BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON

UM 1744

In the Matters of)
NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS COMPANY dba NW NATURAL,)))
Application for Approval of an Emission Reduction Program)
)

REPLY TESTIMONY OF EDWARD A. FINKLEA ON BEHALF OF NORTHWEST INDUSTRIAL GAS USERS

October 2, 2015

1	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND THE PARTY YOU ARE APPEARING FOR.
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3	A.	My name is Edward A. Finklea, and I am an attorney serving as the Executive Director
4		of the Northwest Industrial Gas Users ("NWIGU").
5	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
6	A.	Yes. I previously filed testimony in this proceeding, which can be found at NWIGU/100,
7		and my qualifications can be found at NWIGU/101.
8	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REPLY TESTIMONY?
9	A.	The purpose of my reply testimony is to address arguments made by the electric utilities
10		regarding fuel switching, comments and caparisons to this proposal made by CUB
11		regarding California's cap and trade program and the cost of this program, and Staff's
12		discussion of a reverse auction.
TESTIMONY STATES THAT "RATEPAYER MONEY SHOULD INCENTIVIZE A PUBLIC UTILITY TO ENCO	PACIFICORP WITNESS WIENCKE AT PAGE 4 OF HER RESPONSE TESTIMONY STATES THAT "RATEPAYER MONEY SHOULD NOT BE USED TO INCENTIVIZE A PUBLIC UTILITY TO ENCOURAGE CUSTOMERS TO SWITCH FROM ONE FUEL TO ANOTHER." PGE	
16		WITNESS BARRA IS ALSO CRITICAL AT PAGE 2 OF HIS RESPONSE TESTIMONY OF THE FACT THAT THE NW NATURAL TARIFF WOULD
PROMOTE "FUEL SWITCHING". DO YOU HAVE A RESPONSE TO	PROMOTE "FUEL SWITCHING". DO YOU HAVE A RESPONSE TO THOSE STATEMENTS?	
18	Α.	Yes. Absent SB 844, I agree that the Oregon Public Utility Commission's (Commission)
19		policy has been to not allow utilities to provide incentives for customers to fuel switch.
20		The issue of fuel switching has been a hot button issue before this Commission and in
21		other forums in Oregon since the mid-1980s.

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In my opinion, SB 844 was a legislative change in Oregon policy regarding fuel switching. SB 844 authorizes Oregon natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs) to incentivize their customers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions through the greater use of natural gas. Since natural gas is a fossil fuel, the only way one can use natural gas as a carbon dioxide emission reduction measure is to use natural gas instead of a more carbon-intensive fuel. Natural gas is the least carbon intensive fuel among the fossil fuels. The intent of SB 844 is to use natural gas to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by switching from a more carbon intensive source of energy to natural gas. Thus, SB 844 measures will, by definition, incentivize fuel switching in some form or another--from oil to natural gas, or from electricity to natural gas. In my opinion, this was understood by the Oregon legislature when the bill was being debated and enacted. If the Commission were to rule that the tariff filed by NW Natural is inappropriate because it incentivizes fuel switching, the Commission would be undermining the intent of SB 844.

- Q. CUB WITNESSES MCGOVERN AND JENKS OBSERVE AT PAGE 18 OF THEIR RESPONSE TESTIMONY THAT THE CHP PROGRAM IS "AN EXPENSIVE PROGRAM." MS. MCGOVERN AND MR. JENKS COMPARE THE NW NATURAL PROGRAM WITH CALIFORNIA'S CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM WHICH THEY CLAIM "PRODUCES CARBON REDUCTION AT A COST OF 1/3 TO 1/4 OF THE COST OF THIS PROGRAM. DO YOU HAVE A COMMENT REGARDING THEIR ASSERTION?
- A. Yes. In my opinion, Ms. McGovern and Mr. Jenks are making a valid comparison, but have come to a wrong conclusion on which program is more costly to natural gas consumers. Ms. McGovern and Mr. Jenks correctly note that the current carbon price in California is approximately \$12.75 per metric tonne. That price under the California program is 6.75 cents per therm of natural gas burned. A 6.75 cent per therm increase

would impose a 7.2 percent rate increase on NW Natural's residential customers, based on the expected November 1, 2015 residential rate of 93.513 cents per therm for natural gas. If Oregon had the California carbon price of \$12.75 per metric tonne, industrial interruptible sales customers would see a 14.6 % increase to the first block rate they will pay for natural gas effective November 1, 2015. The 4 percent limit on SB 844 programs keeps NW Natural's programs below the cost of cap and trade at today's California carbon prices. Furthermore, Oregon's program is capped, while California's carbon price could grow to be substantially higher over time as emission caps are decreased.

Where I agree with Ms. McGovern and Mr. Jenks is that the 4 % increase is a significant rate increase. This means that ratepayer dollars must be spent in a cost-effective manner. NWIGU understands that the Oregon Legislature by enacting SB 844 and the Commission by capping programs at 4% have committed significant ratepayer dollars to carbon reduction through voluntary programs that qualify under the statute and regulations. If Oregon LDCs were mandated to participate in a cap and trade regime modeled after the California program, the cost to ratepayers would be significantly more. It is also important to note that the California price is an allowance price. Consumers can choose to pay the \$12.75 per metric tonne to emit carbon. In other words, there is no guarantee of an actual carbon emission reduction. NWIGU recognizes that a 4% increase is a significant amount for natural gas consumers to spend for carbon emission reductions, which is why ratepayer dollars should be spent on programs that achieve the greatest overall benefit, and the CHP proposal has the lowest overall cost and greatest benefit compared to the other measures discussed in the stakeholder process.

1 Q. DOES THIS MEAN THAT YOU ARE NOT AS CONCERNED AS MS. MCGOVERN AND MR. JENKS WITH THE \$10 PER TON INCENTIVE NW NATURAL PROPOSES UNDER THE PROGRAM AS FILED?

Α.

- A. No. NWIGU shares CUB's concern with the size of the company incentive. At the \$5.00 incentive level recommended by Ms. McGovern and Mr. Jenks, and that I made independently in my previous Response Testimony, the Company's incentive is not an excessive percentage of the overall cost of the program. At \$10.00 per tonne, the utility incentive is too high of a percentage of the total cost of the program which is capped at 4%.
- Q. IN THE RESPONSE TESTIMONY FOR COMMISSION STAFF WITNESS ST. BROWN AT PAGE 12 HE DISCUSSES THE MERITS OF A REVERSE AUCTION? DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS WITH A REVERSE AUCTION?
 - The whole concept of a reverse auction is premised on the assumption that the utility will get applications from potential companies seeking to participate in the program. The Commission and NW Natural would be relying on that assumption. To submit a bid, companies with a large number of projects competing for capital would have to invest significant time and resources into developing a bid for the auction. The obvious risk with this approach is that no bids come in. The advantage of setting the number somewhere in the \$25 to \$30 range is that companies considering a CHP investment have a concrete number to run their assumptions against. If the investment meets internal approval, companies will apply for the incentives. In my opinion, adopting a price rather than conducting a reverse auction increases the likelihood that this program is successful.