



900 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 2600  
Portland, Oregon 97204  
main 503.224.3380  
fax 503.220.2480  
www.stoel.com

May 1, 2006

SARAH J. ADAMS LIEN  
Direct (503) 294-9896  
sjadamslien@stoel.com

**VIA ELECTRONIC FILING**

PUC Filing Center  
Public Utility Commission of Oregon  
PO Box 2148  
Salem, OR 97308-2148

**Re: In the Matter of PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT (d/b/a PacifiCorp) Reconsideration  
of Order No. 05-1050  
Docket UE 170 (RECON)**

Enclosed for filing is an original and 6 copies of PacifiCorp's Post-Hearing Opening Brief in the above-referenced matter. A copy of this filing was served on all parties to this proceeding as indicated on the attached certificate of service.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "SJL", followed by a horizontal line.

Sarah J. Adams Lien

SJL:knp  
Enclosures  
cc: Service List

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION  
OF OREGON

UE 170 (RECON)

In the Matter of  
PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT  
(d/b/a PacifiCorp)  
Reconsideration of Order No. 05-1050.

**PACIFICORP'S POST-HEARING  
OPENING BRIEF**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

In Order No. 05-150 (the "Rate Order"), the Commission's selective attribution of PacifiCorp Holdings, Inc.'s ("PHI") interest-related tax deduction to reduce PacifiCorp's tax expense was inconsistent with the Commission's existing rules and standards, was not authorized by Senate Bill 408 ("SB 408"), and is not supported by the facts. For all of these reasons, the Commission should vacate the adjustment and permit PacifiCorp to recoup its lost revenues associated with this adjustment back to October 28, 2005, the date of the deferred accounting application in this case. Barring this, the Commission should reduce the adjustment to \$660,000 based on necessary corrections and updates to its calculations, and should permit PacifiCorp to recover the difference between the original adjustment and the modified adjustment since October 28, 2005.

Administrative Law Judge Kathryn Logan has directed the parties to address the reconsideration and rehearing issues in the following order:

1. Was the Commission required to apply or prohibited from applying SB 408 to this docket?
2. Assume that the Commission could apply SB 408 or "its principles" to this docket. How should SB 408 or "its principles" be applied?
3. Did the \$16.07 million tax adjustment result in rates violative of ORS 756.040?

1           4.       What is the appropriate remedy if the Commission should determine to  
2                   modify the revenue requirement from the original order?

3                                   **II. ARGUMENT**

4   **A.     Was the Commission Required to or Prohibited from Applying SB 408 in This**  
5           **Docket?**

6           1.       **The Commission Erred in Applying SB 408 in This Case.**

7           Prior to the Rate Order, the Commission's historical practice has been to calculate  
8   utility taxes for ratemaking purposes based on a stand-alone methodology. *See* Rate Order at  
9   13, 17-18 (acknowledging that past precedent had "always" been to calculate the tax expense  
10   on a stand-alone basis). In the Rate Order, the Commission abruptly departed from both its  
11   precedent and administrative rules,<sup>1</sup> stating that "[t]he legislative intent behind SB 408 is  
12   clear—we are to depart from historic practice and consider taxes paid by a utility or its parent  
13   when setting rates." Rate Order at 18.

14           Contrary to this ruling, SB 408 does not and should not apply to this case because:  
15   (1) SB 408 does not require or authorize an immediate change to calculation of taxes in rates,

16                   <sup>1</sup> *See* OAR 860-027-0048(3)(g) and (4)(h), which require tax expenses "for both  
17   ratemaking purposes and regulatory reporting" to be calculated on a "standalone basis." In  
18   the Rate Order, the Commission summarily dismissed PacifiCorp's argument that the Stand-  
19   Alone Rule expressly requires a stand-alone approach to tax expense in ratemaking, stating  
20   that the Stand-Alone Rule is "an accounting rule, which requires an energy utility to keep its  
21   books of account on a stand-alone basis," and as such has no effect on how a utility  
22   calculates its taxes for ratemaking purposes. Rate Order at 18. The Commission's  
23   interpretation of its rule ignores the general rules of statutory construction, which maintain  
24   that courts should construe a provision according to its plain meaning and give effect to all  
25   language in a provision if possible. *See* ORS 174.010. The Stand-Alone Rule expressly  
26   requires utility tax expense to be calculated for "ratemaking purposes" on a stand-alone basis.  
There is no support in the rule for the Commission's position that "for ratemaking purposes"  
in this context actually means "for accounting purposes." Indeed, the Commission's orders  
routinely distinguish between the two functions, permitting a utility to treat a cost in one  
manner for accounting purposes while reserving the Commission's authority to address the  
matter differently for "ratemaking purposes." Additionally, the express purpose of the rule—  
to prevent cross-subsidization between regulated and unregulated functions—cannot be  
realized if the rule is construed only to apply to a utility's accounting, not to its rates. *Re*  
*Affiliated Transactions for Energy Utils.*, Order No. 03-691 (AR 459), 2003 WL 23305011  
at \*1 (OPUC Dec. 1, 2003).

1 but rather only authorizes a true-up mechanism; (2) SB 408 applies only to taxes after 2006,  
2 and here the Commission applied it to a case with a rate effective date in 2005; (3) the  
3 Commission has not yet adopted standards and rules for SB 408, and thus its application in  
4 this case is premature; and (4) in order to apply SB 408 in this case, the Commission has to  
5 forecast tax expense under SB 408, which it cannot or should not do.

6           **2. SB 408 Does Not Require or Authorize an Immediate Change to**  
7           **Calculation of Taxes in Base Rates, but Only Authorizes a True-up**  
8           **Mechanism.**

9           The Commission’s conclusion that SB 408 required it to immediately change its  
10 approach to calculating taxes in base rates is not supported by the language of SB 408. The  
11 Commission based its conclusion on the addition of the word “fair” to the “just and  
12 reasonable” standard in ORS 757.210(1)(a). Relying on section 2(1)(f) in SB 408’s  
13 preamble, providing that taxes in rates should reflect taxes paid to be considered “fair, just  
14 and reasonable,” the Commission concluded that SB 408’s change to ORS 757.210 required  
15 immediate adoption of a new, undefined actual-taxes-paid standard in rate cases.

16           The Commission’s interpretation of SB 408 was incorrect. First, as the Commission  
17 acknowledges in the Rate Order, the addition of the word “fair” to the pre-existing “just and  
18 reasonable” standard did nothing other than exactly conform the language of ORS 757.210 to  
19 the Commission’s pre-existing rate standard. Rate Order at 17 (“[W]e have always been  
20 required to establish fair and reasonable rates.”); *see also In re PacifiCorp*, Order No. 05-  
21 1202 at 2-3 (citing numerous orders and statutes (before and after the passage of SB 408) that  
22 require the Commission to set rates that are “fair, just and reasonable”; observing that the  
23 “fair, just and reasonable standard” is “commonly referred to as the ‘just and reasonable  
24 standard,’” such that the express inclusion or omission of the word “fair” is insignificant).

25           Second, the Commission incorrectly relied on section 2(1)(f) of SB 408’s preamble as  
26 the basis for its conclusion that SB 408 mandated an immediate change to the calculation of  
taxes in base rates. *See* Rate Order at 17 (“In interpreting this language [section 2(1)(f)], we

1 believe we are required to consider taxes paid to governmental units when setting rates for  
2 PacifiCorp in this docket.”). A legislative finding in a preamble cannot create rights or  
3 obligations not otherwise found in the statute. *Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson*, 183 Or 305, 193  
4 P2d 543 (1948).

5 Third, the Commission improperly focused on only one section of the preamble,  
6 instead of reading the findings as a whole. ORS 174.010; *Curly’s Dairy, Inc. v. State Dept.*  
7 *of Agriculture*, 244 Or 15, 21, 415 P2d 740 (1966) (improper to read one statement in  
8 findings in vacuum, without guidance of statute as whole). The Commission disregarded the  
9 legislative findings, which expressly acknowledge the current ratemaking practice of setting  
10 the tax expense in rates on a stand-alone basis—without in any way suggesting that this  
11 practice be discontinued—and the fact that ratemaking process can result in taxes being  
12 collected in rates that are not paid. *See* SB 408 § 2(1)(c), (e) (“The Public Utility  
13 Commission permits a utility to include costs for taxes that assume the utility is not part of an  
14 affiliated group of corporations for tax purposes”; “[T]he ratemaking process may result in  
15 collecting taxes from ratepayers that are not paid to units of government.”). When the  
16 sections of the preamble are read together as required, it is clear that they simply provide the  
17 justification for the automatic adjustment clause contained in SB 408, rather than impliedly  
18 mandating an immediate change in the calculation of tax expense in base rates.

19 Fourth, the legislative history of SB 408 (which had not been compiled at the time of  
20 the Rate Order) contains no support for the Rate Order’s finding that the inclusion of the  
21 word “fair” in ORS 757.210 required an immediate change in the Commission’s standard for  
22 calculation of tax expense in base rates. Indeed, the legislative history demonstrates the  
23 exact opposite. Representative Brian Boquist carried SB 408 on the House floor and  
24 unequivocally stated that the bill did “not change the original ratemaking process.”

25 Statement of Rep. Brian Boquist, House of Representatives Chamber Session, July 30, 2005.

26

1 The proponents of SB 408 campaigned for its passage on the basis that it adopted only an  
2 automatic adjustment clause and did not change utility ratemaking or tax policy:

3 “[T]here have been serious misrepresentations about SB 408-C.  
4 Yet the effect of the bill is very straightforward: utilities will  
5 have to report how much they have collected in taxes and they  
6 will have to report how much they paid in taxes. If there’s a  
7 difference between the two amounts of more than \$100,000,  
8 there will have to be a true up. That’s it. Nothing in utility  
9 ratemaking is changed. Nothing in tax policy is changed.

10 “\* \* \* \* \*

11 “The bill could have fundamentally changed tax policy  
12 or ratemaking. The bill could have done many things that  
13 could be labeled extreme. But SB 408-C is very moderate in  
14 its approach \* \* \*”

15 Statement of CUB/ICNU regarding SB 408, Exhibit PPL/1704.

16 The legislative history of SB 408 also reveals the real reason for the addition of the  
17 word “fair” to ORS 757.210: to ensure that SB 408 was read in conjunction with  
18 ORS 756.040, which protects utilities against rate reductions that violate the *Hope* standard.  
19 *See* Statement of Deputy Attorney General Peter Shepherd, SB 408 Work Session, House  
20 State and Federal Affairs Committee, July 15, 2005 (“[The] PUC cannot allow the  
21 adjustment if it would result in a rate which is not fair, just and reasonable, as the terms of  
22 the total rate. So, that there would be an upward limitation, as well as a downward  
23 limitation.”); *see also* Statement of Rep. Tom Butler, SB 408 Work Session, House State and  
24 Federal Affairs Committee, July 15, 2005 (“fair, just and reasonable” language “attempts to  
25 make [the adjustment] both symmetrical, as well as nonconfiscatory and in that regard  
26 completely constitutional”); Statement of Rep. Tom Butler, House Chamber Session, July 30,  
2005 (“The bill’s current proponents contend that the trigger to stop the downward spiral was  
that the rates must be fair, just and equitable—fair, just and reasonable.”); Statement of  
Rep. Robert Ackerman, House Chamber Session, July 30, 2005 (“I conclude that the ‘fair,

1 just and reasonable’ standard and the limited use of the automatic adjustment clause satisfies  
2 constitutional requirements. Now that is from our Legislative Council.”); Written testimony  
3 of Deputy Attorney General Peter Shepherd, SB 408 Work Session, House State and Federal  
4 Affairs Committee, June 30, 2005 (describing “fair, just and reasonable” language as  
5 providing protection against *Hope* violation). The Attorney General’s opinion has confirmed  
6 the applicability of ORS 756.040 to SB 408, consistent with this legislative history. Op Atty  
7 Gen at 16 (Dec. 17, 2005).

8 Fifth, the Commission’s construction of SB 408 undermines SB 408’s express  
9 directives, which allow tax adjustments through an automatic adjustment clause, subject to  
10 various safeguards and limitations. Automatic adjustment clause rate changes under  
11 section 3 of SB 408 are not applicable to small energy utilities or water utilities, require  
12 adjustments to the computation of “taxes” and “taxes paid” to retain certain tax incentives for  
13 investors, and provide a safety net against normalization violations and material adverse  
14 impacts. The fact that these safeguards and limitations expressly apply only to an automatic  
15 adjustment clause rate change under section 3 of the bill, and not to a change to base rates  
16 under section 5, is additional evidence that the legislature never contemplated that the  
17 Commission would make base rate changes under section 5.

18 **3. SB 408 Only Applies to Taxes After 2006, and in This Case, the**  
19 **Commission Applied It to a Case with a Rate Effective Date in 2005.**

20 By its terms, SB 408’s automatic adjustment clause applies only to taxes collected in  
21 rates and taxes paid after January 1, 2006. *See* SB 408 § 4(2). Information on 2006 taxes  
22 collected and paid will not be available until 2007. For this reason, parties to the SB 408  
23 rulemaking, AR 499, all agreed that the SB 408 tax reports filed in 2005 and 2006—which  
24 contain pre-2006 data—“are for the sole purpose of determining whether there is a trigger for  
25 the automatic adjustment clause, not to support a rate change.” *See* ICNU Exh. 600,  
26 Department of Justice letter to AR 499 participants (Oct. 7, 2005). The result of this

1 consensus interpretation is that the automatic adjustment clauses mandated by SB 408 will  
2 not result in rate changes until after the 2007 tax report, more than two years after the date of  
3 the Rate Order. The two-year-plus lag between the rate adjustment in this case and the  
4 commencement of rate adjustments under SB 408's automatic adjustment clause confirms  
5 the premature and unjustified application of SB 408 in this case.

6 Because the Rate Order adjusted pre-2006 rates based on pre-2006 data, the Rate  
7 Order violates section 4(2) of SB 408. Intervenors may argue that section 4 technically  
8 applies only to an automatic adjustment clause rate change under section 3 of SB 408 and is  
9 inapplicable to a general rate change allegedly authorized under section 5. Such an argument  
10 has broad potential implications, however, because it suggests that none of the other express  
11 limitations of SB 408 would apply to a general rate change under section 5, including  
12 protection against normalization violations and inapplicability to water utilities and small  
13 energy utilities. Even if the Commission accepts this argument and concludes that it has  
14 essentially limitless authority under section 5 of SB 408 to apply an actual-taxes standard to  
15 any utility at any time in any manner, it should defer to the clear statement of legislative  
16 policy embedded in section 4 that rate changes under SB 408 not occur until after 2006 tax  
17 data becomes available.

18 **4. The Commission Cannot Apply SB 408 or Its Principles in General Rate**  
19 **Cases Until It Adopts Application Standards.**

20 The Commission's application of SB 408 in this case was unlawful because it  
21 predated the adoption of standards and rules for SB 408's application. SB 408 is not a self-  
22 implementing piece of legislation, as has been made clear by the complexity and length of  
23 the AR 499 rulemaking process, now moving into its ninth month. This fact was also an  
24 express finding of the Attorney General's opinion on SB 408, in its conclusion that the term  
25 "properly attributed" is a delegative term. *See Op Atty Gen at 8 (Dec. 17, 2005).* A  
26 delegative term is an incomplete expression of legislative policy that the agency is authorized



1 to complete. *Id.* at 4. The Commission has not yet defined “properly attributed.” Without  
2 this definition, the proper scope of attribution to a utility of tax benefits from unregulated  
3 entities in the utility’s consolidated group under SB 408—the precise issue in this case—  
4 remains unknown.

5       Until the Commission adopts SB 408 application standards, it cannot apply SB 408 or  
6 its principles in a general rate case. *Trebesch v. Employment Division*, 300 Or 264, 270, 710  
7 P2d 136 (1985) (prior rulemaking required before policymaking term in statute is applied in a  
8 contested case hearing); *Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners*, 288 Or 293, 304-16, 605 P2d  
9 273 (1980) (implied legislative intent that terms delegating policymaking discretion be  
10 explained by rule, not by contested case hearing); *Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Or. Liquor*  
11 *Contr. Comm’n*, 16 Or App 63, 70, 517 P2d 289 (1973) (“A legislative delegation of power  
12 in broad statutory language \* \* \* places upon the administrative agency a responsibility to  
13 establish standards by which the law is to be applied” before applying that statute.); *Forelaws*  
14 *on Board v. Energy Facility Siting Council*, 306 Or 205, 214, 760 P2d 212 (1988) (statutes  
15 that give an agency broad authority to set policies create “a strong inference of legislative  
16 intent that the agency exercise its policymaking in rulemaking proceedings rather than in the  
17 course of deciding contested cases”).

18       In the Rate Order, the Commission “agree[d] with PacifiCorp that [it] must follow  
19 [its] own rules.” Rate Order at 18. This means that the Commission cannot jettison its  
20 historical stand-alone rule<sup>2</sup> until it completes the SB 408 rulemaking to define its new  
21 approach to reflecting utility tax expenses in rates, including the meaning of the delegative  
22 term “properly attributed.”

23       Under Oregon law, an agency is bound by its established rules and policies until it  
24 changes them pursuant to procedures required by the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act

25

---

26       <sup>2</sup> See *supra* note 1.

1 (the “APA”). *Burke v. Children’s Serv. Div.*, 288 Or 533, 538, 607 P2d 141 (1980) (agency  
2 rules are binding on an agency until repealed according to the procedures required by the  
3 APA); *Vier ex rel Torry v. State Office for Serv. to Children and Families*, 159 Or App 369,  
4 374-75, 977 P2d 425 (1999) (once an agency has adopted policy through a rulemaking, it  
5 must use rulemaking to refine that rule); *Harsh Inv. Corp. v. State*, 88 Or App 151, 157, 744  
6 P2d 588 (1988) (“Whether or not an agency is *required* to adopt rules, when it has authority  
7 to adopt them and does so, it must follow them.”). *See also Attorney General’s*  
8 *Administrative Law Manual* at 9 (2004).

9 “Once an agency has adopted a rule, the agency is bound to  
10 follow its terms. Moreover, an agency policy or practice that  
11 meets the definition of a rule but is not in the form of a written  
12 rule or has not been promulgated according to the APA is,  
nevertheless, binding on the agency until it is declared invalid  
by a court or until it is amended or repealed by the agency in  
accordance with proper rulemaking procedures.”

13 *Id.* (footnotes omitted).

14 Even if SB 408 had expressly directed the Commission to change its approach to  
15 setting tax expense in base rates, the Commission would still be bound by the practices and  
16 policies declared by its rules until it changed the existing rules pursuant to the procedures  
17 required by the APA. *Vier ex rel Torry*, 159 Or App at 374-75 (“[A]n agency remains bound  
18 by the practices and policies declared by its rules, even in the face of newly enacted  
19 legislation changing the agency’s responsibilities, unless and until existing practices and  
20 rules are judicially declared invalid or are changed by the agency pursuant to formal  
21 rulemaking procedures.”); *City of Klamath Falls v. Environmental Quality Comm’n*, 318  
22 Or 532, 545 870 P2d 825 (1994) (agency authority “may be circumscribed by the agency’s  
23 own regulations”).

24 Application of SB 408 in this case, before the promulgation of implementation rules,  
25 was impermissible guesswork on the part of the Commission. It was also prejudicial to  
26 PacifiCorp because, among other things, it has decreased cash flows and earnings and caused

1 a rating agency downgrade—matters that cannot easily be remedied if it turns out the  
2 Commission’s guesswork was wrong.

3 **5. To Apply SB 408 in This Case, the Commission Had to Forecast Tax**  
4 **Expense Under SB 408, Which It Cannot or Should Not Do.**

5 The premise of SB 408, which is that a backward-looking automatic adjustment  
6 clause is the means by which actual taxes and taxes in rates are trued up and aligned, is  
7 inconsistent with the Commission’s decision here forecasting such an adjustment in base  
8 rates. The plain language of SB 408 requires the Commission to adjust rates to align “taxes  
9 collected” with “taxes paid” based on historical, not forecasted, data. The backward-looking  
10 nature of SB 408 adjustments is particularly apparent from the definition of “taxes paid,” a  
11 term that appears throughout the Act. Section 3(13)(f) of SB 408 defines “taxes paid” as  
12 follows:

13 “‘Taxes paid’ means amounts *received* by units of government  
14 from the utility or from the affiliated group of which the utility  
is a member, whichever is applicable, adjusted as follows:

15 “(A) Increased by the amount of tax savings *realized* as  
16 a result of charitable contribution deductions *allowed* because  
of charitable contributions made by the utility;

17 “(B) Increased by the amount of tax savings *realized* as  
18 a result of tax credits associated with investment by the utility  
19 in the regulated operations of the utility, to the extent the  
20 expenditures giving rise to the tax credits and tax savings  
resulting from the tax credits have not been taken into account  
by the commission in the utility’s last general ratemaking  
proceeding; and

21 “(C) Adjusted by deferred taxes related to the regulated  
22 operations of the utility.” (Emphasis added.)

23 If the legislature had intended the Commission to base adjustments on forward-  
24 looking estimates, as opposed to actual historical data, it would not have directed the  
25 Commission to determine “taxes paid” by looking at amounts “received” by the government,  
26 adjusted for tax savings “realized.” It would have been a simple matter for the legislature to

1 say “taxes that will be paid,” “rates that will be collected,” “amounts that will be received,”  
2 and “tax savings that will be realized,” but it did not. Likewise, if the legislature had  
3 intended the Commission to base adjustments on forward-looking estimates, it would not  
4 have required utilities to report actual tax payments. *See* SB 408 § 3(1)(a) (requiring utilities  
5 to report tax payments for the prior three years “without regard to the tax year for which the  
6 taxes were paid”); *id.* § 3(13)(f) (defining “taxes paid” as “amounts *received* by units of  
7 government” (emphasis added)).

8 Even if the Commission had discretion to use forecasted data under SB 408 in a rate  
9 case, as a policy matter it should refrain from doing so given the associated complexities,  
10 inaccuracies, and potential for selective and unfair application. The participants in AR 499,  
11 which include utilities, customer groups, and Staff, agreed that, whether or not SB 408 allows  
12 the Commission to use forecasted data for the automatic adjustment clause, as a policy matter  
13 the Commission should base SB 408 adjustments on historical data only. *See* ICNU  
14 Exh. 600. The same policy concerns that informed this consensus position apply to the use  
15 of forecasted data to make an SB 408 adjustment in a general rate case and militate against  
16 such a practice. This is especially true because the presence of the automatic adjustment  
17 clause makes such rate case estimates fundamentally unnecessary to effectuate the policy of  
18 SB 408.

19 **B. Assume That the Commission Could Apply SB 408 or “Its Principles” to This**  
20 **Docket. How Should SB 408 or “Its Principles” Be Applied?**

21 **1. The Commission’s Application of SB 408 (or Its Principles) Must Be**  
22 **Supported by Substantial Evidence Demonstrating That It Is Necessary**  
**to Align Taxes Collected with Taxes Actually Received by Government.**

23 As articulated in the Attorney General’s opinion, “the general policy of [SB 408] is to  
24 more closely align taxes collected by a regulated utility from its ratepayers with taxes  
25 received by units of government.” Op Atty Gen at 2 (Dec. 27, 2005). The Attorney  
26 General’s opinion also made clear that the Commission’s discretion in interpreting SB 408 is

1 not “unfettered,” but is bounded by the need to effectuate the policy of aligning paid taxes  
2 with taxes collected. *Id.* at 11-12. Thus, the Commission has no authority under SB 408 to  
3 make a tax adjustment unless substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that it is necessary to  
4 align taxes collected with actual taxes paid. *See* ORS 183.482(8)(c) (“The court shall set  
5 aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in  
6 the record.”). For this reason, the Commission may not selectively attribute unregulated tax  
7 benefits to the utility under SB 408 in a manner inconsistent with the complete picture of  
8 how the utility or its consolidated group actually pays taxes. *See Younger v. City of*  
9 *Portland*, 305 Or 346, 360, 752 P2d 262 (1988) (substantial evidence standard requires a  
10 review of the evidence as a whole, not just specific evidence in isolation).

11 The record in this case is insufficient to meet this standard. The Commission  
12 concluded that the “PHI tax benefit is a constant that SB 408 requires to be passed on to  
13 customers,” but did not support this ruling with the required factual determination, supported  
14 by substantial evidence, that lowering rates by the amount of the PHI tax benefit was  
15 necessary to align taxes collected and taxes paid. Rate Order at 19. Such a ruling would  
16 need to define and identify “taxes collected,” “taxes paid,” and taxes “properly attributed” to  
17 the utility, and consider actual taxes paid at PHI, including SB 408-recognized add-backs for  
18 tax settlement payments, deferred tax offsets, and charitable contributions.

19 Without such findings, SB 408 cannot be invoked as the authority for the adjustment.  
20 This is especially true given the evidence that PacifiCorp had significant taxes-paid add-  
21 backs that fully or partially offset the PHI tax deduction. Looking to Fiscal Year (“FY”)  
22 2005, for example, PHI’s tax settlement payments to the IRS absorbed a significant portion  
23 of the PHI tax benefit (\$70 million of the \$160 million, or almost 50%). PPL/1303, Martin/3.  
24 Additionally, PacifiCorp had Oregon deferred taxes of \$44 million. *Id.* The Commission  
25 recently reported that, “[u]nder the Temporary Rules, [it] observed the following about taxes  
26 paid and taxes collected for 2004: PacifiCorp: ‘Taxes paid exceeded taxes collected in rates

1 by \$8,183,784. \* \* \*” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, AR 499, Fiscal and Economic  
2 Impact, Including Statement of Cost of Compliance (Apr. 10, 2006).

3 The Commission impliedly acknowledged the lack of substantial evidence for its  
4 adjustment, confessing that the tax adjustment was “not precise” and was “the best [the  
5 Commission could] do under present circumstances,” and that “it was not possible to know  
6 what PacifiCorp (or its affiliated group) will pay [in taxes] each year.” Rate Order at 19.  
7 SB 408 does not authorize one-off tax adjustments in this manner divorced from substantial  
8 evidence about how the adjustment will align rates with actual taxes paid. Without the  
9 requisite record, the Commission could not make the SB 408 adjustment in this case.

10 **2. The Evidence Presented Shows That, in Calendar Year 2006,**  
11 **PacifiCorp’s New Affiliated Group Will Pay to Units of Government Far**  
**More Than PacifiCorp’s Stand-Alone Tax Expense.**

12 On reconsideration, PacifiCorp conclusively demonstrated that the PHI tax benefit  
13 will not lower PacifiCorp’s 2006 actual taxes paid for several reasons, the most important  
14 being that PHI ceased to be PacifiCorp’s holding company on March 21, 2006, when  
15 MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company (“MEHC”) purchased PacifiCorp. PPL/1703,  
16 Larson/3. PacifiCorp’s new consolidated tax group, Berkshire Hathaway, will pay far more  
17 in taxes for 2006 (and beyond) than PacifiCorp will collect on a stand-alone basis.  
18 PPL/1304, Martin/4. As a part of Berkshire Hathaway’s projected \$3 billion tax return,  
19 PacifiCorp expects to pay to the government every tax dollar collected from Oregon  
20 customers in 2006. Tr. at 35. Because of this change of circumstance, PacifiCorp’s tax  
21 liability calculated on a stand-alone basis is now clearly the most accurate estimate of actual  
22 taxes PacifiCorp will pay in 2006.

23 While advocating for an actual tax standard, intervenors have urged the Commission  
24 to disregard PacifiCorp’s evidence on reconsideration of its projected 2006 tax liability,  
25 updated to include changes associated with MEHC’s purchase of PacifiCorp. The  
26

1 Commission should reject the position of the intervenors and consider this evidence for the  
2 following reasons:

- 3       •       The change in PacifiCorp ownership is an undisputed, permanent change,  
4               different in kind from the usual known and measurable cost- or revenue-  
5               related change in a rate case.
- 6       •       The change in PacifiCorp ownership was authorized by and is a result of an  
7               intervening Commission order. *See In re MEHC*, Order No. 06-082, *amended*  
8               *by* Order No. 06-121 (2006).
- 9       •       The basis of the Rate Order was that the PHI tax benefit was a “constant” that  
10              SB 408 required be passed on to customers. Rate Order at 19. The change in  
11              PacifiCorp ownership eliminating the PHI tax benefit negates a fundamental  
12              premise of the Rate Order.
- 13      •       Similarly, the Rate Order was expressly designed to limit the amounts that  
14              will flow through the automatic adjustment clause associated with the PHI tax  
15              benefit. *Id.* With the change in ownership and the elimination of the PHI tax  
16              benefit, this rationale for reducing PacifiCorp’s rates is no longer valid.
- 17      •       According to Industrial Customers of Northwest Utilities (“ICNU”) witness  
18              James Selecky, the PHI tax benefit from what he called the “PHI tax  
19              minimization structure” came from an inter-company loan. ICNU/200,  
20              Selecky/17, Tr. 72. Mr. Selecky testified that the PHI structure was a  
21              “unique,” “one-of-a-kind” structure that he had never seen replicated  
22              elsewhere. ICNU/211, Selecky/6, Tr. 73. Mr. Selecky acknowledged that  
23              there was no equivalent tax structure in place under PacifiCorp’s new  
24              ownership. *Id.*
- 25      •       PacifiCorp’s new ownership structure is materially different from its old  
26              structure. PacifiCorp’s new immediate parent company, PPW Holdings LLC,

1 has no debt. PPL/1304, Martin/3. PPW Holdings LLC was capitalized with  
2 \$5.1 billion of equity issued to MEHC; MEHC in turn issued \$5.1 billion of  
3 equity to its shareholders, \$5.07 billion of which was issued to Berkshire  
4 Hathaway. Berkshire Hathaway provided all of its capital from cash and cash  
5 equivalents. *Id.* at 4.

- 6 • In his testimony, Mr. Selecky's only basis for suggesting that PacifiCorp's  
7 ownership change will not affect PacifiCorp's 2006 actual taxes paid was his  
8 argument that MEHC has debt levels equivalent to PHI's. Tr. 67-68. On  
9 cross-examination, however, Mr. Selecky admitted that the relevant analysis  
10 would be debt levels in the Berkshire Hathaway group because it, and not  
11 MEHC, was the consolidated taxpayer. Tr. 68-69. Mr. Selecky explained that  
12 "you'd have to follow the MEHC capital structure in through the Berkshire  
13 total consolidated return," and that "you got to look at the total" consolidated  
14 tax return, not just MEHC. Tr. 70-71.
- 15 • Mr. Selecky acknowledged that if equity exceeded debt in the Berkshire  
16 Hathaway group, it would be a "significant change" from the PHI situation.  
17 Tr. 70. In fact, Berkshire Hathaway's latest published audited financial filing,  
18 its 10K for 2005, shows cash and cash equivalents of approximately  
19 \$45 billion and notes and others borrowings of approximately \$(14) billion.  
20 PPL/1304, Martin/4. Interest, dividend, and other investment income was  
21 approximately \$5 billion while interest expense was less than \$1 billion. *Id.*  
22 Thus, unlike PHI, Berkshire Hathaway has no net debt. *Id.*

23 For all of these reasons, it is clear that PacifiCorp's ownership change is relevant  
24 evidence that the Commission should consider in reviewing the proper application of SB 408  
25 to this case. The ownership change ensures that PacifiCorp, through its new consolidated  
26 group, will pay its stand-alone taxes to units of government in 2006. Now that concerns



1 about the PHI tax benefit lowering PacifiCorp's actual taxes paid are moot, PacifiCorp's tax  
2 expense in rates should be restored to its full stand-alone level. *See In re PacifiCorp*, Docket  
3 No. UE-050684 at 58-59 (Apr. 17, 2006) (rejecting ICNU's PHI-related tax adjustment on  
4 the basis that PacifiCorp's change in corporate ownership rendered the tax adjustment moot.)

5           **3. At Most, the Commission Should Have Disallowed Only \$0.66 Million of**  
6           **PacifiCorp's Tax Expense.**

7           For all of the reasons outlined above, PacifiCorp does not believe that any tax  
8 adjustment in this case is warranted. If the Commission persists in applying such an  
9 adjustment, however, under SB 408 it must use the most accurate and up-to-date information  
10 possible to ensure that the adjustment comes as close as possible to projecting actual taxes  
11 that PacifiCorp will pay in 2006. *See Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Public Service*  
12 *Comm'n*, 380 A2d 126, 139 (DC App 1977) (finding reversible error when commission  
13 refused to take proper cognizance of certain known changes that occurred after the originally  
14 proposed test period). PacifiCorp has demonstrated the need for several corrections and  
15 updates to the Commission's original adjustment on this basis.

16           First, the Commission should use relative taxable income as the allocation factor for  
17 determining PacifiCorp's share of any PHI tax benefit. Based on PHI's most recent tax  
18 return, FY 2005, this allocation percentage should be 50%. PPL/1304, Martin/5; PPL/1305.  
19 The Rate Order incorrectly allocated the tax benefit using PacifiCorp's estimated  
20 contribution to the "gross profits" of the PHI consolidated group for FY 2005, which was  
21 91.5%. Rate Order at 14. The Rate Order implies that taxable income is the appropriate  
22 allocation factor, however, because it justifies the use of a gross profits approach as a closer  
23 surrogate to taxable income than the assets approach suggested by ICNU. *Id.* at 18. Use of  
24 relative taxable income is consistent with the Commission's Temporary Rule for tax reports  
25 under SB 408, which allocated based on tax liability. OAR 860-022-0039(2)(d)(B). Tax  
26 liability is the product of taxable income and the applicable tax rate.

1 Second, PacifiCorp has submitted evidence that the interest rate on the PHI debt was  
2 reduced as of September 22, 2005 from 6.75% to 4.98%. This lowered PHI's interest  
3 payments from \$160 million annually (the amount assumed in the Rate Order) to  
4 \$136 million, or approximately \$34 million per quarter. PPL/1304, Martin/2, 8.

5 Third, PacifiCorp has submitted evidence that ScottishPower has paid taxes at a 30%  
6 rate under the UK Finance Act of 2005 on all interest payments it received from PHI,  
7 offsetting a significant portion of the PHI tax benefit assumed in the Rate Order. PPL/1303,  
8 Martin/4. While the Rate Order concluded that the PHI interest deduction reduced the tax  
9 liability of PacifiCorp's corporate family by 37.95%, the actual net reduction was only 7.95%  
10 because of ScottishPower's UK tax liability. *Id.* This reduces the tax adjustment by  
11 \$40.8 million annually, or approximately \$10.3 million a quarter.

12 Fourth, as discussed above, PHI ceased to exist as PacifiCorp's parent as of  
13 March 21, 2006. If the tax adjustment is not eliminated on this basis, it should be reduced to  
14 one-fourth of the test year total.

15 Combining these adjustments by using actual calendar year 2006 interest rates, offsets  
16 for tax liability associated with the interest, and considering the first quarter interest payment  
17 only would result in an adjustment of approximately \$0.40 million on an Oregon-allocated  
18 basis, which is approximately \$0.66 million on a grossed-up basis. These figures are derived  
19 as follows: ((PHI interest deduction based on first quarter payment only \* combined U.S.  
20 effective tax rate) - (PHI interest deduction based on first quarter payment only \* UK tax  
21 rate)) \* percentage of PHI group taxable income from PacifiCorp \* Oregon allocation factor  
22 on an SNP basis \* tax gross-up factor = adjustment to revenue requirement. In numeric  
23 form, the calculation is as follows: ((\$34.357m \* 37.95%) - (\$34.357m \* 30%)) \* 50.3095%  
24 \* 28.8723% = \$0.40m \* 1.657 = \$0.66m. PPL/1304, Martin/9-10.

25

26

1 C. **Did the \$16.07 Million Tax Adjustment Result in Rates Violative of  
ORS 756.040?**

2

3 The rate adjustment in this case violates SB 408's "Fair, Just and Reasonable"  
4 standard. The adjustment violates the requirements set forth in ORS 756.040(1) of "fair and  
5 reasonable" rates. As interpreted by the Attorney General, ORS 756.040 "limits utilities'  
6 exposure to rate reductions" under SB 408, regardless of how the Commission applies the  
7 bill. Op Atty Gen at 16-17. The inquiry focuses on the total effect of the rate order, rather  
8 than the ratemaking method used. *Id.* at 16 n 4 (quoting *Duquesne Light Company v.*  
9 *Barasch*, 488 US 299, 307, 109 S Ct 609, 102 L Ed 2d 646 (1989)). However, an  
10 asymmetrical approach to ratemaking raises "serious constitutional concerns." *Id.* These  
11 heightened constitutional concerns are present here, given the fact that the tax adjustment in  
12 this case unquestionably violates the ratemaking matching principle. *See* Tr. 84-86  
13 (Mr. Selecky's testimony acknowledging that the matching principle, providing the benefits  
14 of the expense or investment to the party who bore the costs or risks, is a "general theme of  
15 ratemaking," and admitting that the adjustment in this case is contrary to that principle).

16 As a result of the Rate Order, PacifiCorp will have no reasonable opportunity to earn  
17 the stipulated and approved return on equity ("ROE") of 10%. PPL/317, Williams/2. The  
18 tax adjustment reduces PacifiCorp's ROE by 160 basis points to 8.4%, just barely above the  
19 weighted average cost of capital set in this case. The reduced ROE results from the fact that  
20 the Rate Order imputes a reduction in PacifiCorp tax expense of \$16.07 million that is  
21 inconsistent with the fact that PacifiCorp will incur its full stand-alone tax expense in 2006.  
22 PPL/324, Williams/3.

23 An 8.4% ROE is far below the US industry average of 11.3% for the 12 months  
24 ending September 30, 2005. *Id.* Thus, an effective ROE of 8.4% is not commensurate with  
25 returns on investment in other enterprises having corresponding risk. *Southern Bell Tel. &*  
26 *Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n*, 239 La 175, 227-28, 118 So 2d 372 (1960) (a

1 utility was entitled to a return on its rate base and its equity capital comparable to that  
2 realized by other utilities).

3       Such a return, 160 basis points lower than the lowest ROE recommendation in the  
4 case (by ICNU/CUB and Staff), is confiscatory and in violation of constitutional and  
5 statutory requirements. *See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n*, 202  
6 Tenn 465, 482, 302 SW 2d 640 (1957) (“the rates prescribed by the Commission do not  
7 produce the rate of return on the adjusted net investment rate base which the Commission  
8 itself found was necessary.”).

9       PacifiCorp’s recent financial results provide no headroom for it to absorb the  
10 aberrantly low effective ROE set in this case. PacifiCorp’s most recent semi-annual earnings  
11 report showed its unadjusted ROE to be 7.07% and its adjusted ROE to be 6.895%.  
12 PPL/317, Williams/3. These results place PacifiCorp 45th out of 48 utilities listed with  
13 measurable returns in a January 2006 Regulatory Research Associates ranking of industry  
14 equity returns. *Id.* PacifiCorp’s financial ratios for the last five years compared to the  
15 industry average and to the reference group it uses for cost-of-capital purposes demonstrate  
16 that PacifiCorp has significantly under performed in every year relative to both comparators.  
17 Exhibit PPL/320.

18       In addition to the immediate impact of the Rate Order resulting in underearnings, the  
19 tax expense adjustment has also led to a deterioration of PacifiCorp’s credit rating. On  
20 January 31, 2006, Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”) lowered PacifiCorp’s credit rating on senior  
21 unsecured debt to “BBB+” from “A-,” expressly noting “the unfavorable final order issued  
22 September 2005 by the Oregon commission in PPW’s general rate case.” PPL/317,  
23 Williams/6. Fitch continued that “the Oregon Public Utilities Commission’s September 2005  
24 order incorporating recently enacted tax legislation (Senate Bill 408) in PPW’s Oregon GRC  
25 is a serious matter for concern in Fitch’s view.” PPL/321 at 1-2.

26

1 Other credit rating agencies have expressed similar concerns about the Rate Order  
2 and the application of SB 408. Shortly after the Rate Order was issued, Standard & Poors  
3 (“S&P”) published a note stating that “the ruling is adverse for credit quality,” and warned  
4 about future rating action related to the disallowance. Exh. PPL/322 at 1. More recently,  
5 S&P described the “difficult regulatory environment” created in Oregon by SB 408.  
6 PPL/325. Moody’s has warned that the outcome of rehearing in this case is an issue that  
7 could affect future credit quality. Exh. PPL/327. In early March, Fitch reiterated its  
8 concerns that a key credit concern for PacifiCorp is the adverse tax ruling in this case  
9 associated with SB 408. PPL/326. Concerns regarding the impact of the Rate Order on  
10 PacifiCorp have also been raised by Barclay’s Bank, JP Morgan, and BNP Paribas, all of  
11 which have substantial financial commitments to PacifiCorp. PPL/317, Williams/7.

12 All of this evidence demonstrates that, in Oregon, a regulatory environment in which  
13 PacifiCorp’s ROE has been held to levels that are consistently on the low end of the industry  
14 average ranges, the Commission does not have the ability to aggressively impute away  
15 PacifiCorp’s tax expense without immediately running afoul of ORS 756.040. *See* Op Atty  
16 Gen at 16 n 4 (whether the rate satisfies ORS 756.040 depends on what a fair rate of return is  
17 given the risks of a particular rate-setting system).

18 **D. What Is the Appropriate Remedy If the Commission Should Determine to**  
19 **Modify the Revenue Requirement from the Original Order?**

20 The Commission should grant PacifiCorp’s request for deferred accounting and  
21 permit PacifiCorp to recoup its lost revenues associated with the tax adjustment.  
22 Concurrently with the filing of its Reconsideration Application in this case, PacifiCorp filed  
23 an application for deferred accounting, docketed as UM 1229. PacifiCorp filed this  
24 application to permit the Commission to grant PacifiCorp recovery of its lost revenues if the  
25 tax adjustment was vacated or modified on rehearing.

26

1 The suspension period in this case made rates effective in early October 2005. By  
2 granting reconsideration and seeking additional evidence on SB 408 in this case, the  
3 Commission has effectively extended the rate suspension period on this issue. Although  
4 PacifiCorp agrees that a rehearing process is necessary in this case, it should not come at  
5 PacifiCorp's expense. Granting deferred accounting is required to allow the Commission to  
6 address SB 408 application in this case in a manner that is full, orderly, and revenue neutral  
7 to PacifiCorp. *See In re PacifiCorp*, Docket No. UE 170, Staff's Post-Hearing Reply Brief  
8 at 6 (Aug. 12, 2005) (arguing that Commission should establish deferred account for  
9 PacifiCorp's tax expense so that it can address SB 408 in an orderly manner).

10 The revenues associated with the tax adjustment are material, amounting to  
11 approximately \$500,000 a week since September 28, 2005. PPL/1702, Larson/6. PacifiCorp  
12 has no ability to recoup the lost tax revenues in 2005 through the automatic adjustment  
13 clause and would need to wait approximately two years before it could hope to recoup its lost  
14 revenues for 2006. *Id.*

15 Deferred accounting is necessary to properly match costs borne by and benefits  
16 received by ratepayers as required by ORS 757.259. The use of identifiable tax expenses,  
17 calculated on a stand-alone basis—which as noted above is the most accurate estimate for  
18 PacifiCorp's 2006 actual tax expense—produces an appropriate match between costs borne  
19 by and benefits received by customers, because customers will be charged rates based on the  
20 stand-alone costs PacifiCorp will incur in providing its regulated service.

21 The magnitude of the non-recovery associated with the denial of deferred accounting  
22 could affect PacifiCorp's credit rating, which has already suffered as a result of the Rate  
23 Order. Therefore, the Commission should exercise its broad discretion under  
24 ORS 757.259(2) to authorize a deferred account in this instance to provide PacifiCorp full  
25 recovery of its lost revenues. *See In re Investigation into Deferred Accounting*, Docket  
26 No. UM 1147, Order No. 05-1070 at 7 (Commission should look at the facts of each case and


1 allow deferred accounting if statutory requirements are satisfied and type and magnitude of  
2 event warrant deferred accounting).

3 **III. CONCLUSION**

4 For all of the reasons outlined above and in PacifiCorp's testimony and exhibits, the  
5 Commission should vacate or significantly reduce the tax adjustment contained in the Rate  
6 Order.

7 DATED: May 1, 2006.

8 STOEL RIVES LLP

9   
10 Sarah Adams Lien

11 Attorneys for PacifiCorp  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in Docket UE 170 on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below by email and first-class mail addressed to said person(s) at his or her last-known address(es) indicated below.

Rates & Regulatory Affairs  
Portland General Electric  
121 SW Salmon Street, 1WTC0702  
Portland, OR 97204  
[pge.opuc.filings@pgn.com](mailto:pge.opuc.filings@pgn.com)

Jim Abrahamson  
Community Action Directors  
of Oregon  
4035 12th Street Cutoff SE, Suite 110  
Salem, OR 97302  
[jim@cado-oregon.org](mailto:jim@cado-oregon.org)

Greg Addington  
Klamath Water Users Assoc.  
2455 Patterson Street, Suite 3  
Klamath Falls, OR 97603  
[greg@cvcwireless.net](mailto:greg@cvcwireless.net)

Edward Bartell  
Klamath Off-Project Water Users, Inc.  
30474 Sprague River Road  
Sprague River, OR 97639

Kurt Boehm  
Boehm Kurtz & Lowry  
36 E. Seventh Street, Suite 1510  
Cincinnati, OH 45202  
[kboehm@bkillawfirm.com](mailto:kboehm@bkillawfirm.com)

Lisa Brown  
WaterWatch of Oregon  
213 SW Ash Street, Suite 208  
Portland, OR 97204  
[lisa@waterwatch.org](mailto:lisa@waterwatch.org)

Lowrey R. Brown  
Citizens' Utility Board of Oregon  
610 SW Broadway, Suite 308  
Portland, OR 97205  
[lowrey@oregoncub.org](mailto:lowrey@oregoncub.org)

Phil Carver  
Oregon Office of Energy  
625 Marion Street NE, Suite 1  
Salem, OR 97301-3742  
[philip.h.carver@state.or.us](mailto:philip.h.carver@state.or.us)

John Corbett  
Yurok Tribe  
PO Box 1027  
Klamath, CA 95548  
[jcorbett@yuroktribe.nsn.us](mailto:jcorbett@yuroktribe.nsn.us)

Joan Cote  
Oregon Energy Coordinators Assoc.  
2585 State Street NE  
Salem, OR 97301  
[cotej@mwvcaa.org](mailto:cotej@mwvcaa.org)

Melinda J. Davison  
Davison Van Cleve, PC  
333 SW Taylor, Suite 400  
Portland, OR 97204  
[mail@dvclaw.com](mailto:mail@dvclaw.com)

John DeVoe  
WaterWatch of Oregon  
213 SW Ash Street, Suite 208  
Portland, OR 97204  
[john@waterwatch.org](mailto:john@waterwatch.org)



Jason Eisdorfer  
Citizens' Utility Board  
610 SW Broadway, Suite 308  
Portland, OR 97205  
[jason@oregoncub.org](mailto:jason@oregoncub.org)

Randall J. Falkenberg  
RFI Consulting  
PMB 362  
8351 Roswell Road  
Atlanta, GA 30350  
[consultrfi@aol.com](mailto:consultrfi@aol.com)

Edward Finklea  
Cable Huston Benedict Haagensen  
& Lloyd LLP  
1001 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000  
Portland, OR 97204  
[efinklea@chbh.com](mailto:efinklea@chbh.com)

David Hatton  
Department of Justice  
1162 Court Street NE  
Salem, OR 97301-4096  
[david.hatton@state.or.us](mailto:david.hatton@state.or.us)

Judy Johnson  
Public Utility Commission of Oregon  
PO Box 2148  
Salem, OR 97308-2148  
[judy.johnson@state.or.us](mailto:judy.johnson@state.or.us)

Jason W. Jones  
Department of Justice  
1162 Court Street NE  
Salem, OR 97301-4096  
[jason.w.jones@state.or.us](mailto:jason.w.jones@state.or.us)

Michael Kurtz  
Boehm, Kurtz & Lowry  
36 E. Seventh Street, Suite 1510  
Cincinnati, OH 45202-4454  
[mkurtz@bkllawfirm.com](mailto:mkurtz@bkllawfirm.com)

Jim McCarthy  
Oregon Natural Resources Council  
PO Box 151  
Ashland, OR 97520  
[jm@onrc.org](mailto:jm@onrc.org)

Bill McNamee  
Public Utility Commission of Oregon  
PO Box 2148  
Salem, OR 97308-2148  
[bill.mcnamee@state.or.us](mailto:bill.mcnamee@state.or.us)

Daniel W Meek  
Daniel W Meek Attorney at Law  
10949 SW 4th Ave  
Portland OR 97219  
[dan@meek.net](mailto:dan@meek.net)

Nancy Newell  
3917 NE Skidmore  
Portland OR 97211  
[ogec2@hotmail.com](mailto:ogec2@hotmail.com)

Michael W. Orcutt  
Hoopa Valley Tribe Fisheries Dept.  
PO Box 417  
Hoopa, CA 95546  
[director@pcweb.net](mailto:director@pcweb.net)

Stephen R. Palmer  
Office of the Regional Solicitor  
2800 Cottage Way, Rm. E-1712  
Sacramento, CA 95825

Steve Pedery  
Oregon Natural Resources Council  
[sp@onrc.org](mailto:sp@onrc.org)

Matthew Perkins  
Davison Van Cleve PC  
333 SW Taylor, Suite 400  
Portland, OR 97204  
[mwp@dvclaw.com](mailto:mwp@dvclaw.com)


Janet Prewitt  
Department of Justice  
[janet.prewitt@doj.state.or.us](mailto:janet.prewitt@doj.state.or.us)

1 Thomas P. Schlosser  
2 Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak  
3 & McGaw  
4 801 Second Avenue, Suite 1115  
5 Seattle, WA 98104-1509  
6 t.schlosser@msaj.com

Glen H. Spain  
PCFFA  
PO Box 11170  
Eugene, OR 97440-3370  
fishlifr@aol.com

5 Douglas Tingey  
6 Portland General Electric  
7 121 SW Salmon, 1WTC13  
8 Portland, OR 97204  
9 doug.tingey@pgn.com

10 DATED: May 1, 2006



Sarah J. Adams Lien

Of Attorneys for PacifiCorp