
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

OF OREGON

UE 170 – RECON

In the Matter of)
PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT,)
Request for a General Rate Increase in the Company's Oregon Annual Revenues))

RESPONSIVE DIRECT TESTIMONY ON RECONSIDERATION OF THE CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARD OF OREGON



March 14, 2006

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My name is Lowrey Brown, and my qualifications are listed in CUB Exhibit 501.

2 I. Introduction

1

3 In Order 05-1254, the Commission granted PacifiCorp's Application for

4 Reconsideration to address a few specific issues. We first address those issues that fall

5 within the Commission's limited scope of reconsideration. In PacifiCorp's Testimony,

6 the Company also introduces a number of issues outside of the Commission's prescribed

7 scope. While we think these issues are not appropriate here, as they are beyond the issues

8 detailed by the Commission in its reconsideration Order, we address them as well.

9 II. The Granted Reconsideration Issues

10 The Commission was extremely clear in its Order as to the specific issues for

11 which it granted the Company reconsideration.

In conclusion, we will grant reconsideration so that the parties to UE 170
 will have a more complete opportunity to brief the application of SB 408

to general rate cases. We also grant PacifiCorp an opportunity for hearing
 to determine whether the UE 170 rates fail to comport with ORS 756.040.

3 OPUC Order No. 05-1254, page 3.

4 As the above described issues are those designated by the Commission for

5 reconsideration, we address them first.

22

6 A. Must The Commission Apply SB 408?

This question, by its very nature, invites discussion of the application of the law to 7 the UE 170 rate case. As PacifiCorp's testimony includes arguments that blur the line 8 9 between fact and law, we feel it is important to address them not only in briefs, but here as well. PPL/1702/Larson/6, PPL/1303/Martin/2, PPL/317/Williams/1-2. By enacting 10 Senate Bill 408, the legislature directed the Commission to change the way it calculates 11 12 taxes for inclusion in rates. SB 408 directs the Commission to set fair, just, and 13 reasonable rates as a matter of course, and this direction presumes a change from the Commission's past tax methodology. In regard to the application of SB 408 to rates 14 effective in 2005, it is ridiculous to suggest that the legislature intended the Commission 15 16 to set fair, just, and reasonable rates in 2006, but not in 2005. Utility rates that include amounts for taxes should reflect the taxes that are 17 paid to units of government to be considered fair, just and reasonable. 18 19 Senate Bill 408 Section 2(1)(f). 20 Nowhere in SB 408 is there a suggestion that rates which include taxes not paid to units of government ARE fair, just, or reasonable in 2005, but not in 2006. PacifiCorp's 21

self-serving and without support. PPL/1702/Larson/1. SB 408 expressly applies "taxes

argument that "SB 408 expressly applies only to post-2006 tax[es] collected and paid," is

paid and collected on or after January 1, 2006" to the automatic adjustment clause, and,

- 1 in so doing, makes clear that the rest of the Bill is not subject to that date. There is no
- 2 other use of the year 2006 in SB 408.

3 4 5	If an automatic adjustment clause is established the automatic adjustment clause shall apply only to taxes paid to units of government and collected from ratepayers on or after January 1, 2006.
6	Senate Bill 408 Section 4(2).
7	In SB 408, the legislature expressly states that the issue of utility taxes is
8	essential, it declared an emergency, and dictated that the bill should take effect
9	immediately upon its passage.
10	The Department of Justice's December 2005 legal opinion reiterates SB 408's
11	direction to the Commission to apply the fair, just, and reasonable standard generally, and
12	not simply in 2006 and beyond.
13 14 15 16 17 18	Together, section 5 and subsection 3(1) of chapter 845 contain further expressions of the <i>general policy</i> underlying the statute [I]n setting utility rates, the Commission <i>generally must strive</i> to include amounts of taxes in rates only to the extent that those amounts reflect taxes that are received by units of government from the regulated utility or from the affiliated group of which the utility is a member.
19	Department of Justice, Legal Opinion, II.B.4.a., December 27, 2005. Emphasis added.
20	In PacifiCorp's Testimony, Mr. Williams argues that the Department of Justice
21	Opinion "makes clear that the 'fair, just and reasonable' standard is one that protects
22	utilities." PPL/317/Williams/2. This is an interesting reading of SB 408, and Mr.
23	Williams' argument comes across as an attempt to co-opt the phrase "fair, just and
24	reasonable" for the protection of utilities rather than the protection of ratepayers.
25	However, Mr. Williams' claim that "fair, just and reasonable" is solely for utilities'
26	benefit is insupportable. PacifiCorp makes no decent argument that the Commission is
27	precluded from applying SB 408 immediately after its passage. In fact, the legislature's

1 directive is that the Commission must apply it to rates set after it became law, which includes the rates set in UE 170. 2

3

B. How SB 408 Should Be Applied

4 The Attorney General's above quote regards setting rates in general; there is no reference to the automatic adjustment clause. It directs the Commission to reflect the 5 6 amount of taxes that will be paid to government when setting rates. It does not suggest 7 that the Commission should pretend a utility is stand-alone for setting rates, ignore the 8 tax adjustments that should be made to account for a holding company structure, and wait 9 for the automatic adjustment clause to remedy the mismatch between taxes collected and taxes paid. 10

The natural upshot of the statute's policy is that, during a rate case, the 11 Commission should carefully consider evidence demonstrating that the utility's tax 12 forecast for its test year overstates the amount paid by the consolidated group on behalf 13 14 of the utility. While some tax adjustments that reflect the utility's place in a holding company may not be easy to forecast, others (such as PHI's tax deduction for interest 15 payments) can, and by the principles of SB 408 should, be forecast. This is exactly what 16 17 the Commission did in UE 170, and exactly what the Commission should do in the future. 18

19 i. SB 408 Does Not Apply To ScottishPower Taxes in Britain

20

The application of ScottishPower's tax payments in Britain is one of the more creative arguments we have had to address in this proceeding. 21

1 a. British Taxes

2	PacifiCorp's Larry Martin argues that ScottishPower's tax payments under the
3	British tax code "must be considered under SB 408 or 'its principles.""
4	PPL/1303/Martin/6. He asks the Commission to offset PHI's known interest tax
5	deduction taken on the consolidated group's U.S. tax filing that includes PacifiCorp, by
6	recognizing a tax the British Government levies on ScottishPower. British taxes are not a
7	line item in PacifiCorp rates. The British Government does not tax PacifiCorp or PHI.
8	b. Federal, State, Or Local
9	SB 408 clearly and explicitly states that it concerns the federal, state, and local
10	taxes that are applied to a utility directly or as part of a consolidated tax filing. SB 408
11	does not incorporate British taxation of ScottishPower, PacifiCorp does not file a
12	consolidated federal return with ScottishPower, and ScottishPower's tax rate from the
13	U.S. Finance Act of 2005 does not relate to U.S. federal income tax.
14 15 16	"Affiliated group" means an affiliated group of corporations of which the public utility is a member, and that files a consolidated federal income tax return.
17	Senate Bill 408, Section 3(13)(a).
18	Tax: Means a federal, state, or local tax or fee
19	Senate Bill 408, Section 3(13)(d)(A).
20	c. The Lower Of Cost Or Market
21	The inter-company loan, for which PacifiCorp pays the interest and on which
22	ScottishPower pays British taxes, is an affiliate service. Had PacifiCorp or PHI borrowed
23	that money from an independent bank, instead of from ScottishPower, PacifiCorp
24	customers most certainly wouldn't be expected to pay the bank's income taxes on the
25	interest payments the bank receives. A basic principle of ratemaking is that an affiliate

transaction should be priced at the lower of cost or market. A transaction with an affiliate cannot lead to higher charges than the same transaction with a non-affiliate. Mr. Martin's suggestion is that customers should pay a higher cost on an inter-company loan, than they would otherwise pay on the same loan from an independent party.

5 C. ORS 756.040

PacifiCorp argues that the Commission's Order violates ORS 756.040.
PPL/317/Williams/1-8. This is a question mixed with fact and law, and we attempt to
limit this testimony to the fact and policy at issue in the Commission's Order on
reconsideration.

10 i. Separate Issues: Return On Equity & Forecast Costs

The adjustment to PacifiCorp's tax forecast and the Company's return on equity 11 are two separate issues. The Commission granted PacifiCorp a 10% return on equity at 12 the same time as it adjusted the Company's tax forecast for rates. The Commission made 13 the tax adjustment to better reflect the taxes that will be paid to government in the test 14 15 year, and it granted PacifiCorp a return on equity to reward the investors for the risk of their investment. The Commission neither set PacifiCorp's return on equity in light of 16 the tax adjustment, nor did it make the tax adjustment in light of the return on equity. 17 The tax adjustment was, quite simply, made to better forecast taxes for inclusion in rates. 18 A more accurate tax forecast reduces the likelihood that PacifiCorp will earn above its 19 allowed return on equity. 20

There are a number of costs from a utility's parent company that are paid, at least in part, by customers: corporate costs, board of director costs, CEO costs, and taxes. The Commission makes adjustments to reflect those corporate costs it considers unreasonable 1 such as excessive bonuses or imprudence disallowances. These are not adjustments to the utility's return on equity, but are adjustment to cost components that are part of the 2 Company's revenue requirement. Neither is PacifiCorp's return on equity lower because 3 the Commission declines to acknowledge executive bonuses for ratemaking purposes, nor 4 is it lower because the Commission declines to acknowledge tax payments that are above 5 6 the utility's share in a consolidated tax filing. Taxes are like any other cost; PacifiCorp may not like the Commission's treatment of a cost, but that cost treatment doesn't change 7 the Company's return on equity. 8

9 ii. The Shareholders Of PacifiCorp & Their Return On Equity

PacifiCorp is not a stand-alone utility, and so there are no shareholders of a standalone PacifiCorp. Instead, there are shareholders of ScottishPower. We expect that a utility's owner (parent or independent shareholders) will, on average, receive the allowed return on equity over time. Taxes collected from customers, but not paid to units of government, are a bonus above and beyond what the owner receives in the rate of return paid by customers. PacifiCorp's owner has been receiving an allowed rate of return plus additional tax payments from captive regulated utility customers.

17 iii. An 8.4% Return On Equity Is Nowhere Near An ORS 756.040 Violation

While arguing that the Commission's tax adjustment results in rates that violate
ORS 756.040, Bruce Williams claims that PacifiCorp's return on equity is 8.4% because
of that adjustment. PPL/317/Williams/1-2. Above, we address PacifiCorp's confusion of
forecasted costs, such as taxes, with the Company's return on equity.
However, even if you mix costs and return for argument's sake, there is no

evidence and little argument that 8.4% so much as begins to approach a range that might

be considered confiscatory. Thomas Morgan, of Staff, presented a series of discounted
cash flow models (DCF) to show "the upper and lower ends of Cost of Equity estimates
that Staff believes could reasonably be adopted." Staff/200/Morgan/5. While 8.4% is
below Staff's recommended return on equity of 9.5%, it is within the range of reasonable
results for 3 of the 4 DCF models presented by Mr. Morgan. A copy of the table in
Mr. Morgan's testimony summarizing the results of his analysis follows:

Table 2:

	Range of Results
Single-stage DCF	8.3 percent to 9.3 percent
2-stage 5-year DCF	5.2 percent to 8.6 percent
2-stage 150-year DCF	8.4 percent to 9.2 percent
3-stage 40-year DCF	8.6 percent to 9.5 percent
Staff/200/Morgan/5.errata	

We also note that the Company stipulated to a 10% return on equity as a
reasonable result in this case, while knowing that the tax issue would not be settled, and
that the Commission might accept one of the tax adjustments proposed by CUB, ICNU,
or Staff.

11 iv. The Rating Agency Response

12 Utilities often point to rating agency comments in an attempt to demonstrate their dire straits, their need for a higher return on equity, their need to keep extra tax payments, 13 and the devastating effect of SB 408. As customers, we certainly share the utilities' 14 concern that their ratings be good enough to secure the necessary debt at reasonable 15 prices. Our interpretation of what this takes, however, tends to diverge significantly from 16 the utilities'; so much so, in fact, that we draw primarily on PacifiCorp's exhibits to 17 demonstrate that the Commission's tax adjustment is of no consequence when 18 considering ORS 756.040. 19

1 a. Standard & Poor's On PacifiCorp

2	The tax adjustment itself is \$16 million (\$26 million when grossed up for taxes);
3	hardly a sum to drag the Company from the realm of reasonable to indentured servitude,
4	so ORS 756.040 does not apply. In an article addressing SB 408 and the Commission's
5	ruling in UE 170, Standard & Poor's writes:
6 7 8	the pre-tax \$26 million disallowance represents about 1% of consolidated cash flows. Thus, the immediate consequences of the rate case are nominal from the consolidated perspective.
9	PPL/322/Williams/4.
10	If there were any question that the Commission's adjustment to better forecast
11	PacifiCorp's taxes might be material and might violate the Hope standard, the above
12	quote should put it to rest.
13	b. Regulatory Research Associates On PacifiCorp
14	In its testimony, the Company provided an article by Regulatory Research
15	Associates in which the group lowered its rating of Oregon's regulatory environment
16	because of "potential negative ramifications of Senate Bill (SB) 408."
17	PPL/323/Williams/1. Regulatory Research evaluates state regulatory environments from
18	an investor perspective, so a good rating signifies a shareholder-friendly environment. In
19	its article, Regulatory Research lowered Oregon's rating from the upper end of average to
20	the middle of average.
	State Regulatory Climate From The Investor Perspective

			•			-		
Good 1	Good 2	Good 3	Average 1	Average 2	Average 3	Bad 1	Bad 2	Bad 3
			WA	CA	ID			
			0R	→ OR	UT			
					WY			

PPL/323/Williams/2. Regulatory Research Associates, State Regulatory Evaluations, January 6, 2006.

1 First, it should be noted that a regulatory environment should balance the interests of the shareholders with those of the customers, and so an investor opinion that Oregon 2 regulation is average suggests that Oregon regulators are achieving a good balance. 3 Second, Regulatory Research's adjustment shifted its evaluation of Oregon regulation 4 from upper-average to middle-average. If Oregon regulation were balanced before, now 5 6 it's really balanced. In addition, we note that Oregon is still considered to have a better regulatory environment for PacifiCorp's shareholder than Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming. 7 8 Standard & Poor's On NW Natural с. 9 On March 7, 2006, Standard & Poor's raised NW Natural's corporate credit rating to AA- from A+ and its commercial paper rating to A-1+ from A-1. CUB Exhibit 502. 10 While NW Natural serves some customers in Washington, it is primarily an Oregon 11 12 utility. PacifiCorp, on the other hand, serves customers in six states, less than one-third of whom reside in Oregon. If Standard & Poor's were very concerned about SB 408's 13 impact, its concern should have a greater effect on the credit ratings of NW Natural than 14 15 those of PacifiCorp. Clearly, the rating agency does not think that SB 408 will devastate 16 Oregon utilities.

17 **D.** The Appropriate Remedy

¹⁸Judge Logan's February 3rd Ruling asks the parties to address the appropriate ¹⁹remedy should the Commission choose to modify PacifiCorp's revenue requirement from ²⁰the original Order. Though we have demonstrated that no remedy is necessary, we point ²¹out that CUB's testimony in UE 170 did not rely on SB 408, and demonstrates that the ²²tax adjustment is necessary to balance the benefit of the interest tax deduction at PHI with the burden of debt service, ultimately paid by customers through rates and passed
 from PacifiCorp to PHI.

3	The Commission rightly incorporated the principles of SB 408, but it did not need
4	to. The Commission can, instead, look to CUB's demonstration on the record that the tax
5	adjustment should be made to balance the benefits and burdens of debt within a
6	conglomerate, regardless of the passage of SB 408. Indeed, should the Commission
7	choose not to rely on SB 408, it must return to the record to determine the proper tax
8	amount for rates. As the Commission did not rule on CUB's rationale for our proposed
9	tax adjustment, we ask for a full consideration of our arguments and evidence.
10	III. Issues Outside The Commission's Order On Reconsideration
11	In addition to the Commission's Order on reconsideration, Judge Logan's Ruling
12	of February 3, 2006, also clearly laid out the issues to be addressed in this
13	reconsideration. Nevertheless, PacifiCorp's Direct Testimony on Reconsideration
14	introduced numerous other issues, despite the Commission's Order, Judge Logan's
15	Ruling, and Oregon Law relating to rehearing and reconsideration at the Commission.
16 17 18	If a rehearing is granted, the proceedings thereupon shall conform as nearly as possible to the proceedings in an original hearing, except as the commission otherwise may direct.
19	Oregon Revised Statutes 756.561 (3).
20	While the appropriateness of PacifiCorp's Testimony is certainly in question, we
21	will save that issue for briefing, and instead address PacifiCorp's arguments here, lest we
22	lose the opportunity to do so.

1

A. New Data & Proposed Updates After The Commission's Order

PacifiCorp's introduction of new arguments and suggested updates in the
Company's Direct Testimony on Reconsideration is wholly inappropriate.

4 i. Apples, Oranges & Cherry-Picking Cost Updates

PacifiCorp's suggestion that its UE 170 filing based on ScottishPower costs
should be tweaked to account for MidAmerican's impact on only one variable
mismatches the proverbial apple and orange. The Company is suggesting that, in the
same 2006 test year, some costs should be based on ScottishPower ownership and others
should be based on MidAmerican ownership. While deciding when to use apples and
when to use oranges, the Company also cherry-picks a single cost to update – a cost in its
favor – from the myriad of costs included in the rate case.

12 a. ScottishPower Costs Or MidAmerican Costs?

In its filing, for which the Company picked the timing, PacifiCorp asked for a rate 13 14 increase based on a 2006 test year using cost estimates based on ScottishPower ownership. Now PacifiCorp would have the Commission use this filing as a base, but 15 update one variable – taxes – based on MidAmerican ownership. This is a decidedly 16 17 creative approach to ratemaking which would allow the Company to pick and choose, within a single test year, which costs to base upon ScottishPower ownership and which to 18 19 base upon MidAmerican ownership. While this patchwork may be pretty and profitable, 20 it is not appropriate. It also cannot be made here, as there is no evidence on the record demonstrating the overall impact of MidAmerican ownership on PacifiCorp costs, and 21 22 MidAmerican is still not an affiliate of PacifiCorp, so the parties did not have the 23 opportunity to conduct discovery.

1 b. Known & Measurable

2	PacifiCorp claims that MidAmerican ownership is a known and measurable
3	change that the Commission is "required to consider" in making any tax adjustment for
4	the Company's 2006 test year. PPL/1702/Larson/3. First, MidAmerican ownership,
5	though likely, is not known. As we experienced in Sierra Pacific's Application to acquire
6	PGE, such transactions can dissolve any time before ink is put to paper.
7	MidAmerican ownership was not known or measurable when the Commission
8	issued its Order in UE 170. It was not known or measurable when PacifiCorp filed for
9	this reconsideration. It is not known or measurable as CUB submits this testimony.
10	Though MidAmerican ownership is likely to be known when the Commission issues its
11	Order in this reconsideration, PacifiCorp's suggestion that we should apply that
12	ownership change to only the PHI interest tax deduction is ridiculous. This tax deduction
13	may disappear, but others may appear, and there are any number of unknown changes
14	that accompany MidAmerican ownership. Judy Johansen, PacifiCorp's CEO, will be
15	leaving the Company: should her salary be deducted?
16	While MidAmerican's acquisition may be approaching, it is certainly not
17	measurable. We know very little, if anything, about PacifiCorp's costs under
18	MidAmerican ownership. As PacifiCorp's filing was based on ScottishPower ownership,
19	the parties didn't do any discovery on the Company's costs under MidAmerican
20	ownership. While PacifiCorp may feel comfortable knowing and measuring
21	MidAmerican ownership, we most certainly do not.
22	c. Cherry Picking
23	PacifiCorp would like to update its 2006 rate case test year to account for taxes

24 under the probable ownership of MidAmerican. That's nice. We would like to update

the Company's 2006 rate case test year to account for electricity and gas prices which
have dropped considerably since September when PacifiCorp's forward price curve
raised net power costs by \$11.3 million. PPL/612/Widmer/4. The record closes in a case
for a reason; things always change. The parties do the best they can when forecasting
costs, but there is always better information the day after the record closes. This is just a
part of the ratemaking process.

7 While cherry-picking which costs to base on ScottishPower ownership and which 8 to base on MidAmerican ownership, PacifiCorp is also cherry-picking which costs to 9 update and which costs to leave unchanged. The Company always has better information 10 about its operations than other parties do, and is always in a better position to call-out 11 variables that have changed in its favor. This problem is exacerbated here in the 12 Commission's reconsideration, because many of the Company's costs were settled, and 13 are not, therefore, open for reconsideration.

As a final nail, we note that the Company has filed yet another rate case for 2007, 14 where it will have ample opportunity to present its costs under MidAmerican ownership, 15 should that materialize. The parties may conduct discovery at that time, and PacifiCorp's 16 17 tax expense may be forecast under the new ownership structure. Even were MidAmerican's acquisition to close by the end of March as scheduled, in light of the 18 Company's new rate case, UE 170 rates will be in effect for a time period approximately 19 20 half represented by ScottishPower ownership and half by MidAmerican ownership: October, 2005 through the effective date of rates set in UE 179. PacifiCorp should not be 21 22 allowed to reopen the record to update a single variable for the benefit of ScottishPower 23 and/or MidAmerican shareholders.

1 *ii. Discouragement Of Partial Settlements*

2	The Commission should not re-open a docket after the record has closed simply to
3	update one party's variable. Not only would this be unfair, but, because many issues
4	were settled in this case, the parties will be hurt by having settled those issues, because it
5	allowed the Company to apply for reconsideration without risking the issues that are
6	settled. The Company has nothing to lose in this reconsideration, but the result of this
7	proceeding will affect how the parties will feel about the partial settlements. CUB will be
8	more wary of signing partial settlements in the future.

9

B. Method Used To Calculate Tax Adjustment

10 The discussion, on pages 3-5 of Mr. Martin's testimony, regarding the calculation of the tax adjustment is not relevant to this reconsideration. The method the Commission 11 used to calculate the tax adjustment is supported in the record and discussed at length in 12 the Commission's Order, pages 18-19. Mr. Martin confuses UE 170 with AR 499 when 13 asserting that "all suggested approaches to allocation of consolidated taxes assume the 14 use of relative taxable income." PPL/1303/Martin/4. We refer Mr. Martin to 15 CUB/100/Jenks/8 where Mr. Jenks explicitly uses gross profits for tax attribution in his 16 testimony in this docket. Neither the applicability of SB 408 nor the fair, just, and 17 reasonable standard laid out in ORS 756.040 pertain to the method used to calculate the 18 adjustment. 19

20 C. PacifiCorp's Morphing Test Year

In its Testimony, PacifiCorp introduces new figures, misrepresents those figures,
 and then misapplies them.

1 i. A Forecast Test Year Cannot Be Perfect

2	In his Testimony, Mr. Martin introduces a change in the PHI debt structure which
3	occurred on September 22, 2005, two months after the record in UE 170 closed on this
4	issue, and a whopping six days before the Commission's Order. A future test year is not
5	a perfect device. The parties get new information every day and circumstances evolve
6	constantly, but in order to set rates, a forecast for a future test year must be chosen.
7	Mr. Martin also claims that, based on PacifiCorp's fiscal year 2005 tax return,
8	PacifiCorp contributed only 50% of PHI's taxable income. Though Mr. Martin points
9	out he didn't have this information earlier, so what? There is a lot of information we
10	have now that we didn't have earlier. PacifiCorp's request to update information begs
11	the question: when do we stop?
12	In addition, Mr. Martin fails to show that fiscal year 2005 is representative of
13	calendar year 2006. When forecasting costs in ratemaking, sometimes data from the
14	most recent year is used, sometimes a multi-year average is used, and sometimes other
15	estimates are used. In its argument, the Company puts forth an example year that may
16	serve its argument, but PacifiCorp doesn't support the use of this year's data as relevant
17	to the test year in question. Why is calendar year 2004-2005 an appropriate benchmark?
18	ii. A 2006 Test Year Measured By 2004 Data
19	Above we noted Mr. Martin's claim that, based on PacifiCorp's fiscal year 2005
20	tax return, PacifiCorp contributed only 50% of PHI's taxable income. It is important to
21	remember that PacifiCorp's 2005 fiscal year runs from April 2004 through March of
22	2005, so Mr. Martin's claim that PacifiCorp contributed 50% of the consolidated group's
23	taxable income relates primarily to calendar year 2004, not 2006. Also, while fiscal year

1	2005 may serve PacifiCorp's arguments, we point to Mr. Jenks' testimony in UE 170,
2	Confidential Exhibit 102, which shows that PacifiCorp's average contribution to PHI's
3	consolidated income over 2001, 2002, and 2003 is considerably greater than 50%.
4	Mr. Williams, too, relies on 2004 information to demonstrate that the
5	Commission's order, based on a 2006 test year, will have "significantly negative"
6	impacts on PacifiCorp. PPL/317/Williams/2.
7 8	PacifiCorp's semi-annual report for the year ended March 31, 2005 showed its unadjusted Oregon return on equity to be 7.07%,
9	PPL/317/Williams/3.
10	We repeat, the year in question is 2006, and the adjustment in question applies to
11	a normalized 2006 test year, not to the unadjusted actual results from a 2004-2005 time
12	period.
13	iii. Rounding 101: \$138.9 Becomes \$136
14	When describing the aforementioned debt structure change as a known and
15	measurable change, Mr. Martin states that "[t]his change decreased the level of interest
16	that PHI will pay in calendar year 2006 to \$136 million." PPL/1303/Martin/5. He then
17	mentions that the interest rate in question only applies to the first 90 days of 2006. In
18	response to CUB data request 4 on reconsideration, Mr. Martin expands on this
19	information. CUB Exhibit 503.
20	At the risk of splitting hairs, we note that PHI's quarterly payment amount
21	(assuming the 4.97688% rate for the entire year) will be \$34,734,751.49. The
22	\$136 million mentioned in Mr. Martin's testimony is equivalent to four quarterly
23	payments of \$34 million. Four quarterly payments of \$34.734 million, however, is

but a \$2.8 million rounding error is a big hair. In any case, this highlights the danger of
altering the test year after the Commission's Order.

3 IV. Conclusion

This reconsideration is not an exploration of the Commission's authority to make a tax adjustment, as, clearly, it has such authority. The disagreement is whether SB 408 can be used as a justification for the adjustment. The Attorney General's opinion makes clear that the Commission's incorporation of the principles of SB 408 was indeed appropriate.

9 This reconsideration is also not an issue of takings or the Hope standard, as the 10 Commission's tax adjustment was designed to better reflect the utility's actual tax 11 expense, as a member of its parent company's tax return. The Commission's tax adjustment better reflects PacifiCorp's actual tax costs, and does not impact the return 12 ScottishPower and/or MidAmerican shareholders receive from PacifiCorp customers. 13 Even should the Commission decide that the application of SB 408 was not 14 appropriate, CUB's benefit/burden argument still stands, and the tax adjustment to reflect 15 the risks borne by ratepayers as part of a larger corporate conglomerate is not only 16 17 appropriate, but essential to balance benefits and burdens.

WITNESS QUALIFICATION STATEMENT

NAME:	Lowrey R. Brown			
EMPLOYER:	Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon			
TITLE:	Utility Analyst			
ADDRESS:	610 SW Broadway, Suite 308 Portland, OR 97205			
EDUCATION:	Master of Science, Engineering Bachelor of Science, Civil Engineering Stanford University, Stanford California			
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE:	Provided comments and participated in settlement discussions in OPUC dockets UE 161, UE 165, UE 173, UM 1014, UM 1147, UM 1158, UM 1169, UM 1206, and UM 1209. Presented testimony and engaged in settlement proceedings in UE 167 and UM 1121. Participated in technical subcommittees for the Governor's Advisory Group on Global Warming, and in the Regional Representatives Group for Grid West. Currently involved in the development of PacifiCorp's integrated resource plan. Prior to this, worked as a consultant with KEMA-Xenergy in Portland			
	from 2002 to 2003 on energy and energy efficiency issues. Between 1997 and 2001, freelanced in Colorado for <u>The Valley Journal</u> , Solar Energy International, Energy Systems Engineering, and Resource Engineering providing writing and technical assistance.			



Standard & Poor's Raises NW Natural's Credit Rating to AA-

PORTLAND, Ore.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--March 7, 2006--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has raised the corporate credit rating of Northwest Natural Gas Co. (NYSE: NWN), dba NW Natural, from A+ to AA-. The commercial paper rating was also raised, from A-1 to A-1+.

Standard & Poor's said the ratings upgrade reflected "an excellent business profile that is among the strongest in the country, and a sustained strong financial performance, even after the completion of a substantial capital expenditure program."

About NW Natural

NW Natural is headquartered in Portland, Ore. and serves more than 617,000 residential and business customers in Oregon and southwest Washington. It is the largest independent natural gas utility in the Pacific Northwest. With customer growth exceeding 3 percent for 19 consecutive years, it is one of the fastest-growing local distribution companies in the nation. The company has more than \$2.0 billion in total assets, including nearly 14 bcf of underground storage capacity in its service territory. The company benefits from rate mechanisms that help to protect revenues from warmer than normal weather and declining consumption. NW Natural has increased its dividends paid on common stock for 50 consecutive years.

CONTACT: Northwest Natural Gas Co. Steve Sechrist, 503-226-4211, Ext. 3517 (Media) steve.sechrist@nwnatural.com or Bob Hess, 503-226-4211, Ext. 2388 (Investors) bob.hess@nwnatural.com

SOURCE: Northwest Natural Gas Co.

PacifiCorp / UE 170 R Attachment UE 170 R CUB 4b -1

Chart of PacifiCorp Holdings, Inc. debt to Scottish Power Finance 2 Limited.

All Amounts in US dollars

Payment Date	Payment Amount	Remaining Debt Associated w/ Payment	Interest Rate	Party Issuing Debt
3/31/2006	34,734,751.49	2,731,000,000.00	4.97688%	Scottish Power Finance 2 Limited
6/30/2006	34,734,751.49 A	2,731,000,000.00	4.97688%	A Scottish Power Finance 2 Limited
9/302006	34,734,751.49 A	2,731,000,000.00	4.97688%	A Scottish Power Finance 2 Limited
12/31/2006	34,734,751.49 A	2,731,000,000.00	4.97688%	A Scottish Power Finance 2 Limited

Note A: These amounts are based on the interest rate for the 1st quarter of 2006. Future quarterly rates will actually be based upon LIBOR plus 45 basis points in effect at the beginning of each quarter. This will affect the payment amount.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of March, 2006, I served the foregoing Responsive Direct Testimony on Reconsideration of the Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon in docket UE 170 upon each party listed below, by email and U.S. mail, postage prepaid, and upon the Commission by email and by sending 6 copies by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the Commission's Salem offices.

Respectfully submitted,

escla

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