

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

**OF OREGON**

**UM 1817**

In the Matter of:

PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC  
COMPANY,

Application for the Deferral of Storm-Related  
Restoration Costs.

**STAFF REPLY BRIEF**

**June 27, 2019**

1 **I. Introduction.**

2 Portland General Electric Company (PGE) seeks approval of an application to defer  
3 excess Level III storm damage restoration costs (hereinafter referred to as “Level III storm  
4 costs”). PGE filed the application under ORS 757.259(2)(e). All parties have described the  
5 Commission’s two-stage review of deferral applications filed under ORS 757.259(2). Much of  
6 the dispute in this case is focused on the second, “discretionary stage of review.” Although the  
7 Commission’s analysis in the second stage has been described multiple times, Staff summarizes  
8 it here because it is not clear that PGE understands Staff’s analysis.

9 In the second stage of its two-stage review, the Commission determines whether it should  
10 exercise its discretion to grant the requested deferral by considering two interrelated factors: the  
11 type of event giving rise to the deferral and the magnitude of the amount to be deferred.  
12 Typically, the Commission distinguishes the financial impact that is required by determining  
13 whether the underlying event or costs is a “stochastic risk” or “scenario risk.”<sup>1</sup> To make this  
14 determination, the Commission examines whether and how the event is treated in the utility’s  
15 rates effective at the time of the event.

16 If an event was modeled in rates, the Commission evaluates whether the event was within  
17 a foreseen range of risk, or whether extenuating circumstances were involved that rendered the  
18 event unforeseeable.<sup>2</sup> The former is classified as a stochastic risk and the latter classified as a  
19 scenario risk.<sup>3</sup>

20 ///

21 ///

22

---

23 <sup>1</sup> *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company, Application for Deferred Accounting of*  
*Excess Power Plant Costs Due to Plant Outage* (UM 1234), Order No. 07-049, p. 9.

24 <sup>2</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>3</sup> It is Staff’s understanding of this point that PGE did not perceive. PGE asserts that Staff  
26 categorizes the Level III storms as a stochastic because Level III storm costs are modeled in  
rates. PGE’s Opening Brief, p. 17, lines 9-12. This is an oversimplification. Staff believes the  
2017 Level III storms are a stochastic risk because they are modeled in rates *and within a*  
*foreseen range of risk.*

1 If the event was not modeled in rates, the Commission assesses whether it was otherwise  
2 foreseeable in the normal course of business.<sup>4</sup> An event that is not modeled in rates but  
3 nonetheless foreseeable in the normal course of events is a stochastic risk. An event that is not  
4 modeled in rates and not foreseeable is a scenario risk.

5 If a deferral application is based on an event deemed to be a stochastic risk, deferral is  
6 warranted only if the financial magnitude of the event is “substantial.”<sup>5</sup> If a deferral application  
7 is based on an event deemed to be a scenario risk, the financial impact must be “material.”<sup>6</sup> As  
8 discussed in testimony and opening briefs, the Commission makes this determination on a case-  
9 by-case basis and has yet to adopt a bright-line rule as to what constitutes a “substantial” or  
10 “material” financial impact.

11 **II. The costs at issue are not sufficient to warrant the extraordinary remedy of deferred**  
12 **accounting.**

13 In this case, the costs for Level III storm damage restoration were modeled in rates based  
14 on a ten-year rolling average of the costs actually incurred by the Company. Because costs for  
15 Level III storms are modeled in rates, the appropriate question is whether the 2017 storm costs  
16 are within a foreseen range of risk or whether extenuating circumstances were involved that  
17 rendered the costs unforeseeable. The Association of Western Energy Customers (AWEC),  
18 Oregon Citizens’ Utility Board (CUB), and Staff have submitted testimony and arguments to  
19 demonstrate that \$10.6 million of Level III storm damage restoration costs falls within a foreseen  
20 range of risk captured by the 10-year rolling average methodology.<sup>7</sup> PGE has submitted  
21 testimony and argument attempting to demonstrate that the Level III costs at issue were not  
22 foreseeable.

23 ///

24 \_\_\_\_\_

25 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

<sup>7</sup> See Staff/100, Moore/13.



1 Staff will not reiterate its arguments as to why the 2017 Level III storms and their costs  
2 should be categorized as a stochastic risk in this Reply Brief. Whether the deferral is for a  
3 stochastic or scenario risk is not dispositive because the Commission must also take the financial  
4 impact to the Company into account. Importantly, the financial impact of the deferral amount  
5 (\$8 million) is not sufficient to warrant deferral no matter whether the Level III storm costs are  
6 categorized as a stochastic or scenario risk.<sup>8</sup>

7 The Commission's previous orders make clear that even though the classification of an  
8 event as scenario or stochastic risk may turn on a comparison of the event's actual cost to what  
9 the utility recovers in rates for events of that nature, whether the financial impact of the event is  
10 sufficient to warrant deferral turns on the impact to the utility considering *all* the utility's costs  
11 and revenues.<sup>9</sup> So, even though costs of an event may be beyond the foreseen range of risk for  
12 that particular cost category, the costs may still be insufficient to warrant the extraordinary  
13 remedy of deferral when compared to the utility's overall revenue requirement.

14 The financial impacts at issue in at least the most recent cases involving scenario events  
15 were sufficient to warrant deferrals even if the events had been stochastic events.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly,  
16 what financial impact is "material" as opposed to "substantial" is not necessarily well defined.

17 <sup>8</sup> AWEC/100, Hellman/14 ("Because 36 basis points is far less than the Order 07-049 materiality  
18 threshold of 100 basis points for scenario events, the PGE deferral application should be denied,  
19 regardless of whether the Commission determines 2017 Level III storm costs to be a stochastic  
or scenario event.")

20 <sup>9</sup> See e.g., *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application for Deferral of*  
*Hydro Replacement Power Costs* (UM 1071), Order No. 04-108, p. 9 ("Finally, we note that  
21 PGE claims that without deferral, its return on equity will drop to 8 percent. That is far from a  
dire figure. We find that the impact of excess hydro costs is not significant enough in this case to  
warrant a deferral.")

22 <sup>10</sup> See e.g., *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application for Deferred*  
*Accounting of Excess Power Costs Due to Plant Outage, supra*, 07-049 (allowing deferral for  
23 Boardman Outage, which the Commission classified as a scenario risk with financial impact a  
24 little greater than 250 basis points of PGE's ROE); *In the Matter of the Application of PacifiCorp*  
*for an Accounting Order Regarding Excess Net Power Costs* (UM 995), Order No. 01-420  
25 (allowing deferral for replacement power costs for volatile power markets combined with and  
poor hydro conditions and plant outage) and Order No. 02-503 (power costs eligible for deferral  
26 in UM 995 were approximately \$131 million); and *In the Matter of Portland General Electric*  
*Company Application for Deferral of Hydro Replacement Power Costs, supra*, Order No. 04-  
108, pp. 8-9 (identifying events underlying PacifiCorp application in UM 995 as "scenario" risk).

1 However, in the last several years, the Commission has defined the business risk that a utility is  
2 expected to absorb between rate cases as at least 100 basis points of the utility's ROE.<sup>11</sup> The  
3 Commission has required a utility to absorb costs that did not exceed this threshold no matter the  
4 categorization of the cost-causing event underlying a deferral application. In Docket No. UM  
5 1623, the Commission denied PGE's request to defer excess pension costs concluding "the  
6 impact of the excess FAS 87 expense on PGE's earnings was 18 basis points in 2012 and 86  
7 basis points in 2013, well within the bounds of acceptable risk between rate cases."<sup>12</sup> In Docket  
8 No. UM 1071, the Commission denied PGE's application to defer hydro replacement power  
9 costs,<sup>13</sup>

10 Even in cases in which the Commission has allowed deferrals, it has still required utilities  
11 to absorb a portion of the costs that the Commission deemed to be normal business risk.<sup>14</sup> In  
12 Docket No. UM 1234, the Commission addressed PGE's application to defer \$45 million of  
13 replacement power costs related to an extended outage at its Boardman plant.<sup>15</sup> The Commission  
14 concluded the extended outage was a scenario risk and that the financial impact of slightly over  
15 250 basis points of PGE's ROE was sufficient to warrant deferral.<sup>16</sup> However, the Commission  
16 did not allow PGE to defer all \$45 million of replacement power costs. Instead, the Commission

17 \_\_\_\_\_  
18 <sup>11</sup> See e.g., *In the Matters of Portland General Electric Company* (UE 180), Order No. 07-015,  
19 p. 18 (applying adjusted 150 basis points on ROE deadband in PGE's variable power cost  
20 adjustment mechanism as an explicit measure of normal business risk).

21 <sup>12</sup> See e.g., *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application for Deferral*  
22 *Accounting for Excess Pension Costs and Carrying Costs on Cash Contributions* (UM 1623),  
23 Order No. 16-257, p. 4.

24 <sup>13</sup> *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application for an Order Approving the*  
25 *Deferral of Hydro Replacement Power Costs, supra*, p. 9 (denying application to defer  
26 replacement hydro costs equal to approximately 95 basis points because the impact of the costs is  
not significant enough to warrant a deferral.)

<sup>14</sup> See e.g., *In the Matter of the Application of PacifiCorp for an Accounting Order Regarding*  
*Excess Net Power Costs, supra*, Order No. 01-420.

<sup>15</sup> *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application for Deferred Accounting of*  
*Excess Power Costs Due to Plant Outage, supra*, Order No. 07-049, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*, pp. 10, 13 (finding that \$42.8 million in replacement power costs were eligible for deferral  
and that the financial impact of this amount was equal to a few basis points over 250 points on  
ROE).



1 allowed PGE to defer only the portion of the replacement power costs that exceeded PGE's  
2 "normal business risk," which the Commission deemed to equal 100 basis points of ROE. The  
3 Commission explained,

4 [w]e must decide whether it is appropriate to apply a measure of normal business  
5 risk to a scenario risk such as the Boardman Outage. If so, then we must decide what  
6 the appropriate measure is. As we discussed above, we consider the Boardman  
7 Outage to be a scenario risk because we find the scope of the Boardman Outage to be  
8 outside of the range of foreseeable forced outages. \* \* \*

9 If an event is deemed a scenario risk because it is outside a range of normal risk,  
10 we find that it is appropriate to apply a measure of normal risk when allocating, for  
11 deferral purposes, the costs associated with the event. \* \* \* However, as parties did  
12 not present evidence in this proceeding that would allow us to explicitly calculate this  
13 level of costs, we find it appropriate to approximate the financial impact of this range  
14 of risk. We determine that a 100 basis point deadband on ROE should be applied to  
15 costs eligible for deferral.<sup>17</sup>

16 Ultimately, PGE was allowed to defer \$26.439 million of the \$42.8 million of  
17 replacement power costs PGE incurred during the deferral period.<sup>18</sup>

18 Staff is aware of orders in which the Commission has determined that a larger amount  
19 represents normal business risk. For example in Docket No. UM 995 regarding PacifiCorp's  
20 deferral of excess power costs related to a scenario risk, the Commission "allowed no recovery  
21 of costs or refunds to customers within [a 250 basis point] deadband, reasoning that the band  
22 represented risks assumed, or rewards gained, in the course of the utility business."<sup>19</sup> However,  
23 Staff is aware of no orders in which the Commission has determined an amount equal to less  
24 than 100 basis points of a utility's ROE represents normal business risk a utility should absorb  
25 between rate cases. In light of the Commission orders consistently defining normal business risk  
26 as an amount equal to least 100 basis points of ROE, Staff does not think "material financial  
27 impact" can reasonably be 36 basis points of ROE, which is only a little over one-third of 100  
28 basis points of ROE.

---

<sup>17</sup> *Id.*, p. 19.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.*, p. 13 (finding there is \$42.8 million in replacement power costs eligible for deferral), and  
p. 20 (authorizing PGE to defer \$26.49 million in replacement power costs).

<sup>19</sup> *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application for Deferral of Hydro  
Replacement Power Costs, supra* Order No. 04-108, p. 9, *citing* Order No. 01-420.

1 **III. PGE's reliance on Staff's positions in other cases is misplaced.**

2 In its Opening Brief, PGE relies on the Commission's approval of a 2012 application to  
3 defer storm damage restoration costs filed by PacifiCorp as support for the request at issue in this  
4 docket.<sup>20</sup> In that case (Docket No. UM 1634), PacifiCorp filed a request to defer an unspecified  
5 amount of costs incurred to restore service after a severe storm.<sup>21</sup> PacifiCorp filed the  
6 application on November 20, 2012. On December 13, 2012, Staff posted a Staff Report for the  
7 Commission's regular public meeting on December 18, 2012, recommending the Commission  
8 approve the deferral request on the ground it met the criteria for deferrals the Commission  
9 articulated in Docket No. UM 1147. The Commission adopted the recommendation at its  
10 December 18, 2012 public meeting.<sup>22</sup> PacifiCorp subsequently withdrew the application because  
11 its self-insurance reserves covered the costs at issue.<sup>23</sup>

12 PGE's reliance on the Staff Public Meeting Memorandum and Commission order in the  
13 2012 PacifiCorp case is misplaced because the Commission's review of PacifiCorp's application  
14 did not take into account the amount at issue. In the cases relied on by Staff and the intervenors  
15 in this docket, the Commission considered the interrelated impact of the foreseeability of the  
16 deferral event and the financial impact. Because Staff presented its recommendation to the  
17 Commission prior to the end of the deferral period in the PacifiCorp case, or even prior to the  
18 time PacifiCorp had an estimate of the costs at issue, the Commission could not conduct this  
19 analysis. Accordingly, the Commission's order in the case is not probative on the issue  
20 presented in this case.

21 If PGE is relying on the Commission's order regarding PacifiCorp's 2012 deferral  
22 request for the proposition that restoration costs for severe storms are always deferrable, no

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
<sup>20</sup> PGE's Opening Brief, pp. 10-11, 18.

24 <sup>21</sup> UM 1634 Pacific Power's Request for Deferred Accounting Order for Network Damage from  
25 November 2012 Storm.

26 <sup>22</sup> *In the Matter of PacifiCorp dba Pacific Power's Request for Deferred Accounting Order for  
Network Damage from November 2012 Storm* (UM 1634), Order No. 12-489.

<sup>23</sup> UM 1634 PacifiCorp Withdrawal of Application (January 25, 2013).



1 matter the financial impact, Staff urges the Commission to reject the proposition. If PacifiCorp  
2 had not withdrawn its deferral, Staff and other parties still would have had opportunity at the  
3 time PacifiCorp asked to amortize the costs to assert some or even all the deferred costs should  
4 be absorbed by the Company.

5 Also, Staff's testimony and briefs in this case make clear that Staff's position in the 2012  
6 PacifiCorp matter was anomalous. In other cases concerning deferrals like the deferral at issue  
7 in this case, Staff has based its recommendation regarding deferral on a consideration of the  
8 event at issue and its financial impact.

9 PGE's argument that Staff and intervenors "do not challenge the extraordinary nature of  
10 the 2017 storm events, the prudence of PGE's restoration efforts, or the reasonableness of the  
11 costs expended[,]"<sup>24</sup> is also misplaced. Whether PGE acted prudently and reasonably is not at  
12 issue. The prudence of any deferred amounts is determined when the utility seeks to amortize  
13 them.<sup>25</sup> The questions presented are whether the costs were foreseen, whether their impact on  
14 the Company's earnings is sufficient to warrant the extraordinary ratemaking treatment of  
15 deferred accounting, and whether if deferral is allowed, the Company should still absorb some of  
16 the costs because the Company bears normal business risk between rate cases.

17 Finally, PGE's argument that Staff's opposition to PGE's deferral request is inconsistent  
18 with Staff's position in Docket No. UE 319 is incorrect. In that docket, Staff opposed PGE's  
19 request to modify the Level III storm cost accrual to allow the account to go "negative" so that  
20 PGE would be assured of dollar for dollar recovery of all Level III storm costs. Staff opposed  
21 this ratemaking treatment, but stipulated to PGE continuing to accrue unspent revenues collected  
22 for Level III storm damage restoration from year-to-year. However, Staff has always

23

24

---

<sup>24</sup> PGE's Opening Brief, p. 1.

25

<sup>25</sup> ORS 757.259(5); See e.g., *In the Matter of Portland General Electric Company Application to Amortize the Boardman Deferral* (UE 196), Order No. 10-051, pp. 13-14 (Commission finding PGE's imprudent actions contributed to Boardman Outage and allowing PGE to amortize only 50 percent of the \$26.4 million PGE was allowed to defer).

26



1 acknowledged that PGE may seek to defer extraordinary Level III storm costs.<sup>26</sup> The costs at  
2 issue in this case are not extraordinary.


3 **IV. Conclusion.**

4 Staff recommends that the Commission deny PGE's application to defer 2017 Level III  
5 storm costs.

6 DATED this 27<sup>th</sup> day of June 2019.

7 Respectfully submitted,

8 ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM  
9 Attorney General

10  
11   
12 \_\_\_\_\_  
13 Stephanie Andrus, OSB No. 925123  
14 Sr. Assistant Attorney General  
15 Of Attorneys for Staff of the Public Utility  
16 Commission of Oregon  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

<sup>26</sup> UE 319 Staff/400, Gardner/31; UE 215 Staff/400, Ball/5.