Caballo Mine and could extend the mine life beyond 2040. The strip ratios of these future resources steadily trend from 3.5 to 5.4 BCY/ton.

The primary mining equipment at Caballo are multiple large truck/shovel fleets. Key geologic factors and cost drivers for the Caballo Mine are:

- Total coal thickness averages 75 feet
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 132 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and estimated production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	3.7	25.0	11.56
2015	3.7	25.0	11.60
2020	3.9	25.0	12.90
2025	4.2	30.0	13.54
2030	4.2	34.0	14.10
2035	4.5	35.0	14.79
2040	5.0	40.0	15.82

The Caballo Mine appears to be in a generally favorable strip ratio position for most of the study period. Thus, the mine is relatively well positioned to meet future demand growth. We have therefore projected annual coal production rates to rise from 25.0 Mtpy to 40.0 Mtpy.

4.4.11 Belle Ayr Mine

The Belle Ayr Mine is owned and operated by Alpha Coal West, Inc., a subsidiary of Alpha Natural Resources. In 2010 Belle Ayr produced 25.8 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 45 Mtpa.

The Belle Ayr Mine permit provides for production of 155.0 million tons of controlled coal resources which should be sufficient to support the operation through 2016 at 25.0 Mtpy production rate. Alpha Coal West recently leased the Caballo West LBA which contains 130.2 million tons. This LBA is not adjacent to the Belle Ayr Mine permit area and thus does not allow a logical mining transition into the LBA. The cost to develop a new pit and the limited tonnage within the LBA are factors that will likely mean Alpha will not develop this LBA. We consequently have not included this tonnage in our forecast. Future coal resources will likely be acquired west of the present mine permit area. We have identified 745.0 million tons of coal resources with strip ratios gradually increasing from 4.2 to 5.6 BCY/ton. The combined mine permit and future coal resources total 900.0 million tons.

The Belle Ayr Mine appears is in a difficult coal resource position in the near term. If a trade cannot be negotiated with Peabody for the Belle Ayr North LBA, then alternate LBA tracts will have to be leased. The leasing process is currently taking 5 to 7 years. Controlled and permitted coal resources would be near depletion before an alternate LBA could be leased. Delays would then be incurred to obtain mining permits over the new lease area.

The Belle Ayr Mine employs multiple truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment. Key cost drivers for the Belle Ayr Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 72 feet
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 166 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	3.5	25.0	10.69
2015	3.8	25.0	11.21
2020	4.3	20.0	13.60
2025	4.4	20.0	14.15
2030	4.7	20.0	15.05
2035	4.7	20.0	15.51
2040	5.3	20.0	16.32

Due to its limited coal resource position, we do not believe there will be near term production increases at Belle Ayr. When the coal resource situation is ultimately resolved, Belle Ayr will be facing increasing strip ratios and production costs.

4.4.12 Cordero Rojo Mine

The Cordero Rojo Mine is owned and operated by Cordero Mining Company, a subsidiary of Cloud Peak Energy Resources LLC. In 2010 the Cordero Rojo Mine produced 38.5 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 65 Mtpy.

In 2008 and 2009, Cordero Mining Company successfully bid on the North and South Maysdorf LBA tracts. These two tracts contain 342.6 million tons of coal. The bonus bids for two tracts totaled $298.9 million and equivalent to $0.87/ton. The average strip ratio for these tracts is reported to be 3.7 BCY/ton.

The Cordero Rojo Mine permit (August 2007 version) schedules production totaling 190.1 million tons of coal. The North and South Maysdorf LBAs add 346.2 MT, bringing the controlled total to 536.3 million tons, sufficient to extend the mine life into 2024. The mine would subsequently advance onto the Maysdorf II LBA tract which contains 434.0 million tons and an additional future coal resource of 701.5 million tons is located west of the LBA tracts within the mine's area of interest. The additional coal resources have an average strip ratio around 5.5 BCY/ton. The total coal resources within the mine permit area, LBAs and future area of interest are 1.67 billion tons.

Three draglines (2 Marion 8750 and 1 Marion 8200) and multiple truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment at Cordero Rojo. Key cost drivers for the mine include:

- Total coal thickness averages 60 feet

- 64% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 36% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 138 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and estimated production costs through 2040 are:

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	3.6	40.0	9.53
2015	3.8	40.0	10.00
2020	3.7	40.0	11.20
2025	4.0	40.0	11.82
2030	4.8	40.0	13.89
2035	5.3	50.0	15.30
2040	5.6	50.0	15.98

The Cordero Rojo Mine is currently equipped so that draglines move the majority of the overburden. As the mine strip ratio and pit depth steadily increase, the more costly truck/shovel fleets will move a large percentage of the overburden (67% in 2040) which will impact the cost structure.

4.4.13 Coal Creek Mine

The Coal Creek Mine is owned and operated by Thunder Basin Coal Company, a subsidiary of Arch Coal Inc. In 2010 Coal Creek produced 11.4 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 50 Mtpy. The Coal Creek Mine has generally been operated to supplement production from the Black Thunder Mine. Since the mine was opened in 1982, production has ranged widely between zero (the mine was idled from 2001 through 2005) and 11.5 Mtpy.

Thunder Basin Coal Company recently bid on the West Coal Creek LBA. That bid was rejected by the BLM due to the absence of Qualified Surface Owner Consent. This decision should not, however have any impact on the ability of the Coal Creek Mine to reach and sustain the projected 15.0 Mtpa production over the study horizon.

The Coal Creek Mine permit provides for production of 198.0 million tons. The West Coal Creek LBA would extend the mine life through 2027 if surface owner consent can be secured. Additional future coal resources of 224.0 million tons are available immediately south and west of the mine permit area to support the mine operation through 2040. The average strip ratio of these future coal resources is around 3.0

BCY/ton. The combined total coal resources including tonnage within the mine permit, LBA and future areas of interest are 478.0 million tons.

The primary mining equipment currently at Coal Creek comprises multiple truck/shovel fleets. Earlier in the mine life, the BE-1300 dragline was assigned to the Coal Creek Mine, but that machine is now in use at Black Thunder. Key cost drivers for the Coal Creek Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 35 ft (in two seams)
- 100% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 118 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	2.5	15.0	9.37
2015	2.5	15.0	9.71
2020	2.5	15.0	10.04
2025	3.3	15.0	12.69
2030	3.0	15.0	12.66
2035	3.0	15.0	12.75
2040	3.0	15.0	12.85

Although the Coal Creek Mine does not have a high annual production level, it should remain competitive over the study horizon due to its relatively low strip ratio.

4.4.14 Black Thunder Mine

The Black Thunder Mine is owned and operated by Thunder Basin Coal Company, a subsidiary of Arch Coal Inc. In 2010, Arch purchased the adjacent Jacobs Ranch Mine from Rio Tinto Energy America and incorporated that operation into the Black Thunder Mine. As a consequence, Black Thunder Mine production totaled 116.2 million tons in 2010. The current permitted capacity is 125 Mtpy.

The Black Thunder and Jacobs Ranch Mine permits incorporate lands with 1.256 billion tons of controlled coal resources. This is sufficient tonnage to support the mining operation through 2020.

Thunder Basin Coal Company currently has application submitted for three LBA properties with combined coal tonnage of 1.99 billion tons:

- West Hilight Field LBA – 440 M tons
- Hilight Field (includes a North and South tract) LBA – 591 M tons
- West Jacobs Ranch LBA – 957 M tons

Lease sales for these LBAs may occur as soon as late 2011. These three LBAs would support the mining operation through 2036 at a 120.0 Mtpy production rate. We have identified additional future coal resources of 1.94 billion tons that are situated immediately west and north of the Black Thunder Mine. The strip ratios within these future areas of interest range from 4.5 to 5.5 BCY/ton. The combined total coal resources within the mine permit boundary, LBAs and future area of interest are 5.19 billion tons.

The primary mining equipment at Black Thunder includes six large draglines – 3 BE-2570, 1 BE-1570, 1 BE-1300, 1 Marion 8750 – and multiple truck/shovel fleets. Key cost drivers for the Black Thunder Mine are:

- Total coal thickness averages 70 ft
- 36% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 64% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 161 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and estimated production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	3.8	122.0	10.66
2015	4.2	130.0	12.11
2020	4.6	125.0	13.11
2025	4.7	131.8	14.32
2030	4.9	135.0	14.26
2035	5.1	150.0	14.81
2040	5.0	165.0	14.81

With the acquisition of Jacobs Ranch the Black Thunder Mine is now the largest coal mine in the United States. Strip ratios increase more slowly – even at higher production rates – than at the competing North Antelope/Rochelle Mine. Consequently we have projected significant production increases at Black Thunder over the next 30 years and stable production at North Antelope/Rochelle.

4.4.15 North Antelope/Rochelle Mine

The North Antelope/Rochelle Mine is owned and operated by Powder River Coal LLC, a subsidiary of Peabody Energy Corp. In 2010 the North Antelope Rochelle Mine produced 105.8 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 110 Mtpy.

The North Antelope Rochelle mine permit incorporates a production schedule for 723.0 million tons of coal resources. This is sufficient tonnage to support the operation into 2017 at 105.0 Mtpy production rate.

Powder River Coal LLC has submitted an application to lease the North and South Porcupine LBA tracts containing 1.18 billion tons of coal. The lease sale is scheduled for the later part of 2011. These LBAs have adequate coal resources to extend the mining operation through 2027.

Future coal resources of 1.53 billion tons are located immediately west of the North Antelope/Rochelle Mine. This tonnage is sufficient to support the mining operation through 2040 at 105.0 Mtpy production rate. The strip ratio of these resources average around 5.6 BCY/ton.

Total coal resources within the mine permit boundary, LBAs and future areas of interest total 3.44 billion tons.

The primary mining equipment at North Antelope/Rochelle includes three large draglines - BE-2570 (100 cy), Marion 8200 (64 cy) and BE-2570 (117 cy) – and multiple truck/shovel fleets. Key cost drivers for the North Antelope/Rochelle Mine include:

- Total coal thickness averages 73 feet
- 27% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 73% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 172 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	3.0	105.0	9.49
2015	3.4	105.0	11.33
2020	4.5	100.0	14.24
2025	5.4	100.0	16.13
2030	5.5	100.0	16.02
2035	5.5	100.0	16.14
2040	5.8	100.0	16.93

The North Antelope Rochelle Mine had been the largest mine (on an annual production basis) in the United States until Arch Coal combined Black Thunder Mine and Jacobs Ranch Mine into a large mining complex. We have projected North Antelope/Rochelle Mine production to remain stable at 105.0 Mtpy through 2040. If production was increased above this level then the mine would advance more rapidly into areas of higher strip ratio – over 6.0 BCY/ton – with corresponding higher production costs.

4.4.16 Antelope Mine

The Antelope Mine is owned and operated by Antelope Coal Company, a subsidiary of Cloud Peak Energy Resources LLC. In 2010 the Antelope Mine produced 35.9 million tons of coal. The current permitted capacity is 45 Mtpy.

The mining sequence in the Antelope mine permit schedules production through 2017 when permitted coal resource would deplete.

In July 2011 Antelope Coal company successfully bid on the West Antelope II LBA. This LBA includes north and south tracts. The north tract contains an estimated 350 million tons of coal at a strip ratio of 4.6 BCY/ton. The south tract contains 56 million tons at a reported 5.0 BCY/ton strip ratio. These LBAs would support the mining operation through 2028 at a production rate of 36.0 Mtpy.

Additional coal resources would be needed to carry the mining operation through the 2040 term of this study. We have identified future coal resource of 479.0 million tons that are west of the current operations. The strip ratios of these coal resources range from 5.6 to 6.8 BCY/ton.

The total coal resource within the Antelope Mine permit, LBAs and future areas of interest are 1.14 billion tons.

A single dragline and multiple truck/shovel fleets are the primary mining equipment. Key cost drivers for the Antelope Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 70 ft
- 25% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 75% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity in 2010 was approximately 147 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	2.9	36.0	10.08
2015	3.3	36.0	10.84
2020	4.4	28.0	13.37
2025	4.8	28.0	14.59
2030	5.2	28.0	15.32
2035	5.7	24.0	16.53
2040	6.1	24.0	17.39

Although the Antelope Mine has the desirable 8,800 Btu/Lb coal, the mine will rapidly advance into higher strip ratio areas. As a consequence we have projected declining production in the later years of this forecast.

4.5 Future PRB Mines

Several future PRB mines are in various stages of planning and development. We have identified those projects that appear to be the most likely to move toward development and incorporated production as appropriate from these mines over the 30-year timeframe of this study. We have included three specific properties in our production schedule: Otter Creek in Montana, and School Creek and Youngs Creek in Wyoming. In addition, we would expect two or more other mines to come on line within the study period, however exactly which properties would be developed is unknown. We have therefore incorporated two “generic” mines in the forecast one in Montana (potentially CX Ranch, Tanner Creek/Youngs Creek, Montco, Cook Mountain, Coal Creek and/or

Many Stars), and one in Wyoming (potentially Calf Creek, Rock Pile, Wild Cat, Kintz Creek and/or Keeline).

Each of the identified mines and their primary cost drivers are described in the following sections. Table 4.2, following this chapter, summarizes the projected annual production and production cost for these mines.

4.5.1 Otter Creek Mine

The Otter Creek Mine is located approximately six miles from Ashland, Montana, and consists of private, state and federal coal properties controlled by Arch Coal Company. Projected coal quality is approximately 8,600 Btu/Lb and 0.3% sulfur. The proposed Tongue River Railroad will have to be constructed at least as far as Ashland, Montana for the Otter Creek Mine to be viable.

A key source of information about the Otter Creek Mine is a valuation prepared for the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation in 2009. That valuation includes a conceptual mine plan and cost forecasts.

Key cost drivers for the Otter Creek Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 57 ft
- 75% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 25% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity is assumed to be similar to the Spring Creek Mine at approximately 120 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	-	-	-
2015	-	-	-
2020	2.3	18.0	8.96
2025	3.3	34.9	10.72
2030	3.5	34.9	11.44
2035	3.7	34.9	12.20
2040	3.8	34.9	12.41

We have scheduled the Otter Creek Mine to come online in 2018.

4.5.2 School Creek Mine

The School Creek Mine is owned by Powder River Coal LLC, a subsidiary of Peabody Energy Corp. The mine is situated between the Arch's Black Thunder Mine and Peabody's North Antelope/Rochelle Mine. Total controlled and permitted coal resources are 762.0 million tons. We have identified an additional 279.0 Mt of future coal resources that may logically be added to the currently controlled resources for a total resource base of 1.04 billion tons. Quality of the School Creek Mine coal is estimated at 8,800 Btu and 0.3% sulfur. The School Creek Mine is fully permitted and can be brought into production in a relatively short timeframe.

The northern part of the School Creek Mine is the idled North Rochelle Mine. The North Rochelle Mine adjoins the Black Thunder Mine and was purchased by Arch from Triton Coal Company in August 2004. Arch intended to expand the North Rochelle coal resource base through addition of the West Roundup LBA property. Peabody competitively bid against Arch in May 2005 for West Roundup and won the lease with a bonus bid of $0.97/ton – the highest bonus bid rate ($/ton) to that time. Arch's future at North Rochelle was effectively cut off as Peabody controlled the coal resources ahead of the mine. Arch and Peabody subsequently negotiated an agreement whereby Arch received the North Rochelle mining equipment and Peabody received the remaining coal resources and mine infrastructure including coal storage barn, rail loadout, and rail spur and loop track. Another key asset with the remaining coal resources was the fully developed pit. Peabody can essentially start the School Creek mining operation from the idled North Rochelle pit.

Key cost drivers for the School Creek Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness averages 67 ft
- 25% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 75% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity is assumed to be similar to the North Antelope Rochelle Mine at approximately 170 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	-	-	-
2015	4.0	17.9	11.56
2020	3.6	30.0	11.29
2025	3.8	30.0	12.09
2030	4.2	30.0	13.44
2035	4.0	30.0	13.25
2040	5.7	35.0	16.40

We have scheduled the School Creek Mine to come online in 2013.

4.5.3 Youngs Creek Mine

The proposed Youngs Creek Mine is a joint venture (50/50) between Chevron Mining Inc. and CONSOL Energy Inc. The Youngs Creek Mine is located 15 miles north of Sheridan, Wyoming and encompasses approximately 7,700 acres of predominately privately-held coal resources and surface rights. Estimated recoverable coal resources are 325 million tons, with quality of 9,350 Btu/Lb and 0.3% sulfur. Approximately half of the resource has strip ratio under 3.0 BCY/ton.

Draglines and truck/shovel fleets would be the primary mining equipment. Key cost drivers for the Youngs Creek Mine include the following:

- Total coal thickness is estimated to average 60 ft
- 50% of overburden removed by a cast blast and dragline system
- 50% of overburden removed by truck/shovel fleets
- Labor force productivity is assumed to be similar to the Spring Creek Mine at approximately 120 EMUs/employee-hour

The projected strip ratio trend, annual coal production and production costs through 2040 are summarized below.

Year	Strip Ratio (BCY/Ton)	Projected Coal Production (Million Tons)	Estimated Production Cost ($/Ton)
2011	-	-	-
2015	-	-	-
2020	4.0	2.0	14.54
2025	2.8	15.0	10.43
2030	3.0	15.0	11.17
2035	3.4	15.0	12.05
2040	3.8	15.0	12.69

We have scheduled the Youngs Creek Mine to come online in 2020.

4.5.4 Other Mines

There are several potential mine projects that might come online in the latter years of the study timeframe. In Montana, these include CX Ranch, Tanner Creek/Youngs Creek, Montco, Cook Mountain, Coal Creek and/or Many Stars. In Wyoming, potential mining properties include Calf Creek, Rock Pile, Wild Cat, Kintz Creek and Keeline. Other tracts may be developed between the Wyodak and Caballo mines. All of these tracts have been identified and evaluated to a greater or lesser extent for potential mine development. In each case the available resources are considered sufficient to support mine development if market demand justifies. For purposes of forecasting production and costs, we developed generic mines with characteristics typical of these properties and incorporated those values into the models.

4.6 Overall Mining Cost Trends

Typically as a coal basin matures, mining proceeds from the most favorable to less favorable resources, a trend which puts upward pressure on costs. This is particularly true in the Gillette area where the mines are progressing from shallower, less expensive resources on the eastern edge of the basin to more deeply buried and thus more costly resources to the west. For most of the mines, this advance will also tend to increase coal haul distances putting further upward pressure on costs. Civil features (roads, railroads, buildings, pipelines etc.) will also require additional expenditures in some cases to accommodate.

Historically the trend towards increasing costs in the PRB has largely been offset by improved technology and economies of scale. The next section describes some of the technological trends which could continue to offset increasing costs going forward. For purposes of developing the cost forecasts in this study however, we have assumed that mining technology remains essentially unchanged over the forecast period. While we would expect such improvements to be modest, the forecasts presented herein are still considered conservative (i.e., likely to be high). As shown on Table 4.2, and summarized below, the result is a gradual increase in average mining costs in real terms, over the forecast period.

	Coal Production Cost (2011 $/Ton)			
	2011	2020	2030	2040
Montana Mines:				
Rosebud	16.10	13.77	18.63	20.17
Absaloka	13.13	13.25	14.83	15.99
Spring Creek	10.15	11.51	13.56	14.99
Decker	15.39	-	-	-
Existing Wyoming “8,400 Btu/Lb” Mines:				
Buckskin	9.55	8.37	14.30	14.65
Rawhide	8.44	8.44	11.49	15.47
Eagle Butte	9.83	11.72	16.32	-
Dry Fork	7.32	8.92	8.85	-
Wyodak	9.95	10.64	11.12	12.39
Caballo	11.56	12.90	14.10	15.82
Belle Ayr	10.69	13.60	15.05	16.32
Cordero Rojo	9.53	11.20	13.89	15.98
Coal Creek	9.37	10.04	12.66	12.85
Existing Wyoming “8,800 Btu/Lb” Mines:				
Black Thunder	10.66	13.11	14.26	14.81
North Antelope Rochelle	9.49	14.24	16.02	16.93
Antelope	10.08	13.37	15.32	17.39
Undeveloped Properties:				
School Creek	-	11.29	13.44	16.39
Otter Creek	-	8.96	11.44	12.41
Youngs Creek	-	14.54	11.17	12.69
Unidentified MT	-	-	17.01	14.38
Unidentified WY	-	-	-	13.79

The cost trend is illustrated on the nearby graph. Unlike many coal producing areas, this increase occurs very slowly in the PRB due to the nature of the deposit and scale of operations. BOYD's forecasts of average mining costs indicate a modest increase of ± 1% per year in real terms from about $10/ton (constant 2011 dollars) to about $15/ton in 2040. Note that this represents the average of all mines studied – individual mines may vary significantly both in trend and magnitude of costs.



4.7 Future Trends

The viability of PRB coal as a power plant fuel source over the timeframe of this study and beyond may be influenced in many ways including the following:

- Mining technology trends
- Geologic trends
- Transportation changes
- Energy industry trends
- Political influences

These trends are speculative but reasonably define potential future trends.

4.7.1 Mining Technology Trends

Past technology changes in the PRB have generally centered around introduction of draglines into the PRB mines and up-scaling the size of the mining equipment. While future up-scaling of machine sizes may continue, we think the potential for doubling or tripling machine sizes is minimal. Future size increases will be incremental.

Equipment Automation. Automation of equipment will be a trend in the future. Fully autonomous machines (for example, haul trucks) will offer savings in labor cost as no operator is required, and increased operating time as no operator-related delays (shift changes, shift breaks, lunch breaks, etc.) will be incurred. The automation of trucks is the main focus as the numbers of truck in the mines will increase as strip ratios increase.

Fully autonomous trucks are now in the testing stages in large iron ore mines in Australia. The benefits of this early testing will spread as the technology is proven.

Remote Machine Monitoring. Remote monitoring of machine systems and functions is continuing to evolve to effect improvements in machine availability and productivity. Modern mining machines are being equipped with sensors to monitor nearly all systems and functions of the machines. The collected information is transmitted via wireless signal to the mine office, corporate office, and to maintenance providers. The ability to react to machine needs is enhanced and will result in shorter downtimes and increased operating time. This all combines to decrease mining costs.

Electrical-Powered Equipment. Fuel price increases present a level of vulnerability to the mining operations as much of the haulage and support equipment is diesel driven. The transition to more electrical-driven equipment will work to mitigate some of that fuel price risk. Trolley assist for large haul trucks is being used in certain areas of the world, particularly where trucks must drive up long, steep grades to exit deep pits. This technology will continue to spread especially as the power distribution system that drives the trolley assist operation becomes more flexible and moveable.

Widespread GPS Usage. The use of global positioning system (GPS) equipment is currently being used in some of the PRB mines. That use will spread to all of the mines. GPS equipment is used to both monitor the performance of machines and also load electronically-transmitted mining plans to the mining equipment. This technology is used to achieve precise reclamation grades.

Advanced Mine Planning. Mining industry software and simulation packages will continue to improve. These will be able to interface with surveying hardware and software that can scan the mine surface in a short time so that topographic surfaces can be rapidly updated. A large number of mine plan alternatives will be evaluated in a short time so that the most cost-effective mining alternative can be followed.

Underground Mining Methods. The transition to underground mining methods will occur when it is less expensive than surface mining. Longwall Top Coal Caving methods are currently being used in thick-seam Chinese coal mines to achieve maximum recovery of the coal resource. The introduction of underground mining methods would effectively cap mining costs as underground mining is not influenced by increases in strip ratio.

4.7.2 Geologic Trends

The main geologic trend that will influence production costs is the gradual increase in strip ratio as mines advance down dip. As production costs in the deeper mines increase, new mines will be developed along the edges of the basin where strip ratios and mining costs are lower.

Other geologic trends include the splitting or parting of seams so that multiple coal seams are mined. This generally increases mining costs compared to mining a single, thick seam.

Coal quality generally improves as mines advance away from the subcrop line. There are often areas of higher sulfur and ash and lower Btu/Lb along the subcrop line. As mines advance down dip, there is often a slight increase in thermal content (Btu/Lb). This helps to offset the production cost when measured on a $/mmBtu basis.

4.7.3 Transportation Changes

Railroads will continue to be the primary transporters of PRB coal over the longer term. Capacity will be increased in step with increased PRB coal demand. Other transportation trends include the following:

<u>Tongue River Railroad</u>. The Tongue River Railroad was originally planned as an extension off the BNSF Railway between Miles City, Montana and the Montana-Wyoming border near Sheridan, Wyoming. In June 2011 Forrest Mars, the billionaire former chief executive of Mars Inc, purchased about one-third of the planned railroad that would have passed through his 140 square mile Diamond Cross Ranch near Birney, Montana. The railroad extension will now terminate around Ashland, Montana. This new railroad would provide access to the proposed Otter Creek Mine near Ashland, Montana.

<u>Dakota, Minnesota and Eastern (DM&E) Railroad</u>. The DM&E railroad (a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railroad) has contemplated a build in to the PRB from DM&E lines that currently extend to the western side of South Dakota. The addition of a third railroad (along with the Burlington Northern Santa Fe railroad and Union Pacific railroad) would increase rail competition and result in lower transportation rates. The final Environmental Impact Statement for the build in has been approved and the next major step involves securing financing for the project.

<u>Port Capacity</u>. Increased coal demand within Asian markets has spurred new interest in PRB coal. In the past, a small percentage of overall PRB production has been delivered into Asian markets. This coal was primarily shipped through ports around Vancouver,

British Columbia. Earlier this year, Arch Coal announced an agreement to ship PRB coal through Ridley coal terminal located near Prince Rupert, British Columbia. Ambre Energy, an Australian company, has purchased a port facility near Portland, Oregon on the Columbia River. They plan to expand the port to transload coal for sales into Asian markets. Other coal port projects along the west coast are in various stages of development. Even with all these port projects in operation, still only a relatively small percentage of overall PRB production would be exported. The increased demand for PRB coal would generally result in slight upward price pressures.

Power Transmission. The rail component of the delivered cost of PRB coal to various power plants is generally greater than the coal production cost. If rail transportation costs increase, it may become more economic to locate new power plants within or near the PRB and transmit the power over high-voltage transmission lines. This coal-by-wire alternative will become more viable with technological advances in power transmission.

Diesel Fuel Prices. A major component in transportation costs (and mining costs) is the cost of diesel fuel. If diesel prices increases significantly, the market range for PRB coal could be impacted. In such case locally produced coals or lignite may be more cost competitive than PRB coal.

4.7.4 Energy Industry Trends

The various sources of energy (coal, natural gas, uranium, petroleum) will continue to go through market cycles which will lead to emphasizing production of certain fuels over others. Many of the large electric utilities manage these market cycles by diversifying their power generating fleet through a mix of coal-fired, gas-fired, nuclear, and renewable generation.

Oil prices will continue to have an influence on mining costs as well as the cost of diesel fuel and gasoline at the pump. Some of the energy industry trends that may impact PRB viability include the following:

Low Cost Natural Gas. Large quantities of natural gas are being discovered and produced from shale formations across the country. The production of shale gas involves directional drilling (horizontal) and fracturing the formation (fracing) to liberate the gas. The potential impact of fracing on overlying aquifers is gaining attention within the media and may hinder growth of the industry if new regulations are passed. The current increase in gas supply has resulted in lower gas prices. This in turn has led exploration companies to re-direct their efforts more toward oil production which currently has higher profit margins. While natural gas prices are relatively low, it may be more economic for utilities to emphasize gas-fired power generation.

Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Technology. CCS technology aims to collect the CO2 that would otherwise be emitted into the atmosphere and inject it into permeable geologic formation. The sequestration of CO2 through injection into older oil fields may enhance oil recovery from the fields and also partially or totally offset the CCS cost. If this technology is proven and applied, then it should mitigate the alleged impacts of CO2 on global warming.

Coal to Liquids. The technology to convert coal to liquid fuels (diesel and gasoline) has been in commercial-scale applications since World War II. During the apartheid era in South Africa, essentially all the diesel and gasoline was produced from coal. Today it still remains a major source of diesel and gasoline in South Africa. There are several patented processes to convert coal to liquid fuels. The conversion of coal to liquid fuels becomes competitive with traditional petroleum refining costs when crude oil prices are around $60/barrel. The development of coal to liquid plants would tend to divert PRB coal use from power plant fuel to coal to liquid plant fuel. The increased demand would generally result in slightly higher prices. Alternately, this new source of diesel fuel would tend to lower the price of diesel which is a major component in mining and transportation costs.

Renewal of Nuclear Power Generation. It has been more than two decades since new nuclear power capacity has been constructed. The high up-front capital costs and lengthy time required to construct a nuclear plant are the greatest obstacles to resurgence in nuclear power. The standardized design of a modular nuclear plant has been proposed to address the noted obstacles. Other challenges continue to be long-term disposal of nuclear waste materials and public sentiment in view of the idled Japanese nuclear units following the tsunami earlier this year. Over the longer term, nuclear power should experience a resurgence. At that time, it will compete head on with coal-fired power generation.

Renewable Power Sources. Renewable power sources, particularly wind and solar, will continue to increase over the term of this study and beyond. Currently, renewable power sources are not competitive with conventional coal-fired power generation. Renewable power expansion presently relies on mandates to install some percentage of renewable power or user willingness to pay higher prices for “green” energy. Advances in renewable power technology will improve its competitiveness against traditional power sources, though we do not see renewable power becoming the least costly source of power over the term of this study (through 2040).

4.7.5 Potential Political Influences

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty to long term PRB coal viability arises from potential legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse gases – notably CO2. The burning of coal in power plants is a major source of CO2. If CO2 emissions were taxed via a "cap and trade" scheme, coal-fired generation would become more costly. The magnitude of the tax would influence whether alternate sources of power would be more economic than coal-fired power generation. It is quite difficult to project when such a tax may be legislated. It seems the most likely time would have been during the initial years of the current administration when the congress and executive office were controlled by individuals that seemed sympathetic to the environmental agenda. Proposed CO2 emission legislation was not able to gain the required minimum votes. It does not appear such favorable control of the congress and presidency will again be aligned over the near term to force the environmental agenda.

The regulatory requirements to open new mines and continue to operate existing mines have increased over the years. Both the time and cost to obtain the necessary permits and licenses has continually increased. Some of these increases arise from the orchestrated campaign of numerous groups to block or at least delay mine development. Almost all of the proposed mines eventually come online, albeit at a higher cost to obtain permits and licenses. While such groups are free to engage in such delay tactics, it should be recognized that the additional permitting costs are merely rolled into the coal sales price which is ultimately passed on to the electric rate payer.

Following this page are Tables:

4.1; Coal Supplier Summary, Powder River Basin
4.2: Projected Annual Production, Cash Cost and Production Costs, Powder River Basin Mines

TABLE 4.1

COAL SUPPLIER SUMMARY
POWDER RIVER BASIN
Prepared For
XCEL ENERGY
By
John T. Boyd Company
Mining and Geological Consultants
September 2011

Mine/Property	Primary Owner (Opera ing Company)	Mine Type	2010 Production (M Tons)	Transportation Logistics	Available Resources* (M Tons)	As Received Quality Ash (%)	Sulfur (%)	Btu/Lb	Comments
8,800 Btu (Southern) Mines									
Antelope	Cloud Peak Energy	Surface, Dragline & Truck/Shovel	35.9	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	1,138	5.3	0 22	8,850	Highest quality mine in the Gillette area. Increasing strip ratios will impact this mine before the other 8,800 Btu coal producers.
North Antelope Rochelle	Peabody Energy (Powder River Coal Co)	Surface, Dragline & Truck/Shovel	105.8	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	3,437	4.5	0 20	8,800	Combination of Peabody's North Antelope mine and Rochelle mine. Has previously been the largest mine in US on a tonnage basis.
School Creek	Peabody Energy (Powder River Coal Co)	Surface, Dragline & Truck/Shovel	-	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	1,041	5.0	0 30	8,800	The mine is fully permitted and mining can commence from the old North Rochelle mine pit. This will be the next PRB mine to come online.
Black Thunder/Jacobs Ranch	Arch Coal Inc. (Thunder Basin Coal)	Surface, Dragline & Truck/Shovel	116.2	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	5,189	5.4	0 30	8,800	Arch acquired the Jacobs Ranch Mine in 2009 and integrated hat operation into the overall Black Thunder Complex. Current largest US coal mine.
8,400 Btu (Northern) Mines									
Cordero Rojo	Cloud Peak Energy (Cordero Mining Co)	Surface, Dragline & Truck/Shovel	38.5	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	1,668	5.4	0 30	8,400	Combination of the Cordero and Caballo Rojo Mines.
Belle Ayr	Alpha Natural Resources (Alpha Coal West)	Surface, Truck/Shovel	25.8	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	900	4.5	0 32	8,500	Formerly Foundation Coal Inc. - Merged with Alpha Natural Resources in 2009.
Caballo	Peabody Energy (Caballo Coal Company)	Surface, Truck/Shovel	23.5	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	1,055	5.0	0 32	8,500	
Wyodak	Black Hills Corporation (Wyodak Resources Inc.)	Surface, Truck/Shovel	5.9	Conveyor Delivery to Power Plant, On-Site Truck & Rail Loadouts, BNSF	262	5.5	0.40	8,000	Primarily captive to on-site power plants
Eagle Butte	Alpha Natural Resources (Alpha Coal West)	Surface, Truck/Shovel	23.2	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	823	4.7	0 36	8,400	Formerly Foundation Coal Inc. - Merged with Alpha Natural Resources in 2009.

TABLE 4.1 - Continued

Mine/Property	Primary Owner (Opera ing Company)	Mine Type	2010 Production (M Tons)	Transportation Logistics	Available Resources* (M Tons)	As Received Quality Ash (%)	Sulfur (%)	Btu/Lb	Comments
Dry Fork	Western Fuels	Surface, Truck/Shovel	5.4	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	111	4.9	0 30	8,100	Will increase production to supply Basin Electric's Dry Fork Station.
Rawhide	Peabody Energy (Caballo Coal Company)	Surface, Truck/Shovel	11.2	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	1,778	5.1	0.40	8,300	Historically Rawhide has been Peabody's swing producer with production ranging between 0.0 and 18.4 Mtpy, but has worked continuously since 2001.
Buckskin	Kiewit Mining	Surface, Truck/Shovel	25.5	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	1,535	5.1	0.40	8,300	Acquired by Kiewit Mining Group in 2007. Blends to meet a variety of specifications but does not generally produce an average 8400 Btu/Lb product.
Coal Creek	Arch Coal Inc. (Thunder Basin Coal)	Surface, Dragline, Truck/Shovel	11.4	On-Site Loadout, UP or BNSF	478	5.7	0 35	8,400	Historically a swing producer, but has worked continuously since 2006.
Wyoming Total			428.3		19,415				
Montana Mines									
Decker	Kiewit Mining and Cloud Peak Energy (Decker Coal Company)	Surface, Dragline, Truck/Shovel	3.0	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	12	4.2	0 50	9,500	Available resources are nearly depleted. Significant resources of +5 0 BCY/T coal remain within the lease area. High sodium - 6.4% in ash.
Spring Creek	Cloud Peak Energy (Spring Creek Coal Co)	Surface, Dragline, Truck/Shovel	19.3	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	600	4.3	0 30	9,300	High sodium in ash - 8.5%
Absaloka	Westmoreland Resources	Surface, Dragline, Truck/Shovel	5.5	On-Site Loadout, BNSF	180	8.9	0.60	8,600	Coal is leased from the Crow Indian Tribe. Moderately high sodium in ash - 2.0%
Rosebud	Westmoreland Resources (Western Energy Co)	Surface, Dragline, Truck/Shovel	12.2	Conveyor Delivery to Power Plant, On-Site Loadout, BNSF	360	9.0	0.70	8,575	Most of he production is delivered to the adjacent Colstrip power plant.
Montana Total			40.0		1,152				
PRB Total			468.3		20,567				

* Available Resources include controlled and permitted resources as of 12/31/2010, identified LBA properties and Future resources within the area of interest of each mine.

TABLE 4.2

PROJECTED ANNUAL PRODUCTION, CASH COSTS AND PRODUCTION COSTS
POWDER RIVER BAS N MINES
Prepared For
XCEL ENERGY
By
John T. Boyd Company
Mining and Geological Consultants
September 2011

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Montana Mines															
Rosebud Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	15.10	14 93	15 07	15 20	15.45	15.41	15 59	14.69	12 91	12 97	14.75	16 01	16.83	18.16	18 91
Production Cost ($/Ton)	16.10	15 90	16 07	16 22	16.47	16.42	16.62	15.66	13.71	13.77	15.68	17 04	17.93	19.34	20 36
Absaloka Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	12.39	12 39	12 36	12 36	12 36	12.46	12.46	12.46	12.46	12 51	12.62	12 95	12.95	13.06	13 06
Production Cost ($/Ton)	13.13	13.13	13.10	13.10	13.10	13 21	13 21	13.21	13 21	13.25	13.36	13.71	13.71	13.83	13 83
Spring Creek Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9.26	9 36	9.44	9 54	9 83	10 03	9 98	10.15	10.15	10 52	10.75	11 09	11.39	11.53	11 53
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10.15	10 28	10 37	10.49	10 80	11 01	10 93	11.12	11.12	11.51	11.77	12.13	12.46	12.62	12 62
Decker Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	14.39	14 39	14 36	14 36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Production Cost ($/Ton)	15.39	15 39	15 36	15 36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wyoming Mines (8,400 Btu/Lb)															
Buckskin Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	30,000	30,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	8.64	8 62	8 57	8 55	8 68	8 66	7.44	7.42	7.44	7 54	7.54	11 68	11 68	11.65	11 65
Production Cost ($/Ton)	9.55	9 53	9.47	9.45	9 59	9 57	8 27	8.25	8 28	8 37	8.37	13.44	13.44	13.41	13.41
Rawhide Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	14,500	20,400	20,400	20,400	23,400	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	28,800	30,000	30,000	30,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	7.78	7 59	7.43	7 32	7 20	7.19	7.18	7.18	7 21	7.71	8.66	9 33	9 33	9.32	9 20
Production Cost ($/Ton)	8.44	8 24	8 08	7 98	7 86	7 84	7 83	7.83	7 86	8.44	9.55	10 21	10 21	10.20	10 06
Eagle Butte Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	8.65	8 63	9.48	9.48	9 57	9 57	9 57	9.96	9 99	10 38	10.38	10.45	9.41	9.41	9.41
Production Cost ($/Ton)	9.83	9 80	10.77	10.77	10 86	10 86	10 86	11.30	11 33	11.72	11.72	11.79	10 60	10.60	10 60
Dry Fork Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	6.70	6 67	6 60	6 60	6 67	6 67	7 23	7.34	8 06	8.17	8.27	8 69	8 69	8.75	10 57
Production Cost ($/Ton)	7.32	7 28	7 20	7 20	7 27	7 27	7 91	8.01	8 81	8 92	9.02	9.48	9.48	9.54	11 55
Wyodak Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9.07	9 07	9 03	9 03	9 29	9 29	9 29	9.29	9 61	9.76	9.76	9 83	10.09	10.09	10 09
Production Cost ($/Ton)	9.95	9 95	9 92	9 92	10.17	10.17	10.17	10.17	10.49	10 64	10.64	10.71	10 97	10.97	10 97
Caballo Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	30,000	30,000	30,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	10.22	10 22	10.19	10.19	10 27	10.65	10.65	10.65	10 80	10.86	11.32	11.41	11.39	11.41	11.43
Production Cost ($/Ton)	11.56	11 56	11 52	11 52	11 60	12 65	12 65	12.65	12.79	12 90	13.43	13 52	13 50	13.52	13 54
Belle Ayr Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9.51	9 51	9.47	9.47	9 95	10.03	10.29	10.99	11 33	11.54	11.62	11 82	11.82	11.95	12 06
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10.69	10 69	10 66	10 66	11 21	11 29	12 23	13.02	13.40	13 60	13.69	13 88	13 88	14.01	14.15
Cordero Rojo Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	8.67	8 67	8 91	8 91	9 09	9 34	9 34	9.34	9 57	9.64	9.57	9 65	9.67	9.69	10.18
Production Cost ($/Ton)	9.53	9 53	9 80	9.80	10 00	10 90	10 90	10.90	11.13	11 20	11.13	11 21	11 23	11.25	11 82
Coal Creek Mine															
Production (Tons-000)	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	11,900	13,900	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	8.43	8.45	8.43	8.45	8.78	8 80	8 81	8.83	8 90	9.10	9.04	9.11	9.44	10.48	10 92
Production Cost ($/Ton)	9.37	9 39	9 37	9 39	9.71	9.73	9.75	9.77	9 84	10 04	9.98	10 05	10 37	12.19	12 69

	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	TOTAL
Montana Mines																
Rosebud Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	360,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	19 26	20.12	17.16	17 22	17.36	17.45	17.75	17.84	17.90	17 95	18.31	18.35	18.60	18 66	18.81	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	20.74	21.68	18.42	18.48	18.63	18.73	19 04	19.14	19.21	19 27	19.63	19.68	19.94	20 01	20.17	
Absaloka Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	180,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	13 34	13.34	13.51	13 90	13.98	13.98	14 26	14.26	14.64	14 64	14.76	14.76	15.04	15 04	15.04	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	14.12	14.12	14.35	14.75	14.83	14.83	15.13	15.13	15.56	15 56	15.69	15.69	15.99	15 99	15.99	
Spring Creek Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	600,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	11 84	11.84	11.98	11 98	12.39	12.65	12.79	12.79	13.10	13.10	13.25	13.25	13.55	13 55	13.69	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	12 96	12.96	13.12	13.12	13.56	13.81	13 98	13.98	14.32	14 32	14.49	14.49	14.82	14 82	14.99	
Decker Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Wyoming Mines (8,400 Btu/Lb)																
Buckskin Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	31,700	35,800	38,200	38,500	40,000	40,000	45,000	45,000	45,000	924,200
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	11 65	11.70	12.03	12 05	12.51	12.51	12 50	13.00	13.12	13.14	13.13	13.13	12.79	12.79	12.79	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	13.41	13.46	13.79	13 82	14.30	14.30	14 28	14.85	14.98	15 00	14.99	14.99	14.65	14 65	14.65	
Rawhide Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	34,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	37,000	36,700	43,500	45,000	45,000	899,100
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9 36	9 38	9.31	9 33	9.97	10.49	10 64	10.65	11.14	12 84	13.51	13.53	13.53	13 54	13.56	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10 82	10.84	10.77	10.79	11.49	12.07	12 22	12.24	12.81	14.75	15.42	15.44	15.44	15.45	15.47	
Eagle Butte Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	-	-	-	675,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9.41	9.47	13.75	13.75	14.23	14.23	14 23	14.23	14.49	14 52	14.61	14.61	-	-	-	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10 60	10.66	15.83	15 83	16.32	16.32	16 32	16.32	16.60	16 63	16.72	16.72	-	-	-	
Dry Fork Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	5,500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	110,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9 28	8.11	7.68	7 26	8.16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10.11	8.82	8.32	7 82	8.85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Wyodak Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	180,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	10 09	10 09	10.09	10 09	10.24	11.25	11 38	11.38	11.38	11 38	11.38	11.38	11.38	11 38	11.38	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10 97	10.97	10.97	10 97	11.12	12.26	12 39	12.39	12.39	12 39	12.39	12.39	12.39	12 39	12.39	
Caballo Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	30,000	31,400	33,700	34,000	34,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	918,100
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	11.44	11.50	12.10	11.77	11.99	12.00	11 94	11.92	12.52	12 60	12.62	12.64	13.30	13 50	13.51	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	13 55	13.61	14.29	13 88	14.10	14.11	14 03	14.00	14.70	14.79	14.80	14.82	15.58	15 81	15.82	
Belle Ayr Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	635,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	12 62	12.62	12.62	12 65	12.88	13.09	13 09	13.09	13.34	13 34	13.43	13.58	14.03	14 03	14.03	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	14.78	14.78	14.78	14 82	15.05	15.25	15 25	15.25	15.51	15 51	15.59	15.77	16.32	16 32	16.32	
Cordero Rojo Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000	44,900	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	1,264,900
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	10 58	11.15	11.38	11.78	12.05	12.41	12.42	12.72	13.11	13 27	13.29	13.40	13.60	13 86	13.88	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	12 27	12.89	13.16	13 62	13.89	14.29	14 31	14.65	15.11	15 30	15.32	15.44	15.66	15 96	15.98	
Coal Creek Mine																
Production (Tons-000)	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	445,800
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	10 94	11.14	10.88	10.79	10.97	10.99	11 01	11.03	11.05	11 06	11.08	11.10	11.12	11.14	11.16	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	12.71	12 91	12.59	12.48	12.66	12.68	12.70	12.72	12.74	12.75	12.77	12.79	12.81	12 83	12.85	

TABLE 4.2 - Continued

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	TOTAL
Wyoming Mines (8,800 Btu/Lb)																															
Black Thunder Mine																															
Production (Tons-000)	122,000	130,000	130,000	130,000	130,000	130,000	130,000	125,000	125,000	125,000	125,000	125,000	125,000	128,300	131,800	134,100	135,000	135,000	135,000	135,000	135,000	143,000	148,000	148,000	150,000	150,000	150,000	158,000	160,000	165,000	4,093,200
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	9.51	9 68	9 94	10 21	10.48	10 58	10 63	10.75	11 02	11.11	11.49	11 93	11.91	12.15	12 20	12 33	12.37	12.39	12 09	12.16	12.18	12 34	12.41	12.59	12 64	12.74	12.78	12.60	12 62	12.65	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10.66	10 88	11.16	11 81	12.11	12 23	12.51	12.65	12 95	13.11	13.55	14 01	13.99	14.26	14 32	14.47	14.52	14.53	14.18	14.26	14.28	14.47	14.55	14.73	14 81	14.93	14.97	14.75	14.77	14.81	
North Antelope/Rochelle Mine																															
Production (Tons-000)	105,000	105,000	105,000	105,000	105,000	105,000	105,000	105,000	105,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	3,045,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	8.50	8 63	8.73	8 86	9 57	9.70	9 55	9.91	10 65	12.11	12.72	12 57	12.71	13.57	13.79	13 95	13.88	13.53	13 50	13.74	13.76	13.78	13.79	13.81	13 86	14.19	14.42	14.54	14 56	14.57	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	9.49	9 65	9.77	9 92	11 33	11.49	11 36	11.80	12 61	14.24	14.92	14.72	14.88	15.87	16.13	16 32	16.22	15.82	15.78	16.02	16.04	16 06	16.07	16.09	16.14	16.48	16.75	16.89	16 91	16.93	
Antelope Mine																															
Production (Tons-000)	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	36,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	876,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	8.76	8 89	8 93	9 06	9.42	9 55	9 67	10.74	11.17	11.44	11.54	11 97	12 07	12.19	12 57	12 67	12.54	12.64	12 65	13.21	13.56	13.75	14.27	14.29	14 30	14.44	14.52	14.60	15 00	15.07	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	10.08	10 24	10 30	10.46	10 84	10 99	11.15	12.65	13.10	13.37	13.49	13 93	14.05	14.19	14 59	14.71	14.60	14.72	14.75	15.32	15.71	15 92	16.50	16.51	16 53	16.69	16.78	16.87	17 30	17.39	
Undeveloped Properties																															
School Creek Mine																															
Production (Tons-000)	-	-	3,500	14,900	17,900	26,700	26,500	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	35,000	799,500
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	15 87	9 02	10 35	10 01	9 69	9.74	9 85	9 91	9.93	10 02	10.14	10.29	10.42	10 60	10.98	10.90	10 98	11.44	11.02	11 02	11.07	11.16	11 29	11.38	12.42	13.82	13 94	14.05	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	18.14	10 04	11 56	11.42	11 02	11.07	11 22	11 29	11.56	11 64	11.77	11.94	12 09	12 32	12.94	12.86	12 95	13.44	12.94	12 93	12.99	13.10	13 25	13.35	14.52	16.12	16 25	16.39	
Youngs Creek																															
Production (Tons-000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	4,000	7,500	7,500	7,500	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	268,500
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13 06	10.04	8 85	8 87	9.11	8.79	9 02	9.04	9.06	9 08	9.42	9.67	9 69	9.71	9.95	10.19	10.21	10.45	10.47	10.49	10.73	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14 54	11.55	10 39	10.42	10.69	10.43	10 69	10.72	10.76	10 80	11.17	11.46	11.49	11.56	11.81	12 05	12.09	12.36	12.39	12.43	12.69	
Unidentified MT																															
Production (Tons-000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	4,300	13,700	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000	164,000
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16 07	15.45	10.31	9 99	10.13	10.97	11.40	11.70	11.83	12.43	12 57	13.00	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17 63	17.01	11.32	10 95	11.26	12.13	12 61	12.93	13.09	13.74	13 90	14.38	
Otter Creek																															
Production (Tons-000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,100	17,500	18,000	25,000	27,500	32,300	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	34,900	725,700
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.45	8 35	8 38	9.10	9.18	9 31	9.98	10 00	10 00	10.00	10.09	10.17	10.70	10.70	10.70	10.79	10.84	11 24	11.24	11.24	11.33	11 37	11.44	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.01	8 92	8 96	9.75	9 83	9 99	10.69	10.72	10.72	10.72	10.81	10 90	11.44	11.44	11 64	11.73	11.79	12 20	12.20	12.20	12.30	12 34	12.41	
Unidentified WY																															
Production (Tons-000)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000	4,000	10,000	15,000	25,000	31,500	36,600	124,100
Cash Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.60	12 36	11.25	11.15	11.49	11 53	11.58	
Production Cost ($/Ton)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.72	14.48	13.39	13.30	13.65	13.72	13.79	
Production Summary																															
Montana Mines	41,000	41,000	41,000	41,000	38,000	38,000	38,000	50,100	55,500	56,000	63,000	65,500	70,300	72,900	72,900	72,900	72,900	72,900	74,900	77,200	86,600	88,900	88,900	90,900	92,900	98,900	103,900	113,900	120,400	125,500	2,165,800
Wyoming Mines (8,400 Btu/Lb)	181,000	186,900	186,900	186,900	189,900	191,500	191,500	186,500	186,500	185,400	189,400	197,800	204,000	209,000	216,500	216,500	217,900	220,200	220,500	220,500	220,000	222,700	226,800	234,100	239,500	243,000	242,700	234,500	236,000	236,000	6,320,600
Wyoming Mines (8,800 Btu/Lb)	263,000	271,000	274,500	285,900	288,900	297,700	297,500	296,000	296,000	283,000	283,000	283,000	283,000	286,300	289,800	292,100	293,000	293,000	293,000	293,000	293,000	297,000	302,000	302,000	304,000	304,000	309,000	317,000	319,000	324,000	8,813,700
Total PRB Production	485,000	498,900	502,400	513,800	516,800	527,200	527,000	532,600	538,000	524,400	535,400	546,300	557,300	568,200	579,200	581,500	583,800	586,100	588,400	590,700	599,600	608,600	617,700	627,000	636,400	645,900	655,600	665,400	675,400	685,500	17,300,100

5.0 POWDER RIVER BASIN MARKETS AND PRICES

5.1 Introduction

PRB coal is marketed across the United States due to its favorable quality characteristics – notably low sulfur – and relatively low price. PRB coal is the most widely consumed coal in the U.S., supplying over 40% of the total U.S. market on a tonnage basis. Significant production began in the late 1970s, and since that time the PRB has become a large, reliable, competitive and relatively stable fuel supply source for electrical generation, and is the dominant player in coal markets across most of the U.S.

This chapter addresses PRB markets and prices in a basin-wide context based on the mine by mine analyses in the previous chapter. Supply and demand balances are addressed as are pricing considerations for PRB coal. Finally, BOYD's projection of coal prices over the study period are presented and discussed. All coal prices and price projections are expressed in constant value 2011 dollars.

5.2 PRB Coal Supplies

The Powder River Basin, as compared to other producing regions in the country, is a fairly new supply source, but one which has grown dramatically over a relatively short period, as illustrated:



Prior to about 1974, production was limited to a handful of mines in Montana and the Sheridan Field, primarily due to lack of transportation elsewhere, and the relatively low Btu content of the coal as compared to other western U.S. sources. Several factors, including the construction of numerous new power plants in the mid 1970s and early 1980s, the passage in 1978 of the Clean Air Amendments Act (which put a premium on low sulfur content), and the 1984 construction of the “Joint Line” rail access into the southern portion of the basin promoted a very rapid increase in production in the PRB.

PRB coal production peaked in 2008 at about 496 million tons, declining to about 455 million tons in 2009 due to the recession. Since that time production has recovered somewhat to about 470 million tons. Even with the 2009 decrease, PRB production has grown, on average, by approximately a 5% per year rate since the mid-1980s.

PRB supplies have historically been driven primarily by demand – geologic, environmental, operational, and logistical constraints have typically been managed successfully by mine operators and the railroads. Supply shortfalls, although rare, have occurred, but are typically not severe or sustained over an extended term. While the mines have tended to maintain some excess capacity, that excess has typically been relatively small. This is largely because given the nature of the mines and the coal deposit, adding capacity to an existing mine, within limits, is relatively straightforward and economical. Thus, the producers can respond to modest increases in demand in relatively short timeframes. BOYD expects this situation, with a relatively small but adequate excess capacity to continue for the foreseeable future.

5.3 PRB Coal Demand

Virtually all PRB production goes for power generation – industrial sales are very limited. Geographically, PRB customers are primarily to the east and south. Relatively little PRB coal moves west from the basin, although greater interest by consumers in the Southwestern U.S. and for export are likely to increase this flow.

BOYD has developed a forecast of PRB coal demand in conjunction with electrical industry expert R. W. Beck Inc. (a unit of SAIC) for BOYD’s annual multiclient market study entitled – “US CoalVision 2011”. That demand forecast relies upon a market model for steam coal use in U.S. electric power generation. In the market model, coal supply choices are handled principally (but not entirely) on the basis of estimated busbar costs for each economically and technically feasible coal product on a unit-specific basis. Transportation costs from each U.S. coal supply region are used in consideration of the coal choice for each coal-fired unit.

In addition to the PRB share of the U.S. electric generation market, the model incorporates anticipated tonnages moving to export markets, and for potential coal-to-liquid (CTL) projects. Tonnage consumed by CTL development does not generally affect markets as those projects tend to be isolated and draw coal from new, dedicated sources, not established open market mines. Forecast export tonnages are uncertain due to both economics, and the lack of port facilities for such exports. Generally, while exports will be a factor in PRB markets, the tonnage is not expected to be large in the context of total PRB production.

Based on this modeling, BOYD projects PRB coal demand to continue to increase over the timeframe of this study albeit at a slower rate than experienced historically, to around 685 million tons per year in 2040, as summarized below:

Year	Annual Coal Production (Million tons)
2011	485.0
2015	516.8
2020	524.4
2025	579.2
2030	590.7
2035	636.4
2040	685.5

This forecast is illustrated graphically below and compared to historic production.



5.4 PRB Coal Prices

PRB coal prices are fundamentally driven by coal production cost. Market imbalances which might potentially lead to higher prices – such as a sharp increase in demand or a production shortfall – have been rare. There are occasions when PRB coal prices have "spiked" for a short period of time or a particular quality of coal. This is usually due to a brief disruption in coal supply – e.g., railroad problems, pit flooding, extreme weather events (snow) or market factors (demand for "ultra-low" sulfur coal). Oftentimes these events are so short lived that there is little or no impact on overall coal prices. PRB coal production capacity has generally expanded in step with power plant fuel needs so that coal supply and demand are typically in balance, and over the longer term coal sales price trends reasonably closely with coal production cost.

Since initial mine development in the 1970s, various parties have tracked coal market price trends [4]. The chart below reflects the indicative prices published by Coal Outlook, a daily/weekly coal market newsletter. In the early years, price was reported for a generic PRB coal, generally being the lower Btu/Lb material mined in the immediate Gillette area. As new, higher quality mines developed to the south and along the Joint Line, Coal Outlook began differentiating between the higher 8,800 Btu/Lb and lower 8,400 Btu/Lb products. The long term price trend, expressed in constant value 2011 dollars is illustrated below:



[4] For purposes of this report "market prices" are defined as the price that would be negotiated, at the relevant time, between a knowledgeable buyer and reliable seller for coal in substantial volumes to be delivered over a multi-year future period. As used herein "price" is not necessarily the same as a spot price, a forward market price, or prices that would reflect a distressed situation on the part of either buyer or seller.

As shown, prices decreased significantly as new mines came on-line or expanded in the late 1980s and 1990s. FOB mine prices remained in the ± $6/ton range ($3 to $4/ton in nominal dollars) throughout the 1990s. During this period, increases in underlying cost drivers, including stripping ratio and haul distance, were largely offset by improvements in technology and economies of scale. Since that time coal prices have increased as the cost of diesel fuel, labor, explosives, machine parts and other consumables have increased, and as the mines have advanced westward into areas of deeper overburden with longer haul distances. This has forced an underlying increase in prices, which coupled with two price “spikes” in 2001 and 2008, have increased prices into the $11 to $14/ton range depending on quality.

Over the 1990 – 2010 period, real prices for PRB coal increased at approximately a 3% rate. However, since 2000 that growth rate has approached 7%. This growth has significantly increased the FOB mine cost of PRB coal, but has not significantly limited demand. This is understandable in the context of the coal market as a whole and as related to delivered cost to the customer. For instance, the PRB price remains very low compared to eastern U.S. compliance coal (12,000 Btu/Lb and <1% sulfur) which is presently selling for $75/ton with prices projected to trend higher.

Transportation costs are also an important consideration in evaluating PRB markets. Because of its low cost at the mine, PRB can be transported relatively large distances and still be competitive with other fuel sources at the destination. A typical delivered cost for PRB coal might total $32/ton, with $12 of that being FOB mine cost, and $20 being transportation cost. In that case, an increase in FOB mine price of, say 10%, results in only a 4% increase in the cost to the customer. A 10% increase in the FOB mine price of the eastern U.S. compliance coal noted above, and assuming a $5/ton transportation cost, would result in a 9% increase in cost to the customer.

As shown on the PRB coal price trend chart above, the higher quality 8,800 Btu/Lb PRB coal commands a disproportionate (relative to Btu content) premium over the lesser quality 8,400 Btu material. Historically, this premium has averaged about $1.90/ton, and generally varied between about $1.50 and $2.40/ton (in 2011 dollars). In times of high demand and higher prices, this premium has tended to increase, while in times of lesser demand and lower prices, the premium has decreased.

This relationship is illustrated on the nearby chart.



Currently the price premium for the 8,800 Btu/Lb coal is unusually high at about $2.70/ton, a premium that has been exceeded only during the 2001 and 2008 "spikes". Although the premium for 8,800 Btu/Lb coal is relatively high at the current time, we believe that over the longer term of this study, the premium will return to more typical levels in the $2.00/ton range.

The price premium on the higher quality coal is the result of a number of factors, the most important of which is transportation cost – fewer tons of 8,800 Btu/Lb coal must be hauled via railroad to provide the same total Btus at the power plant – thus, delivered cost for the 8,400 Btu product will be higher on a Btu basis. This is illustrated below, for a typical haul costing $20/ton.

	Product	
	8,400 Btu/Lb	8,800 Btu/Lb
Volume		
Tons per year (000)	4,000	3,818
Btu/Lb	8,400	8,800
Btu/Ton (Millions)	16.8	17.6
FOB Mine Price ($/Ton)	11.00	12.48
Transportation Cost ($/Ton)	20.00	20.00
Delivered Cost ($/Ton)	31.00	32.48
Delivered Cost per mmBtu	1.85	1.85
Fuel Cost per Year ($-000)	124,000	124,000

As shown, the customer could theoretically pay a $1.48/ton premium ($12.48/ton for 8,800 Btu/Lb coal vs. $11.00/ton for 8,400 Btu/Lb) for the 8,800 Btu/Lb product without increasing the total delivered fuel cost.

The transportation distance and cost relationships tend to bifurcate the market for PRB coal. The greater the distance the coal is transported, the greater the transportation cost, and thus the larger the premium for the higher Btu coal. This is illustrated on the nearby graph which shows the premium that would provide the 8,800 Btu product at the same delivered cost as the 8,400 Btu product at various transportation costs. As shown, the premium ranges from about $0.90/ton at a $10 transportation cost to over $1.90/ton at a $30/ton transportation cost. In this situation, a consumer that is located fairly near the PRB will tend to purchase the lower price 8,400 Btu/Lb product, while consumers that are located at significant distances will favor the higher Btu product. Those consumers in the mid-range are positioned to take advantage of whichever product can be purchased and delivered most cheaply.

While transportation cost is the most important single factor, there are other considerations that, depending on the customer, affect the 8,800 Btu/Lb coal premium. These include:

- The higher Btu PRB coals may also have lower sulfur content, particularly on a Lbs of SO2 per mmBtu basis.
- Some power plant boilers were designed to burn higher Btu coal. Burning lower Btu coal may lead to de-rates of unit capacity.
- Burning the lower Btu coal requires approximately 5% more material be dumped, stockpiled and crushed at the plant. This increases cost and may reduce capacity.

While the higher Btu PRB coal is generally perceived as the more important in terms of pricing (because it is the preferable product in most cases), we believe that over the long term, prices will be influenced more by the 8,400 Btu/Lb product because those resources are more plentiful and the competition in that segment is more robust. The PRB coal price projections developed in this chapter are therefore based on the production cost of 8,400 Btu/Lb coal more than the 8,800 Btu product. The producers of the higher Btu coal will be able to price their product at a level equivalent to the cost of the lower Btu material plus a premium for so long as the cost of the higher product remains below that (price + premium) level. Should production costs at the higher Btu mines increase beyond that level, then the price of the higher Btu coal will be forced upwards. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, we do not project this to occur within the timeframe of this study.

This report also addresses a pricing scenario for the Montana mines. As mentioned, there are four operating mines in the Montana PRB, one of which (Decker) will close in the near future. Of the other three mines, one (Spring Creek) competes in essentially the same markets as the high Btu Wyoming mines, and thus would expect to realize that price with appropriate adjustments for higher energy content and higher sodium. The other two mines, Rosebud and Absaloka, are both owned by Westmoreland Coal Company. At this time Rosebud is essentially dedicated to the mine mouth Colstrip Generating Station. Absaloka is an open market mine generally serving customers in the upper Midwest. Absaloka competes in that market against the Wyoming PRB mines, and therefore the delivered cost of coal to/from those mines will be the key factor in setting market prices for Absaloka, as well as for other potential mine developments in Montana. For this reason, we have focused on the 8,600 Btu/Lb Absaloka coal as the benchmark Montana coal product.

5.5 PRB Supply Forecast

BOYD's analysis of PRB coal supply indicates that over the study period, demand will primarily be met from existing mines which will expand production capacity as demand gradually increases. New mines will be developed when they can compete economically with the existing mines and when transportation infrastructure is extended into more remote parts of the PRB. However, new mines will not be a major factor in terms of markets or prices.

To develop projections of costs and supply, the production level of each PRB mine was projected based on our analysis of geology, resources and production capability for each such that the cumulative production of all mines met the annual projected coal demand. This process of setting the individual mine production levels was repeated for each year over the 2011 through 2040 timeframe.

Production increases were generally forecast from the lower cost mines and/or those with adequate resource availability. Production from higher cost mines was held constant or decreased as would be expected in a competitive market. The forecasts vary from this general principle in certain cases where site specific circumstances would influence production, including:

- Wyodak Mine – is a captive fuel supply to the Wyodak and Wygen power plants and is generally independent from the PRB coal market. Although the mine is relatively low cost, we consider it unlikely that the mine would sell significant tonnages into any other markets.
- Dry Fork Mine – has a limited coal resource base and focuses on supplying Western Fuels Association members. Coal resources for Dry Fork deplete around 2030, and we would not expect outside sales in that period.
- Coal Creek – has a limited coal resource base and would not be able to supply over the longer term.

Similarly, the forecast assumes certain higher cost mines will maintain current production levels for specific reasons, including:

- Rosebud Mine – is more or less captive to the Colstrip power plant and generally independent from the PRB coal market.
- Decker Mine – is nearly depleted. Although near term closure of this mine had been announced, we consider it more likely the mine will continue at a relatively low production level for some period. The forecast assumes Decker operates through 2014 and then is phased out. Decker would not have a material influence on markets in any event.

New mines were added to the projection to meet the demand increases in the following years:

- 2013 – School Creek Mine
- 2018 – Otter Creek Mine
- 2020 – Youngs Creek Mine
- 2029 – Unidentified MT Mine
- 2034 – Unidentified WY Mine

The mines shown as “unidentified” could be any one (or more) of several prospects that may be developed in the future (as discussed in Chapter 4). The combined annual production capacity of these new mines in 2040 is just under 140 million tons.

5.6 PRB Coal Price Forecasts

Based on the supply/demand balance and resulting production schedule, a 30-year production forecast is developed for each of the PRB mines. Those forecasts are one of the inputs into BOYD's mine cost model used to develop estimates of production cost trends for each mine over the forecast period. The resulting information can then be plotted in the form of production vs. cost curves for the three product types: 1) 8,400 Btu/Lb coal, 2) 8,800 Btu/Lb coal, and 3) Montana PRB coal. We developed production vs. cost curves at 5-year intervals as a basis to project PRB coal prices.

A typical curve, with costs expressed in constant value 2011 dollars, is illustrated below:



The coal sales price is estimated as the production cost of the marginal increment of production required to meet the coal demand. That marginal increment is essentially the highest cost mine that supplies coal against the required demand.

The primary driver of PRB prices, as discussed above, has historically been 8,400 Btu/Lb product. In the price forecast, the marginal production cost of the 8,400 Btu/Lb product is used as a baseline for developing projections of price for the three primary PRB products.

As discussed above, the 8,800 Btu/Lb Gillette Field coal carries a price premium that is related to transportation cost advantages, quality (sulfur) differentials, and operating concerns at the power plant. The forecast price of 8,800 Btu/Lb coal developed herein is based on the 8,400 Btu/Lb price plus the premium, with that premium modeled as a combination of fixed and variable (proportional to total price) components.

Montana market prices are difficult to quantify and project due to the limited number of mines, and portion of production that is essentially captive. The Montana coals can be broadly grouped into two market related categories:

- 9,300 Btu/Lb coal from mines in the Decker, MT and Sheridan, WY area. These coals generally compete in the same markets as the Gillette area coals, however, they carry a premium due to higher thermal content and sometimes a penalty due to sodium content.
- 8,600 Btu/Lb coal from mines in the Colstrip and Ashland areas along the northern border of the PRB. Westmoreland Coal Company's Absaloka Mine is the only truly open market mine in this region at this time, but Arch Coal's planned Otter Creek operation could be a significant source eventually.

As the price benchmark for Montana coal, we have focused primarily on the Colstrip and Ashland sources or potential sources. These coals would compete with Gillette area coals into upper Midwest markets, and possibly into export markets. Mines in this area have a transportation advantage in the upper Midwest markets vs. Gillette area mines which we estimate to be in the $3.00 to $4.00/ton range. The coals may however, be penalized in those and other markets due to the high sodium content in ash. Overall, we estimate the transportation benefit and quality penalties to equate to an approximate $3.30/ton premium over the Gillette area 8,400 Btu/Lb sales price. That premium with minor adjustments has been incorporated into forecast Montana PRB coal sales prices.

BOYD's price projection for the three PRB coal products is shown on the following graph (FOB mine price expressed in constant value 2011 dollars):



The projected coal sales prices, FOB rail at the mine, for the three coal products are summarized at five-year intervals in the table below:

	Projected Coal Sales Price (2011 $/Ton)		
Year	8,400 Btu/Lb	8,800 Btu/Lb	Montana
2011	11.50	14.00	14.75
2015	11.75	14.20	15.00
2020	13.60	16.20	16.80
2025	14.20	16.90	17.50
2030	15.80	17.80	18.80
2035	16.60	19.00	19.40
2040	17.50	19.50	19.90

As shown, we project a relatively steady increase in prices throughout the forecast period. That increase which equates to 1% to 2% per year is significantly less than the historic trends over the past decade. We consider this result reasonable over the long term given the large overall production volume, the relatively flat cost curves, and the competitive nature of the business. This forecast is considered inherently conservative (high) since no major technological or operational advancements are incorporated. While we would expect such improvements to be modest, historically, PRB producers have been able to partially offset less favorable geologic conditions with such improved technology, thus limiting price increases.

We would note that the forecast is intended as a long term projection – there will almost certainly be variations from the forecast due to shorter term factors that could significantly impact prices. Overall however, our evaluation of future mine costs and projection of long term price trends indicates that while prices for PRB coal will increase in real terms, that increase will not be at the pace of the past decade, and buyers will probably not experience large increases due to resource shortages within the timeframe of this study.

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

Exhibit No. MWR-1
Staff/252
Kaufman/84
Rosebud
Westmoreland
COLSTRIP GENERATING STATION
PROPOSED TONGUE RIVER RR
Absaloka
Westmoreland
HARDIN GENERATING STATION
HARDIN
BNSF
CUSTER COUNTY
POWDER RIVER COUNTY
NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATION
ASHLAND
Otter Creek
Arch Coal
BROADUS
CROW INDIAN RESERVATION
LIMIT COAL BEARING FORMATION
POWDER RIVER COUNTY
CARTER COUNTY
Spring Creek Mine
Cloud Peak Energy
ROSEBUD COUNTY
BIG HORN COUNTY
Decker Mine
Kiewit Mining/ Cloud Peak Energy
BIG HORN COUNTY, MT
SHERIDAN COUNTY
POWDER RIVER COUNTY
CAMPBELL COUNTY
MONTANA
WYOMING
YOUNGS CREEK
Chevron & CONSOL
SHERIDAN
UCROSS
SHERIDAN COUNTY
POWDER RIVER BASIN
BUFFALO
Buckskin
Kiewit Mining
Rawhide
Peabody Energy
Dry Fork
Western Fuels
WYODAK GENERATING STATION
Eagle Butte
Alpha Natural Resources
GILLETTE
Wyodak
Wyodak Resources
CAMPBELL COUNTY
CROOK COUNTY
BIG HORN COUNTY
WASHAKIE COUNTY
Caballo
Peabody Energy
Belle Ayr
Alpha Natural Resources
Cordero Rojo
Cloud Peak Energy
Coal Creek
Arch Coal
WASHAKIE COUNTY
JOHNSON COUNTY
JOHNSON COUNTY
CAMPBELL COUNTY
BNSF/UP JOINT LINE
Black Thunder
Arch Coal
WRIGHT
School Creek
Peabody Energy
PINE TREE JUNCTION
WESTON COUNTY
NATRONA COUNTY
Antelope
Cloud Peak Energy
North Antelope / Rochelle
Peabody Energy
MIDWEST
EDGERTON
FREMONT COUNTY
NATRONA COUNTY
NATRONA COUNTY
CONVERSE COUNTY
LEGEND
APPROX. LIMIT OF COAL BEARING FORMATION
MINED OUT AREAS
PROPERTIES BY OWNERSHIP
KIEWIT MINING
WYODAK RESOURCES
PEABODY ENERGY
WESTMORELAND
ARCH COAL
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES
WESTERN FUELS
CLOUD PEAK ENERGY
CONSOL ENERGY
GENERATING STATION
INDIAN RESERVATIONS
LEASE BY APPLICATION TRACTS
FUTURE AREA OF INTEREST
STRIPPING RATIO (BCY/TON)
SCALE (Miles)
EXHIBIT 1
POWDER RIVER BASIN MINES AND MAJOR UNDEVELOPED PROPERTIES
POWDER RIVER BASIN
Southeastern Montana & Northeastern Wyoming
Prepared For
XCEL ENERGY
John T. Boyd Company
September 2011
Scale 1" = 5 Miles

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

UE 307

I certify that I have, this day, served the foregoing document upon all parties of record in this proceeding by delivering a copy in person or by mailing a copy properly addressed with first class postage prepaid, or by electronic mail pursuant to OAR 860-001-0180, to the following parties or attorneys of parties.

Dated this 8th day of July, 2016 at Salem, Oregon

Kay Barnes

Kay Barnes
Public Utility Commission
201 High Street SE Suite 100
Salem, Oregon 97301-3612
Telephone: (503) 378-5763

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